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Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Jennifer Bates 
The primary concern of the “Anthropology” section in Hegel’s Encyclopedia of 1830 is 
the relationship between soul and body: how the soul gains an immediate, bodily existence 
through embodiment, why and how this immediate mode of the soul’s bodily existence is 
precarious, and how the soul becomes second nature by overcoming the immediate, bodily 
existence through habit, more precisely. Importantly, the “Anthropology” is the place in Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia system where the Philosophy of Nature ends, and the Philosophy of Spirit begins. 
The thematization of the soul-body relationship in the “Anthropology” is thus essentially framed 
by a broader, systematic problem concerning the relationship between nature and spirit. What 
Hegel ultimately theorizes by thematizing the soul-body relationship, in other words, is how 
spirit emerges out of nature as spirit: how spirit appears in its submergence in and subordination 




naturalness. The goal of this dissertation is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
“Anthropology” section in Hegel’s Encyclopedia of 1830, spelling out its twofold concern, that 
is, the emergence of spirit out of nature through the soul-body relationship. It claims that the 
“Anthropology” does not simply thematize the soul-body relationship but conceptualizes a 
threefold complex consisting of soul, world, and body. It further reconstructs Hegel’s treatment 
of this ontological, existential complex in the Anthropology in terms of the dialectic of 










Foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my committee chair, Dr. Bates, for the 
continuous support of my dissertation research. She helped me complete this dissertation with 
her guidance, patience, and enthusiasm. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. 
Lampert and Prof. Gérard. Dr. Lampert promoted my research with critical and challenging 
questions. In an attempt to answer his questions, my dissertation became enriched and 
sophisticated. I am also ineffably indebted to my master advisor at the University of Louvain-la-
Neuve in Belgium, Prof. Gérard, for accepting to become a committee member of my 
dissertation. As a great Hegel scholar and a patient reader, he provided me with acute and 
profound questions, which greatly helped me do my research without losing my bearings in the 
deep forest of Hegel’s philosophy and grasp where I am, what I am doing, and where to I am 
heading in that forest. Beyond that, he is the greatest scholar, philosopher, and teacher I have 
ever met. He motivated me to keep pursuing my researches by being himself a knowledgeable, 
but diligent, earnest, open-minded, and humble scholar. What I learned and I am still learning 
from him is not only this and that piece of Hegel’s philosophy but more fundamentally what a 
philosopher or scholar should be like. If I did not realize that there cannot be any decisive right 
answer to any philosophical question, and if I did not learn from him that philosophy is nothing 
but a daily practice of thinking through and struggling with questions, I could not have even 
made up my mind to do PhD in philosophy.  
I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Polansky from Duquesne University and Prof. 
Sang-Hwan Kim from Seoul National University. Learning Aristotle’s philosophy and ancient 




fortunately gain during my PhD studies at Duquesne University. He kindly allowed me to attend 
his Greek reading group although I did not know even the Greek alphabet. I could not otherwise 
have dared to learn ancient Greek and read Aristotle in the original language. Were it not for his 
teachings and seminars, I would not have been able to write a single page on Aristotle in my 
dissertation. Also, he encouraged me to grow as a junior scholar with an ambitious and 
optimistic vision, providing me with practical advice on building up an academic career. Prof. 
Sang-Hwan Kim was my undergraduate and master advisor at Seoul National University in 
Korea. He is a knowledgeable, erudite, and enthusiastic scholar in contemporary French 
philosophy as well as German classic philosophy. Through his teachings, I was able to build up a 
wide and strong background knowledge about the history of western philosophy and develop my 
philosophical interests and intuitions. He gave me a full and firm support in numerous ways, 
encouraging me to pursue my studies freely and to develop my intuitions, introducing valuable 
resources to me, advising me to learn German, French and English, and recommending me 
experiencing European academia with Erasmus Mundus Master program. Without his support 
and the early process of my philosophical cultivation with him, I could not have become who I 
am now intellectually.  
I am also extremely thankful and pay my gratitude to all my friends and colleagues. My 
friends from Duquesne University helped me adjust myself to the new environment of the United 
States and improve my English speaking and writing. I find myself lucky to have been able to 
form an intimate friendship with nice people with whom I could freely speak about the 
difficulties and troubles I had to undergo and who were willing to help and support me. My 
friends and colleagues from Seoul National University have never refused my request for 




always welcome me with open arms whenever I have visited Korea. This made me recognize 
that academia, above all things, is a community based on intellectual passion, pure goodwill, and 
friendship. Also, my old friends from the literature circles in my undergraduate and high school 
years meant and still means a lot to me. They keep faith with unwavering confidence in me, in 
my philosophical studies as well as my life, which gave me great strength. I would also like to 
express my special thanks of gratitude to the Buddhist monk Gak-San. To a young student who 
was extremely and unnecessarily sensitive to the sufferings of life but did not know how to 
understand them, he taught and showed how life can be bright, light, and delightful. With his 
enthusiasm with and sincere faith in Buddhist teachings, he demonstrated to me what the 
spiritual and intellectual freedom should be like. From his life and teaching, I have also learned 
that we cannot convince anybody else of what we are doing if we have no self-conviction first, 
and that this requires much effort, trials and errors, honesty, sincerity, and courage.  
The process of writing this dissertation was not always happy. There were a lot of skeptic 
and painful moments when I was not certain of my abilities, the value and usefulness of my 
studies, the significance and vision of philosophy, the ways of living in today’s academia, and so 
forth. It was the support, affection, and energy from all my philosophy teachers, friends, and 
colleagues that eventually led me to exit the long and dark tunnel. The completion of this 
dissertation could not have been possible otherwise. I sincerely thank them again with all my 
heart. 
Lastly, my deep gratitude goes to my mom, who is always greatly concerned about the 
health and safety of her daughter living abroad for years. I would also like to tell her that I am 
very proud of being a daughter of a farmer. What has grown me physically, intellectually, and 




country town in Korea, Gongju. There where I was always surrounded by various plants and 
animals and felt all the seasonal changes vividly, I developed my affection toward the world. It is 
also where my sense of life and freedom is ultimately rooted in. And I am also very grateful to 



































List of Abbreviations xv 
Introduction xvii 
     Chapter Outline  xxiv 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. The Formation of Post-Kantian German Idealism in Jena  






1. Crisis …………………………………………………………………………………... 4 
2. Kant in the Crisis: Reinhold’s Fact of Consciousness…………………………………. 9 
3. The Being of Consciousness:  
     From Reinhold’s Fact to Fichte’s Act via Schulze’s Skepticism…………………....... 
 
  15 
4. Beyond Fichte’s Transcendental Consciousness ............................................................ 24 
      4.1. Tathandlung in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1794............................................. 24 
      4.2. Hegel’s Criticism of Fichte in the Differenzschrift…………………………......... 31 
      4.3. The Problem of the Subjectivist Model of Consciousness…………………......... 37 
      4.4. Rationale for the non-Cartesian-Fichtean Model of Self-consciousness………… 43 
5. Hegel’s Definition of Consciousness as the Concept of Spirit……………………........ 46 
      5.1. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4…………………………………………... 47 
      5.2. Hegel’s Definition of Consciousness as the Concept of Spirit…………………... 51 
             External and Internal Organism …………………………………………………. 52 
             Nature and Spirit: Organism in General and Conscious Organism ………..……. 54 
      5.3. A third: Consciousness and Spirit………………………………………………... 59 





CHAPTER 2. Subjective Spirit: Mind, Geist, and the Actuality of Reason 71 
1. Why is Subjective Spirit not a Mind? Ambiguity between Subjective Spirit and Geist 74 
2. The Psychological Subject:  
    The Emergence of Spirit out of the Death of the individual…………………………… 
 
  82 
      2.1. Immediacy of the Idea in Life…………………………………………………… 85 
      2.2. The Genus-process: the Sublation of the Immediacy of the Idea………………... 92 
      2.3. Transition from Life to Knowing………………………………………………... 96 
      2.4. The Emergence of Spirit out of the Death of the Individual Living Being……… 99 
3. Objective Thinking and Actuality in Hegel’s Logic …………………………………... 104 
      3.1. Hegel’s Notion of Objective Thinking…………………………………………... 107 
      3.2. The Move from Pure Reflection to Ground:  
 From the Relation without Relata to the Real Relation………………………….. 
 
113 
      3.3. Hegel’s Lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics………………………………......... 119 
      3.4. Actuality: Manifestation of the Absolute………………………………………... 129 
Conclusion. Concreteness of Subjective Spirit…………………………………………… 134 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology  





1. The Phenomenology of Spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia ……………………………… 142 
      1.1. The Problem of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia System……... 142 
      1.2. Absolute Negativity: Consciousness and Spirit’s Scission……………………… 146 
      1.3. The Phenomenology of Spirit and the Doctrine of Essence……………………... 150 
      1.4. Desiring Self-Consciousness:  
            Hegel’s Appropriation of the Philosophy of Reflection………………………….. 
 
153 
2. Transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology ……………………... 161 
      2.1. Recognition and Universal Self-consciousness ……………………………......... 162 
      2.2. The Rational: From the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology………......... 167 
3. Hegel’s Speculative Psychology:  
    Representation and Memory of the Theoretical Spirit…………………………………  
 
170 




      3.2. Representation:  
             Transformation of the Given Rational Content by Theoretical Spirit……………  
 
176 
      3.3. The Actuality of Mind and the Mechanism of Spirit……………………………. 181 
4. The Anthropology as a Negative Part of the Phenomenology of Spirit………………... 183 
5. The Manifestation of Spirit: The Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit ........ 185 




CHAPTER 4. Kant and Hegel:  






1. Kant’s Idea of a Pragmatic Anthropology……………………………………………... 201 
      1.1. The Question and Answer of Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology………………….. 205 
      1.2. Knowledge of the World………………………………………………………… 207 
      1.3. Kant’s Teleology of Nature: Culture as the Link between Nature and Morality... 212 
      1.4. Unsociable Sociability:  
             The Teleology of History and Modern Civil Society …………………………… 
 
220 
      1.5. The Human Bestimmung: The Teleology of History Towards Moral Perfection.. 224 
2. Hegel: Nature as an Inorganic Whole and the Sentient Soul in the Anthropology ……. 232 
      2.1. Kant’s Inner Purposiveness and Hegel’s Teleology of the Concept ………......... 235 
             The Dialectic of Syllogism in the Doctrine of the Concept ……………………...  238 
             The Objectivity of the Concept in Nature ………………………………….......... 248 
      2.2. Hegel’s Notion of Nature as an Inorganic Whole …………………………......... 252 
      2.3. An Analysis of § 389: What is the Soul? ………………………………………... 256 
  Universal Immateriality of Nature ……………………………………………… 257 
  Substance as Absolute Foundation ……………………………………………... 268 
  Sleep of spirit: the passive νοῦς of Aristotle ………………………………......... 269 












CHAPTER 5. The Dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology: 
Soul, World, and Bodiliness  
 
279 
1. Naturgeist and the Natural Soul: Soul, World, and Bodiliness ……………………….. 284 
      1.1. Natural Qualities: The Gradual Emergence of Spirit out of Nature……………... 288 
      1.2. The Stages of Life of the Natural Soul and the Stages of Life of Spirit………….  293 
             The Threefold Complex: Soul, World, and Body………………………………… 294 
             The Natural Soul: Individuality without Intersubjective Subjectivity……………  303 
      1.3. Hegel’s Non-Evolutionary Notion of the Gattung as the Environmental World 
of the Soul………………………………………………………………………… 
 
305 
             Buffon and Kant: The Genealogical View of a Natural Species………………… 306 
             Hegel’s Anti-evolutionary Conception of Species………………………………. 310 
             Gattung as the Environmental World …………………………………………… 317 
      1.4. The Sex-Relationship and the Family: Duplication of Naturgeist………………. 320 
              Antigone and the Family: The Limited Sublation of Nature in and through  
              Nature in the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807………………………………… 
 
323 
              The Family in the Philosophy of Objective Spirit: The Sublation 
              of Naturgeist in and through Naturgeist………………………………………… 
 
329 
               Naturgeist in the Anthropology without the World as a Second Nature ………. 336 
      1.5. From Sleep to Waking:  
 The Soul’s Differentiation into Substantiality and Subjectivity…………………. 
 
339 
2. The Sentient Soul and Symbolic Bodiliness ……………………………………………  345 
      2.1. Sensation: Internal Process of the Soul Mediated by Bodiliness………………… 346 
      2.2. The Bodily Subjectivity of the Sentient Soul ……………………………………. 348 
3. Derangement of the Feeling Soul and the Negativity of Naturgeist ……………………. 356 
      3.1. The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy:  
 Being Awake while Dreaming or Dreaming while Being Awake………………... 
 
359 
      3.2. The Magical Relationship: Being Awake While Dreaming ………………………  365 
      3.3. Animal Magnetism: Dreaming While Being Awake ……………………………. 368 
      3.4. Derangement: The Negativity of Naturgeist …………………………………….. 374 
      3.5. Bodiliness as Spirit’s Own Negative…………………………………………….. 385 




      4.1. Habit as Second Nature: The Overall Transformation of Bodiliness …………… 393 
      4.2. Habit as the Genesis of Consciousness …………………………………………..  399 
      4.3. Habit and Spirit: The Mechanism of the Soul…………………………………… 403 




      On the Recent Naturalist Readings of Hegel ………………………………………… 

































LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
  HEGEL 
 
GW = Gesammelte Werke. In Verbindung mit der Deuschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. 
Edited by the Rheinish-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1968-. (Cited by volume and page number). 
W = Werke in zwanzig Bänden, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1969-71). (Cited by volume and page number). 
Diff = The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy. Translated 
by H.S. Harris and Walter Cert. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. 
ENZ = Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830).  
LHP = Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6. Volume II. Greek Philosophy. Edited 
by Robert F. Brown and translated by R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
LPS = Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8. Translated by Robert R. Williams. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
PhS = Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford, New York, Toronto, 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1977. (Citated by the translator’s paragraph 
number. 
PR = Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M.Knox. Digireads.com Publishing, 
2010. 
PS 1803/4 = “Frist Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 
1803/4).” In System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and Frist Philosophy of Spirit (Part III 
of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4). Edited and translated by H.S. 
Harris and T.M. Knox. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979. 
SL = Science of Logic. Edited and translated by George di Giovanni. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
VGP = Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie Teil 3. Griechische Philosophie II. 
Plato bis Proklos (Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Band 
8). Edited by Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1996. 
VPG = Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin 1827-1828. Nachgeschrieben 
von Johann Eduard Erdmann und Ferdinand Walter. Edited by Franz Hespe and 















Ak  = Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by die Königliche Preußische (later Deutschen) 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. Berlin, 1902-83; 2nd edn De Guyter, for 
vols.1-9).Citations from Kant’s texts refer to volume and page number in the 
Akademie edition, except for references to the Critique of Pure Reason (cited by A/B 
pagination in the original editions), and to the Critique of the Power of Judgement 
(cited by passage numbers).  
Ca  = Cambridge Edition of the Writings of Immanuel Kant. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992-. 
AP  = Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), Ak 7.                             
Anthropology from a pragmatic standpoint, Ca Anthropology, History and Education 
CO  = Ca Correspondance 
IaG  = Idee zu einer allgemenen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), Ak 8.      
Idea toward a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim, Ca Anthropology, History 
and Education. 
GM  = Grundlegung zur Ketanpysik der Sitten (1785), Ak 4 .                                     
Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ca Practical Philosophy 
KpV  = Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), Ak 5.                                                        
Critique of practical reason, Ca Practical Philosophy 
KrV  = Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781,1787). (Cited by A/B pagination).                           
Ca Critique of Pure Reason 
KU  = Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), Ak 5.                                                                              
Ca Critique of the Power of Judgment 
R  = Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793-94), Ak 6.              
Religion within the boundaries of mere reason, Ca Religion and Rational Theology 
RM  = Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen (1775), Ak 2.                                       
The Different races of human beings, Ca Anthropology History and Education 
TP       = Ca Theoretical Philosophy. 1755-1770 
WE  = Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784), Ak 8. 







Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit remains one of the least studied area in Hegel’s 
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division of the philosophy of subjective spirit, the Anthropology. Specifically, those readers who 
attempt to portray Hegel’s philosophical position in terms of naturalism have paid special 
attention to his account of the soul-body relationship and the notion of habit in the 
Anthropology.2 While this contemporary, naturalist reading of Hegel is significant in making 
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University of New York Press, 2013). For studies of Hegel’s Anthropology, see: Bernard Bourgeois, “Les deux 
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(London and New York: Routledge, 2005/ first published in French in 1996); Errol E. Harris, “Hegel’s 
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Anthropology (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972). 
2 Italo Testa, “Hegel’s Naturalism or Soul and Body in the Encyclopedia,” in Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 19-35; Italo Testa, 
“Second Nature and Recognition: Hegel and the Social Space,” Critical Horizons, vol. 10, issue 2 (2009): 341-370; 
Simon Lumsden, “Between Nature and Spirit: Hegel’s Account of Habit,” in: Essays on Hegels Philosophy of 
Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 121-138; Terry Pinkard, 
Hegel’s Naturalism. Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also: 
Christoph Menke, “Hegel’s Theory of Second Nature: the ‘Lapse’ of Spirit,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of 




Hegel’s philosophy relevant to the contemporary context, it tends to ignore Hegel’s project of a 
philosophical system in the Encyclopedia as well as the historical context of the eighteenth-
century German classic philosophy. Instead of narrowly focusing on some themes in the 
Anthropology, this dissertation aims at offering a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
Anthropology in Hegel’s Encyclopedia of 1830 while bringing into sight how it is systematically 
connected with the three divisions of the Encyclopedia: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and 
the Philosophy of Spirit on the one hand, and how it is embedded in the historical context of the 
eighteenth-century German classic philosophy, on the other. Throughout such an extensive 
study, this dissertation focuses on spelling out Hegel’s notion that spirit emerges out of nature 
through the development of itself as Naturgeist in the Anthropology. 
Hegel’s philosophy can perhaps be characterized as a philosophical anthropology, one in 
which all of the diverse dimensions of human life are comprehensively considered in terms of 
the dialectical development and manifestation of Geist. The idea that philosophy is an essentially 
anthropological discipline is more explicitly brought up by Kant. According to Kant, all three 
questions dealt with in his three Critiques—what I can know; what I ought to do; what I may 
hope—converge into one and the same question: what the human being is.3 Although Hegel does 
not explicitly characterize his philosophy in terms of anthropology, we observe that the 
Philosophy of Spirit in his Encyclopedia considers human existence and life in a comprehensive 
manner: it thematizes an individual human being’s natural existence and psychological 
                                                   
Role of Habit in the Appearance of Perceptual Consciousness,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 48, issue 4 
(2010): 325-352; Simon Lumsden, “Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of History,” 
International Journal f Philosophical Studies, vol.24, no.1 (2016): 74-94.  
3 Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, ed. “Immanuel Kant’s Logic: A Manual for Lectures,” in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on 





constitution (Subjective Spirit), an intersubjective life form realized at various levels of 
institution including family, civil society, and the state (Objective Spirit) and a cultural form of 
life in art, religion, and philosophy (Absolute Spirit). The Encyclopedia system grounds this 
extensive and comprehensive consideration of human existence and life in the Philosophy of 
Spirit on the Logic. The Logic establishes that the Concept and reality are united with each other, 
and this unity constitutes the dialectical life of the logical Idea. The dialectical life of the Idea 
consists in unfolding itself as such a unity of the Concept and reality in and through the 
philosophical system in the Encyclopedia. In this system, the Idea thus externalizes itself into the 
realm of externality, i.e., nature, and internalizes this external existence of itself to return to itself 
as the ideality of nature, i.e., spirit. Further, this dialectical life of the Idea is at the same time the 
self-development of spirit. Spirit, in other words, first appears in the form of the Idea, then 
alienates itself into nature, and finally reflects into itself as spirit. Thus, one can perhaps view 
Hegel’s mature system of the Encyclopedia as embodying his complete and systematic 
anthropology, which bases the consideration of humanity on the dialectical, ontological monism 
of spirit—which is established in the Logic and developed through the Philosophy of Nature and 
the Philosophy Spirit. 
 Yet, it appears that Hegel’s main concern about humanity lies in the ethical and political 
life, which he discusses through the philosophy of objective spirit. Noticeable in this regard is 
the relationship between the first two divisions of the Philosophy of Spirit: the philosophy of 
subjective spirit and the philosophy of objective spirit. The philosophy of subjective spirit 
considers spirit in its interiority and ideality, thereby thematizing the internal, threefold 
constitution of an individual human spirit: the soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such. By treating 




establishes that the essence of spirit is freedom and thereby provides a basis for the philosophy of 
objective spirit, which considers the ethical and political life in terms of the realization of the 
essence of spirit, i.e., freedom, in the realm of objectivity. Thus, one can draw out one of the 
fundamental insights of Hegel with respect to humanity: the essence of human life is freedom, 
and freedom is something objective that is realized through intersubjective and institutionalized 
forms of life.  
Hegel’s concern about the intersubjective dimension of human life is further associated with 
his critical stance against the subjectivist tendency in modern philosophy. For Hegel, modern 
philosophy—starting from Descartes and culminating in Kant’s and Fichte’s transcendental 
philosophy—tends to privilege the perspective of the subject who cognizes the object and 
comprehends the objectivity of the world from the first-person based, one-sidedly subjectivist 
standpoint. On the one hand, Hegel positively assesses the subjectivist trend in modern 
philosophy as an expression of the stage of world-history where humanity has achieved in 
modern times. Subjectivism in modern philosophy, in other words, goes hand in hand with 
modern, political liberalism, which endorses the idea that every person—not just one person 
(Oriental monarchy), nor a limited number of people (Greek democracy)—is equally free. But he 
holds, on the other hand, that subjectivism in modern philosophy is to be crossed over, just as the 
individualist tendency in modern political life is to be reconciled with the ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit].  
Thus, Hegel’s emphasis on the intersubjective dimension of human life is associated with his 
project of establishing a philosophical system capable of transcending modern subjectivism in an 
essential manner. If this is the case, however, the status and significance of the first section of the 




philosophy of subjective spirit deals with spirit in its interiority without yet bringing up its 
objectivity in the external world. It gives a foundation to the philosophy of objective spirit by 
establishing that the essence of spirit is freedom. However, it does not itself present a treatment 
of freedom. Accordingly, one can best say that the philosophy of subjective spirit is a preparation 
for the subsequent treatment of freedom in the philosophy of objective spirit. It then seems hard 
to take the Anthropology in the philosophy of subjective spirit as Hegel’s philosophical 
anthropology in a positive and constructive sense. More significantly, the notion that the essence 
of spirit is freedom is established in the Psychology and not in the Anthropology. The 
Anthropology rather thematizes the natural, bodily existence of the human being and considers 
spirit in terms of its submergence in and subordination to nature. It considers, in other words, the 
least spiritual form of spirit: Naturgeist, which is far away from its essence, i.e., freedom. 
Therefore, one can rightly pose the question as to why Hegel gives the title “anthropology” to the 
section in which he considers the relationship between the soul and the body in terms of spirit’s 
submersion in and subordination to nature, and which thus seems unrelated to humanity 
considered in terms of spirit’s freedom and its realization in the realm of objective spirit. Can we 
take the “Anthropology” section in Hegel’s Encyclopedia as his philosophical anthropology? If 
so, what does its main thesis, spirit’s emergence out of nature, mean for humanity?  
Now, it appears that one of the important reasons for the relative ignorance of Hegel’s 
Anthropology rests on the prevalent criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of history for its 
commitment to the Eurocentric, teleological presentation of human history. For instance, the 
contemporary American anthropologist, Marvin Harris, suggests that anthropology began to 
form as an independent discipline in the eighteenth-century Europe with the Enlightenment 




sense of teleologically ever progressing, Harris suggests, is prominent in Kant’s pragmatic 
anthropology and is also an important part of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. However, for him, 
“most of Hegel’s philosophy is a worthless ruin.”4 Despite in a more subtle nuance, Odo 
Marquard also suggests that Hegel does not differ much from Kant in that he subjugated the new 
rising discipline anthropology to the philosophy of history.5 It should be noted, however, that 
Hegel’s philosophy of world history does not play any systematic or methodological role for his 
Anthropology. More significantly, the Anthropology has no conceptual or theoretical bases for 
thematizing human history because it is where the Philosophy of Nature ends, and the 
Philosophy of Spirit begins. The preconception that Hegel’s Anthropology is based on a 
teleological understanding of human history is therefore to be called into question. Further, the 
fact that the Anthropology considers Naturgeist at the junction of the Philosophy of Nature and 
the Philosophy of Spirit suggests that its primary concern is the relationship between nature and 
spirit rather than the historicity of spirit.  
Hegel’s understanding of human life and existence in the Anthropology, therefore, is to be 
elucidated in light of the dialectic of Naturgeist that it displays. As I hopefully show throughout 
this dissertation, the dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology does not institute a 
teleology of history, nor does the latter underlie the former. The human being that it considers is 
not the one who is involved in the teleological movement of the world history but the one who 
exists, first of all, in and through the body. This prominently spiritual being in nature is also an 
                                                   
4 Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory. A History of Theories of Culture (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1968), 67. 
5 Odo Marquard, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs ‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten 
Jahrhunderts,” in Collegium Philosophicum. Studien Joachim Ritter zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Schwabe & Co. Verlag 





essentially worldly being whose life and existence is inseparably connected with the world, and 
who stands in a relationship with the world through its bodiliness. The dialectic of Naturgeist 
thus describes the complicated relationship between human life and existence, the world, and 
bodiliness. Further, these three terms constituted of the dialectic of Naturgeist together form a 
dynamic complex such that the difference in the form of bodiliness entails the difference in the 
way in which one relates herself to the world and further, the difference in the form of the world 
she lives in. By considering the relationship between the three terms in their inseparable 
connections at various levels, the Anthropology ultimately shows how Naturgeist develops itself 
to Geist, or how spirit emerges out of nature as spirit. As the result of the dialectic of Naturgeist, 
we thus come to have a properly spiritual form of human existence and a properly spiritual form 
of the world: the intersubjective subject of recognition and the world of actuality that is alive by 
the activity of the former.  
The primary goal of this dissertation is to shed full light on the dialectic of Naturgeist in 
Hegel’s Anthropology and the relationship between human, world, and bodiliness that it 
describes. It also aims at spelling out the properly dialectical aspect of Naturgeist. As I show, if 
the Anthropology has an important significance for Hegel’s notion of Geist, this is because the 
emergence of spirit out of nature cannot mean an absolute denaturalization. On the contrary, 
spirit is for Hegel essentially subject to self-naturalization since it can reveal itself only in and 
through its other, i.e., nature. Spirit is for Hegel fundamentally dialectical in this sense, and 
Naturgeist, considered in all of its dialectical aspects, is the proper form of spirit. Considering all 
the rich and complicated ideas presented in Hegel’s Anthropology, then, it seems that 
contemporary naturalist readings of Hegel are somehow limited in their understandings of this 




therefore, I reflect on the motivations, insights, and limits of recent naturalist readers of Hegel. 
Further, another important issue of Hegel’s Anthropology is whether or not the “Natural Soul” 
section where Hegel deals with human existence and life in terms of spirit’s submersion in and 
subordination to nature supports the naturalist, reductionist view that cultural, social, and 
political elements are decided by natural, biological ones. Obviously, this view is dangerous due 
to its discriminatory effects concerning ageism, racism, and sexism. In the second part of the 
Conclusion, therefore, I examine Hegel’s dialectic of Naturgeist from a critical point of view, 
addressing the extent to which his Anthropology has racist and sexist implications, the ways in 
which we can defend Hegel against this criticism, and more importantly the ways in which we 
can draw critical powers of Hegel’s philosophy from his dialectic of Naturgeist. 
 
Chapter Outline   
Chapter 1 investigates the formation of post-Kantian German Idealism in the last decades of 
the eighteenth century. It deals with the works of Jacobi, Schulze, and Fichte and sets Hegel’s 
“1803/4 Philosophy of Spirit” in the context of the post-Kantian discussions of consciousness 
and self-consciousness. With this study, I show that since his early years in Jena, Hegel rejects 
the Post-Kantian, first-person conception of consciousness and instead considers consciousness 
in terms of the relationship between nature and spirit.  
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the status of the Anthropology within the Encyclopedia system. 
Chapter 2 deals with how it is structurally connected with the three divisions of the 
Encyclopedia: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. Chapter 3 




Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the Psychology. Throughout these studies, I 
show that Hegel’s notion of Geist cannot be equated with what we today call “mind” due to the 
dialectical relationship between nature and spirit that underlies the philosophy of subjective 
spirit. In contrast with our narrow concept of the mind, subjective spirit more broadly denotes an 
individual human spirit. And the philosophy of subjective spirit portrays it as a living being: not 
just an organism that has a bodily existence, but a living being whose interior is filled with 
concrete contents including spiritual ones that concern our moral, ethical, artistic, and religious 
lives. This notion of subjective spirit further requires viewing the three divisions of the 
philosophy of subjective spirit as internally connected with each other rather than as presenting a 
linear development of spirit toward ever higher stages. As I show, the Anthropology can be 
viewed as part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, dealing with consciousness in its negative, 
deranged aspect. It also presupposes the Psychology in the sense that the formation of the soul as 
a container of all things in potentiality, including universal representations of particular things, 
involves the process of recollection [Erinnerung]. 
Chapter 4 sets Hegel’s Anthropology in the historical context of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment. It is largely assumed that the tradition of philosophical anthropology began to 
form at the end of the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment vision of human history as ever 
progressing, and that Kant was the founder of this new tradition. Historians of philosophical 
anthropology also suggest that Hegel’s Anthropology, like Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, takes 
on the Enlightenment, optimistic and teleological view of history. Chapter 4 shows, however, 
that Hegel’s Anthropology is not grounded in a teleology of history; the teleology of history in 
his philosophy of world history does not play any methodological, theoretical, or systematic role 




nature under the assumption that the two philosophers’ different conceptions of anthropology 
bear on their different understandings of nature. Briefly stated, Kant’s argument in his pragmatic 
anthropology is that moral perfection is a noumenon that a human being, as a single individual, 
cannot achieve due to their empirical and egoistic proclivities; however, it is the direction toward 
which the human species as a whole is destined to be heading. This teleology of history in Kant’s 
pragmatic anthropology is grounded in his teleology of nature in the third Critique, which 
establishes that nature constitutes a well-ordered chain of means and ends in which the human 
being, conceived as a cultural being, is the ultimate end of nature, namely the last end within the 
system of nature for the sake of which all other natural beings are supposed to exist, and in 
which the same human being, considered as a moral being endowed with the faculty of freedom, 
is the final end of nature, that is, the supra-natural end that grounds the teleological system of 
nature outside it. In contrast to Kant, Hegel does not view nature as a teleological whole. Rather, 
nature is for him an inorganic whole in which natural beings exist separately from and 
independent of each other in space. For Hegel, the fundamental determination of nature is 
therefore externality, conceived as side-by-sideness and asunderness of things in space. Thus, 
Hegel’s philosophy of nature arranges the natural beings and our understandings of natural 
beings according to the degree of externality, proceeding from the most external to the most 
internal form of nature, that is, from the physical to the chemical and finally to the organic 
nature. In this system of nature in which we come closer to the teleological form of the Concept, 
an organism occupies the highest place. Hegel further suggests that sensation is the end point of 
nature and the starting point of spirit in the sense that a sentient being is the first being in his 
system of nature that displays subjectivity, specifically through its self-reflective operation such 




grounded in his teleological conception of the Concept or the logical Idea, enables Hegel to 
consider the human existence and life in the Anthropology in terms of a bodily existence of a 
sentient being.  
On the basis of those studies in Chapters 1 through 4, Chapter 5 carries out a detailed 
analysis of the Anthropology. Hegel’s Anthropology comprises three parts: the natural soul, the 
feeling soul, and the actual soul. With respect to the “Natural Soul” section, I first show that its 
first stage, “Natural Qualities,” challenges Schelling’s philosophy of nature with the idea of the 
gradual emergence of Geist out of nature. Further, I pay special attention to the section stage, 
“Natural Alterations,” attempting at articulating Hegel’s dialectical notion of Naturgeist. All of 
the three forms of the soul’s alteration, i.e., the stages of life, the sex-relationship, and the 
transition from sleep to waking, seem important in figuring out Hegel’s notion of Naturgeist 
because they are all concerned with the differences that are at once natural and spiritual, thereby 
displaying natural-spiritual complexes. While attempting to clarify the natural and the spiritual 
dimension that each form of the soul’s alteration displays, I suggest, first, that the stages of life 
present four different modalities of an individual’s relationship with the world rather than 
describe how a person experiences the world differently depending on how old he or she is. They 
also frame the development of Geist in the Anthropology; specifically, the first three modalities 
(full acceptance, idealistic resistance or alienation, and actualization or active participation, 
which correspond to childhood, youth, and adulthood, respectively) represent the ways in which 
the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul relates itself to the world. I also show that at this 
first stage of the “Natural Alterations,” both the soul and the world has some natural remainder. 
The soul is considered as living in a cultural world; however, it is ultimately subordinated to 




ethical world, which for Hegel requires the sublation of death. Reflecting on the significance of 
the stages of life, I also investigate how Hegel’s notion of Gattung in the Anthropology can be 
considered in terms of an environmental world to which one is to react practically, in contrast to 
Kant’s genealogical and teleological understanding of a natural species. With respect to the 
second way of the soul’s alteration, i.e., the sex-relationship, I focus on Hegel’s idea that it finds 
its ethical and spiritual meaning in the family, and that the family is the reappearance of 
Naturgeist at the level of objective spirit. To spell out this, I examine Hegel’s presentation of 
Antigone in the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit and the discussion of the family in the “Ethical 
Life” section in the philosophy of objective spirit. With this study, I show that Naturgeist can be 
considered the properly dialectical form of Geist, which is to naturalize itself to become spirit for 
itself, and I argue that there cannot be an absolute denaturalization of spirit in Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia system. In relation to this study, I further consider two different meanings of 
Hegel’s notion of habit as a second nature to underline that the soul in the Anthropology is still 
caged in its monadic world. Lastly, I consider how Hegel blurs the distinction between dreaming 
and waking by examining his discussion of the transition from sleep to waking, which is the third 
way of the soul’s alteration. As I further consider in relation to the “Feeling Soul” section, the 
ultimate significance of Hegel’s discussion of sleep and waking bears on the contrast between 
the feeling soul and consciousness, which are, in fact, two different forms of consciousness: one 
without the mediation of objective consciousness, and the other that stands in an objective 
relationship with the world of actuality. By suggesting that one can be said to be dreaming even 
when she is physically awake if her psyche is isolated from the world, Hegel sets the stage for 




Anthropology can be considered as a doctrine of a dreaming soul, which can become a waking 
soul, i.e., consciousness when its mode of bodily existence is transformed through habit.  
The last part of the “Natural Soul” section is on sensation, and Hegel here considers 
sensation in terms of the embodiment of one’s inner feelings. With respect to this last stage of 
the natural soul, I focus on Hegel’s idea of the relationship between the soul and the body. As I 
suggest, sensation is in Hegel’s Anthropology considered in terms of the soul’s immediate, 
bodily mode of existence rather than an epistemic relation with a sensory object. Further, the 
bodily existence of the soul that Hegel considers is an expressive existence in the sense that the 
soul comes to exist by exteriorizing its interior. As such, bodiliness is not just a physical, organic 
body but a symbolic materiality in which the spiritual contents are immediately embodied. The 
bodily existence of the soul, however, is completely immediate such that it lacks a connection 
with the world. It is therefore precarious because lacking an objective relationship with the 
world, it necessarily leads the soul to fall into one-sided subjectivism.  
Under this condition of the sentient soul that immediately exists as the body without the 
connection with the world, Hegel proceeds to the “Feeling Soul” section and discusses the 
essentially subjectivist character of the feeling soul under the rubric of derangement or madness 
[Verrücktheit]. By exploring the history of psychiatry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
in relation to Hegel’s discussion of animal magnetism and derangement, I spell out Hegel’s 
dialectical notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, reason as 
the unity of reason and unreason. Following this, I suggest that the deranged subject—who is 
tormented by an awareness of the contradiction between her inner world and the reality of the 
outer world, and the feeling of unhappiness that arises from this awareness—is for Hegel a self-




negative form, i.e., the contradiction between consciousness and unconsciousness. As such, the 
feeling soul constitutes the negative stage in the development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology. 
Considering the significance of derangement, I further suggest that there is a Hegelian, 
dialectical paradox in the Anthropology: the most deranged is the most self-consciousness. By 
implication, if there is any distinct character of humanity in Hegel’s Anthropology, it would be 
the power of derangement; humans differ from any other natural beings in that they can get 
deranged—in that they can resist the world, enter into a negative relation with the world, and feel 
alienated from the world.  
 In the last stage of the feeling soul, “Habit,” then, Hegel brings up habit as the way in which 
one’s bodiliness is transformed into a second nature. I suggest that habit is for Hegel a process of 
an overall transformation of bodiliness such that it can serve spiritual purposes in the ethical 
world. With this transformation, one’s relationship with the objective world of actuality can be 
established. We thereby come to the stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which concerns the 
realm of intersubjectivity.  
This is how in Hegel’s Anthropology, Naturgeist first appears in the from of submergence in 
and subordination to nature, develops itself up to the point where its negativity bursts out with 
the soul’s derangement, and sublates itself into and as spirit through habit.  
In the Conclusion, I consider the limits of naturalist readings of Hegel. I argue that they fail 
to see the dialectical dimension of Hegel’s Naturgeist with their tendency to dismiss a priori, 
metaphysical thinking in general as well as their narrow, pragmatist-scientific conception of 
nature and the relationship between natural science and philosophy. They suggest that Hegel’s 
Anthropology presents the idea of embodied cognition; or, they focus on the normative 




ontological and existential significance of Hegel’s Anthropology that concerns the dynamic and 
dialectical triad of soul, world, and body.  
 In the Conclusion, I also consider the problem of the “Natural Soul” section where Hegel 
discusses the difference of human races, the stages of life, and the sex-relationship. These 
discussions in the “Natural Soul” section raise the question as to whether Hegel thereby supports 
naturalist reductionism, which claims that our identities and lives are determined by biological 
factors including race, age, and gender. I argue that this cannot be the case because naturalist 
reductionism should mean, for Hegel, the complete subordination of Geist to nature. I concede 
that his statements about the stages of life, race, and sex-relationship, when we disregard the 
dialectical context of the Anthropology, have some discriminatory implications and effects. I 
suggest, however, that his dialectical notion of Naturgeist can give us some important conceptual 
tools that have strong, critical powers.  
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CHAPTER 1. The Formation of Post-Kantian German Idealism in Jena and 
the Problem of Consciousness 
 
The first part of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia of 1830 is the 
philosophy of subjective spirit, and Hegel here thematizes the finite human spirit from a 
threefold perspective: undifferentiated substantiality of the soul (Anthropology), conscious 
opposition between subject and object (Phenomenology of Spirit), and spirit-as-such which 
achieves an infinite form of self-knowledge (Psychology). With this threefold consideration of 
subjective spirit, Hegel challenges both rational and empirical psychology. While rational 
psychology conceives of the finite human spirit as a metaphysical substance of which properties 
such as simplicity, unity, and immortality are assumed to be predicable, empirical psychology 
considers it as a mere collection or an aggregate of dissected parts. But both psychologies, for 
Hegel, commits the error of making the finite human spirit into a thing or a thing-like entity and 
doing away with its concrete and dynamic nature.1 Hegel’s suggestion is that the true nature of 
the finite human mind can only be grasped from the standpoint of spirit—as that which exhibits 
the subjective, internal, and ideal dimension of Geist.  
One of important elements underlying Hegel’s notion of spirit is his objection to what he 
calls the standpoint of consciousness, that is, the perspective of understanding [Verstand] that 
holds on to the oppositional relationship between subject and object. Overcoming this 
antithetical, non-speculative view of consciousness constitutes the key project of Hegel’s early 
                                                   
1 Cf. ENZ, §378, §386. 
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Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. In the philosophy of subjective spirit of the 1830 
Encyclopedia, however, we observe that the issue of the finite conception of consciousness also 
frames the Anthropology in a significant manner.2 For our study of Hegel’s Anthropology, it is 
therefore indispensable to elucidate how the issue of consciousness frames this opening part of 
the philosophy of subjective spirit and further his notion of spirit. 
Hegel’s concern with overcoming the standpoint of consciousness bears on his challenge 
of Kant’s transcendental idealism. To explicate how the issue of consciousness frames the 
Anthropology, we would therefore have to examine Hegel’s critical engagement with Kant as it 
is presented in the Anthropology. Yet, a close reading of the Anthropology reveals that Hegel’s 
notion of consciousness is as much over-determined as his notion of spirit.3 To my view, the 
                                                   
2 For instance, we see the words consciousness, and its related notion understanding, frequently occurring 
throughout the Anthropology; cf. ENZ, §397 Z, §408. 
3 We can draw out multiple meanings of Hegel’s notion of consciousness from his Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. 
Importantly, Hegel conceives of consciousness as structured by the opposition between subject and object but 
strongly rejects the idea of an epistemological opposition between cognizing subject and cognized object—or 
between empty forms of cognitive powers and external objects which are supposed to be given to them for contents. 
This antithetical, epistemic relationship between subject and object, for Hegel, stands only when one theoretically 
abstracts all complex relationship of consciousness with the world. In this context, the term consciousness, first, has 
a critical meaning, representing the finite, antithetical perspective that confines our views of the human mind to 
some epistemic operations. Of importance with respect to this critical meaning of consciousness is his project of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, which dissolves the view of the rigid opposition between subject and object step by step 
by describing the oppositional relationship between subject and object at various levels and reveling the conflict or 
contradiction internal to that relationship from within it. Throughout this journey of consciousness full of errors and 
despairs, the Phenomenology of Spirit eventually leads us to the speculative perspective of absolute identity. 
Consciousness thus has a second, methodological meaning: it configures the subject of dialectical experiences that 
dissolves its intrinsic, oppositional constitution from within itself to attain the truth of the absolute identity of being 
and thought. This methodological meaning of consciousness is implied in the central thesis of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit that the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness. By revealing the self-conscious truth of consciousness at 
various levels, however, Hegel extensively deals with the cognitional-epistemic, practical-intersubjective, 
communal-historical, and moral-religious existence of the human being. In this sense, the dialectical experiences of 
consciousness ultimately pertain to the manifestation of Geist. Herein lies the third, anthropological meaning of 
consciousness.  
Hegel’s mature system of the Encyclopedia, especially its third part, the Philosophy of Spirit, can be considered as 
representing Hegel’s philosophical anthropology. As I discuss later in detail, however, the Encyclopedia system does 
not adopt the methodological idea of the early Phenomenology of Spirit, i.e., the dialectical experiences of 
consciousness. Proceeded by the Logic, it assumes that the absolute identity of being and thought is already 
established, and that the full, speculative meaning of the identity of being and thought is displayed by the absolute 
subjectivity of the logical Idea. The absolute subjectivity of the Idea consists in its self-alienation into its other and 
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difficulty in understanding Hegel’s mention about consciousness in the Anthropology chiefly 
comes from the fact that it retains, in condensed and elaborated forms, plentiful important 
elements from the early post-Kantian discussions about consciousness, which Hegel had digested 
before he came to be able to present his original thoughts through the Phenomenology of Spirit of 
1807.4 
                                                   
reflection into itself as spirit in and through that being-otherness. In other words, the Idea externalizes itself as 
nature, and internalizes this self-externalization as nature into itself as spirit.  
In this dialectic of the Idea’s self-externalization and internalization within the Encyclopedia system, the 
Anthropology is the stage where spirit begins to emerge as spirit out of its immersion in nature. And the 
Anthropology thematizes this central issue of the Encyclopedia system in terms of the rise of consciousness out of 
the soul’s unconscious, undifferentiated substantial totality. In the Encyclopedia system, consciousness—conceived 
as arising from the Anthropology as the subject matter of the Phenomenology of Spirit within the philosophy of 
subjective spirit—thus configures a human subject whose existence is liberated from an immediate attachment to 
nature. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 5, however, the soul thematized in the Anthropology is a form of 
consciousness. Specifically, the second stage of the Anthropology, the feeling soul, represents a one-sidedly 
subjective or subjectivist form of consciousness in which it lives a pathological psychical life, lacking the 
connection with the objective world. But in the Anthropology, the negativity of spirit is exhibited in this negative, 
pathological form of consciousness. Despite the great difference from the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit, the 
Anthropology in the Encyclopedia thus holds the leitmotif of the early Phenomenology of Spirit that consciousness is 
the locus of the negativity of Geist. But the Anthropology in the mature system of the Encyclopedia presents the 
connection between consciousness and spirit, again, in terms of the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit, 
and this issue underlies Hegel’s philosophical anthropology within the Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia. 
4 In the years of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the so-called Kantian critical philosophy was widely 
conceived as a philosophical project to complete rather than as a work of the author, Kant. We thus observe that 
during the years of 1770s through 1800s in Jena, there was a vigorous intellectual movement around the Kantian 
critical philosophy, one in which the leaders proclaimed to be genuine successor of Kantian philosophy while 
developing and transforming their master’s ideas in various significant ways. Regarding this post-Kantian 
intellectual movement in Jena, Dieter Henrich points out that during this period Kant did not leave Königsberg and 
was alienated from that movement of the early German Idealism. He thus poses an interesting retrospective question 
as to what would have happened in the formation of the early German Idealism, if Kant was in Jena. For studies of 
the early formation of German Idealism in Jena, see: Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel Lectures on German 
Idealism, ed. David S. Pacini (Cambridge, Messachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2008); Frederick 
C. Beiser, German Idealism. The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge, Messachusetts, and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2008). For studies more focused on Hegel in Jena, see: H.S.Harris, Hegel’s 
Development. Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806) (Oxford: Clearendon Press, 1983); Gilbert Gérard, Critique et 
dialectique. L’itinéraire de Hegel à Iéna (1801-1805) (Bruxelles: Faculté universitaires Saint-Louis, 1982). The 
original texts important for the early formation of the German Idealism in Jena are edited and translated into 
English: George di Giovanni and H.S.Harris, Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian 
Idealism (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000). For a study of post-Kantian idealism in 
a larger historical context of the German philosophy from the fourteenth through nineteenth centuries, see: Lewis 
White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 
Cambridge, 1969). 
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It therefore appears that the early post-Kantian reactions to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason is still important in understanding Hegel’s Anthropology. As a preliminary study for our 
reading of Hegel’s Anthropology, this chapter therefore aims to examine the late eighteenth-
century German context in which consciousness was thematized, problematized, and theorized, 
in the aftermath of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Needless to say, the intellectual movement 
of this period of time is so rich that no approach centered on a particular topic or on certain 
figures can cover the entire reality. Being aware of this and for that reason, I will focus on those 
figures who explicitly addressed the issue of consciousness specifically in the context of the 
post-Kantian project of accomplishing the Critical philosophy as a philosophical system, 
including Reinhold, Schulze, and Fichte. For the part on Hegel, the focus will be given to several 
works of Hegel in Jena with a serious attention given to Differenzschrift and the Philosophy of 




Regarding the acceptance of Kant’s critical philosophy by his contemporaries, Manfred 
Kuehn offers a very helpful historical description of the German intellectual situation around the 
mid-eighteenth century. Kuehn states that the German intellectual situation after the death of 
Wolff in 1754 can be characterized as a crisis, “the cognitive crisis of the Enlightenment.”5 It 
was an era of crisis because all the old authorities of the Scholastic philosophy began to collapse, 
                                                   
5 Manfred Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense in German: 1768-1800 (McGill Queen’s University Press, 1987), 36 and 
footnote 1.  
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and yet no new authority was yet established. Claiming that the German intellectual anarchy 
around the mid-eighteenth century should be considered in the wider context of the European 
Enlightenment, Kuehn underlines the significance of the German acceptance of the British 
empiricism. While the rise of Hume’s skepticism and the subsequent development of the Scottish 
school of the common sense contributed to the dramatic decline of the classic conception of 
philosophy as a foundational discipline grounding all other derivative knowledge, the German 
thinkers responded to this new trend of philosophy promptly, seriously, and passionately.6 Of 
importance is that they reacted to British empiricism with a serious concern for securing the 
status of philosophy as systematic knowledge, which was the case neither of England nor of 
France.7 Briefly, the ideal of a synthesis of British empiricism and the tradition of German 
rationalism characterizes the time around when Kant’s first Critique was brought into the world. 
How to establish philosophy as a scientific system and defend it against Humean skepticism, by 
reviving the argumentative power of reason and not by appealing to the common sense, in other 
words, was the core problem that framed this era, according to Kuehn.   
Considering that the Enlightenment was a multifarious movement which, together with 
social and political changes, involved an explosive intellectual development in various domains, 
the rise of the popular philosophy should also be mentioned. Popular philosophers are said to be 
                                                   
6 Kuhn points out that the writings of the Scottish school were promptly translated into German and received 
immediate reviews. With respect to the translation of the English “common sense” into the German “der 
menschliche gesunder Verstand” by the German readers of the time, see in particular: Manfred Kuehn, Scottish 
Common Sense in German: 1768-1800, (McGill Queen’s University Press, 1987), 53-68. 
7 A similar characterization is offered by Ernst Cassirer. In the preface to his book, The Philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, Cassirer states that although the Enlightenment begun by breaking down the old metaphysical idea 
of philosophy, the loss of the “spirit of systems” did not entail giving up the “systematic spirit:” Ernst Cassirer, The 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1951; the German original published in 1932), vii. Cassirer also suggests that there was a modification in their 
conception of the system: from an axiomatic and deductive form to a fundamental form of all natural and spiritual 
beings that can be articulated by philosophy’s free movement and immanent activity.  
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“skeptics who moderated their skepticism with eclecticism and common sense.”8 They enjoyed 
relatively more intellectual freedom, either in terms of their loose or non-institutional connection 
or in terms of their predilection for non-academic style of writing. Worth noting is that Kant held 
a complex relationship with the popular philosophy. Kant’s Critiques alone offer the picture of 
Kant only as an academic philosopher, as if the Critical philosophy had nothing to do with the 
popular philosophy, or as if Kant’s Critical philosophy as a whole stood in an entire isolation of 
the latter. But the fact that Kant kept teaching the anthropology course for thirty years of his 
career and acknowledged the significance of the rise of empirical psychology reveals a more 
complicated relation between his Critical philosophy and the popular philosophy.9 Noticeable 
with respect to this complicated relation Kant’s Critical philosophy and the popular philosophy is 
                                                   
8 Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press; Cambridge, 1969), 321. Beck offers a concise but thorough description of the characters of popular 
philosophers. He states that during the third quarter of the eighteenth-century Berlin was the center of the German 
Enlightenment, having two important intellectual groups: those who belonged to academy of philosophy founded 
and sponsored by Frederick the Great and the popular philosophers. Popular philosophers were German speaking 
protestants enjoying a new intellectual freedom and achieved a high level of literary criticism. The German popular 
philosophers were not so much actively engaged in the political critique as the French philosophers such as Diderot, 
Rousseau, and Voltaire were. Instead, their interests were focused on the private sentiment and virtue, religion, 
education, and art: cf. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors, 319-324. John H. 
Zammitto sheds light on the rise of popular philosophy as the rise of a new intellectual social class, i.e., the educated 
[der Gebildete] who can be identified as “the bourgeois reading public,” distinct from the scholars [der Gelehrnte] 
who held their posts at universities; cf. John H. Zammitto, Kant, Herder, the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 15-23. With regard to the co-existence of those two different 
modes of philosophical writing and life, Beck suggests that the German philosophy since the establishment of 
universities in the fourteenth century is characterized by two distinct tendencies: the dominance of university-based 
academic philosophy which has a scholar form, on the one hand, and a constant recurrence of various non-
institutional, non-Scholastic modes of philosophical thinking on the other—pantheism, humanisms, vitalism, 
mysticisms, and pietisms. The rise of pietism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and counter-
enlightenment, Sturm and Drang, and Romanticism in the late eighteenth century, according to Beck, were part of 
the non-institutional philosophical movement: cf. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his 
Predecessors, 6-8. 
9 According to Zammito, the traditional claim that Kant’s critical turn was a turn away from the Wolffian Scholastic 
metaphysics, and it happened during the years of 1762-63 fails to explain Kant’s silence of a decade between 1762-
73. Instead, Zammito suggests that the so-called critical turn of Kant can be better explained when we take into 
account of Kant’s turn away from the popular philosophy and the subsequent change in his self-conception from a 
popular philosopher to an academic philosopher, which happened during that decade. For Zammitto’s overall 
perspective of the pre-critical Kant, see in particular: John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, the Birth of Anthropology 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 5-8. 
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Odo Marquard’s remark that Kant laid a foundation-stone of the tradition of philosophical 
anthropology but acknowledged only an auxiliary status of this new discipline. According to 
Marquard, the genuine contribution of Kant’s Critical philosophy to his time consists in the 
philosophical “turn toward the life-world” that it effectuated.10 Without necessarily alluding to 
Husserl’s phenomenological notion of the life-world,11 Marquard emphasizes that Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason brought up the human life-world as a problematic domain, one that 
evades both the metaphysics of the old Scholastic philosophy and the modern mathematical 
natural science. A new philosophical discipline was needed to deal with this rising new 
problematic domain. Kant can therefore rightly be called the founder of the tradition of 
philosophical anthropology, Marquard suggests, because he opened up the problematic, 
anthropological domain through the twofold turn toward the life-world away from the 
metaphysics and from the mathematical natural sciences with his transcendental doctrine of 
human reason. It is therefore worth noting that offering his courses on anthropology over three 
decades, Kant stated that all three questions of his Critiques—what can I know?; what ought I to 
                                                   
10 Odo Marquard, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs ‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten 
Jahrhunderts,” in Collegium Philosophicum. Studien Joachim Ritter zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Schwabe & Co. Verlag 
(Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co.Verlag, 1965), 209-239.  
11 Husserl’s view of Kant with respect to the issue of the life world is twofold: cf., Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. 
David Carr (Northwestern University Press, 1970; the German original published in 1936), 103-104. Husserl 
appreciates that Kant was insightful in criticizing rationalism for not being able to penetrate “the subjective structure 
of our world-consciousness prior to and within scientific knowledge.” But Kant did not advance his insight so far as 
to grasp that which grounds the a priori subjective conditions of our conscious relationship with the world, i.e., the 
“surrounding life-world.” Husserl therefore corrects Kant by stating that understanding has two functions in relation 
to nature; “understanding interpreting itself, in explicit self-reflection, as normative laws” and “understanding ruling 
in concealment, i.e., ruling as constitutive of the always already further developing meaning-configuration 
‘intuitively given surrounding world’.” For Husserl, conceiving these two different functions of understanding was 
part of Kant’s discovery, but Kant failed to show that and how the latter grounds the first. In a similar vein, Robert 
R. Williams points out that although Kant contributed to the philosophical turn towards the mundane life-world, he 
did not develop an ontology of the life-world: “Kant never goes beyond transcendental justification of the categories 
of Newtonian science, and so never reached, much less developed, an ontology of the life-world;” Robert R. 
Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 8.  
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do?; what may I hope—converge to the anthropological question as to what the human being is. 
In this context, we can also say that what underlies Kant’s Critical philosophy is his 
anthropological concerns. As Marquard points out, however, Kant himself took anthropology to 
be merely instrumental for pure considerations of morality.12 The new discipline of the world-
                                                   
12 Marquard claims that the development of philosophical anthropology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is 
to be understood in terms of a mutual exclusion of the philosophy of history and the Romantic Naturphilosophie. He 
suggests that Kant inaugurated the new discipline of philosophical anthropology with the Critical turn toward the 
life-world but only acknowledged an auxiliary status to his pragmatic anthropology by basing it on the philosophy of 
history. While Kant’s pragmatic anthropology remained subordinated to the philosophy of history, the Romantic 
philosophers found his philosophy of history unsatisfactory on account of the presumption of infinite progress of 
human history and the idea of conjecture and faith as the ultimate ground for the link between morality and history. 
For Marquard, the turn toward the life-world effectuated by Kant’s Critical philosophy and the theoretical deficiency 
of his philosophy of history were important contributing factors to the rise of the Romantic Naturphilosophie. He 
thus suggests that it was Kant who founded the new tradition of philosophical anthropology; however, it was 
through the breakaway from his philosophy of history and the development of the Romantic Naturphilosophie that 
philosophical anthropology gained its disciplinary independence, escaping from its subordinated status in relation to 
the philosophy of history. This was, for Marquard, how the remarkable development of philosophical anthropology 
in the nineteenth century was made possible. In suggesting this, Marquard briefly mentions that in Hegel’s 
philosophy, the treatment of humanity ultimately belongs to the philosophy of history while his Anthropology in the 
Encyclopedia involves some critical engagement with Romanticism. Seen this way, Hegel does not differ much 
from Kant, for Marquard, in that both philosophers base their anthropological discussions on the philosophy of 
history.  
Marquard’s remark on Hegel is very short, and he does not really offer a detailed and systematic account of the 
relationship between Hegel’s Anthropology in the Encyclopedia, his critical engagement with Romantic 
Naturphilosophie, and his philosophy of world history. While this remains an issue yet to be thoroughly studied, I 
suggest in this dissertation that the dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology plays a pivotal role in his 
philosophical anthropology embodied through his philosophy of spirit in the Encyclopedia, and that the dialectic of 
Naturgeist, which I attempt to articulate as the fundamental form of Hegel’s Geist that can become Geist only in and 
through its other, is not grounded in his philosophy of world history.  
Marquard’s remark on Hegel, however, provides us with some crucial insight about the historical context of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which we can set Hegel’s Anthropology. With respect to his emphasis on the 
role of the Romantic Naturphilosophie in the formation and development of philosophical anthropology, we can 
thus point out that the development of the Romantic Naturphilosophie instituted an important change in the view of 
nature, from the Newtonian, mathematical-mechanistic one in the seventeenth century to the vitalist-organist one in 
the eighteenth century; for a detailed account, see Peter Hans Reill, “The Legacy of the ‘Scientific Revolution’: 
Science and the Enlightenment,” in The Cambridge History of Science Volume 4. Eighteenth Century Science, ed. 
Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23-43; Peter Hans Reill, Vitalizing Nature in 
Enlightenment (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2005). This paradigm change in 
the view of nature entailed the development of various fields of inquiry of Enlightenment science including 
physiology, medicine, biology, psychiatry, and so forth. This further entailed, I suggest, the rise of the view of the 
human being as a physical-psychical being whose health, disease, and death, at both physical and psychical levels, 
are assumed to be treated scientifically. Shedding light on how this new angle on the human being was formed and 
developed in some inter-disciplinary manner—inter-disciplinary not in the sense that there were interactions among 
existing separate disciplines on a certain set research subject, but in the sense that the life phenomena at physical and 
psychical levels were formed as objects of anthropological inquiries through various approaches and methodologies, 
and this entailed the formation of various scientific disciplines—is therefore vital for a study of the formation of 
philosophical anthropology in the eighteenth century. This point gives an important clue for setting Hegel’s 
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knowledge [Weltkenntnis], which concerns the empirical knowledge of the different people and 
cultures of the world and thus went hand in hand with the flourishing development of the popular 
philosophy, drew significant attentions of Kant but was not recognized of a scientific value on its 
own right by the same author.  
 The popular philosophy enriched the German Enlightenment, but it was also conceived 
by some thinkers as a counterpart, so to speak, of a true philosophy. Evidently this picture covers 
only part of the entire German intellectual movement of the late eighteenth-century. But it is an 
important thread, at least, of the formation of early German Idealism in the aftermath of Kant’s 
Critical philosophy. We thus observe that the self-conception of his era as a crisis, or as a mere 
antithesis of different points of view without a synthesis, and the claim for systematic philosophy 
as a solution to this crisis were determining factors in Reinhold’s enthusiastic reception of Kant.  
 
2. Kant in the Crisis: Reinhold’s Fact of Consciousness  
 
Scholars agree that Reinhold played a pivotal role not only in popularizing Kant’s 
Critical philosophy but also for the development of post-Kantian German Idealism. But his 
contribution to the development of German Idealism has not been paid attention as much as it 
deserves until recently.13 Reinhold attends to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason with an intense 
                                                   
discussion of derangement in the Anthropology in the context of the formation of psychiatry at the end of the 
eighteenth century as I discuss in Chapter 5. It also leads us to reconsider Foucault’s thesis that there was no science 
of man before the nineteenth century. I briefly discuss this issue in Chapter 5, note 96. 
13 Reinhold published twelve essays on Kant’s first Critique in the Teutscher Merkur in 1786 and 1787. In 1787, 
“six years after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, one year before the publication of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, and three years prior to the appearance of the Critique of Judgement,” he became the chair of Jena 
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awareness of what Kuehn describes as crisis. While holding that his era is framed by the decline 
of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics and the rise of popular philosophy,14 Reinhold claims that the 
existence of God is the foundation of human morality and, as such, should be the prominent 
subject matter of philosophy. Both the absence of a metaphysics capable of giving a universally 
valid answer to the question of God and the prevalent indifference of the Enlightenment reason 
to metaphysical investigation are therefore problematic to Reinhold. For the existence of God is 
a question that reason can “neither avoid nor leave unanswered.”15  
Reinhold’s enthusiasm with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason thus comes from his concern 
about morality and religion and his belief that Kant’s first Critique offers a conclusive answer to 
the question of God. The result of the entire investigation of the first Critique, according to 
                                                   
University and took charge of the job until 1794 when he left Jena with the arrival of Fichte: cf. Daniel Breazeale, 
“Between Kant and Fichte: Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s ‘Elementary Philosophy’,” The Review of Metaphysics, 
vol.35, no.4 (1982), 785. Shedding light on Reinhold’s contribution to the early formation of post-Kantian German 
Idealism, Breazeale offers an overview of how Reinhold attempted to transform Kant’s critical philosophy into a 
more consistent philosophical system before Fichte set out for a similar project. Kant himself appreciated Reinhold’s 
Letters for making his own Critical philosophy more comprehensible, although he changed his view as Reinhold 
gradually developed his own Elementary philosophy.  
For the significant influence of Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy on the formation of the first-
generation post-Kantian German thinkers, see in particular: Karl Ameriks, “Reinhold’s First Letters on Kant,” in 
Kant and the Historical Turn. Philosophy as Critical Interpretation (New York; Oxford University Press, 2006), 
163-184. Manfred Frank suggests that the Reinhold-Fichte connection was important in the formation of early 
German romanticism, underlining that the romanticists, Novalis, Holderlin, and Schlegel, were all students of 
Reinhold at Jena and attended Ficthe’s courses with an expectation of being offered a new anti-foundational 
perspective: cf. Manfred Frank, “Lecture 1. On the Early German Romanticism as an Essentially Skeptical 
Movement: The Reinhold-Fichte Connection,” in The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, 
trans. Ellizabeth Millán-Zaibert (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008), 23-38. For Hegel’s hidden 
reference to Reinhold in his 1794 manuscript on subjective spirit (Materien zu einer Philosophie des Subjectiven 
Geistes), see: Jeffrey Reid, “How Reinhold Helped Hegel Understand the German Enlightenment and Grasp the 
Pantheism Controversy,” in Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment, ed. George di Giovanni (Dordrecht, 
Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 2010), 255-268. 
14 Cf. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, “First Letter: The Need for a Critique of Reason,” in Letters on the Kantian 
Philosophy, ed. Karl Ameriks and trans. James Hebbeler (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-17; Karl Leonhard 
Reinhold, “On What has been Happening with the Kantian Philosophy,” in Essay on a New Theory of the Human 
Capacity for Representation, trans. Tim Mehigan and Barry Empson (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2011), 3-28. 
15 Reinhold, Letters, 10. 
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Reinhold, is that “the impossibility of all apodictic proofs for or against the existence of God 
follows from the nature of speculative reason, and the necessity of moral faith in the existence of 
God follows from the nature of practical reason.”16 The answer offered by the Critique, in other 
words, is that the existence of God can neither be proved nor unproved but should be postulated 
for the sake of practical reason. Both the one-sided claims, one for only finite human reason and 
the other for supernatural faith, are thus suspended by Kant’s argument that there cannot be any 
apodictic proof of the existence of God and therefore it is necessary to postulate it for the benefit 
of practical reason. This reading does not seem to deviate too much from the author’s intention, 
considering Kant’s own inauguration of moral theology.17 
However, Reinhold begins to develop the idea that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason lacks a 
principle grounding its whole work. The principle established by the Critique is that “the only 
tenable metaphysics is the science of the objects of possible experiences,”18 and Kant was able to 
achieve this principle by his treatment of human cognition per se. While all metaphysical 
impasses have their roots in ascribing the predicates belonging to a representation of a thing to 
the thing itself, Kant’s doctrine of a priori conditions for the objects of possible experience made 
it possible to separate that which belongs to a representation of a thing from that which belongs 
to the thing itself. The greatness of the Critique, therefore, consists in its offering a ground for 
                                                   
16 Ibid., 38. For Kant’s conception of rational faith for morality in the first Critique, see: KrV, A631-43/B659-71, 
A804-19/B832-31, B856-59. Reinhold thus draws out “the moral foundation of cognition” as the main theme or 
result of the Critique of Pure Reason (Third Letter). The conception of the supremacy of the practical interest of 
reason is a theme that connects Kant, Reinhold, and Fichte. For the development of this theme in Kant-Reinhold-
Fichte, see in particular: Daniel Breazeale, “Reason’s Changing Needs: From Kant to Reinhold,” in Karl Leonhard 
Reinhold and the Enlightenment, ed. George di Giovanni (Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 
2010), 89-112.  
17 Reinhold, “The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” in Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of 
Post-Kantian Idealism, trans. George di Giovanni and H.S.Harris (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company), 66. 
18 Reinhold, The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge, 66. 
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resolving all metaphysical conundrums; positively, Kant gives a foundation for the metaphysics 
of sensible nature through his treatment of cognition per se. However, Reinhold contends that the 
doctrines of cognition per se in the Critique which grounds the metaphysics of sensible nature 
remains itself ungrounded. The Critique treats human cognition in terms of three different 
cognitive powers, i.e., sensibility, understanding, and reason, but it does not offer any account of 
their common ground. The common ground for Reinhold cannot be anything other than the 
faculty of representation, since “space and time, the twelve categories, and the three ideas of 
reason” are nothing but “properties of representation per se.” The Critique deals only with the 
properties of representations and fails to give an account of that to which those properties belong. 
It establishes the metaphysics of “objects proper” but does not inaugurate a science of “mere 
representation.”19 The Critique for Reinhold, in other words, is not completed but remains a 
project to be completed. It should be more than a mere propaedeutic work to the metaphysics; it 
should itself be established as a science. 
As it can be seen clearly from above, a foundationalist conception of philosophy guides 
Reinhold’s reading of Kant. Since Reinhold assumes that representation is the common ground 
of all the cognitive powers, the crucial issue of his Elementary philosophy is to set forth the 
ultimate ground from which the concept of representation can be drawn out. Reinhold eventually 
claims that the (actual) fact [Tatsache] of consciousness is the only ground from which the 
concept of representation can be drawn out: 
 
                                                   
19 Cf. Reinhold, The Foundation, 67. 
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It is not through any inference of reason that we know that in consciousness representation 
is distinguished through the subject from both object and subject and is related to both, but 
through simple reflection upon the actual fact of consciousness, that is, by ordering 
together [Vergleichung] what is present in it.20  
 
The fact of consciousness is a fact in the sense that it is given by “simple reflection” on “what is 
present in consciousness.” It is a fact of which any conscious being can make an immediate 
experience by virtue of consciousness’s self-reflective nature. As such, it is an immediate inner 
experience of oneself, obviously comparable to the Cartesian Cogito. Reinhold further assumes 
that the fact of consciousness makes the fundamental proposition [Grundsatz] that offers a 
concept of representation immediately known: that in consciousness representation is 
distinguished from and related to both subject and object. This being said, the fact of 
consciousness is for Reinhold the last recourse to refer to when one wants to articulate the 
fundamental principle of a science of the faculty of representation per se; it also makes it 
possible for us to avoid falling into an infinite regression which Reinhold seems to assume to be 
unavoidable when one tries to find the fundamental principle of a science by means of rational 
inference.21 
                                                   
20 Reinhold, The Foundation, 70. 
21 The significance of Reinhold’s idea that the fact of consciousness is known by simple reflection and not by 
inference, I think, can be considered in terms of the infinite regress problem, one in which one can get involved in 
pursuit of the first principle of a philosophical system. With regard to the problem of the first principle, Kant claims 
that human reason is forced by its nature to proceed to the unconditioned causality of the conditioned, comes to 
transcendental ideas such as the soul, the world, and God, but then unavoidably falls into contradiction, i.e., 
antinomies. Thus, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason does not offer any positive account of the first principle. By 
bringing the issue of the first principle to the forefront, however, Reinhold emphasizes that the first principle “is not, 
and cannot be, demonstrated in the science it grounds, or through it:” Reinhold, The Foundation of Philosophical 
Knowledge, 66. It is not something that can be demonstrated by rational inference, but something whose “meaning 
can be elucidated in the science only through its application,” and which “cannot be further developed or grounded 
without circularity:” ibid., 66-67. Reinhold’s theorization of the fact of consciousness as the ultimate source of the 
first principle can therefore be viewed as a strategy for avoiding the problem of the infinite regress by appealing to a 
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 Reinhold’s notion of the fact of consciousness as the ultimate reference for the 
fundamental principle that ties together sensibility, understanding, and reason, however, seems to 
intensify the problem rather than resolve it. As we have seen above, what drove Reinhold to a 
serious examination of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the subsequent development of his 
Elementary philosophy was the idea that philosophy is to be pursued as a scientific discourse. 
The scientific status of a philosophy is then assumed to be secured by its systematicity grounded 
on a fundamental principle, and this is the way in which Reinhold believed one could defend, so 
to speak, a true philosophy in the face of different forms of empiricism and skepticism. Yet, 
Reinhold makes an appeal to the authority of a given fact by taking the fact of consciousness as 
the ultimate reference for articulating the fundamental principle. We can therefore rightly pose a 
question as to whether Reinhold is not, in fact, employing the empiricist methods of observation 
of and abstraction from experience—in particular, an immediate self-conscious experience of 
oneself called the fact of consciousness. The implication of this question goes far beyond a 
methodological issue. By calling the immediate self-conscious experience of oneself a fact, 
Reinhold conceives consciousness as an immediate given to oneself. But how this conception of 
consciousness as an immediate given can be justified within the framework of Kant’s Critique 
remains questionable. Is Reinhold’s fact of consciousness an object of possible experience—
namely, an appearance that is subject to the a priori conditions of sensibility and understanding, 
i.e., space and time and categories of understanding—or a thing in itself? Further, the proposition 
of consciousness leaves the notion of representation much more ambiguous than Reinhold 
himself believes. The proposition defines representation in terms of the two activities, relating 
                                                   
psychological fact, an immediate inner experience of oneself. 
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and distinguishing; however, whether those activities are a priori or a posteriori—logically or 
temporally— to that which are related and distinguished needs to be better articulated.  
 
3. Being of Consciousness:  
From Reinhold’s Fact to Fichte’s Act via Schulze’s Skepticism 
 
With the conception of the fact of consciousness, Reinhold leaves his doctrine of the 
faculty of representation vulnerable to skeptic challenges. Specifically, Schulze brought up sharp 
criticism of the critical philosophy of Kant and Reinhold, and this played an important role in 
Fichte’s elaboration of an alternative notion of consciousness as an Act [Tathandlung] to 
Reinhold’s one as a fact [Tatsache]. Schulze concedes that as a skeptic, he never intends to deny 
the matter of fact itself, the fact “that we possess the representations of a sensibility, an 
understanding and a reason.”22 Rather, the problem he finds in Reinhold’s notion of the fact of 
                                                   
22 G.E.Schulze, Aenesidemus or Concerning the Foundations of the Philosophy of the Elements Issued by Prof. 
Reinhold in Jena Together with a Defense of Skepticism Against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason, in 
Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, trans. George di Giovanni and 
H.S.Harris (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000),109. Hegel provides a sharp criticism of 
Schulze in his essay published in the Critical Journal in 1802: “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, 
Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient one.” In this essay, 
Hegel mainly refers to Schulze’s Critique of Theoretical Philosophy (1801), which was issued nine years after the 
publication of his first work Aenesidemus (1792). Hegel’s essay does not contain any significant direct reference to 
the Aenesidemus, but it is known that Schulze has not changed his position over the nine years. It is therefore still 
worth mentioning in spelling out Schulze’s eclecticism. Shortly, Hegel estimates that Schulze shares with 
Reinhold’s “conscious-fact” philosophy the same belief in “indubitable certainty” of “the facts of consciousness:” 
G.W.F, Hegel, On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and 
Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One, in Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-
Kantian Idealism, 318. Although Schulze brought up some critical, skeptic questions about the Critical philosophy 
of Kant and Reinhold, he does not go beyond the standpoint of consciousness, which assumes that “the existence of 
what is given within the compass of our consciousness has undeniable certainty” (ibid. 318). Hegel’s criticism of 
Schulze is acute. The fact-conscious philosophy of Schulze, for Hegel, makes two inconsistent claims: that “the 
existence and character of things is self-explanatory,” and that it is “not self-explanatory” (ibid. 319). It is a 
skepticism holding fast to the idea that “nothing of what experience teaches, can be an object of skeptical doubt” 
(ibid. 320). Ultimately, the source of such a defective position of Schulze lies in his clinging to “an extremely 
subjective point of view” (ibid. 315). Hegel thus concludes Schulze’s skepticism is incomplete and not philosophical 
indeed, in contrast to the ancient skepticism that puts into doubt all sensible, empirical experiences. With regard to 
Hegel’s understanding of the ancient skepticism and its significance for Hegel’s later reintroduction of the issue of 
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consciousness is that it undermines the main ideas of Kant’s Critique on which it is supposed to 
be based. Reinhold establishes that “there must be the faculty of representation” with an 
emphasis on its belonging to an undeniable fact, but he does not offer any proof of “the objective 
actuality of the faculty of representation.”23 Schulze therefore claims that Reinhold’s assumption 
of the faculty of representation per se as that to which three cognitive powers belong is in fact 
based on a causal inference: since there are representations (sensibility, understanding, and 
reason), there must be the faculty of representations.24 In this causal inference, cognitive powers 
are regarded as effects of which the cause is supposed to exist independently of them, and the 
mind, called the faculty of representation per se, is assumed to be their effective cause. Yet, 
Reinhold ignores the fact that the mind is an object that is a “suprasensible object,” which is 
“neither intuitable nor given to any experience.”25 Thus, Schulze contends that the defect of 
Reinhold’s argument consists in applying the categories of understanding, causality and 
actuality, to the supersensible object called mind or the faculty of representation per se. For 
Schulze, Reinhold is committing the same error as one that Kant finds has been committed by 
the classic metaphysicians.  
Schulze further claims that the same problem occurs in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
He points out that Kant believes a satisfactory account of the possibility of synthetic judgements 
can be given by showing that they are necessary as far as they originate in the mind, and by 
                                                   
the standpoint of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, see in particular: H.S.Harris, “Skepticism, 
Dogmatism and Speculation,” in Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, 252-
271.  
23 Cf. G.E.Schulze, Aenesidemus or Concerning the Foundations of the Philosophy of the Elements Issued by Prof. 
Reinhold in Jena Together with a Defense of Skepticism Against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason, 107-108. 
24 Ibid. 107-109. 
25 Ibid. 110.  
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establishing that they are forms of our experiential cognition.26 But Kant thereby treats the 
existence of synthetic judgements in the mind as “undeniable conscious fact[s],” and points to 
the mind as the ultimate ground of their being a priori when the necessity of those conscious 
facts is called into question.27 Schulze therefore suggests that Kant’s “Transcendental 
Deduction” regards the mind as the effective cause of cognitive powers, just as Reinhold’s 
Elementary philosophy considers the faculty of representation as the effective cause of 
representation. Schulze’s primary concern is not to decide the epistemological or the ontological 
status of mind. As a skeptic, he is content with the skeptic conclusion that one can only affirm 
that it is “undecided whether or not such faculties of this sort have actual being outside our 
representations of them,”28 and that both Kant and Reinhold fail to dispel Hume’s doubt on 
account of their presupposition of the existence of mind as the efficient cause of representations 
and as the ultimate ground for the latter’s necessity. To what extent Schulze’s criticism does 
justice to Kant would be a matter of a further independent research. Regardless of how relevant 
his criticism is to the authors’ own view he criticizes, the point remains important that his skeptic 
reconstruction of Kant’s and Reinhold’s argument made the being of consciousness a problem.  
Along with Schulze’s reading of Kant and Reinhold, we can therefore pose a question 
about the ontological status of consciousness. How can one speak of the mode of being of 
consciousness within the framework of the Kantian transcendentalism? Indeed, Kant himself 
dismisses any metaphysical approach to consciousness. He claims that it is a paralogism of pure 
reason, committed on the behalf of rational psychology, to take the soul as a substance that 
                                                   
26 Cf. ibid. 112. 
27 Ibid. 112. 
28 Ibid. 109. 
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allegedly has simplicity, unity, and identity, for its properties. For Kant, this metaphysical notion 
of the soul is nothing but a transcendental ideal that pure reason is forced to bring forth by its 
internal demand for “the absolute identity of a thinking subject.”29 Pure reason thus deduces the 
substantiality of the self from the activity of thinking, just as Descartes establishes the existence 
of I from the self-conscious act of thinking. But such a deduction is illicit, Kant argues, because 
“although I exists in all thought, not the slightest intuition is connected with this 
representation.”30 Kant therefore concludes that the I, as transcendental apperception, has only a 
logical meaning that it is a representation accompanying all representations.31 “Even our inner 
experience, which Descartes considers as undoubted,” Kant contends, “is possible only on the 
supposition of outer experience,”32 and the I alone, as a pure concept, cannot be the object of 
knowledge.33 With such an anti-metaphysical approach, however, Kant seems to leave it more or 
less ambiguous what consciousness can be—what it is if it is neither an object of possible 
experience, nor an appearance, nor an object of knowledge. In this regard, Schulze’s criticism of 
Kant and Reinhold has a point in calling attention to the fact that if consciousness is to be 
regarded as something in which all epistemic processes take place, this something, within the 
framework of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, cannot be an appearance which is subject to the 
conditions of space and time. Indeed, the Critique disallows ascribing the category of actuality to 
consciousness by establishing that the soul is something that can be thought but is not an object 
of our possible experience. But it still leaves a room for treating consciousness as a transcendent 
                                                   
29 KrV, A336/B393 
30 KrV, A350. 
31 Cf. KrV, A97/B132.  
32 Cf. KrV, B275. 
33 Cf. KrV, B 406-407, 412-413. 
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object, a thing-in-itself, because of the same idea that consciousness is not an object of our 
possible experience. This is a trap of Kantian transcendentalism which Reinhold ends up falling 
into when he tries to think of the fact of consciousness as the ground of all the three different 
doctrines of cognitive powers in the Critique. 
In 1794, two years after the publication of Schulze’s book Aenesidemus, Fichte wrote a 
long review of it.34 As an enthusiastic proponent of Kant’s Critical philosophy who claimed for 
remaining true to the spirit, not the letter, of Kant’s thought, Fichte takes on a defense of Kant 
against Schulze’s challenge.35 In his review, Fichte thus points out that it was neither Kant nor 
Reinhold but Schulze who thought of “the faculty of representation” only as “‘a thing’ that exists 
as thing-in-itself, independent of his representing it, and indeed as a thing that represents.”36 
Kant’s Critical philosophy, in other words, is not necessarily responsible for the misconception 
of consciousness as a thing-in-itself. And what is important to Fichte is the fact that it is a 
misconception to regard consciousness as a thing-in-itself. Given the dualism in Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason between appearance and thing-in-itself, then, one might attempt to define 
consciousness as an appearance. This cannot be a satisfactory account of consciousness, 
however, because, as Fichte sees through the problem, consciousness differs in kind from any 
external object given to consciousness as an object of possible experience. In criticizing Schulze, 
                                                   
34 J.G.Fichte, Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundation of the Philosophy of the Elements issued by Prof. 
Reinhold in Jena, together with a Defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason, in 
Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, trans. George di Giovanni and 
H.S.Harris (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 137-157. In the following, citations from 
this text will be used with the abbreviation “Aenesidemus Review.”   
35 His “Aenesidemus Review” is known to be important not only in the development of German Idealism but also in 
the development of Fichte’s own transcendental philosophy, specifically of his notion of the Act of consciousness 
[Tathandlung]. For a systematic and detailed account of Fichte’s Aenesidemus Review, see: Daniel Breazeale, 
“Fichte’s ‘Aenesidemus’ Review and the Transformation of German Idealism,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34, 
no. 3 (1981): 545-568.  
36 Fichte, “Aenesidemus Review,” 141. 
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therefore, Fichte does not entirely dismiss his problematization of the mode of being of 
consciousness. The relevant strategy for defending Kant against the skeptic questioning would 
consist in showing how one can then speak of the mode of being of consciousness within the 
framework of the Kantian philosophy, not doing away with the opponent’s questioning. When 
Fichte charges Schulze for his “extravagant awareness” to call into question “the objective 
existence of such a thing as the faculty of representation,” what Fichte finds extravagant is 
therefore not the question of the existence of consciousness, but more precisely the allegedly 
objective mode of existence, which one usually ascribes to external objects of consciousness and 
which Schulze seems to be projecting to consciousness. Yet, it seems then indispensable to move 
the so-called Kantian Critical philosophy forward to such an extent as to go beyond the doctrine 
of the first Critique, since consciousness can be neither a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. This 
is where Fichte’s replacement of Reinhold’s fact of consciousness [Tatsache] with his new 
notion of consciousness as an Act [Tathandlung] comes into play.  
Fichte establishes that the truth of consciousness is that “the faculty of representation 
exists for the faculty of representation and through the faculty of representation.”37 In other 
words, consciousness is an activity of positing itself through itself. Ego is an act that produces its 
being by its activity of positing itself. Such is the act of consciousness [Tathandlung]. This being 
assumed, Reinhold’s failure, responsible for Schulze’s wholesale criticism of the Kantian 
philosophy, consists in his incapacity to think of the faculty of representation per se as an 
                                                   
37 Ibid.143. 
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activity of producing representations, nor of representation as a mode of operation of 
consciousness or as a means of producing representations.38  
Fichte also argues that his new notion of consciousness as the Act [Tathandlung] clears 
up the ambiguity of Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness. Reinhold’s proposition of 
consciousness sets up a mediating-mediated relationship among the three components of 
consciousness (object, subject, and representation) by ascribing two activities (relating and 
distinguishing) to consciousness, but it leaves it ambiguous which mediates which and which is 
mediated by which. In this regard, Reinhold declares the priority of representation over subject 
and object, a logical priority necessitated by the fact that subject and object are present in 
consciousness only by mediation of representation. But Schulze counters Reinhold by claiming 
that subject and object must be prior to representation because it would otherwise be impossible 
for representation to be related to subject and object. With regard to those two positions, Fichte 
acknowledges the relevance of both, and yet only partially. As Reinhold claims, representation 
has priority over subject and object, but the priority stands only with empirical consciousness in 
which subject and object are only relatively considered via representation, i.e., only “qua 
representing and qua represented.”39 Schulze’s idea is also right, Fichte argues, and yet only with 
the absolute Ego and not with empirical consciousness. There must be, in other words, the bearer 
of the relationship in order for there to be any representation, but this bearer can never be an 
empirical consciousness but only a pure Ego which is capable of producing that relationship 
from within itself.   
                                                   
38 Cf. ibid. 142. 
39 Ibid. 
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The debate about Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness among Reinhold, Schulze, 
and Fichte is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between the act of relating and the 
terms that are related by that act—which occurs prior. It is caused by the problem of Reinhold’s 
proposition, which establishes that consciousness is relational but does not offer any further 
account of the nature of that relationship. Fichte’s solution to this problem, as we have seen 
above, consists in separating two dimensions of consciousness, in confining the relational aspect 
to empirical consciousness and elaborating a non-empirical notion of consciousness for the 
source of that relationship. In separating the two dimensions of consciousness, Fichte 
acknowledges that the relational aspect of consciousness emphasized by Reinhold is the nature 
of empirical consciousness. Implicit in this acknowledgement is the idea that it is the nature of 
empirical consciousness to lead us to the puzzle of the relationship between the bearer of the act 
of relating on the one hand, and terms that are related by revealing only its relational aspect on 
the other. Fichte thus brings forth a fundamental insight about the puzzle of the self-reflectivity 
of consciousness, namely the fact that consciousness is at the same time subject of and object to 
itself. The insight states that the puzzle becomes a puzzle when consciousness is considered in 
terms of the immediate self-conscious experience of oneself conceptualizable as the fact of 
consciousness or as the Cartesian Cogito, or as such an immediate, psychological given.  
Therefore, when Fichte claims that consciousness is not a fact but an act, consciousness as an act 
is not to be confused with in immediate self-conscious reflection of oneself.  
The psychological reflection for Fichte has to do with Reinhold’s fact of consciousness, 
a fact that is given through empirical self-observation. Fichte therefore sides with Schulze with 
respect to the idea that there must be something responsible for the act of relating, and that the 
bearer of the conscious act must be prior to representation. But Fichte is careful, at the same 
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time, not to make the bearer into a thing, something that has a mode of existence of an external 
thing, or into a transcendent object, i.e., a thing-in-itself. Fichte therefore suggests that the bearer 
of the conscious act of relating is not subject to the conditions of sensible intuition, space and 
time; rather, it should be an intellectual intuition which produces its own being by thinking. In 
short, the radical change in the conception of consciousness made by Fichte can be viewed as a 
result of radicalizing Schulze’s provocative question concerning the being of consciousness. 
With his skeptical reading of Reinhold and Kant, Schulze brings up the issue that consciousness 
should ontologically differ from any other external object. He showed that as soon as the peculiar 
mode of the being of consciousness is called into question, it comes into sight that Kant’s 
doctrine of a priori conditions of an object of possible experience leaves it undecided whether 
consciousness belongs to appearance or to thing-in-itself. In this context, while Schulze charges 
Reinhold’s conception of the faculty of representation for making the mind into a transcendent 
object, Fichte pushes this point so far as to affirm that “the absolute subject, the Ego, is not given 
in an empirical intuition, but is posited through an intellectual one.”40 The conception of 
intellectual intuition obviously contradicts the main assumption of Kant’s first Critique—that 
human intuition is sensible. But this is, for Fichte, a consequence one must accept when one 
wants to achieve a philosophical system on the base of the Kantian Critical philosophy. Fichte 
thus maintains that his new notion of consciousness as the Act better grounds the Critical 
philosophy than Reinhold’s fact of consciousness does. 
 
 
                                                   
40 Ibid. 
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4. Beyond Fichte’s Transcendental Consciousness 
 
4.1. Tathandlung in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre of 179441 
In the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, Fichte claims that “the primordial, absolutely 
unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge” is to be expressed as “Act-fact 
[Tathandlung].”42 He defines Tathandlung as that which does not appear among our empirical 
                                                   
41 In 1794 Fichte published the first version of his Wissenschaftslehre (the full title is Grundlage der gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehre, translated as Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge). By the neologism 
Wissenschaftslehre Fichte intends to radically revise Kantian Critical philosophy. But he was never satisfied with his 
presentation of the new Critical philosophy and so continuously revised it right up until his death. Fifteen versions of 
the Wissenschaftslehre are handed down to us. The English translators of Hegel’s Diffrenzschrift, H.S. Harris and 
Walter Cerf, state that Hegel’s exposition of Fichte’s system in this text is mainly based on the Foundation of the 
Entire Science of Knowledge of 1794: cf. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of 
Philosophy, trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 119, footnote 1. 
They also point out that “intellectual intuition” Hegel mentions in the Differenzschrift is thematized by Fichte for the 
first time in the “Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge” of 1797. On the basis of the remark by Harris 
and Cert, I refer to those two works of Fichte—the Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge of 1794, and the 
“Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge” of 1797—to examine Hegel’s understanding of Fichte in the 
Differenzschrift. English translations of both texts of Fichte are contained in: J.G. Fichte, Science of Knowledge with 
the First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, 
Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
Another important resource of Fichte Hegel refers to in the Differenzschrift is the Foundation of Natural Right of 
1796. In this text, Fichte develops the notion of recognition as the fundamental condition for interactions between 
free agents. Fichte’s suggestion is that in order to secure the sphere of free action, the Ego makes a demand on every 
other free agent that they should limit their action, and this necessarily involves the Ego’s recognition of all other 
free agents as rational beings who make the same demand on him. This is an application of the first principle of a 
theoretical science established in the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre—that the Ego posits itself as limited by the non-
Ego—to the relation of right [Recht]. To ground his notion of recognition, Fichte further theorizes the body as the 
external, material world in which the mutually recognitional relationship can take place. In the Differenzschrift, 
however, Hegel challenges Fichte’s notion of the embodiment of the Ego as the necessary condition for an 
individual agent’s being a subject of right, for its treatment of the body as a merely dead matter (cf. W 2, 80-81/ Diff, 
142-3). Hegel calls into question Fichte’s claim that a community of rational beings must depend on the system of 
coercive laws because recognition does not necessarily involve a moral respect of others’ rights. Hegel thus sees 
Fichte’s system as entailing a multiplication of prohibitive and punitive laws, which he finds are made superfluous 
by customs in a beautiful community (cf. W 2, 84-5/ Diff, 146-7). Further, the multiplication of coercive laws in 
Fichte’s system is for Hegel a logical consequence of the view of a rational agent’s body as a dead matter, and of the 
recognitional relationship between rational agents as a causal relationship. This is more fundamentally associated 
with Fichte’s antithetical conception of the relationship between the Ego and the non-Ego, intelligence and nature. 
In my view, this early critical engagement of Hegel with Fichte’s notion of embodiment and recognition is later 
systematically developed into his theory of habit as a second nature, which I discuss in Chapter 5.  
42 The German Tathandlung is translated as “fact/act” or “Act.” It appears that one can understand the full meaning 
of this term only by going through the entire Wissenschaftslehre, which Fichte revised over a decade. The term 
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consciousness but underlies all consciousness and makes it possible.43 To present [darstellen] 
how Tathandlung can operate as the first principle of all knowledge, Fichte suggests two 
methodical procedures: reflection and abstraction. Reflection can proceed from any proposition 
that is granted by everyone without dispute, i.e., a fact of empirical consciousness accompanying 
the feeling of necessity. Reflection is a free thinking about what such a fact of empirical 
consciousness is in its purity. Abstraction is then concerned with detaching from the same fact of 
consciousness all empirical features one after another until there remains nothing empirical.  
 To present Tathandlung, Fichte first singles out the proposition of identity A=A. He 
reflects on the fact that the proposition A=A does not posit “that A is” or “that there is an A.” 
The only thing that is posited by the proposition is the “if-so connection (=X):” “if that A is, then 
there is an A.” It then turns out that the X is only posited in and by the Ego because the ‘I’ is the 
one who judges in that proposition. Yet, the X is connected to both ‘A’s, subject and predicate, 
and the two ‘A’s are, in their turn, united in the X. This means, for Fichte, that insofar as A is 
posited at all, A is posited in and by the Ego.  
 From this, it follows that what is posited in the proposition of identity is “Ego is.” 
Whereas the proposition A=A does not establish the being of the terms of the proposition, its 
self-evidence establishes that the “Ego is.” But this Ego, of which the being is thus posited by the 
proposition of identity, is an empirical consciousness, the one who makes the judgement A=A. 
“Ego is,” is therefore itself “a fact of consciousness [Tatsache]”44 of which the being is assured 
                                                   
Tathandlung also seems to involve a complex, problematic relationship between empirical and transcendental 
consciousness. Considering the difficulty of finding an English word which conveys its full meaning and sounds 
natural at the same time, I here use the German word Tathandlung. 
43 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 93. 
44 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 96. 
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by a fact of empirical consciousness, by the feeling of necessity accompanying the proposition of 
identity.  
 Now, if we abstract all the empirical features from the reflections above, two pure factors 
of the proposition of identity can be drawn. First, the two ‘A’s, i.e., both subject and predicate, of 
the proposition of identity are posited in and by the Ego. Second, the Ego is. From these two 
factors, then, a new proposition of identity is finally drawn out: “Ego is Ego.” Fichte highlights 
that in this new proposition “Ego is Ego,” the Ego is posited unconditionally and absolutely 
[schlechthin]. If in the proposition “A=A,” A is posited by the if-so connection and hence by the 
mediation of the Ego, the Ego in proposition “Ego=Ego” is posited by and through the Ego itself. 
If the Ego in “the Ego is” is a fact of consciousness [Tatsache], in other words, the Ego in the 
“Ego=Ego” “posits itself simply [schlechthin] because it exists; it posits itself by merely existing 
and exists by merely being posited.”45 This is the conclusion that Fichte draws out from his 
abstracting reflection on the proposition of identity “A=A.” Consequently, what Tathandlung is, 
is now fully unfolded and can be expressed in the formula: “Ego posits fundamentally and 
absolutely [schlechthin] its own being.”46 
 Fichte’s notion of Tathandlung can be considered in light of the problem of a thing-in-
itself in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. As it is well known, Jacobi pointed out that problem in 
Kant’s Critique with his famous statement that without the presupposition of a thing-in-itself one 
cannot partake in Kant’s philosophy, and yet one cannot stay with it holding the same 
proposition. The ambiguity in Kant’s idea of a thing-in-itself was thus regarded by the early Kant 
                                                   
45 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 98. 
46 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 99.  
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readers as one of the biggest problems of Kant’s Critical philosophy. Indeed, one of the most 
important claims presented in Kant’s first Critique is that that a thing-in-itself, although it can be 
thought, cannot be an object of knowledge. Yet, Kant states, on the other hand, that “the non-
sensible cause of the representations,” i.e., “merely intelligible cause of appearances in general” 
can be called “the transcendental object.”47 With an emphasis on his thesis of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic that sensible intuition is only receptive and hence should be affected by something 
else, the statement then most likely authorizes the idea that sensible intuition is to be affected by 
something merely intelligible, by a thing-in-itself. This being said, Kant seems to be inconsistent 
in claiming, on the one hand, that a thing-in-itself cannot be known and has no constitutive value 
regarding our knowledge of objects, and on the other hand, that it is the non-sensible cause of 
our representation.  
Proclaiming himself to remain true to the spirit of Kant without sticking only to the letter 
of the critical philosophy of Kant, Fichte justifies his reading of Kant by distinguishing between 
two ways of establishing a system of transcendental philosophy. There are, according to Fichte, 
two different ways of grounding our experiences: dogmatism and idealism, depending on if they 
ground experiences upon a thing-in-itself or the self-conscious activity of the Ego. Those who 
criticize Kant for his doctrine of a thing-in-itself as an efficient cause of representation such as 
Jacobi and Schulze are dogmatists. But Fichte maintains that “certainly our knowledge all 
proceeds from an affection; but not affection by an object.”48 For him, this notion leads us to an 
idealistic reading of Kant, enabling us to remain true to the spirit of Kant. To support his idealist 
                                                   
47 Kant, KrV, B522. 
48 Fichte, “Second Introduction,” Science of Knowledge, 60. 
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reading of Kant, Fichte focuses on Kant’s idea of transcendental apperception which he finds is 
primarily characterized as a pure act of a self, an act conditioning all consciousness.49 Fichte’s 
claim is that Kant’s transcendental apperception contains the idea of his Wissenschaftslehre, 
which aims to explain how intellectual intuition, i.e., the absolute self-activity of the pure Ego, 
grounds all empirical consciousness.50 But he also recognizes the difference between Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy and his Wissenschaftslehre. Whereas “being conditioned 
[Bedingtheit]” for Kant does not necessarily imply “being determined [Bestimmtheit],” it does in 
his Wissenschaftslehre.51 Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, in other words, only establishes that 
self-consciousness conditions empirical consciousness without showing how the former grounds 
the latter and how one can derive the latter from the former. It does not prove the categories to be 
conditioned by self-consciousness but simply says that they are.52 For this reason, Fichte holds 
that in Kant’s Deduction there is no deduction of categories from the activity of the pure self-
consciousness. This being said, Kant’s Deduction does not offer a truly transcendental account of 
                                                   
49 Cf. Kant, KrV, B132. For Fichte’s interpretation of Kant’s transcendental apperception, see in particular: Fichte, 
“Second Introduction,” Science of Knowledge, 45-52.  
50 As for Fichte’s articulation of “intellectual intuition,” see in particular: “Second Introduction,” Science of 
Knowledge, 38-42.  
51 Fichte, “Second Introduction,” Science of Knowledge, 50. Before Fichte, Maimon addresses the problem of Kant’s 
deduction of categories in terms of determinability. Although concepts of understanding are a priori conditions of 
our experience of an object, from this it does not necessarily follow that those concepts actually determine our 
experience of an object. This being assumed, it turns out that Kant does not properly address how categories actually 
apply to the manifold of sensory intuition. With respect to Maimon’s conception of the principle of determinability 
and its direct influence on Fichte’s idea of reciprocal determination [Wechselbestimmung] in the Wissenschaftslehre, 
see: Daniel Breazeale, “‘Real Synthetic Thinking’ and the Principle of Determinability,” in Thinking Through the 
Wissenschaftslehre. Themes from Fichte’s Early Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 43-69.     
52 Cf. “I am aware that he [Kant] by no means proved the categories he set up to be conditions of self-consciousness, 
but merely said that they were so:” Fichte, “Second Introduction,” Science of Knowledge, 51. Indeed, this sentence 
is ambiguous because it seems to imply that categories are to be proved as that which conditions self-consciousness. 
The German original amplifies the ambiguity: “Ich weiss, dass er die von ihm aufgestellten Kategorien keinesweges 
als Bedingungen des Selbstbewesstseyns erwiesen” (Italic is mine). To my understanding, neither Kant’s Deduction 
nor Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre conclude that categories condition self-consciousness. Thus, I read “Bedingungen 
des Selbstbewesstseyns” as “being conditioned by self-consciousness” or “results of self-consciousness’s 
conditioning.” 
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the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. Consequently, Fichte believes that by developing 
the Kantian notion of transcendental apperception into the key notion of his Wissenshaftslehre, 
i.e., intellectual intuition, he can develop a system of true transcendental philosophy that fits the 
spirit of Kantian Critical philosophy, one that can offer a deduction of categories without the 
presupposition of a thing-in-itself.  
For Fichte, Tathandlung, intellectual intuition, and pure Ego are the names for a truly 
transcendental consciousness that replaces Kant’s transcendental apperception. The truly 
transcendental is to be defined as a self-affecting, self-positing, active principle. Only as such, 
can there be a transcendental consciousness that underlies all consciousness without itself 
appearing among empirical consciousness, which Kant expressed through his doctrine of 
transcendental apperception but failed to develop as a first principle grounding his Critical 
philosophy.  
Fichte’s presentation of the way in which Tathandlung operates as such a transcendental 
principle, however, leaves the relationship between empirical and transcendental consciousness 
enigmatic. As we have seen above, Fichte starts with a law of identity A=A and proceeds to the 
thesis that a pure Ego posits itself in an absolute and unconditioned manner. Fichte’s claim is 
that he can thereby show how a pure Ego underlies the fact of empirical consciousness, i.e., the 
law of identity. But Fichte seems to be deriving a pure Ego from the fact of empirical 
consciousness.53 To be more precise, he seems to be assuming that his derivation of the principle 
                                                   
53 Perhaps we can address the enigmatic relationship between empirical and transcendental consciousness in Fichte’s 
Wissenschatslehre in terms of the methodic meaning of a presentation [Darstellung]. Fichte states that his thought 
process, methodologically guided by reflection and abstraction, is a presentation [Darstellung] of how the pure Ego 
operates as the first principle of all empirical consciousness. It is then questionable how a transcendental principle, 
assumed not to appear among empirical consciousness, can be a matter of presentation if the term presentation has a 
meaning of conveying images or illustrating representations and hence presupposes a certain symbolic relationship 
between presentation and what is presented. Indeed, the problem is begging the question because presentation 
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of Ego=Ego is itself a presentation of Tathandlung. He shows what the Tathandlung is by 
himself reflecting on a series of propositions. Along with the method of abstracting reflection, 
Tathandlung is thus turned into his philosophical reflection, a thought-process of an individual 
philosopher called Fichte. But this does not seem to fit well with his definition of Tathandlung as 
the pure Ego that posits its own being in an unconditioned and absolute manner, since this 
positing by pure Ego is by definition not to take place in an empirical consciousness. In 
continuation of our previous discussion about Reinhold’s definition of consciousness as a 
psychological fact, therefore, we can pose a question as to whether Fichte’s Tathandlung is not, 
in fact, leaving room for being confused with a psychological act, a psychological self-
consciousness of an individual mind. This is one of the main points of Hegel’s criticism of 
Fichte, which I will deal with below in more detail by examining the second and third principles 
of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre together with Hegel’s critical reconstruction of Fichte’s 




                                                   
cannot have a methodical meaning without presupposing a certain relationship between empirical and pure 
consciousness, which Fichte should therefore define prior to setting out the presentation. This is also a question we 
can pose in the context of Kant’s definition of presentation [Darstellung] as a method for mathematics and not for a 
philosophical proof. Kant states that “Philosophical knowledge is knowledge which reason gains from concepts; 
mathematical knowledge is knowledge which reason gains from the construction [Darstellung] of concepts. By 
constructing a concept I mean exhibiting a priori the intuition corresponding to it” (KrV, B 741). An example of this 
type of construction is presenting an image of a triangle to the mind which corresponds to the concept of a triangle. 
When presenting an image of a triangle to the mind, reason does not borrow anything from experience. Kant 
therefore affirms that in the mathematical construction, one presents the object entirely a priori. Thus, both 
philosophy and mathematics are a priori knowledge. However, they differ in the direction in which each of them 
proceeds: “philosophical knowledge considers the particular only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the 
universal in the particular, and indeed in the individual” (KrV, B742).  
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4.2. Hegel’s Criticism of Fichte in the Differenzschrift 
In 1801, shortly after his arrival at Jena, Hegel published the Differenzschrift. Hegel’s 
goal in this work is to clarify the difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s systems, which he 
finds their contemporary readers fail to notice. As a champion of Schelling’s identity philosophy 
Hegel eventually endorses his younger friend’s system as truly speculative. But the 
Differenzschrift contains Hegel’s detailed critical analyses of Fichte’s doctrine of Tathandlung 
and thus gives some important clues for elucidating Hegel’s own position about the systematic 
significance of consciousness. 
In the Differenzschrift, Hegel first calls attention to the historical meaning of Fichte’s 
and Schelling’s philosophies. As with Reinhold, Hegel considers the need of philosophy as 
essential in defining the present philosophical task. But Hegel’s consideration of the need of 
philosophy is not limited to philosophical situations, i.e. those which, for instance, Reinhold 
framed in terms of the decline of old philosophy, the rise of popular philosophy, and the lack of a 
new system. For Hegel, the need of philosophy has its source, more widely and deeply, in the 
culture of his era: the modern European culture which he finds is penetrated by various forms of 
dichotomy, such as the division between life and philosophy, between individuals and 
community, between man and God, etc.54 Such historical conditions with which philosophical 
endeavors are inherently connected, give rise to the need for a philosophical system capable of 
                                                   
54 For Hegel’s conception of dualism as characteristic of modern culture, see in particular: Michael N. Forster, 
Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 17-60. In 
Hegel’s early theological writings, Forster articulates the eight modern dualisms which he finds at play behind the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The first four are concerned with separation of man from reality: divisions between 
man/nature and God, man and nature, individuals and their community, and the self/its thought and reality. The last 
four deal with the division of man within himself: divisions between fact and human volition, duty and 
inclination/desire, virtue and happiness, and mind and body.     
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bringing all dualistic conceptions to a synthesis. Whether there remains any oppositional idea is 
therefore for Hegel an essential appraisal standard of any philosophical system. Hegel coins the 
evaluative terms speculation and reflection, matching them with the Kantian terms, reason and 
understanding, respectively. An infinite mode of thinking capable of grasping the absolute 
identity of subject and object is called speculative; a finite mode of thinking that remains the 
standpoint of opposition is called reflective.  
With regard to Fichte’s doctrine of Tathandlung, Hegel first appraises that the notion of 
a pure Ego expresses the idea of the identity of subject and object. In this respect, Fichte’s 
philosophy, for Hegel, has a speculative aspect. This is so, however, only when it comes to the 
idea of a pure Ego. After a short remark about the speculative aspect of Fichte’s philosophy, 
Hegel contends that the speculative aspect is lost in Fichte’s system and is downgraded to 
reflection. To illustrate how this occurs, Hegel reformulates the problem of Fichte’s system as 
follows.55 Since Fichte wants empirical consciousness to be completely determined, and not just 
conditioned, by pure consciousness, his task is to demonstrate a complete annulation of the 
opposition between empirical and pure consciousness. However, Fichte considers the 
relationship of the two different types of consciousness in terms of a mutual determination. As a 
result, the opposition between the two does not completely disappear, and empirical 
consciousness is not completely determined by pure consciousness.  
To understand Hegel’s critical reconstruction of Fichte’s problem, we need to examine 
how Fichte proceeds from the first principle Ego=Ego to the second and third principles. As we 
have seen above, the principle Ego=Ego is derived from the proposition of identity A=A. 
                                                   
55 Cf. W 2, 52/ Diff, 119. 
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Following the derivation of the first principle Ego=Ego, Fichte takes up the proposition of 
opposition: “–A is not equal to A.” Fichte holds that in this proposition the subject –A is 
conditioned by A as to matter, in the sense that the content of –A means that it is not some 
specific thing, i.e., A. But the subject –A is not conditioned as to form because the form of –A 
only means that it is an opposite of something else. From this Fichte concludes that the second 
principle of all knowledge, i.e., the principle of opposition, is conditioned as to content. 
It is not hard to see that Fichte’s principle of opposition is concerned with the law of 
contradiction, which affirms that something cannot both be A and –A. Noticeable, however, is 
the fact that in contrast to the first principle “A=A,” Fichte does not proceed to articulate the 
second principle in terms of Ego. Instead, he simply states that the principle of opposition is the 
second principle of all knowledge, and that the second principle is conditioned as to content.56 
But this is not a coincidence. Fichte further adds that the second principle cannot be defined or 
verbally expressed at the present stage. Proper understanding of the proposition of opposition 
from the perspective of the Wissenschaftslehre can only be obtained after elucidating how the 
same principle is conditioned as to form, and this moves us into the need for the third principle, 
which states that the proposition of opposition is conditioned as to form.  
Although Fichte characterizes the second principle as being conditioned as to content, it 
thus seems that the focus of the second principle is rather on the formal aspect of opposition in 
general. By the unconditionality of the proposition of opposition as to form, Fichte means that –
A is posited just as absolutely as A. Positing of –A therefore has very little to do with a logical 
negation of the terms that cannot be predicated of A. Rather, it is a counter-positing performed 
                                                   
56 Cf. Science of Knowledge, 105. 
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by and in one and the same consciousness that posits A. The fact that the two acts, positing and 
counter-positing, belong to one and the same consciousness, according to Fichte, can be 
expressed by the formula “the Ego=the non-Ego.” This formula then sets down the last task of 
the philosopher of the Wissenschaftslehre. The task is to reconcile the two principles, one of 
identity and the other of opposition, by showing how the two acts belong to one and the same 
consciousness.  
From his considerations of the second and third principles, Fichte thus establishes that 
positing and counter-positing are not nullification of each other insofar as Ego and non-Ego 
mutually limit themselves. Since the conception of mutual limit comes from the idea of the unity 
of opposites by divisibility,57 which, in its turn, comes from pure abstraction even from the ideas 
of Ego and non-Ego, the third principle establishes that Ego and non-Ego are conditioned as to 
form.  
Now, Hegel’s criticism is that this idea of the Ego’s positing itself as being limited by 
the non-Ego cannot be an adequate answer to the problem brought up by Fichte: i.e., 
demonstrating a complete annulation of the opposition between empirical and transcendental 
consciousness. If empirical and transcendental consciousness appear in opposition, their identity 
for Hegel should be shown in a higher synthesis from which both originate. Fichte’s conception 
of the pure act of Ego expresses such a higher synthesis, but it disappears as soon as Fichte 
                                                   
57  Hegel holds that Fichte’s idea of mutual determination cannot offer a satisfactory solution to the problem brought 
up by Fichte himself: how to show empirical consciousness is determined and not just conditioned by transcendental 
consciousness. To my understanding, this is an underlying issue of Hegel’s Logic of Essence in which he shows how 
determinations of reflection (essentialities) including identity, difference, and contradiction are developed to the 
determination of essence, i.e., ground [Grund] by positing and determining reflections. For an interpretation of 
Hegel’s Logic of Essence in terms of a practice of Fichte’s Tathandlung, see: Michael Quante, “The Logic of 
Essence as Internal Reflection,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyer (Online Publication: DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199355228.013.12, 2017). 
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draws out the principle of Ego=Ego from his reflection on the proposition of identity, and the 
principle of the Ego’s positing itself as being limited by the non-Ego from another reflection of 
his on the proposition of opposition. Specifically, Hegel points out that the distinction between 
empirical and transcendental consciousness is a “concept” which “originates because he [the 
philosopher] abstracts in his thinking from all the extraneous things that are not Ego and holds on 
only to the connection of subject and object.”58 This being said, the task of the philosopher of the 
Wissenschaftslehre consists in “suspending pure consciousness as concept.”59 The philosopher 
promises to complete this task by constructing empirical consciousness from “an active 
emanation or self-production of the principle.”60 At this point, Fichte’s reflections on the three 
principles may well be said to be “three absolute acts of the Ego.”61 But they are all ideal factors 
and hence not real.62 Consequently, empirical consciousness is not completely determined by 
transcendental consciousness and their opposition remains in Fichte’s system.  
In the Differenzschrift, Hegel estimates that Schelling’s identity philosophy is 
completely speculative both in its principle and system. While the speculation is supposed to 
present a proper way for resolving the dichotomy of the two opposed poles—subject and object, 
nature and intelligence, necessity and freedom—and thus for establishing a system incorporating 
the two, the truly speculative solution is given by Schelling’s identity philosophy and not by 
Fichte’s Wissenschafstlehre. This is because Schelling’s system conceives not only the subject 
pole, but also the object pole as an expression of the absolute identity. In Schelling’s system, 
                                                   
58 W 2, 52-3/ Diff, 120.  
59 W 2, 53-4/ Diff, 120. 
60 W 2, 53/ Diff, 120. 
61 W 2, 57/ Diff, 123. 
62 Cf. W 2, 57-8/ Diff, 123-124. 
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“both subject and object are posited as Subject-Object” and “the Absolute presents itself in both 
together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both in so far as they are opposed.” 63 Both poles 
are thus equally credited for their being real for itself and hence for their status as “an object of a 
science.”64 Since both poles are equally conceived as something real in and through the absolute 
identity, the opposition of the two in Schelling’s system is real. Accordingly, Schelling’s system 
enables one to conceive both of its parts, nature and intelligence, as distinct ways in which the 
absolute identity is realized: nature as a self-determining, constitutively teleological totality, and 
consciousness as equally conditioned by nature. Nature and Intelligence, in other words, have 
only quantitative difference, such that neither of the two sciences has superiority over the other. 
The philosopher of the identity philosophy can then only show the “inner identity” of the two 
poles of the system.65 He is thus assumed to achieve an absolute equilibrium of its two parts by 
achieving the point of absolute indifference between the two.  
Hegel claims that Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre reduces the absolute identity to the subject 
pole by setting up a causal relationship between the pure and empirical Ego. It thus turns out that 
in Fichte’s system, “the only consciousness that exists is pure consciousness,” whereas “it is 
flatly denied that empirical consciousness is.”66 The object pole, in other words, is here 
conceived of as an ideal moment for the subject pole; hence, Fichte’s system is based off of an 
ideal opposition between subject and object. This is, so to speak, a nullification of the 
ontological objective validity of the world of non-Ego. Such is the consequence of Fichte’s 
                                                   
63  W 2, 94/ Diff, 155. 
64 W 2, 100/ Diff, 160. 
65 Ibid. 
66 W 2, 54/ Diff, 121. 
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subjectively one-sided identity of subject and object. Therefore, Hegel concludes that the 
“absolute identity of the Ego,” capable of grounding the whole system of philosophy—
incorporating both poles of subject and object, Ego and non-Ego, consciousness and nature—
cannot be such a “pure identity” opposed to the non-Ego, but must be “both identity and 
duplication at once.”67 This is the point that evades Fichte’s thought, demonstrating Fichte’s 
falling into the finite mode of thinking, reflection.  
 
4.3. The Problem of the Subjectivist Model of Consciousness 
Hegel’s primary concern in the Differenzschrift is to spell out the difference between 
Fichte and Schelling in favor of Schelling’s identity philosophy, but Hegel gradually gives up his 
alliance with Schelling. As it is well documented, the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 
formalizes Hegel’s break with his younger, wizardly friend by identifying the latter’s philosophy 
as formalism that captures only a “night in which all cows are black.”68 The Phenomenology of 
Spirit therefore suggests that the absolute is found, not in the absolute indifference of Schelling, 
but in the life of spirit tarrying with the negative, which necessarily makes itself into its own 
other and becomes for itself in its being otherness to itself. Indeed, the Phenomenology of Spirit 
does not fully develop a systematic concept of spirit; nor does it systematically consider the 
relationship between nature and spirit. Despite this, the conception of spirit as the self-relating 
negativity exhibits Hegel’s ultimate position about the proper way of achieving a philosophical 
system. As his mature system of the Encyclopedia substantializes, a philosophical system grasps 
                                                   
67 W 2, 55/ Diff, 122. 
68 GW 9, 17-8/ PhS §16. 
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the absolute as the logical Idea’s externalization into nature and the sublation of nature by spirit. 
Thus, the truly speculative identity is for Hegel to be grasped in terms of the sublation of nature 
by and into spirit insofar as spirit is inherently self-relating negativity.  
Along with Hegel’s declaration of his departure from Schelling, one might be tempted to 
take the Phenomenology of Spirit as resuscitating some elements of Fichte’s conception of 
consciousness as an act [Tathandlung]. Both Fichte’s pure Ego and Hegel’s spirit are 
characterized as self-conscious and active. Further, the Phenomenology of Spirit sets up a 
connection between natural consciousness and the perspective of a philosopher (“for-us”) as the 
methodological ground of how natural consciousness achieves absolute knowing by going 
through all its experiences. Apparently, this is comparable to the relationship between empirical 
and transcendental consciousness in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.  
However, these factors which Fichte and Hegel seem to have in common appear to have 
no substantial meaning, if not for the self-relating, active element assigned to the principle of a 
philosophical system. Obviously, both Fichte and Hegel can be said to inaugurate self-
consciousness as the truth of consciousness. But they have different ideas of each of those key 
terms. If self-conscious activity is for Hegel an essential term that articulates the speculative 
identity, this is so, strictly speaking, insofar as that activity belongs to spirit and not to 
consciousness. For the same reason, when Hegel establishes in the Phenomenology of Spirit that 
the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, both consciousness and self-consciousness 
belong to natural consciousness which has to make experience, such that they are not concerned 
with such a pure Ego as that of Fichte which ultimately involves an intellectual intuition. More 
importantly, Hegel leaves no room for reducing self-consciousness as the truth of consciousness 
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or the self-relating, active nature of spirit, to a self-awareness of an individual mind. Hegel’s 
departure from Schelling and the subsequent development of his doctrines of consciousness and 
spirit, therefore, cannot be understood as a reinstatement of Fichte’s doctrine of the pure Ego, if 
not the global theme of the superiority of spirit over nature.  
Therefore, Hegel’s notion of spirit differs both from Fichte’s pure Ego and Schelling’s 
nature-intelligence identity. Perhaps it is correct to say that Hegel finds a third way of 
establishing a philosophical system. To my understanding, this is the place where we can discuss 
the significance of the early fragmentary manuscript of Hegel, “the Philosophy of Spirit of 
1803/4.” In this manuscript, Hegel establishes the thesis that consciousness is the concept of 
spirit, assuming that nature and spirit differ from each other depending on whether the absolute 
union of being and becoming is only implicit (nature) or actual (spirit). As I will show in the next 
section, Hegel thus theorizes consciousness as a living organism, and yet as a particular sort of 
an organism in which spirit becomes spirit for itself. Thus, this early Jena manuscript affirms the 
superiority of spirit over nature and not the equilibrium of the two, and hence alludes Hegel’s 
departure from Schelling. But it also shows how Hegel develops his notion of consciousness on a 
different base from that of Fichte’s Ego, specifically by conceiving it as a living organism.  
Importantly, Hegel’s criticism of the Fichtean conception of consciousness is part of his 
broader critical assessment of the modern concept of the subject. In his Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy, Hegel appreciates that Descartes’ philosophy is the “true starting point of modern 
philosophy.”69 Specifically, Descartes opened up a completely new era in the history of 
                                                   
69 W 20, 123. 
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philosophy by transplanting philosophy to a new sphere, i.e., “the sphere of subjectivity.”70 For 
Hegel, both Kant and Fichte move within that sphere opened up by Descartes, one in which 
subjectivity is considered at the level of an individual mind and not of spirit’s self-relation. Hegel 
holds that such a modern concept of subjectivity clings to a rigid opposition between an 
individual mind and the external world; it thus also represents antithetical principles that frame 
modern forms of life. While the speculative identity is ultimately concerned with overcoming all 
the antithetical structures framing modernity, Hegel sees that Fichte remains in the framework of 
the Cartesian Cogito by taking the I, conceived as self-certainty and such a self-relation, as the 
absolute starting point for building up a philosophical system.71 Just as he did in the 
Differenzschrift, so too does Hegel appreciate in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy the 
speculative aspect of Fichte’s notion of the ego. What Fichte developed was “the absolute form,” 
which affirms the idealist truth that “all the matter in the universe must be represented as 
produced from the ego.”72 However, Fichte ultimately turned this absolute ego into “the artificial 
consciousness,” “the consciousness of consciousness,” by making the ordinary consciousness of 
the one who is philosophizing into his own object.73  
Along the lines of those critical remarks of Hegel, we can therefore pose a question as to 
whether the activity of Fichte’s pure Ego is, in fact, reducible to the activity of the Cartesian 
Cogito. Is it not the case that consciousness, which is assumed to be irreducible to such a 
psychological fact as that of Reinhold, is now instead understood by Fichte as a psychological 
                                                   
70 W 20, 130. 
71 Cf. W 20, 391-391.  
72 W 20, 388.  
73 W 20, 393. 
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act of an individual philosopher’s mind? At this point, Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s Tathandlung 
for being only ideal in his system becomes more comprehensible. In Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, 
Hegel finds that both the distinction between and identity of empirical and transcendental 
consciousness take place in the consciousness of a philosopher. Tathandlung thus becomes an act 
that the philosopher of the Wissenschaftslehre carries out, which amounts to saying that 
transcendental consciousness becomes empirical consciousness. Is this not a trap that one cannot 
but help falling into without ever knowing how to get out of it when adopting the first-person 
perspective?   
If Fichte’s pure Ego thus involves some methodological considerations regarding how 
consciousness can operate as an active principle, Hegel’s rejection of the Cartesian-Fichtean 
model of the ego for its inherently subjectivist orientation can more fully be explained by his 
distinction between external and internal reflection. The distinction between the two sorts of 
reflection is made in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel speaks of the 
customary way of writing a preface to one’s own work. It is generally assumed that in a preface 
the author explains the goal he sets for himself and how his approach is related to others’ 
approaches to the same subject matter. But Hegel suggests that each work of philosophy should 
be considered as part of the whole history of philosophy, i.e., the whole truth that has the form of 
an organic unity. Just as the truth reveals itself over time through such a teleological movement 
of the history of philosophy, so does the thing itself [die Sache selbst]74 require “development 
                                                   
74 The German Sache literally means the subject matter of a talk or an action. But Hegel imposes a particular 
meaning upon it: reality that is produced by reason, one that has in itself rationality. Sache thus prefigures the 
spiritual reality, namely the substantiality of spirit which in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers in terms of 
the ethical life of the ancient Greek. Jean Hyppolite highlights that Sache is objectivity, and yet the most contentful 
objectivity, calling it “spiritual objectivity:” cf., Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. Samual Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974; the French 
original published in 1946), 300.  In the Logic, Sache also implies the unity of being and thought. It is “the concept 
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[Ausführen]” because “the actual whole is not the result, but the result together with its 
becoming.”75  
Since the result is a result of a becoming, if one deals only with the result left behind its 
coming to be, this amounts to setting aside an essential part of the thing itself. Philosophical 
reflection is then only external to the thing itself. In order for a philosophical reflection to be 
internal to the thing itself, therefore, it is necessary to “reside in the thing itself and forget oneself 
in it.”76 At the center of this statement is the idea that the actual reality, called the thing itself, has 
in itself rationality; truly philosophical reflections consist in making the truth of such a rational 
reality emerge from within itself. Internal reflection therefore assumes a necessary, inherent 
connection between philosophical reflection and the thing itself, such that the rationality of the 
thing itself, in order for it to be truly actual, requires a philosophical reflection, and a 
philosophical reflection can be internally involved in the thing itself because of the rationality of 
the thing itself. A dynamic, living relationship between philosophy and reality thus defines an 
internal reflection, in comparison to an external reflection that grasps only the dead result left 
behind the movement of actuality.  
 
 
                                                   
of the things” and not “the things:” The Science of Logic, trans. George Di Giovanni (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 19. In his detailed comments on the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Yirmiyahu Yobel points out that 
Hegel’s Sache, indicating “actuality as a unity of being and thought,” recalls Kant’s thing-in-itself [Ding and sich]: 
cf. Yirmiyahu Yobel, Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit (Princeton University Press, 2005), 69. 
75 GW 9, 10-11; PhS, § 3. 
76 Ibid. 
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4.4. Rationale for the non-Cartesian-Fichtean Model of Self-consciousness 
The Cartesian-Fichtean model of the ego for Hegel can be said to be associated with an 
external reflection since it presupposes an antithetical relationship between a philosophizing 
subject and his objects. But the distinction between external and internal reflection also gives a 
clue for understanding how Hegel’s notion of spirit can offer an alternative conception of a self-
relating activity to Fichte’s pure Ego. What kind of self-relation and activity, if not of an 
individual’s self-consciousness, can be thought in pursuit of a philosophical system? At this 
point, it appears that Kant’s theory of the power of reflecting judgement offers an insight into the 
context in which what Hegel calls internal reflection carries an important meaning specifically 
with regard to the issue of overcoming the dualism between nature and human by a non-
subjectivist model of self-relation. 
To begin with, it should first be noted that the issue of a philosophical system, conceived 
by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, is not only concerned with the local problem of the 
Transcendental Deduction, but more broadly and more fundamentally with Kant’s dualism of 
nature and morality. Throughout the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical 
Reason, Kant presents a dualistic system comprised by the mechanism of natural causality and 
the metaphysics of moral freedom, without giving an account of a common ground of the two. In 
his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant attempts to show how the two sorts of teleological 
experience, i.e., aesthetic experience of beauty and reflective comprehension of an organism, can 
bridge nature and morality. At this point, it is worth nothing that the theory of the power of 
reflecting judgement in Kant’s third Critique affirms an opposite direction to the first Critique: 
from object to subject, instead of from subject to object. The first Critique sets forth the goal of 
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carrying out a Copernican revolution in philosophy by switching the direction of the working 
assumption: from the assumption that our knowledge must confirm to its object, to the notion 
that the object must confirm to our knowledge.77 It thus theorizes pure reason as that which has a 
full capacity for self-investigation. The validity of the objects of natural sciences is assumed to 
be guaranteed by pure reason’s investigations into its own powers and limits; the errors of the old 
metaphysics can also be revealed by the same power of pure reason. To that extent, the first 
Critique can largely be said to reiterate the Cartesian approach proceeding from a thinking self to 
the world of objects. Yet, the third Critique pays attention to the fact that certain products of 
nature are not subject to mechanistic laws of nature, i.e., living organisms. In relation to living 
organisms, human understanding possesses no concepts under which to subsume those non-
mechanistic products of nature and hence cannot be determining. For those products, reflecting 
judgement is in play, putting forward from within itself universal principles that may correspond 
to those phenomena exceeding the categories of understanding. It thus brings up a teleological 
idea of a natural end [Naturzweck] affirming “internal purposiveness in organized beings,” 
namely the idea that  “an organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and 
reciprocally a means as well.”78 In this way, reflecting judgement proceeds from nature to 
understanding.  
                                                   
77 Cf. Kant, KrV, B xvi. 
78 KU, §66. With regard to the teleological notion of the end of nature [Naturzweck], Kant states that it is a 
subjective maxim for our understanding and not a constitutive principle determining how the object is constituted: 
cf., KU, §76. As with transcendental Ideas, only the regulative value is thus acknowledged for the notion of the end 
of nature. Underlying this notion is the idea that we cannot say that there is a teleological constitution of nature, but 
some teleological presumptions are heuristically necessary in pursuit of grounding a natural science. But this idea 
seems to involve an important ambiguity, since it involves skepticism about the teleology of nature on the one hand, 
and yet suggests that the teleology can have objective validity on the other. Regarding this, Hegel claims that Kant’s 
restriction of the operation of the power of judgment to a regulative use makes the Kantian reflection into an 
external reflection: cf. The Science of Logic, p. 350. It is an external reflection because it “applies itself to the 
immediate as to something given.” If it is proved that neither reflection nor object is immediate, such that “reflection 
rises in its process of determination” and the universals put forward by reflection are “the essence of the immediate 
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Kant’s consideration of the power of reflecting judgement likely approves an alternative 
conception of a self-relation to the Cartesian-Fichtean model of self-consciousness that assumes 
a first-person perspective for a methodical ground and a third-person perspective on the subject 
matters under investigations. Although Kant himself does not develop an alternative conception 
of a self-relation from his considerations of the power of reflecting judgement, perhaps we can 
speculate that as a power of reflecting judgement, human understanding is reflecting, not simply 
in the sense that it turns back to itself from certain natural phenomena, but more fundamentally 
in the sense that it is a self-understanding through self-discovery in nature. This being said, 
nature is a mirror or an objective counterpart by mediation of which human understanding comes 
to recognize the universals within itself. Reflecting judgement is therefore internal both to nature 
and understanding itself; internal to nature because it starts from nature, and internal to 
understanding because understanding discovers itself in nature.  
Assuming this, Hegel’s endorsement of and departure from Schelling can be better 
understood. Indeed, Kant’s doctrine of reflecting judgment, if his restriction of it to a regulative 
use can be set aside, justifies viewing nature as that in which rational principles are somehow 
exhibited. From the perspective of reflecting judgement, therefore, there is some truth in 
Schelling’s idea that one can assign an equal status to nature as intelligence, such that both are 
equally considered as different modes of expression of the absolute— just as Spinoza conceives 
extension and thought as different attributes of one and the same substance. However, if we are 
correct in assuming that the operation of reflecting judgement makes it necessary to conceive of 
                                                   
from which the reflection began,” then, there is no reason for claiming that the reflection is only concerned with the 
subjective conditions of our faculties. Such is, for Hegel, “absolute reflection.” In Chapter 4, I discuss Kant’s 
teleology of nature and Hegel’s non-teleological conception of nature in detail.  
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nature as a mirror or the counterpart of human understanding by the mediation of which 
understanding comes to recognize itself and thus becomes conscious of itself, it seems 
insufficient to simply say that nature is an expression of the absolute. Rather, we would have to 
say, more precisely, that nature is an expression of the absolute, and yet only insofar as nature is 
that in and through which mind comes to recognize itself by reflecting into itself from nature.  
The movement of reflection, in other words, is completed by the reflecting subject and not 
simply by reflected nature. That reflecting subject, however, cannot be a self-consciousness of an 
individual mind, insofar as an individual mind, theoretically and practically, stands in an 
oppositional relationship to object. This is the point where Hegel’s notion of spirit, defined as a 
self-relating negativity, becomes significant.  
 
5. Hegel’s Definition of Consciousness as the Concept of Spirit  
 
Our final question is about the status of consciousness in Hegel’s system. As we have 
seen above, Hegel denies first-person perspective notions of consciousness for its being 
inherently dualistic.79 But this does not imply that Hegel dismisses the problem of consciousness 
                                                   
79 This does not imply that Hegel denies the reality of the psychological experiences that one describes with the first-
person singular pronoun “I.” Importantly, Hegel maintains that consciousness is structured by the opposition of the 
abstract I and an object external to it. As we notice in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the 1830 Encyclopedia, 
however, Hegel understand the essentially oppositional constitution of consciousness in terms of a practical 
relationship between a desiring, appetitive subject and an object that it desires rather than as an epistemic opposition 
between a cognizing subject and a cognized object. In Chapter 3, I will argue that Hegel critically appropriates the 
Kantian notion of abstract I, as he calls it, by conceptualizing the conscious opposition as a confrontation between a 
desiring subject and a desired object. What is important to Hegel is that consciousness, namely a practical subject 
who relates herself to the world through desire has an intersubjective subjectivity. To put it differently, 
consciousness is a practical relationship that is mediated by the world of objectivity rather than an immediate 
encounter and consumption of an object of desire. If it lacks the mediation by the world of intersubjective 
objectivity, it remains a one-sidedly subjective consciousness that is trapped inside itself. As I will show in Chapter 
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itself. Rather, the problem of consciousness is at the center of his philosophy of spirit. The 
connection of consciousness and spirit is so essential for Hegel’s system that we would have to 
say that there is no consciousness without spirit, and no spirit without consciousness. Now, 
Hegel’s doctrine of consciousness should then involve an account of the identity of subject and 
object, since Hegel claims to conduct a speculative philosophy with his denial of any dualistic 
conceptions. The identity of subject and object has little to do with correspondence between a 
cognizing mind and a cognized object, but more so with two antithetical poles whose features 
can be characterized in terms of subjectivity and objectivity—specifically, nature and spirit. 
Further, Hegel contends that a genuinely speculative identity consists in the identity of identity 
and difference, not in the only one-sided identity opposed to difference. This being said, a 
speculative doctrine of consciousness should then involve an account of the speculative identity 
of identity and difference. What can such a speculative notion of consciousness be?  
 
5.1. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 
Regarding Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness, it should first be noted that in 
the aftermath of Fichte and Schelling, a crucial matter of the project of a philosophical system 
consists in reconciling the two distinct spheres: nature and morality, necessity and freedom, or 
nature and intelligence—broadly speaking, non-human nature and non-natural humanity. If 
consciousness for Hegel has a systematic significance, therefore, the systematic significance can 
                                                   
5 through an examination of the “Feeling Soul” section in the Anthropology, this solipsistic consciousness, which 
believes what it senses and feels to be true and objective, is for Hegel fundamentally pathological. Therefore, the 
“Feeling Soul” section can largely be read, I suggest, as Hegel’s criticism of the subjectivist tendency to privilege 
one’s immediate, personal experiences predicated of the first-person singular pronoun “I.”  
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be found in his considerations of consciousness as a being that is both natural and spiritual. In his 
Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4, known as his first attempt to develop his own system,80 we notice 
that it starts with consciousness, following the discussion of an animal organism at the end of the 
philosophy of nature. We also notice that consciousness is considered a being that makes itself 
into a conscious being, or a spiritual being that becomes spiritual by spiritualizing itself. Though 
only implicitly, this early manuscript of Hegel thus seems to anticipate the notion of the soul 
presented in the Anthropology of his mature system of the Encyclopedia that it is an embodied 
mind: a natural existent that spiritualizes itself in and through that natural existent, more 
precisely. In other words, what is implicit in the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 is the idea that 
consciousness is a being that spiritualizes itself and as such, has the status of a link between 
Nature and Spirit in the philosophical system. And this is, as far as I see, what makes his early 
conception of consciousness break from the post-Kantian, first-person oriented philosophy of 
                                                   
80 The System of Ethical Life, written in 1802/3, is also taken as one of the earliest of Hegel’s “systematic” 
manuscript. In the Introduction to his English translation, Harris suggests that this manuscript of 1802/3 represents 
the third part of the four-part system comprised of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Ethical Nature, and Religion, which 
Hegel had been working on since 1801: cf. G.W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and Frist Philosophy of 
Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4), ed. and trans. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1979), 5-8. The System of Ethical Life deserves a serious amount of research 
with regard to Hegel’s early conception of a philosophical system as well as his insight into practical and political 
dimensions of human life and their systematic meanings. Now, it is in the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4 
(Jenaer Systementwürfe I: Das System der speculativen Philosophie 1803/4) that Hegel puts forward for the first 
time the idea of the three-part system, comprised of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit. The 
Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 thus has a significant value in tracing the development of Hegel’s fundamental idea 
that a philosophical system must be a system of Geist. But the manuscript is only fragmentary and contains many 
elements of Schelling’s identity philosophy, as we can see, for instance, from his theorization of sensation in terms 
of the three levels [Potenz]. It is therefore hard to say that in this manuscript Hegel works on his systematic concept 
of spirit entirely independent of Schelling. Without intending to neglect such a transitory character of this 
manuscript, however, I will attempt to draw out some fundamental ideas of Hegel as far as they help shedding light 
on the originality of Hegel’s notion of consciousness in relation to other post-Kantian German philosophers of 
consciousness I have treated in this chapter. I will also reflect on Hegel’s lines of thought presented in this early Jena 
manuscript about the relationship between nature and spirit while having his philosophy of subjective spirit in the 
1830 Encyclopedia in view. Among the three parts of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4, the manuscript 
of the first part, the Logic, does not survive; the Philosophy of Spirit is translated into English by Harris and Knox, 
but there is no English translation of the Philosophy of Nature. In the present work, I will provide my translation 
when citing passages from the Philosophy of Nature; the existing English translation of Harris and Knox will be 
used for citations from the Philosophy of Spirit, followed by the abbreviation PS 1803/4. 
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consciousness. For Hegel, consciousness is far from being a principle whether it be expressed as 
a proposition of a fact of consciousness [Tatsache] (Reinhold) or as an act of pure Ego 
[Tathandlung] (Fichte). It is neither a psychological fact nor a psychological act, but something 
living, a special kind of living being of which life and existence is to be considered in terms of 
spirit.  
In the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4, Hegel establishes that “consciousness is the 
concept of spirit.”81 This is Hegel’s first clear formulation about the relationship between 
consciousness and spirit. This intrinsic relationship between the two was not mentioned in the 
System of Ethical Life of 1802/3 but becomes more and more important in his later works, 
specifically the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. In what follows, I examine the meaning of the 
thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit. By paying attention to what relationship is set 
up by this thesis among nature, consciousness, and spirit, I attempt to articulate an answer to our 
previous question as to what Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness can be. 
Before delving into an analysis of the thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit, 
Harris’s “Introduction” to his translation of the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 is worth 
mentioning because it gives a good account of the context and character of this fragmentary text. 
Hegel composed the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 for his course of 1803: “philosophiae 
universae delineation,” i.e., “outline of universal philosophy.” As Harris points out, Hegel 
understand “universal philosophy” within the framework of the identity philosophy as pursuing a 
systematic treatment of two realities of the Idea: body and spirit, or nature and Sittlichkeit. Hegel 
thus brings up a being-conscious [Bewusst-sein] as the point where the two realities of the Idea 
                                                   
81 GW 6, 266/ PS 1803/4, 206. 
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converge—“man as the embodiment of the theoretical reason” toward which the philosophy of 
nature is elevated and “the free spontaneity of practical reason” in which the philosophy of spirit 
finds its origin.82 Harris emphasizes that a theory of consciousness is the most important and 
most difficult part of the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4. But we can be assured, he states, of the 
fact that Hegel’s theory of consciousness developed in this text synthesizes the idealist position, 
claiming for a reality’s belonging to the mind, and the realist position, claiming for a mind-
independent reality. Hegel thus nullifies the opposition of self and world by considering 
consciousness as “a neutral position,” in such a way that from this neutral position the opposition 
is comprehended.83 With regard to the thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit, Harris 
points out that this idea was not present in the text of the System of Ethical Life of 1802/3, which 
Hegel distilled from his lectures on “natural law” in a form suitable for direct incorporation into 
the system of universal philosophy. He suggests that the thesis’s absence in the previous text is 
ultimately concerned with the difficulty Hegel believed he could easily solve when he began to 
write the System of Ethical Life as an outline of universal philosophy. According to him, Hegel 
holds the idea of a philosophy of nature that “life reaches its point of absolute contraction in the 
consciousness of the cognitive organism,”84 but the spatial notion of the point of absolute 
contraction, though considered as that which expands from within itself, does not make it known 
how spirit can be seen from within itself. In the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4, Hegel resolves 
this difficulty, Harris suggests, by describing the self-evolvement of spirit, as conscious-being, 
from within itself. For Harris, this is the point where the thesis that consciousness is the concept 
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83 PS 1803/4, 194. 
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of spirit comes into play. Interestingly, Harris seems to assume that the ultimate meaning of this 
thesis is found in what Hegel calls a third consciousness, which denotes, according to him, an 
observer of the spirit’s self-evolvement who does not simply observe it from outside but also 
participates in bringing it to consciousness. For Harris, the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 is 
therefore significant in its anticipation of the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807.85  
In the years of 1803/4, Hegel largely remains in the framework of Schelling’s identity 
philosophy. But Harris’s analysis of the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 above likely seems to 
authorize us to set Hegel’s notion of consciousness presented in the context of Fichte’s 
discussion of consciousness. This is specifically because his understanding of Hegel’s notion of a 
third consciousness seems to be comparable to Fichte’s conception of a transcendental 
consciousness. However, the Fichtean interpretation of Hegel’s notion of consciousness is hardly 
tenable given Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s transcendental Ego, and his rejection of subjectivism. 
Another important aim of this section is therefore to elucidate how Hegel’s notion of 
consciousness developed in his early Jena manuscript differs from Fichte’s and how it declines 
the first-person perspective notion of consciousness in general.  
 
5.2. Hegel’s Definition of Consciousness as the Concept of Spirit 
To facilitate our analysis, I here consider Hegel’s thesis that consciousness is the concept 
of spirit, as involving a twofold distinction: a distinction between nature and spirit on the one 
hand, and a distinction between consciousness and spirit on the other. Insofar as consciousness is 
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the concept of spirit, how spirit differs from nature and how consciousness is spiritual are 
essential for defining what consciousness is. But consciousness, since it is the concept of spirit, 
cannot itself be identical with spirit, implying that there remain certain natural aspects to 
consciousness. Correspondingly, we see that throughout the introductory part of the Philosophy 
of Spirit (Fragment 15 and 16) Hegel works on ontological determinations of nature, spirit, and 
consciousness, which are in fact quite complex and often confusing. Regarding the distinction 
between nature and spirit, Hegel states that whereas in nature the union of being and becoming 
remains an inner aspect of nature, something hidden, “in the philosophy of spirit […] it is really 
their absolute union as absolute becoming.”86 The distinction between consciousness and spirit is 
then said to consist in the fact that “in the spirit it [the absolute union of being and becoming] 
exists for itself,” whereas consciousness remains the concept of spirit.87  
 
External and Internal Organism 
To make comprehensible those complex ontological ideas that together constitute the 
definition of consciousness as the concept of spirit, it should be noted that Hegel finds a close 
connection between the life of an organism and spirit. An organism for Hegel is a theme that 
emerges at the culminating point of the development of Nature where Spirit is at play. This idea 
requires some detailed analysis of the last part of the Philosophy of Nature (Fragment 15), in 
which Hegel suggests considering an organism in terms of the twofold system comprised by 
what he calls an external and internal organism. An external organism is concerned with the 
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structuring of an organic body; but it alone does not make the body organic, since structuring a 
body into different parts does not necessarily ensure an organic relationship between the whole 
and parts. On the other hand, an internal organism—which is in its turn a threefold system of 
senses, lymph, and nerve—makes parts be the whole and the whole immediately exist in parts.88 
Without an internal organism, an external organism is nothing but an inorganic assembly of 
different bodily parts.  
What draws our attention in Hegel’s theory of internal organism is the idea that the 
totality of an organic body cannot properly be thought of in terms of the static ontological 
category, i.e., being or substance. An organic body is in a constant movement of constituting 
itself as a whole; hence, its oneness cannot simply be thought of as a being-one, but 
fundamentally as becoming-one. Hegel thus states that the organic whole is “absolute one,” in 
which each part is itself an internal organism, i.e. “unseparated becoming.”89 For this reason, 
Hegel does not consider an external and internal organism only in terms of biological operations 
of an organic body. Those antithetical factors can rather be conceptualized as quasi-principles: a 
fluid one (internal organism) which communicates particular parts with each other such that they 
are connected to each other, thereby being itself present in all those parts; a static one (external 
organism) which is concerned with already particularized, structuralized bodily parts. As such, 
an internal organism represents the universal in particulars; an external organism, the particulars 
that can operate as particulars by virtue of the operation of the universal. An internal organism 
represents the principle of becoming; an external organism, the principle of being.  
                                                   
88 Cf. GW 6, 246. 
89 Ibid.  
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Based on this, Hegel establishes that the life of an organism consists in a dynamic, 
inseparable connection of the two organisms, i.e., in its being “the movement that makes itself 
out of the indifference of fluidity into a potency [sich potenziert] of the difference of its moments 
and preserves its differentiating movement in the fluidity.”90 Accordingly, life and death for 
Hegel can also be defined in terms of the relationship of an internal and external organism. An 
organism is alive when an internal organism does not fail to perform its proper operations, 
commuting particular bodily parts. A dynamic and inseparable relationship of an internal and 
external organism is thus essential to life. On the other hand, an organism gets ill when an 
internal organism does not function properly, when the factor of the absolute fluidity, in other 
words, is isolated from the other constructing factor and thus becomes for itself. From this, it 
follows that the life of an organism exhibits an infinite unity, a union of two antithetical factors. 
Life is a union in which the universal (absolute fluidity) is present to and in all particulars 
(bodily parts). As such, it is a union of being and becoming. In this context, the life of an 
organism for Hegel prefigures spirit which is essentially being-itself in being-an-other. 
 
Nature and Spirit: Organism in General and Conscious organism 
That the organic life prefigures spirit does not mean that it is spirit. While bringing up 
becoming as a prominent ontological category for thinking about the totality of an organism, 
Hegel on the other hand concludes that being and becoming are not united in nature. This is 
because, according to Hegel, an internal organism is only a “passive medium”91 that is in a 
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constant movement of becoming—becoming its other, particular bodily parts, more precisely—
without being able to constitute its own being. It is, in other words, a universal that is to 
constantly dissolve itself into particulars so as to remain the universal. As such, it is an absolute 
fluidity, a negativity which cannot constitute its self-identity. The fact that an internal organism 
is such a passive, only negative medium, fundamentally pertains to another fact of an organism, 
i.e., that it gets ill and dies. As we have seen above, Hegel holds that disease and death occur 
when an internal organism cannot perform its proper functions, when it loses its negative 
connection to the external organism. This means that in nature there is no way for a universal 
factor to become for itself, since its becoming for itself means death, an end to the life of an 
organism. As far as its becoming for itself means an annulation of its existence together with the 
death of the entire organism, an internal organism for Hegel cannot be said to be genuinely 
internal to an external organism. As far as it should constantly annihilate itself without ever 
being able to constitute its own being in its becoming its other, an internal organism 
fundamentally remains external to an external organism. Therefore, if the organic life prefigures 
spirit, the biological death explains why it cannot itself be spirit.  
While an internal and external organism are concerned with a bodily constitution of an 
individual organism, Hegel next examines sensation in terms of a genus-process. Since Fragment 
15, as the last stage in the development of Nature, has for its subject matter the life and totality of 
an organism, sensation is here not a matter of a perceptive cognition of an external object. It is 
rather concerned with an animal’s self-feeling, which involves an immediate feeling of the 
species it belongs to and an immediate recognition of another individual belonging to the same 
species and having an opposite sex. Sensation, thus understood, triggers an entire genus-process 
by motivating individual animals to go engage in sexual intercourse. Hegel states that “its [an 
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individual’s] particularity immediately becomes absolute universality, that what an individual 
acts [tun] for itself, immediately becomes an act for the whole species.”92 Indeed, it can hardly 
be the case that the universality of the species comes to the consciousness of individual animals 
involved in a sex-relation [Geschlechtsverhältnis], as if they were consciously aware of their 
belonging to the same species. But when we pay attention to their act, it turns out that an 
animal’s feeling of itself and another, as it occurs in a sex-relation, involves a complex 
recognitional relationship taking place at an unconscious, non-rational level.93 It is a quasi-
recognitional relationship in the Hegelian sense inasmuch as a species is a universal that is 
produced by individuals’ mutual acts. Although begetting a newborn necessarily involves an 
individual’s coming to be, we do not necessarily have to assume that an individual’s qua 
individual animal’s coming to be is all about sex-relation. Further, the genus-process is for Hegel 
a process in which an individual’s act is an act for the whole species, one in which a universal 
comes to be by particulars’ mutual acts. However, Hegel points out, on the other hand, that in a 
genus-process a species comes to be at the sacrifice of individuals in the sense that the death of 
an individuals is necessary for the subsistence of a species. A species is thus for Hegel a being 
that is maintained throughout constant appearance and disappearance of individuals, which is 
opposite to the case of an internal organism. If an internal organism exhibits an only negative 
universality that is to constantly dissolve itself into particulars, a species is a universal that can 
exist only by virtue of individuals’ constant appearance and disappearance. But they make no 
difference in that being and becoming, universality and particularity, identity and difference, are 
                                                   
92 GW 6, 264. 
93 Hegel himself does not define a genus-process as recognition. For an interpretation of Hegel’s conception of a 
genus-process in terms of recognition, see in particular: Italo Testa, “How does Recognition Emerge from Nature? 
The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings,” Critical Horizons, vol. 13, issue 2 (2015): 176-196. 
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not united in them. Consequently, “in nature the unity of being and becoming is only something 
hidden [das Verborgene].”94  
At this point, we can clarify how Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the concept of 
spirit gives an account of the ontological difference between an organism in general and a 
conscious/spiritual organism. Considering the lines of thought of Hegel regarding an internal 
organism and a genus-process, the being of conscious/spiritual organism consists in its being an 
active medium having two requirements. First, it should be a medium in which a universal 
maintains its subsistence through the relationship it makes with individuals without itself being 
constantly dissipated into particulars. Second, it should be a medium in which individuals are not 
merely perishing moments for the existence of the universal, but rather the beings that produce 
their existence through the relationship in which it stands with the universal. In the case of a 
conscious/spiritual organism, in other words, there cannot be a universal that can stand without 
individuals, nor can there be an individual that can stand without a universal.  
Now, it is worth noting that Hegel highlights that an internal organism is the medium of 
an internal and external organism and not merely one of the two juxtaposed in opposition to the 
other. This idea illustrates Hegel’s fundamental, speculative thesis that identity is not a finite 
term opposed to another finite term, i.e. difference, but the identity of identity and difference. 
With regard to the way in which the relationship between the universal and an individual —
which defines consciousness as the concept of spirit—exhibits a speculative identity, perhaps we 
can refer to the idea in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit that spirit is essentially a self-
relating negativity; more fundamentally, to the thesis given in the mature system of the 
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Encyclopedia that spirit is an internalization of itself from its outer existence in nature, nature 
which is in its turn an externalization of the logical Idea. In the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4, 
however, Hegel does not seem to have attained such a clear articulation. As we will see below, 
he instead develops the theory of the middle [das Mitte] as an explanation of how consciousness 
can be such an active medium.  
Despite this, it can be noted that this early manuscript displays Hegel’s original idea that 
spirit differs from nature in virtue of its potential for positively constituting its self-identity in its 
self-negation. Of importance here is that the difference of spirit from nature is not merely 
conceptual, but rather something that occurs as differentiation through the conscious/spiritual 
organism. This would be the fundamental reason why conscious/spiritual organism is called a 
medium. Thus, Hegel states that “the being of consciousness is at first […] that it is the ideality 
of nature; in other words, it is at first in [a] negative relation with nature, and in this negative 
relation it exists as related to nature itself within the nature; the mode of its existence is not a 
particularity [or] a singularity of nature, but a universal [moment] of nature, an element of it.”95 
If spirit can be understood as a universal in which individuals partake in their existence, this is so 
insofar as the being of consciousness consists in the ideality of nature.  
Referring to the master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the thesis that the 
being of consciousness consists in the ideality of nature can be understood as meaning that 
consciousness, considered only as a natural being, is only a negative universality that is to 
constantly consume natural objects for its subsistence. As such, consciousness as an organism is 
attached to natural conditions. We know that the Phenomenology of Spirit thus draws out from 
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that basic requirement for the life of self-consciousness the fundamental paradox of self-
consciousness: that it cannot entirely annihilate the objects of its natural desire. For this would 
then mean that there is no way of satisfying its desire. The Phenomenology of Spirit presents 
recognition as the genuine way in which self-consciousness can satisfy its desire, which is also 
the way in which self-consciousness proves itself to be independent from those natural 
conditions. It thus frames the mode of existence of a human being, designated by self-
consciousness, in terms of a twofold issue: attachment to, and detachment from, nature. Since 
detachment cannot occur without attachment, perhaps we could say that a human being can be 
spiritual because it is tied to nature but knows to untie itself from it. Returning to the thesis of the 
Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 that the being of consciousness consists in the ideality of nature, 
we can articulate a similar idea that consciousness as an organism is the very place in which 
nature is idealized, and thus spirit eventually emerges. 
  
5.3. A third: Consciousness and Spirit 
In the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 Hegel conceptualizes the middle [das Mitte] as the 
mode of existence of consciousness, which is an explanation of how consciousness is not to be 
considered among other living organisms but rather as a conscious organism. The middle has 
three forms: speech, tool, and family goods. Those three forms of the mode of existence of 
consciousness then have for their counterparts three activities of consciousness: memory, labor, 
and family. It is here not hard to see that Hegel is considering the existence of a human being in 
terms of a threefold activity: psychological, physical-economic, and inter-subjective activities 
through which speech, tool, and family goods are produced as their material counterparts. But 
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Hegel underlines that the middle itself is neither consciousness nor its object, but “the work of 
both,” “the third to which they are related, in which they are one, but [as] that in which they 
likewise distinguish themselves.”96 If we consider, for instance, speech as one side of the 
antithesis of which the other is memory, this is for Hegel only “for the standpoint of 
consciousness which only looks at the antithesis of consciousness.”97 That consciousness exists 
as the middle, therefore, means that consciousness is an active being that “posits itself as 
conscious” by “positing both sides [of the middle] and their particular moments as ideal.”98 In 
other words, consciousness is not an agent who carries out those three activities (memory, labor, 
family) against their material counterparts (speech, tool, and family goods). But it is an agent 
who in the middle, “separates himself from his true antithesis: in speech, from others to whom he 
speaks; in the tool, from that against which he is active with the tool; through the family goods, 
from the members of his family.”99 In short, the middle is not “that against which he is active 
[…], but […] the means [das Mittel], whereby, through which, he is active against something 
else.”100  
The theory of the middle illustrates Hegel’s struggle for a description of the mode of 
existence of consciousness without a reflective, dualistic assumption of an active subject and 
passive object, and of an inner subjectivity and an outer objectivity. The speculative character of 
this theory is found in the idea that consciousness exists as a medium in which the opposition 
between conscious acts and its products take place through the activities of consciousness. In this 
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sense, consciousness is not merely an agent who materializes his memory in the form of a 
speech, uses a tool for producing goods, and manages home life, but an agent who speaks to and 
with other speakers, labors for the consumers of his products, and raises a family with other 
family members. This is for Hegel the true meaning of the active nature of consciousness, of the 
fact that consciousness posits itself as conscious. And this is the way in which consciousness, 
unlike other animal organisms, constitutes itself as an active medium.  
Yet, the account of consciousness as a third, given in the only fragmentary manuscript of 
Hegel’s early Jena years, does not seem truly speculative unless it is supplemented by another 
account of how those intersubjective activities are concerned with the speculative identity. 
Without a well-established notion of spirit, it does not offer a satisfactory account of how those 
activities can be the ways in which the universal exists through individuals and how individuals 
exist through the universal. 
While the theory of the middle thus seems to remain somewhat obscure, the idea of “a 
third (consciousness)” which formally resembles the theory of the middle gives an important 
clue for elucidating the relationship between consciousness and spirit. In the beginning of this 
section, we established an interpretative thesis that Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the 
concept of spirit involves two ideas: consciousness is the concept of spirit, and it is the concept 
of spirit. If the ontological account of the difference between an organism in general and a 
conscious/spiritual organism clarifies the meaning of consciousness’s being the concept of spirit, 
now it is to be clarified what it means that consciousness is the concept of spirit, that it is 
spiritual but not identical with spirit. At this point, I make a loose distinction between a formal 
and a real definition for the purpose of argumentation, depending on whether the definition 
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specifies an essence or a true reality in which the essence finds its existence. With regard to the 
spirituality of consciousness, we can thus refer to the formal definition which concerns the 
essence of consciousness: consciousness is “the union of the simple and infinity.”101 By this 
Hegel means that consciousness is something simple that unites within itself the opposed terms. 
To that extent, consciousness is essentially the absolute unity of the antithesis and thus pertains 
to spirit. However, Hegel establishes on the other hand that this essence is not present for 
consciousness itself but only “for a third.”102 This implies that “consciousness appears only on 
one side,” only as “active” and “negative”103 which is thus opposed to the other side, i.e. 
something passive that is negated by it. As such, it is an empirical consciousness that “posits 
only itself as consciousness, that of which it is conscious.”104 In other words, although empirical 
consciousness must be absolute in itself because its essence consists in the absolute unity of the 
antithesis, it is not absolute as it stands. Correspondingly, the absolute identity of the antithesis 
remains only a concept and is not yet real. However, it must become such an absolute 
consciousness for which the absolute unity of the antithesis is not merely a concept but is real, 
because the absolute identity is its essence. Therefore, Hegel concludes that an empirical 
consciousness has absolute unity for its goal. Empirical consciousness must become absolute 
consciousness by sublating all that appears as an other to itself. “This is,” according to Hegel, 
“the goal, the absolute reality of consciousness, to which we have to elevate its concept.”105 
Briefly, empirical consciousness is in a movement of becoming absolute consciousness.  
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Then, what is a third—a third consciousness to which the absolute unity of the antithesis, 
which is not immediately present to empirical consciousness, is assumed to be present? Indeed, 
the concept of consciousness as a third anticipates the perspective of “for us” in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit106—the speculative perspective of a philosopher who dialectically 
organizes the experiences of natural consciousness to show how absolute knowing is achieved 
through those experiences of consciousness. We can therefore say that a third consciousness in 
the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 is analogous to the absolute knowing of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, inasmuch as both indicate an absolute unity that can come to be only by empirical or 
natural consciousness’s movement of itself becoming the absolute unity; this is so because it is, 
as concept, inherent to empirical or natural consciousness but is not immediately present to it. 
However, the text of 1803/4 seems to contain more than the methodic ground for the science of 
experience of consciousness. This can be clarified by our distinction between the formal and real 
definition as discussed previously. Indeed, it is clear that consciousness as a third does not 
indicate a concept of the absolute identity which gives a formal definition of consciousness. It 
rather pertains to the absolute identity that is real, which Hegel vaguely means by “an absolute 
reality of consciousness.” A third is therefore a real definition of consciousness. Now, if a third 
                                                   
106 As mentioned in the beginning of this section, Harris claims that the notion of a third (consciousness) in the 
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the natural aspects of consciousness seem to have important meanings regarding the issue of how consciousness can 
link Nature and Spirit in Hegel’s system. Although the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 is only fragmentary and 
sketchy, we can therefore also notice a certain continuity between this early manuscript and the philosophy of 
subjective spirit in Hegel’s mature system of the Encyclopedia. For these reasons, I here focus more on those natural 
aspects which I find are important in Hegel’s definition of consciousness given in his early text of 1803/4.  
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is thus concerned with the absolute unity that is real, this idea seems to fundamentally bear on 
the distinction between nature and spirit which we previously discussed. Again, it is Hegel’s 
main thesis that in spirit “the union of being and becoming” is “really their absolute union as 
absolute becoming” whereas in nature the same union is only something hidden. Since this thesis 
states that spirit is an absolute union (of being and becoming) that is real, we can assume a 
certain connection between consciousness as a third and spirit that is distinct from nature. If a 
third in the text of 1803/4 contains more than the for us or absolute knowing in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, it should therefore be clarified by demonstrating how consciousness as 
a third is concerned with the distinction of spirit from nature. 
We have seen above that nature for Hegel is characterized as becoming without being. In 
this sphere of permanent repetition of appearance and disappearance of individuals, we can 
therefore say that the absolute union of being and becoming, one in which the union is both for 
the universal and individuals, is its other and not itself. To that extent, it can also be said that 
nature is an alterity of spirit; it is the other of the spirit, such that in nature the spirit is the other 
of itself without being itself.107 Therefore, spirit can come to be when its being-otherness in 
nature is negated. But the negation must then take place in nature because nature is the very 
other of the spirit. We can then pose a question as to specifically in what part of nature the 
negation takes place. Is there any particular natural being in which spirit comes to be? 
 
What is in the sphere of spirit, is its own absolute activity; and our knowledge that it 
raises itself out of nature […], must be known as knowledge of the spirit itself. Or [it 
                                                   
107 In the Encyclopedia of 1830, Hegel states that “the spirit has nature as its presupposition, of which the truth and 
therefore the absolute first is the spirit” (ENZ, § 381). 
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must be known as] spirit’s coming to be, i.e., its merely negative relation with nature. 
This negative relation with nature is the negative side of spirit in general, […]; or in 
other words, how it becomes the totality of consciousness of the singular. For 
consciousness itself, as active, as negating, as sublating, the being of its other-being, is 
consciousness as [the] one side of it, as subjective consciousness or consciousness as 
absolute singularity.108 
 
According to the passage above, the particular nature in which the negation for spirit’s coming to 
be occurs is the subjective consciousness, i.e., an individual mind. Individual mind is, in other 
words, the nature in which spirit comes to be, i.e., a living organism in which a certain negation 
of nature takes place.  
With regard to the issue of the concept of consciousness as a third, as the absolute unity 
that is real, the passage above stands out due to its exposition of some important epistemological, 
so to speak, dimensions of spirit. While in this early manuscript Hegel seems to consider spirit 
chiefly as “the spirit of a people [der Geist eines Volks],”109 the passage above defines spirit, 
above all, in terms of knowledge. Importantly, it states that spirit’s emergence from nature is our 
knowledge but is to be understood as knowledge of spirit itself. Further, this is so insofar as 
spirit’s emergence from nature occurs in a particular nature, i.e., an individual mind called 
subjective consciousness. Thus, we have here three bearers of knowledge: a philosopher, spirit, 
and mind. At this point, perhaps we can first say that the ultimate bearer of the absolute activity 
occurring in the sphere of spirit is not necessarily an individual person, i.e. a philosopher who is 
                                                   
108 GW 6, 275/ PS 1803/4, 213. 
109 GW 6, 274/ PS 1803/4, 213. 
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currently describing spirit’s emergence from nature. Referring to the Preface of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, if “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as 
Substance, but equally as Subject,”110 “the true shape in which truth exists can only be the 
scientific system of such truth.”111 Scientific system is of course a written work which 
materializes an individual philosopher’s reflection. But insofar as a philosopher’s reflection is 
transformed into such a written, materialized, systematized form of knowledge, this knowledge 
that thus gains a new body is irreducible to the knowledge that is present in the philosopher’s 
consciousness. In this context, spirit can be said to be an impersonal form of knowledge that is 
embodied in the form of a scientific system. This would be the meaning of a somewhat 
ambiguous expression indicating a philosopher, i.e., the third person pronoun, us. Yet, this 
requires, according to our analysis above, an account of spirit’s emergence from nature in and 
through an individual mind called subjective consciousness, i.e., a cognitive living organism. In 
fact, the subjective consciousness in the passage above likely seems to foreshadow the subjective 
spirit in the Encyclopedia. In this mature system, Hegel establishes the necessity for spirit’s 
having a subjective dimension and theorizes the subjective spirit as that in which spirit comes to 
be for the first time as the embodied soul, which sublates such an immergence in nature, and 
achieves its concept, i.e., freedom.  
The philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia thus represents Hegel’s theory of 
an individual mind. But the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 only throws out the idea that spirit 
emerges from nature in and through subjective consciousness, without developing a well-
                                                   
110 GW 9, 18/ PhS, §17. 
111 GW 9, 11-2/ PhS, §5. 
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elaborated theory explaining how this is the case. Therefore, we cannot here precisely decide the 
significance of the notion of subjective consciousness for our question about the meaning of 
consciousness as a third. Despite this, the text of 1803/4 provides us with Hegel’s insight that 
spirit, insofar as it can be considered as highest form of knowledge, has for its essential moment 
the finite form of knowledge called either consciousness or subjective spirit. 
If we have a point in saying that consciousness as a third can be better understood by an 
assumption of an impersonal form of knowledge, called spirit and materialized as a system, then, 
by turning it into an individual persons’ consciousness or knowledge we can also show how 
Hegel’s model of consciousness differs from Fichte’s. To put it briefly, Hegel’s consciousness as 
a third, together with “us” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, can hardly be reduced to Fichte’s 
transcendental consciousness which is assumed to carry out Tathandlung for the purpose of 
establishing a transcendental system by constructing empirical consciousness for transcendental 
consciousness. In this context, the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 seems to be sufficiently 
informative with regards to the alternative position about consciousness Hegel will eventually 
take. In the philosophy of subjective spirit of the Encyclopedia, Hegel will develop his theory of 
mind, and yet without any assumption of the Cartesian-Fichtean conception of self-
consciousness. His theory of mind rather aims at laying down the fundamental category of our 
practical, communal life described in the philosophy of objective spirit, i.e., freedom, by 
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Conclusion: Hegel’s Consciousness as the Link between Nature and Spirit 
 
  Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the concept of spirit in the Philosophy of Spirit of 
1803/4 has far-reaching implications, specifically considering the post-Kantian discussions of 
consciousness. As Hegel announces the Phenomenology of Spirit as “psychology”112 and 
presents what we can call a philosophical psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit in the 
Encyclopedia, a treatment of an individual mind for Hegel has a critical meaning for a 
philosophical system. However, Hegel strongly rejects any subjectivist approach which grasps 
the mind primarily as an epistemic subject standing against the objects on the basis of the first-
person perspective Cogito subject. Indeed, Hegel has no theory of consciousness as an empty 
form of the thinking I, of which the primary role is supposed to consist in an epistemic operation 
of receiving information of outer objects. Regarding this, the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 
well illustrates that consciousness for Hegel rather refers to a practical existence of a human 
being. By establishing that the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, Hegel here considers 
self-consciousness as a subject of desire who stands in a practical relationship with material 
things by the mediation of a recognitional relationship with another self-consciousness. 
Attachment to and detachment from naturality are thus brought up as essential factors defining 
self-consciousness. But Hegel’s description of the master-slave dialectic and the ever leveling-up 
experiences of self-consciousness up to absolute knowing leave it ambiguous as to how spirit 
                                                   
112 Shortly after the publication the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel made an announcement of his first major work 
in the Bamberg Zeitung, where he worked as an editor. In this announcement, Hegel introduces the Phenomenology 
of Spirit as “the first part” of his “system of science” and added that “it should take the place of a psychological 
explanation, or an abstract account about the grounding of knowledge:” cf., G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des 
Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), 549. 
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comes out of nature. These issues are directly addressed in the Anthropology in the mature 
system of the Encyclopedia. Treating the soul as indifferentiated substantiality from which 
consciousness comes to arise, the Anthropology offers an account of the rise of consciousness, 
which is at the same time an account of the rise of spirit out of nature. How the human mind is 
the link between nature and spirit is thus explained by the Anthropology which considers 
bodiliness [Leiblichkeit] as the external/material form of the existence of consciousness, as a 
place where a certain negativity takes place such that spirit comes out of nature. To that extent, 
perhaps we can say that the Anthropology gives a preliminary explanation to the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. Or, we can say that in order to be able to phenomenologically speak of the 
manifestation of spirit, we should first speak of the bodily existence of consciousness.  
From this consideration, it becomes clearer what the new element is which Hegel 
introduces to the concept of consciousness in his Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4: consciousness, 
above all things, is a natural being, a living organism. More strictly, consciousness deserves a 
systematic interest only when it is considered as a natural-conscious being, or as an embodied 
mind. This is one of the guiding threads of our reading of the Anthropology of the Encyclopedia 
of 1830. Again, the Anthropology gives a detailed account of the negation of naturality for the 
spirit’s coming to be in terms of bodiliness [Leiblichkeit], embodiment [Verleiblichung], and 
habit, of the soul, while the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 establishes that consciousness is the 
place where that negation takes place.  
From the Hegelian speculative perspective, then, consciousness is not something purely 
inside since it exists in relation to something material. But the material existence of 
consciousness, even when it is considered in terms of a body, is not something pre-given, 
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because consciousness comes to exist as a subject through an active relation with the material 
from. In short, the speculative concept of consciousness would then pin down consciousness as 
external. It is outside of oneself and comes to be inside of oneself only by being constituted as an 
inside from the outside. 
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 CHAPTER  2. Subjective Spirit: Mind, Geist, and the Actuality of Reason 
  
It is widely assumed that the philosophy of subjective spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia 
presents his philosophical psychology or the theory of mind. However, Hegel’s notion of 
subjective spirit is not in full accord with what we call mind today.1 More importantly, we 
unlikely have any established definitions of the terms “mind” and “psychology” against which to 
                                                   
1 Regarding the discrepancy between Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit and what we call mind, Winfield offers a 
helpful overview of contemporary understandings of Hegel’s philosophical psychology within the Anglophone 
academia: cf., Richard Dien Winfield, Hegel and Mind. Rethinking Philosophical Psychology (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 1-8. Winfield points out that today’s understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of mind has been framed by 
linguistic holism under the influence of Wilfred Sellars and Robert Brandom. Briefly stated, linguistic holism 
assumes that three forms of awareness, that is, awareness of an object, oneself, and other subjects, are 
interconnected to each other by the medium of language. An awareness of an object involves the subject’s self-
awareness, and this makes it possible for the subject to express her cognition of the object through a proposition. 
The subject’s awareness of an object also involves intersubjective relations with other subjects because one has to 
learn a language to have the ability to use propositions. Thus, linguistic holism regards the mind primarily as 
discursive consciousness. Winfield highlights, however, that Hegel does not reduce the mind to discursive 
consciousness. He points out that in the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel treats the mind as inherently 
connected to a physical world of life and incorporates an organism as a constitutive element of the mind. He further 
suggests that even the forms of consciousness (sense-certainty, perception, and understanding) may be considered in 
terms of prelinguistic, pre-reflective operations of the mind, which he finds is accessible to certain animals and 
immature children too.  
Winfield’s suggestion is insightful in showing that Hegel’s subjective spirit is not reducible to discursive 
consciousness because it more broadly denotes the finite human spirit having an organic body. However, it seems 
untenable to proceed from this to claim that the forms of consciousness are prelinguistic and pre-reflective. As I 
discuss in detail in Chapter 5, the sentient body of a human being is in the Anthropology treated as involving a 
spiritual dimension in the sense that the embodiment of one’s inner feelings is preceded by the process of 
inwardizing recollection [Erinnerung]. The sentient body of the soul is therefore an expressive, symbolically 
spiritualized body rather than a living organism. Further, the key issue of the Anthropology is not just the bodily 
existence of the human being but its transformation into a body that serves the realization of spiritual purposes. 
Therefore, there is no good reason, I think, for holding that Hegel privileges the non-discursive, pre-reflective 
dimension of the human spirit insofar as the Anthropology presupposes the Psychology in such a dialectical way that 
the Anthropology presupposes the Psychology and the truth of the Anthropology is revealed in the Psychology. By 
implication, although the Anthropology does not portray the embodied soul in terms of linguistic activities, there is 
no good reason for assuming that it is non-discursive. With respect to the connection between the three parts of 
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, I suggest in Chapter 3 that they together treat one and the same subject, i.e., 
the finite human spirit, from different aspects. As far as I see, Winfield’s emphasis on the organic, pre-linguistic, and 
pre-reflective dimension of Hegel’s conception of the human mind goes hand in hand with the tendency in the recent 
Anglophone Hegel scholarship to treat Hegel as a naturalist philosopher. In the Conclusion, I discuss the limits of 
recent, naturalist readings of Hegel. 
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measure Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. As with most other philosophical concepts, the 
meanings of the words “mind” and “psychology” involve historical formations. A student trained 
in the analytic camp, for instance, would have some epistemological preconceptions that the 
mind is a discursive, conscious, and reflective entity capable of perceiving oneself and other 
objects and of justifying this perception. Thus, one can hardly understand what an author’s 
theory of the mind without an examination of a set of implicit assumptions under which he works 
on his theory, and his background knowledge of the psychological discussions made in the past 
and in the present as well.  
This chapter aims at spelling out the sense in which Hegel’s philosophy of subjective 
spirit represents his philosophical psychology but exceeds the general scheme of today’s theory 
of mind. For the reasons stated above, however, I start this chapter only with a very loose, almost 
empty definition of philosophical psychology as a discipline that studies the human mind, in 
attempting to shed light on the underlying assumptions of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective 
spirit. In pursuing this study, it seems necessary to consider the relation of the philosophy of 
subjective spirit with the system of the Encyclopedia. Failing to see where it stands within the 
system and how it is related to other parts of the system would easily lead us to somewhat violent 
misrepresentation of Hegel’s thoughts.  
In the first section of this chapter, I consider the reason why subjective spirit cannot be 
equated with the human mind. My strategy is to articulate the ambiguity between spirit [Geist] 
and subjective spirit as the essential constitution of subjective spirit. I thereby argue that 
subjective spirit does not simply signify a human mind because it is, within the system of the 
Encyclopedia, the place where spirit emerges as spirit out of nature. Another crucial aspect of 
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Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit is its essential connection with the first part of the 
Encyclopedia system, i.e., the Logic. As I discuss below, Hegel defines subjective spirit as 
“knowing [Erkennen]” and considers it as concrete spirit’s self-determination in comparison to 
the knowing that was in the Logic presented only as “a determinacy of the logical Idea.”2 Hegel 
thus thematizes knowing twice in the system of the Encyclopedia: in the dialectic of the logical 
Idea, and in the philosophy of subjective spirit. In the second section of this chapter, I therefore 
examine the systematic connection of these two thematizations of knowing in the Encyclopedia. 
What I show by this examination is the essentially finite feature of subjective spirit, that is, its 
embeddedness in the body. It thereby reveals the concrete sense in which spirit is submerged in 
nature before it emerges as spirit. In the third section, I investigate the Objective Logic (the 
Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence) in Hegel’s Science of Logic, focusing on his 
ideas of the objectivity of thought-determinations, and actuality [Wirklichkeit] as the subjectivity 
of the absolute. I pursue this study of the Science of Logic to set the stage for my subsequent 
discussion of the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology in Chapter 3, 
paying attention to the fact that Hegel relates this transition in the philosophy of subjective spirit 
to the transition in the Logic from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic. While treating 
Hegel’s notion of objective thinking and actuality, I also take a close look at the dialectic of form 
and matter presented in “The Absolute Ground” section of the Doctrine of Essence and Hegel’s 
lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, aimed at elucidating the relationship between the finite 
human spirit and the absolute.  
 
                                                   
2 ENZ, § 223. 
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1. Why is Subjective Spirit not a Mind? 
Ambiguity between Subjective Spirit and Geist 
 
Geist is the central concept in Hegel’s philosophy, but it can hardly be translated into any 
other language due to its thickness. It is often translated into the English “mind,” but the 
inadequacy of this translation easily comes to light when one considers, among others, the fact 
that the Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia comprises not only the philosophy of subjective 
spirit but also the philosophy of objective spirit and that of absolute spirit. Even when we confine 
ourselves to the philosophy of subjective spirit, subjective spirit cannot be equated with what we 
call mind. The prime reason for this is that within the system of the Encyclopedia the philosophy 
of subjective spirit is the place where Geist emerges for the first time as Geist. This signifies that 
there is an essential connection between subjective spirit and Geist. The extent to which 
subjective spirit coincides with and differs from “mind,” can therefore be settled down when this 
connection is spelled out. In this section, I attempt to clarify the sense in which subjective spirit 
is connected to Geist by analyzing Hegel’s ambiguous usages of those two terms, which I find 
prominent in the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit (ENZ, §§ 377-386). 
 
The knowledge of spirit is the most concrete, and thus the highest and most difficult 
one. Know yourself. The meaning of this absolute command […] is not only self-
knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of 
the individual, but rather knowledge of that which is true of human as it is the true in 
and for itself,—of the essence itself as spirit.3   
                                                   
3 ENZ, § 377. 
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In this first passage of the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit (§ 377), Hegel 
speaks of the difficulty of the knowledge of spirit. The knowledge of spirit is the most difficult 
because it is the most concrete. With respect to the concrete feature of the knowledge of spirit, 
the Zusatz to this passage adds that the knowledge of spirit is concerned with “the most concrete, 
developed form that the Idea achieves in its actualization.” The Zusatz further states that “even 
finite or subjective spirit, not only absolute spirit, must be grasped as an actualization of the 
Idea.” The knowledge of spirit is thus concrete not simply because it considers this or that 
particular thing but because it comprehends spirit as an actualization of the Idea. Yet, it is 
ambiguous what Hegel means by this knowledge of spirit that bears on the actualization of the 
Idea. Since § 377 is the first passage of the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit, the 
knowledge of spirit in question seems to refer to the Philosophy of Spirit. Then, we can perhaps 
say that the knowledge of spirit, which is embodied through the Philosophy of Spirit, is that 
through which the Idea is actualized. But the second statement in the Zusatz then becomes 
puzzling. Since Hegel here seems to be identifying “finite spirit” with “subjective spirit,” it is 
questionable why Hegel does not mention “objective spirit,” which is equally finite. The 
emphasis on subjective spirit in the Zusatz thus leads to suspect that Hegel has in mind, not 
exclusively the Philosophy of Spirit, but also its first division, the philosophy of subjective spirit.  
This suspicion leads us to reconsider the “knowledge of spirit” mentioned in § 377. If this 
refers to the Philosophy of Spirit, why does Hegel contrast it with the Menschenerkentniss, 
namely the psychologist-anthropological discourses of the time that only concern “particular 
capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual”? Indeed, the Philosophy of 
 
 76  
Spirit can be viewed, I suggest, as Hegel’s philosophical anthropology in the broad sense that it 
is all about humanity. It is an anthropology that deals with humanity in terms of the three 
dimensions of spirit: subjective spirit that is concerned with an individual person’s psychological 
constitution; objective spirit, with communal life forms such as the family, civil society, and the 
state; absolute spirit, with cultural activities such as art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel’s 
mention about the Menschenerkenntniss can then be understood as involving a claim for a 
holistic approach that considers all the dimensions of the human life and a speculative approach 
that conceptualizes them in accordance with the determinations of the Concept. We can also 
presume Hegel’s criticism of a one-sided, subjectivist portrait of humanity of which the focus is 
on an individual man and a particular psychological constitution of her personality, and the 
criticism of an empiricist inquiry that is incapable of synthesizing their observations of diverse 
manifestations of humanity in terms of their necessary connections. Without ignoring these 
comprehensive, anthropological concerns of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, I call attention to the 
fact that those topics of the Menschenerkenntniss as “particular capacities, character, 
propensities, and foibles of the individual” are the themes of the first division of Hegel’s 
philosophy of subjective spirit, the Anthropology—specifically, its first sub-division, the 
“Natural Soul.” Given this, it is also plausible to presume that by the knowledge of spirit in § 377 
Hegel is expressing a local concern about the Anthropology rather than a global concern about 
the Philosophy of Spirit.  
Now, the question I pose in this chapter is as follows. In the “Introduction” to the 
Philosophy of Spirit, does Hegel address the Philosophy of Spirit or the philosophy of subjective 
spirit or both? Does he have in mind Geist or subjective spirit or both? Concerning these 
questions, which I formulated out of a reading of § 377 and the Zusatz to § 377, one may well 
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call into question the credibility of Zuzätze. These additional texts are not from Hegel’s original 
manuscript but from notes taken by students at his lectures. One cannot expect that they convey 
Hegel’s verbal presentations without any distortion.4 However, even if we discredit the texts 
from Zusätz, the questions I raised above seem to remain relevant. For the ambiguity between 
Geist and subjective spirit is also found in other passages of the Introduction text. In trying to 
answer the questions above, I will below analyze in detail Hegel’s ambiguous usages of those 
terms in the Introduction text and the organization of this text.  
To begin, the ambiguity between Geist and subjective spirit is more explicit in §378. In 
§378, Hegel challenges rational and empirical psychology and appreciates Aristotle’s De anima 
and other essays on the soul for being the sole work of speculative interest. Hegel points out that 
rational psychology considers soul in terms of an abstract, ambiguous category, i.e., “a thing,” 
something of which such abstract concepts as simplicity and immortality are assumed to be 
predicated.5 It is thus “abstract metaphysics of understanding,”6 which only applies some fixed, 
abstract categories of understanding to the equally abstract notion, i.e., a soulful thing. Empirical 
psychology, on the other hand, differs from rational psychology in that it has as its object 
concrete spirit and bases its investigations of this subject matter on experience and observation. 
But it does not differ much from “the conventional metaphysics of understanding 
[Verstandesmetaphysics]”7 insofar as it sticks to rigid conceptual elements such as forces or 
                                                   
4 For an informative summary of the editorial and interpretative debates about the Zusätze texts, see in particular: 
Robert R. Williams, “Translator’s Introduction,” in G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1-6. In the present work, I will use the Zusätze texts insofar as I find they 
largely hang together with Hegel’s manuscripts or with the general ideas of Hegel’s philosophy.   
5 Cf. ENZ, § 34. 
6 ENZ, § 378. 
7 Ibid. 
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faculties of the mind. Consequently, empirical psychology does conceive of concrete spirit, and 
yet only as an aggregate of diverse mental forces, without being able to grasp the original unity 
of its subject matter. Aristotle’s treatments of soul have advantages over those two types of 
philosophical psychology because they point to a way of considering concrete spirit in terms of 
the absolute restlessness of spirit, that is, of the pure activity of negating all fixed determinations 
of understanding by dealing with the soul as inwardly bounded to the body.8 Hence, the essential 
aim of “a philosophy of spirit”9 consists in nothing but introducing the Concept into the 
knowledge of concrete spirit such that the meaning of Aristotle’s treatments of the soul can 
thereby be revealed in terms of spirit’s absolute negativity.  
Thus, we notice that what Hegel addresses in the second passage of the “Introduction” to 
the Philosophy of Spirit (§378) is the issues of the philosophy of subjective spirit and not the 
Philosophy of Spirit—the defectiveness of rational and empirical psychology, the need of 
speculative approach to spirit, and a preferred model of the latter. His speculative approach to 
“concrete spirit” consists in treating it without arbitrarily dismembering its original unity by 
some presupposed, fixed, abstract categories, such that its concreteness is not lost on the course 
of theorization. For Hegel, this is possible by introducing the Concept, that is, by considering 
concrete spirit in terms of the self-development of the Concept whereby all its determinations are 
shown to be related to each other in a necessary manner. Now, it then becomes clearer that by 
“concrete spirit” Hegel means “mind,” so to speak, treated by empirical psychologists or what he 
                                                   
8 Cf. ENZ, § 378 Z. Hegel’s presentation of Aristotle’s conception of the soul in terms of the absolute negativity of 
spirit raises the question about its relevance to Aristotle. I discuss this issue later in this chapter when I examine 
Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s metaphysics.   
9 Ibid. 
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thinks Aristotle means by the “soul.” Consequently, by “the philosophy of spirit” Hegel means 
philosophical psychology or his philosophy of subjective spirit.  
The issue of the ambiguity between Geist and subjective spirit leads us to call into 
question the overall structure of the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit (§§ 377-386). I 
already pointed out the ambiguity in the first two passages (§§377-378). In the next passage 
(§379), Hegel speaks of the self-feeling [das Selbstgefühl] as a phenomenon that testifies to the 
deficiency of empirical psychology; animal magnetism as an example that evidences the 
“substantial unity of the soul.” These examples, for Hegel, serve to support the Aristotelian 
approach, one that sees the soul as the principle of life and does not take on a dualistic 
assumption about the relationship between soul and body. But the relationship between soul and 
body is within Hegel’s system the issue of the Anthropology. It is also in the Anthropology that 
Hegel thematizes the self-feeling and animal magnetism. Shortly, this third passage of the 
“Introduction” (§379), too, concerns the philosophy of subjective spirit. In the next passage 
(§380), Hegel again brings up the concrete feature of spirit. The concrete feature of spirit, Hegel 
states, makes it necessary that a lower stage (the Anthropology) anticipates a higher one (the 
Phenomenology of Spirit), and the higher one is present in the lower one. The “concrete spirit” 
mentioned in §380 is therefore more narrowly concerned with the philosophy of subjective spirit 
rather than with the Philosophy of Spirit. While the first four passages of the “Introduction” 
(§§377-380) thus mainly address the issue of philosophical psychology or the philosophy of 
subjective spirit, the remaining six passages (§§381-386) consider the “Concept of Spirit” 
(§§381-384) and the “Division of the Philosophy of Spirit” (§§385-386). In the “Concept of 
Spirit” Hegel lists essential conceptual elements defining spirit [Geist]: ideality (the relationship 
between nature and spirit), freedom (the formal essence of spirit), and manifestation (the 
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absolute mode in which spirit presents itself). In the “Division” he finally outlines the three 
divisions of the Philosophy of Spirit: the Subjective Spirit, the Objective Spirit, and the Absolute 
Spirit. Those later six passages are therefore more properly concerned with Geist and not with 
subjective spirit.  
Consequently, the questions I posed above concerning the ambiguity of the “knowledge 
of spirit”—whether it indicates the Philosophy of Spirit or the philosophy of subjective spirit—
can now be reformulated as follows. Why did Hegel not move the first four passages (§§377-
380) to the “First Division of the Subjective Spirit” (§§387-482)? How can we make sense of 
this textual issue that Hegel left, consciously or unconsciously, those passages concerning 
subjective spirit at the head of the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit? In trying to answer 
these questions about the somewhat confusing structure of the “Introduction” to the Philosophy 
of Spirit, I pay attention to the fact that in the first four passages of this text Hegel seems to be 
placing emphasis on the Anthropology among the three divisions of the philosophy of subjective 
spirit. As I describe above, his appraisal of Aristotle’s treatments of the soul and the cases of the 
self-feeling and animal magnetism all pertain to the Anthropology. Further, his mention about a 
lower stage’s (the Anthropology) anticipation of a higher stage (the Phenomenology of Spirit) 
and the latter’s being present in the former spotlights the Anthropology rather than the 
Phenomenology of Spirit because what Hegel here emphasizes is that particular stages of the soul 
as awakening and derangement belong to certain forms of consciousness and understanding, not 
the other way around.  
Now, if I have a point in suggesting that Hegel puts emphasis on the Anthropology in the 
“Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit, one can perhaps presume a special meaning of the 
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Anthropology for the Philosophy of Spirit. First of all, one can assume that the unity of soul and 
body is for Hegel one of the critical standards for measuring whether a psychological account is 
speculative or not since he repeatedly underlines the necessity for a consideration of the soul as 
intrinsically connected to the body. Correspondingly, the Anthropology, since Hegel here deals 
with the relationship between soul and body, makes his philosophical psychology contained in 
the philosophy of subjective spirit speculative, distinct from empirical and metaphysical 
psychology of the time. But this explanation is not satisfactory because it discloses nothing about 
the relationship between the philosophy of subjective spirit and the Philosophy of Spirit, one that 
I have articulated as an ambiguity between subjective spirit and Geist. One can therefore pose a 
question as to why Hegel attaches great importance to the unity of soul and body. Where does 
this issue, among so many other psychological subject matters, find a rationale for being treated 
as such an important problem in an introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit?  
It is important to note that the Anthropology is not only the first division of the 
philosophy of subjective spirit, but also the first stage of the Philosophy of Spirit. It is the 
watershed where Geist emerges for the first time as Geist out of nature. This being said, the 
Anthropology has an introductory role, not only concerning the philosophy of subjective spirit, 
but more significantly concerning the Philosophy of Spirit. The account of the relationship 
between soul and body in the Anthropology is at the same time an account of the sense in which 
Geist emerges out of nature. The Anthropology thus introduces Geist. If there is any ambiguity 




 82  
2. Psychological Subject: The Emergence of Spirit out of Death of an Individual 
 
In the previous section, I claimed that Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit cannot simply 
be identified with the mind because it also denotes Geist that emerges out of nature. Now, 
another important feature of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit is its connection with the 
Logic. Subjective spirit develops itself by going through three stages: (1) the soul or nature-spirit 
[Naturgeist] (the Anthropology); (2) consciousness or spirit in relationship [Verhältnis] or 
particularization (the Phenomenology of Spirit); (3) spirit determining itself in itself, as a subject 
for itself (the Psychology).10 Yet these three stages constitute the “progress of development 
[Fortgang der Entwicklung].”11 In other words, the movement of subjective spirit through the 
three states occurs in the way that the Concept develops itself from within itself. The soul or 
Naturgeist is what spirit is in itself; in the spirit-as-such, this becomes for spirit itself. Hegel 
highlights that this method of the self-development of the Concept makes his philosophy of 
subjective spirit distinct from “the psychological, or the habitual ways of consideration” of spirit, 
that is, the psychological trend of the time that only recounts unsystematically [erzählungsweise] 
how the mind is constituted and what its activities are.12  
Since the notion of the Concept’s self-development is the key idea of Hegel’s speculative 
logic, one can hardly understand the speculative feature of his philosophy of subjective spirit 
without an understanding of its relationship with the logic. Throughout this section and next 
                                                   
10 ENZ, § 387. 
11 ENZ, § 387 Z. 
12 ENZ, § 387 Z. 
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section, I examine some arguments of Hegel put forward in his logic that I find give important 
clues for spelling out the relationship between the logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit. I 
thereby attempt to articulate some key insights of Hegel underpinning his philosophy of 
subjective spirit. In this section, I analyze his discussions about the logical Idea’s differentiation 
into knowing [Erkennen] and the external world (ENZ, §§ 223-235). In next section, I will 
examine Hegel’s idea of the objective thinking. My focus on these two issues in Hegel’s logic—
knowing as differentiation of the logical Idea and the unity of rationality and reality—draw on 
the following definition of subjective spirit given by Hegel.13  
 
Spirit, developing itself in its ideality, is spirit as knowing [Erkennen]. The knowing, 
however, is conceived here not merely as a determinacy of the logical Idea (§ 223), but in 
the way in which concrete spirit determines itself to knowing.14 
  
In this passage, Hegel defines subjective spirit in terms of knowing. It is a knowing to 
which spirit determines itself and not the knowing as a determinacy of the logical Idea. As I will 
show below, the “knowing” here has two meanings: the subject matter of the Psychology, i.e., 
the spirit-as-such, which has cognitive and volitional aspects, on the one hand, and its genesis or 
its rise as the theme of the Psychology in the system of the Encyclopedia, i.e., spirit’s self-
determination, on the other. These two meanings of knowing are eventually involved in what I 
                                                   
13 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “logic” without capitalizing or italicizing when I broadly refer to 
Hegel’s speculative logic. But I use the italicized title “the Logic” when I refer to the first part of the 1830 
Encyclopedia system, as I use the italicized titles “the Philosophy of Nature” and “the Philosophy of Spirit” when 
discussing these two other parts of the Encyclopedia system. To avoid confusion, I use the title “the Science of 
Logic” when I deal with Hegel’s greater logic published between 1812 and 1816. 
14 ENZ, § 387. 
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have articulated as the ambiguity between subjective spirit and Geist in the previous section, but 
in a different way than the Anthropology weaves two issues together, the relationship between 
soul and body on the one side, and the emergence of spirit from nature on the other. Briefly 
stated, the passage above sums up the movement of subjective spirit from the Anthropology to 
the Psychology. It states that spirit “develops itself in its ideality” and thereby comes forth as 
“knowing.” In other words, by idealizing nature and thus de-naturalizing its naturalness (the 
Anthropology), spirit comes forth as knowing, namely as the finite human spirit with two 
aspects: intelligence and will (the Psychology). But these cognitive and volitional aspects of the 
finite human spirit are not just arbitrarily chosen by an observer or speculator from outside as 
themes of psychological investigations. They rather belong to necessary results from the 
movement of spirit that “determines itself” to such psychological themes. This determination of 
spirit’s own is concerned with the movement of subjective spirit and, more narrowly, I suggest, 
with the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology.  
Now, both of those two issues in the definition of subjective spirit—thematization of the 
finite human spirit in the Psychology and spirit’s self-determination to this in the transition from 
the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology—involve a vital connection with the first part of 
the Encyclopedia system, i.e., the Logic. As Hegel mentions in the citation above, knowing as 
the finite human spirit is already considered in the Logic, specifically as the determinacy of the 
logical Idea. But the Logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit differ in that the former deals 
with knowing only as the determinacy of the logical Idea whereas the latter concerns the 
concrete spirit that determines itself to knowing. If so, why does the same subject matter, 
knowing, appear twice at different places in Hegel’s system? Is there any necessity that knowing, 
which we can call a psychological subject having intelligence and will, is to be thematized in the 
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Logic but re-thematized in the philosophy of subjective spirit? This is what I examine in this 
section. On the other hand, spirit’s self-determination to knowing, which I find present in the 
transition the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology, somehow reinstitutes the transition 
from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic. This will be discussed in the next section and 
in Chapter 3 more thoroughly.  
 
2.1. Immediacy of the Idea in Life 
With respect to the finite human spirit as a theme of the Psychology, it is to be noted that 
the same subject matter is already thematized in the last part of the Logic on the Idea (ENZ, §§ 
223-235). Hegel here defines the logical Idea as “the absolute unity of the Concept and object” 15 
and hence, as that which involves the unity of all dualistically related terms—“the unity of the 
ideal and the real, of the finite and infinite, of the soul and the body, as the possibility that has its 
actuality in itself, as that the nature of which can only be comprehended [begreiffen] as existing, 
etc.”16 Briefly, the logical Idea is the logical unity that underlies all dualistic relations. Following 
this, Hegel considers the differentiation of the logical Idea into “knowing [Erkennen]” and an 
external world or life. As with the Psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel here 
in the Logic considers knowing as having theoretical and practical activities, i.e., intelligence and 
will. It thus indicates a psychological subject that relates to the world through its cognitive and 
volitional operations. It is here to be noted that Hegel’s logic has no psychological ground but is 
instead grounded in the idea of the unity of thought and being. Accordingly, the pure forms of 
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thought considered in it do not pertain to psychological operations of an individual mind that 
already takes up separation from the world. Instead, such a psychological subject arises as a 
result of all logical considerations about being, essence, and the Concept, specifically as a 
differentiation of the logical Idea.  
If so, why does the psychological subject come forth as an outcome of the Logic? Is there 
any necessity for it to be thematized in the Logic? Further, why does Hegel not directly proceed 
to the Psychology at the end of the Logic? Is there any reason for making a lengthy detour 
through the Philosophy of Nature, the Anthropology, and the Phenomenology of Spirit to address 
in earnest what he already took up in the last stage of the Logic?  
These questions have to do with the dialectic nature proper to the logical Idea. In 
considering the logical Idea as unity underlying all dualistic relations, Hegel does not make it 
into an absolute substance underlying all finite attributes or such an “abstract, calmly enduring 
identity.”17 Instead, it is dialectic in the sense that it essentially involves a “process”—the 
process in which the Concept […] determines itself to be objectivity, […] and in which this 
externality that has the Concept as its substance leads itself back into subjectivity.”18  As it is 
clear in this passage, it is important to note that the dialectic nature of the Idea is fundamentally 
concerned with the self-developing feature of the Concept. Hegel underlines that the Concept 
constitutes a different kind of movement from being and essence; it is self-development 
[Entwicklung] whereas being is characterized by transition [Übergehen] and essence is in the 
shining [Schein].19 What makes the Concept stand out is the fact that in it “what are 
                                                   
17 ENZ, § 215A. 
18 ENZ, §215 
19 Cf. ENZ, § 161. 
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differentiated are at the same time immediately identical with each other and with the whole.”20 
In other words, the Concept is a totality that is determined in such a way that all the elements 
constitutive of its movement are identical with it and, conversely, it is somehow implicitly 
present in all those moments of its movement. As Hegel makes it clear, the development of the 
Concept is therefore a teleological movement, one in which the end that is to be achieved 
through the movement is implicitly present in the beginning and in the whole process of the 
movement as well, which is analogous to the growth of a seed which “contains the entire plant in 
itself already.”21 In accordance with this teleological feature of the self-development of the 
Concept, the Doctrine of the Concept comprises three sub-divisions: (1) the subjective or formal 
Concept (the Concept as such, judgment, and syllogism); (2) the Concept determined to be 
objectivity (mechanism, chemism, teleology); (3) the Idea as the unity of the Concept and 
objectivity (life, knowing, the absolute Idea).22  
Thus, the Doctrine of the Concept somehow anticipates the progression of the 
Encyclopedia system from the Idea to Nature, and to Spirit, by considering the mechanic, 
chemic, and teleological constitution of natural beings in terms of the objectivity or 
objectification of the Concept and by considering knowing and the absolute Idea in terms of the 
restored unity of the Concept. Hence, one can roughly say that the movement of the Concept 
within the Doctrine of the Concept establishes that and how the system is to be structured as the 
self-development of the Concept, before one moves forward to Nature and Spirit. Further, it 
should be noted that it does not assume a somewhat categorical distinction between Nature and 
                                                   
20 ENZ, § 161 
21 ENZ, § 161 Z. 
22 ENZ, § 162. 
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Spirit. Regarding this, it is important to note that the last stage of the movement of the Concept 
within the Doctrine of the Concept, i.e., the dialectic process of the Idea anticipates the transition 
from Nature to Spirit—from the organic nature in the Philosophy of Nature to the spirit-as-such 
in the Psychology of the philosophy of subjective spirit while the Anthropology and the 
Phenomenology of Spirit are missing. It thereby establishes that the transition from Nature to 
Spirit is to be shown as part of the teleological self-development of the Concept. The Doctrine of 
the Concept thus gives some basic methodological foundations for the Philosophy of Nature and 
the Philosophy of Spirit so that both nature and spirit can be grasped in terms of the self-
development of the Concept. To that extent, the dialectic of the Idea is not mere anticipation or 
an overview of the process from organic nature to knowing which will come on later in the 
system. While the latter is more concerned with the self-development of the Concept in reality, 
the dialectic of the Idea in the Logic is more concerned with the necessity of the Concept’s self-
development in reality. It is therefore important to note that the dialectical process of the Idea 
reifies the teleological self-development of the Concept whereby the Concept makes itself into 
objectivity and turns back into itself as subjectivity. More precisely, the dialectic of the Idea 
comprises (1) life, (2) knowing, and (3) the absolute Idea, where life is the “immediate Idea,” 
knowing is its “difference,” and the absolute Idea is the “restoration of the unity.”  23 It thereby 
establishes that the Concept is determined in such a way that it is essentially life and is 
differentiated into knowing and the external world to come back to itself as their unity. 
Conversely, perhaps one may say that the process from organic nature to knowing in the 
                                                   
23  ENZ, § 215 A.  
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Realphilosophie is the exemplary case of the self-development of the Concept, one that 
paradigmatically exhibits the teleological, self-developing constitution of the Concept.  
To begin with, the dialectic of the Idea starts with life, with the fact that the Idea is 
immediate in life, more precisely. In his discussion about life, Hegel weaves together, as far as I 
see, three different strands in the theory of life: (1) Aristotle’s notion of the soul as a sort of 
principle of life that makes living beings distinct from inanimate bodies; (2) Kantian teleology of 
an organism; (3) the biological discussions of the day about irritability and sensibility—and 
further, about reproduction of an individual body and the natural history. While considering life 
in terms of the relation between soul and body in line with Aristotle, Hegel suggests that the soul 
expresses the determinations of the Concept. It can be considered, in other words, the 
“immediate, self-relating universality” of the externality of the body and the “particularization” 
of the body as well, that is, the “individuality as infinite negativity.”24 Hence, life for Hegel can 
be identified with the Idea, insofar as the soul, i.e., that which makes a living being alive, 
exhibits the determinations of the Concept. But there is an important qualification in this 
identification between the Idea and life: life is not just the Idea but the immediate Idea. By this 
qualification, Hegel brings up the issue of a body. If life is the immediate Idea, this is because the 
soul exists in a body, such that “the Concept is realized as the soul in a body.”25 One can 
therefore assume that those determinations of the Concept are also concerned with vital functions 
making a living organism alive. Alternatively, one would have to say, more strictly, that what 
makes a living body alive is not the determinations of the Concept themselves, but certain bodily 
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operations that can be explained in terms of the conceptual relations between universality, 
particularity, and individuality. Hegel understands those bodily operations in the Kantian terms 
of teleology. They are, for Hegel, nothing but the teleological process in which “all members are 
reciprocally momentary means as much as momentary purposes,” which he calls the “dialectic of 
the bodiliness [Leiblichkeit].”26 But Hegel understands this teleological process in terms of some 
vital functions such as sensibility and irritability. For Hegel, these biological functions are 
concerned with reproduction, namely the process of self-organization by which an organic body 
constantly reproduces itself as an individual living organism.  
Considering all these elements, I interpret Hegel’s term Lebendiges as “an individual 
living organism which constitutes itself as such in a constant movement of self-organization.” 
When he states that “life is essentially an individual living organism [Lebendiges],”27 therefore, 
his point is that life is to be considered in light of the self-organizing process of a living body—
which he believes Aristotle already grasped, Kant successfully formulated with his notion of 
inner purposiveness, and the biological studies of the time comprehended. To that extent, “life is 
the immediate Idea,”28 implying that an individual living organism is the reality that embodies 
the Concept, namely the concrete universality that is an individuality.  
However, the individual living organism is essentially finite due to its subordination to 
mortality, which, in Hegel’s terms, relates to the determination that “the soul and the body are 
separable, on account of the immediacy of the Idea.”29 Further, a living body’s self-organization 
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is not always entirely successful as it gets ill when some parts of it become inorganic. Life is 
therefore “constant battle against inorganic powers.”30 Accordingly, insofar as it is considered in 
terms of an individual organism’s bodily processes of self-organization, life is not just life. 
Instead, it is intrinsically self-contradictory, involving in it its opposite, namely disease and 
death. This is what the immediacy of the Idea signifies.  
Indeed, Hegel’s discussions about life and death, which I have articulated as an inner 
contradiction of life, does not seem hard to understand from a common-sense standpoint. Hegel 
emphasizes that life is not something mysterious or incomprehensible. He thus seems to be 
certain that fundamental vital phenomena that make living beings alive are biologically 
understandable and philosophically explicable. The extent to which his biological understanding 
of the vital phenomena such as irritability and sensibility and his philosophical conceptualization 
of those biological phenomena meet today’s scientific and philosophical standard, is a matter of 
further examination. Whatever the case may be, Hegel’s thesis that life is the immediate Idea, 
does not entail any bold claim for a supernatural entity’s instantiation in natural beings. Instead, 
it concerns the teleological structure of an organism’s self-organization, which Hegel finds 
squares with the logical structure of the Concept. Further, there is no absurdity in Hegel’s idea 
that life is intrinsically self-contradictory insofar as the phenomena that seem only negative to 
life, i.e., disease and death, are part of life. For these phenomena belong only to living beings and 
not to any other kinds of being.  
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2.2. The Genus-process: The Sublation of the Immediacy of the Idea 
While Hegel’s discussion about the immediacy of the Idea in life does not cause 
significant difficulty, his theorization of the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea is 
complicated. It is also in this problematic of the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea that 
knowing [das Wissen] becomes an important theme in Hegel’s Logic. To spell out the sense in 
which knowing becomes a key issue in the dialectic of the Idea, we can therefore pose a question 
as to why the immediacy of the Idea should be sublated. Indeed, if it only concerns vital 
phenomena such as an organism’s self-organization, disease, and death, it does not necessarily 
have to be sublated. The problem that an organism’s life and death causes to the dialectic of the 
Idea is therefore to be more clearly articulated.  
To recapitulate, the immediacy of the Idea is for Hegel eventually concerned with the fact 
that the Concept has its reality in an embodied-ensouled being, i.e., an organism. Specifically, 
Hegel understands the life of an organism in terms of a biological process of self-organization, 
and the latter as embodying the logical structure of the Concept. Again, an organism is alive by a 
constant process of self-organization, which Hegel considers as a battle against inorganic 
tendencies of the body. Hence, the life of an organism consists in a dynamic association of self-
organizing activities and inorganic tendencies. Now, the death of an individual organism then 
consists in a complete, irreversible dissociation of those two antithetical elements. Yet, this 
dissociation is a dissolution of the individuality of a living body. For a living body’s self-
organization has to do with maintaining itself as an individual body, one in which organic 
elements (universality) and inorganic elements (particularity) continuously communicate with 
each other to have an individual living body reproduce itself constantly. Consequently, the inner 
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contradiction of life does not simply denote the plain truth that disease and death are essential 
parts of life. Since life as an individual living body [das Lebendige] for Hegel signifies a 
realization of the Idea, the death of an individual organism denotes the impossibility of the Idea’s 
realization. This is so because death is a dissolution of the individuality of an organism, and this 
is the dissolution of the Concept that is defined as a concrete universality that is an individuality. 
The problem is here not about whether or not plural organisms exist such that the Concept finds 
its reality whenever a living being lives. For the relationship between the Concept and a living 
organism is not instantiation of the universal in particular things or participation of the 
particulars in the universal. Instead, the problem consists in the fact that a living being does not 
have the power of enduing or mastering the negativity of death, implying that in an organism, 
life contradicts death. This is a problem since the Concept is ultimately a teleological whole 
which constitutes itself as self-identical in differentiating itself into externality. In short, if an 
organism is the immediate reality of the Concept, this is so only insofar as it is alive. But when 
one considers the fact that a living being dies and life essentially involves death in itself, it turns 
out that this contradictory connection of life and death does not fit with the teleological unity of 
the Concept. In short, life cannot be a reality adequate for the Idea when it is considered in the 
biological terms of an individual organism’s self-organization. To save the Idea from the inner 
contradiction of life, it is therefore necessary to sublate the immediacy of the Idea, and this 
means that one should seek another reality that is adequate for the Idea.  
In the dialectic of the Idea, the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea is eventually 
achieved by the transition from life to knowing. Before examining this transition, I would here 
like to briefly reconstruct Hegel’s conception of the genus-process to set the stage for the 
discussion about the meaning of death that I will make in the last part of this section. The genus-
 
 94  
process is the first solution to the problem of the immediacy of the Idea. Sexual intercourse and 
begetting newborns for Hegel constitute another dimension of life than an individual organism’s 
self-organization: the life of a species that comes to be by virtue of interactions among plural 
individuals. When considered in relation to the genus-process, the death of an individual 
organism is therefore given another meaning than a mere dissolution of individuality, as Hegel 
states that it “perishes in this [universality] as the power.”31 In relation to the genus-process, the 
death of an organism has a positive meaning because a species preserves itself by the 
individuals’ birth and death. It is, in other words, a constitutive factor of the life of a species; in 
this sense, it is a perishing in the universality. Further, life is also to be redefined. When 
considered at the level of the species, life is no longer an immediate universality that the Idea has 
in an individual organism’s self-organization. Instead, it is a mediated universality that is 
mediated by the birth and death of the individuals: a universality that preserves the individuality 
as its moment. In this sense, the immediacy of the Idea is sublated in the genus-process. Hegel 
therefore states that in the genus-process the Idea “comes to itself, to its truth, entering into 
existence as the free genus for itself.”32 Further, this sublation of the immediacy of the Idea 
results in spirit’s emerging, as Hegel states: “the death of the merely immediate, individual being 
[das Lebendige] is the spirit emerging.”33  
I here do not enter biological investigations into Hegel’s thoughts about the species. What 
I find complicated and pivotal as well in his discussion about the immediacy of the Idea in life 
and its sublation in the genus-process, is the thesis that spirit emerges out of that sublation. If the 
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“genus for itself” is the existence in which the Idea comes to itself, to its truth, as Hegel puts it, 
why does the Idea not come to an end with the genus-process but proceed to spirit? What is the 
spirit that thereby emerges? What does the “emergence” mean?  
These questions relate, again, to the teleological, self-developing feature of the Concept. 
Hegel characterizes the dialectic process of the Idea as “the absolute unity of the Concept and 
objectivity” and defines this unity as the “exhibition [Darstellung] of the Concept.”34 By this 
Hegel means that the Concept, whose determinations constitute the ideal content of the Idea, 
exhibits itself in the form of external existence [Dasein] and takes this shape, which it enclosed 
in its ideality, up into its power.35 It is therefore to be noted that the Concept as such, i.e., the 
concrete universality that is an individuality, is itself not identical with the Idea. The Idea is 
present only in the exhibition of the Concept. It is, in other words, a logical movement in which 
it is at first present in the Concept, then goes for a reality conforming to this ideal content, and 
finally takes up this reality up into itself. Or, it is the movement in which the Concept makes 
itself into its object and turns back into itself by positing this objectivity of its own as such for 
itself.  
This scheme of the exhibition of the Concept explains why the genus for itself is not the 
complete truth of the Idea. Indeed, that the genus for itself and not an individual living being is 
the reality adequate for the Idea, is only half the dialectic process of the Idea. For it only means 
that a mediated universality that it exhibits is the true form of the reality in which the Idea has 
objectivity but does not ensure that the objectivity of the Idea is posited for and by the Idea. In 
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other words, the genus for itself is the reality that illustrates the true form of the objectivity of the 
Idea, but not the reality in which the Idea posits itself for itself. For the same reason, the 
sublation of the immediacy of the Idea by the genus-process is only a middle stage and not an 
endpoint in the exhibition of the Concept.  
 
2.3. Transition from Life to Knowing  
 Now, Hegel reconceptualizes the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea by the genus-
process in terms of differentiation of the Idea, and this sets out the transition from life to 
knowing in the dialectic of the Idea. Specifically, Hegel reconsiders the relationship between an 
organism’s self-organization and the genus-process in terms of the relationship between the 
subjective Idea and the objective Idea whose identity is to be posited by and for the Idea itself.36 
First, Hegel already defined an organism’s self-organization as something subjective. What is 
reproduced by the process of self-organization is the members of a body. Hegel understands this 
as a living being’s “making its bodiliness its object,” or “its inorganic nature” having “relative 
externality.”37 But all activities of the members of a body belong to “one activity of the subject” 
that serves to reproduce the subject, i.e., an individual living body.38 For this reason, self-
organization is self-reproduction; in this sense, Idea has subjectivity in an organism’s self-
organization. However, self-organization is “the process of the individual living body within 
itself.”39 The externality of the members of a body is therefore only relative and does not have an 
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objectivity that itself displays the determinations of the Concept. For this reason, Idea is only 
one-sidedly subjective in an individual’s self-organization. Secondly, the genus for itself is that 
in which the Idea “has the universality for the element of its existence;” it is “the objectivity” of 
the Idea, that in which Idea makes itself into its object.”40 But in this existence, the Idea has no 
subjectivity since its objectivity in the genus for itself depends on the individuals that constantly 
come to be and perish. In the genus-process the Idea is therefore only one-sidedly objective 
without being able to turn back to itself. But both an individual organism’s self-organization and 
the genus for itself are identical to each other “in itself or as life.”41 More precisely, they belong 
to differentiation of what is identical in itself, i.e., life as the Concept.  
In this way, Hegel reconceptualizes the life of an individual living being [das Lebendige] 
and the life of a species as a differentiation of the Idea into its subjectivity and objectivity, both 
of which are equally one-sided. Following this, Hegel proceeds to the next stage of the dialectic 
of the Idea, i.e., knowing. He states that the differentiation at stake is “a pure differentiation 
within the Idea itself,” such that “the Idea is for itself both itself and its other.”42 It is therefore 
“the certainty of being in itself the identity of this objective world with it.”43 This means that 
“reason comes to the world with the absolute faith in its capacity to posit the identity and elevate 
its certainty to truth.” This is “the process of knowing [das Erkennen].”44 The differentiation of 
the Idea into its subjectivity and objectivity is here once again reconceptualized as the pure 
differentiation of the Idea within itself, implying that it is both itself and its other. It is then 
                                                   
40 ENZ, § 223. 
41 ENZ, § 224. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ENZ, § 225. 
 
 98  
identified as the process of knowing, namely the relation between the finite human spirit and the 
external world in which reason comes forth as the certainty of its identity with the world and 
demonstrates this to be true.  
The transition from the genus-process to knowing is thus made by a series of 
reformulations of the notions that concern the differentiation of the Idea: (1) an individual 
organism’s self-organization and the genus-process, as the differentiation of the Idea into one-
sided subjectivity and one-sided objectivity; (2) this differentiation of the Idea, as a 
differentiation of the Idea within itself; (3) this unifying differentiation in which the Idea is both 
itself and its other, as the differentiation between the finite human spirit and the external world 
whose identity is presupposed by reasons’ certainty and is posited as such for and by reason. As I 
have attempted to show above, the first reformulation is concerned with the one-sidedness that 
the Idea has both in an individual living body’s self-organization and the genus-process. The 
second reformulation hinges on the fact that both the subjectivity and objectivity are of the Idea. 
But it further adds an important point to the discussions of the differentiation of the Idea that it is 
the self-differentiation of the Idea. The aspect of self-identity of the Idea is therefore to be taken 
as the key conceptual standard defining the next object in the dialectic of the Idea. The third 
reformulation then suggests that the finite human spirit is the reality that meets that standard, 
specifically when it is considered as reason that demonstrates the certainty of its unity with the 
world to be true. Therefore, the emergence of a psychological subject, i.e., knowing, in Hegel’s 
logic is a necessary consequence of the logical structure and the dialectic nature of the Idea. The 
dialectic exhibition [Darstellung] of the Concept hinges on the conformity between the Concept 
and reality—the logical structure of the Concept at each stage and the conceptual constitution of 
the reality corresponding to it. In this exhibition, the finite human spirit is the reality in which the 
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Idea can exhibit itself as self-identical self-differentiation. Therefore, the sublation of the 
immediacy of the Idea occurs in the process of knowing.  
 
2.4. The Emergence of Spirit out of the Death of the Individual Living Being 
 As mentioned above, Hegel states that “the death of the merely immediate, individual 
living being [Lebendigkeit] is the emergence of spirit [das Hervorgehen des Geistes].”45 Since 
this statement condenses all the dialectic process of the Idea I have reconstructed so far, I here 
turn back to the thesis of the emergence of spirit out of the death of an individual living being. 
Now it becomes more evident that the spirit that emerges out of the death of an individual living 
being is subjective spirit—knowing [das Erkennen] that is thematized in the Psychology of the 
philosophy of subjective spirit more precisely. My concern here is therefore to clarify the 
significance of the death of an individual living being for the knowing.  
 I have earlier suggested that the genus-process brings up a modification in the meaning of 
death: from an immediate dissolution of the individuality of a living organism to a mediating 
factor constitutive of the life of a species. On this basis, I understand “the death of the merely 
immediate, individual living being” in the statement above as involving that modification, while 
identifying the Lebendigkeit in the statement with das Lebendige which I have previously 
interpreted as an individual living body that is alive by self-organization. Hence, the statement 
that spirit emerges out of the death of an immediate individual living being cannot be understood 
as if spirit emerges when living beings all die, or as if spirit is something supernatural that can 
                                                   
45 ENZ, § 222. 
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subsist even when there are no living beings. Instead, it condenses the dialectic process of the 
Idea that goes from an individual organism’s self-organization to the genus process, and to 
knowing. I have attempted to show that the transition from life to knowing in the dialectic of the 
Idea involves a series of reformulations concerning the logical structure of the Idea and the 
conceptual constitution of the realities such as an individual organism, the genus for itself, and 
the finite human spirit. If my previous analysis of this dialectic has a point, the thesis of spirit’s 
emergence out of the death of an individual living being can be understood as reaffirming the 
dialectic of the Idea. It means that through the dialectic of the Idea it has been shown that the 
finite human spirit that interacts with the external world through its cognitive and volitional 
operations, i.e., knowing, is the reality adequate to the Idea, the reality in which the Idea is 
identical to itself in its self-differentiation.  
 But the meaning of spirit’s emergence out of death is to be more aptly clarified in both 
terms of connection and disconnection between spirit and death, as the German “hervorgehen” 
ambiguously means both the origin from which something comes forth and the state in which it 
has become somehow independent from that origin. Hegel’s thesis of spirit’s emergence out of 
the death of an individual living being therefore involves, as far as I see, the conceptual 
difference between the biological life of an organism and the cognitive and volitional life of a 
spiritual being. Specifically, the dialectic of the Idea implies that when we are concerned with the 
biological life of a living body, the self-contradictory constitution of life is the conceptual limit 
we can reach. But we move from this realm of natural life to the realm of spiritual life when we 
put the inner contradiction of life in the context of the life of a species and consider the 
resolution of that contradiction in the genus-process in relation to the logical structure of the 
Idea. For it thereby turns out that the finite human spirit that relates to the world through 
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cognition and volition is the reality in which the Idea exhibits itself as self-differentiation. By 
implication, the finite human spirit differs in kind from non-human organisms in that it is, again, 
the reality in which the Idea, which has its objectivity in the speciating life of organisms, posits 
this objectivity for itself. 
 But spirit’s emergence out of the death of an individual living being does not mean that 
spirit completely leaves behind the realm of death. Instead, the finite human spirit that comes on 
following the genus-process in the dialectic of the Idea, holds an essential connection with its 
living body. Noteworthy in this regard is Hegel’s following characterization of the finitude of a 
human spirit: it is the “finitude in this sphere [the sphere of life]” in which “the presupposing is 
not yet a positing” and hence “for the subjective Idea the objective one is an immediate world 
that is present as un-reflectively pre-given [vorgefundene] or the Idea as life in the appearance of 
individual existence.”46 Hegel here formulates the cognitive relationship between the finite 
human spirit and the world by employing the terms the subjective Idea and the objective Idea, 
those terms he used for reconceptualizing an individual organism’s self-organization and the 
genus-process as a differentiation of the Idea. This formulation finds its rationale in the fact that 
the finite human spirit is still in the “sphere of life in which the presupposing is not yet a 
positing.” By implication, the spirit that is emerging is something alive, and hence, something 
embodied.  
 Therefore, the thesis of the emergence of spirit introduces the theme of the finite human 
spirit as something between nature and spirit: something spiritual that is distinct in kind from an 
animal organism but has at the same time a living body. From this, we can quickly grasp Hegel’s 
                                                   
46 ENZ § 224. 
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strategy in his philosophy of subjective spirit. If the finite human spirit is the reality in which the 
Idea posits itself for itself, this positing of the Idea can only be exhibited by the process of the 
finite human spirit in which it somehow sublates its embodied conditions (the Anthropology), 
develops itself into reason (the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Psychology), and thereby 
exhibits itself as a spiritual being that is distinct from a mere animal organism. While holding 
this framework of the philosophy of subjective spirit for its detailed analysis I will carry out in 
Chapter 3, I would here like to look deeper into the issue of the death of an individual living 
being. If the spirit that is emerging is an embodied living being, this implies that the death of an 
individual remains a problem. I have suggested that the physical death of a living body denotes 
the dissolution of the Concept and the impossibility of the Idea’s realization; the genus-process 
presents a way out of this difficulty by bringing forth a positive understanding of the meaning of 
death. However, it should now be mentioned that the modification in the meaning of death does 
not make any change in the fact that embodied living beings die. Or, the death of an individual 
may positively be comprehended by a philosopher who is considering its meaning in relation to 
the genus-process. But it does not ensure that it has the same positive meaning for the individuals 
who are subject to death. By this, I do not intend an existentialist interpretation, but only point 
out that the logical problem caused by the mortality of living beings, namely its preclusion of the 
concrete universality that is an individuality, remains a problem insofar as the finite human spirit 
is dealt with as an embodied living being.  
 In this respect, it is to be noted that the thesis of the emergence of spirit reintroduces the 
issue of individuality. Returning to Hegel’s characterization of the finitude of a human spirit, 
Hegel speaks of how the objective Idea (the genus for itself) appears to the subjective Idea (an 
organism) and how the subjective Idea conceives of the objective Idea. We here discern a switch 
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of the focus from the universality of the genus for itself to the individuality of an organism. By 
this formulation Hegel imbues new meanings to the terms the subjective Idea and the objective 
Idea: the former now indicates the finite human spirit, and the latter, the external world. On this 
basis, the finitude of the human spirit is said to consist in the fact that it encounters the objects in 
the world only as having “individual existence.”47 At this stage of the emergence of spirit, in 
other words, the finite human spirit is an individual being with a living body that recognizes its 
objects in the world of life only as individual entities. This incipient cognitive relationship 
between the finite human spirit and its objects is just a confrontation of individual beings. We do 
not see how the finite human spirit as such an individual embodied being can be, at the same 
time, the concrete universality. Hence, this should be exhibited by an analysis of the finite human 
spirit that is embodied, and this analysis should involve an explanation of the sublation of death 
since this is the problem of individuality.  Now all these issues concerning the finitude of a 
human spirit set the stage for the Anthropology in the philosophy of subjective spirit. If the spirit 
that emerges by the death of an individual living being in the dialectic of the Idea, ultimately 
refers to knowing, i.e., a psychological subject thematized in the Psychology in the philosophy of 
subjective spirit, this is so only under the condition that all the issues concerning its bodily 
existence are clarified in the Anthropology. Further, if spirit emerges out of the death of an 
individual living being, this is not a metaphor. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, it is concerned with 
a real process of habituation, one through which the soul as a first nature dies and is reborn as a 
second nature.   
 Now, the considerations above give a clue for figuring out the reason why Hegel makes a 
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lengthy detour through the Philosophy of Nature, the Anthropology, and the Phenomenology of 
Spirit to address in earnest what he already dealt with in the Logic: knowing. If this 
psychological subject appears at first as a natural being that is embodied, it can only be 
thematized when its position in the order of natural beings is defined. The Logic can therefore 
deal with knowing only as the determinacy of the logical Idea. It can only establish that knowing 
is the reality in which the Idea can turn back to itself in its self-differentiation and that this 
knowing is at first something alive. But it cannot further deal with how the Idea posits itself in 
this embodied spirit. For this requires an explanation of how an organism occupies the 
culminating point in the system of nature, how the finite human spirit comes forth as an 
embodied living being, and how this embodied spirit develops itself to reason that is liberated 
from embodiment in a certain manner. In short, subjective spirit has the logical Idea for “its first 
presupposition,” and nature for “its proximate presupposition.”48 
 
3. Objective Thinking and Actuality in Hegel’s Logic 
 
In the previous section, I have attempted to show how Hegel’s treatment of knowing in 
the dialectic of the Idea relates to the philosophy of subjective spirit. I have thereby suggested 
that knowing, namely the finite human spirit that relates itself to the world through cognitive and 
volitional activities, is the reality adequate for the Idea; however, it can be thematized in the 
Encyclopedia system only after the issues concerning the natural aspects of the human spirit such 
as its bodily existence and mortality have been settled down. But I have left untouched another 
                                                   
48 Cf. ENZ, § 381 Z.  
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crucial thesis of the dialectic of the Idea that knowing is the reality adequate for the Idea when it 
is reason. Now, in the philosophy of subjective spirit, the relationship between reason and 
knowing has to do with the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology, as the 
Psychology begins its discussion of knowing based on the Phenomenological exhibition of 
reason as the truth of self-consciousness. But this transition in the philosophy of subjective spirit 
is also associated, I suggest, with the transition from the Objective logic to the Subjective logic.  
Regarding the relation between the two transitions—one in the philosophy of subjective 
spirit and the other in the logic—I draw attention to the following formulation concerning reason 
and knowing given in the last passage of the Phenomenology of Spirit: “the certainty that its 
determinations are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are 
its own thoughts. Hence, it is reason, which is […] not only the absolute substance, but the truth 
as knowing.”49 As I deal with in this section, one of the main claims of Hegel in the Objective 
logic (the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence) is that thought determinations are to be 
treated as essentialities of a thing. To be more precise, thought is for Hegel something substantial 
that is itself content and produces its content by the negative, active movement of pure reflection 
rather than a pure, empty form, which is supposed to give conceptual orders to sensual data 
received from outside world. In this sense of thought-determinations as essentialities of a thing 
that produce themselves as such, Hegel calls the subject matter of the logic “objective thinking.” 
What Hegel suggests in the above citation from the last passage of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
is that the notion of objective thinking in the logic constitutes the Phenomenological certainty of 
reason. We can therefore assume that the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the 
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Psychology whereby reason is further treated as knowing somehow reinstitutes the transition in 
the logic from the Objective logic to the Subjective logic whereby it is established that the truth 
of objective thinking consists in the unity of existence and essence and the true form of this unity 
consists in the absolute reflection internal to that unity, namely actuality.  
As a preliminary study for close analysis of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit which 
I undertake in Chapter 3, this section examines Hegel’s notion of objective thinking and 
considers its implications for the philosophy of subjective spirit. Prior to carry out this study, it is 
to be noted that Hegel’s logic does not consider the thought and thinking in terms of 
phenomenological reality or psychological operation. What it considers is the logical 
interconnections among thought determinations, which Hegel finds underlie all our mental 
activities. The movement of pure reflection that constitutes the negative activity of pure thinking 
is concerned with the dialectical exhibition of those logical relations among thought 
determinations. To put it simply, what is active, what moves, and what thinks, in Hegel’s logic, 
is the thought itself that determines itself and thus produces its own determinations and not the I 
who thinks about them as a psychological subject. Conversely, the activity of knowing 
thematized in the Psychology is not the pure reflection exhibited in the logic but the activity of 
the human spirit whereby what is intuited is recollected and thus transformed into universal 
representations.  
If one wants to draw out some psychological implications of Hegel’s notion of objective 
thinking for his philosophy of subjective spirit, one would therefore have to spell out how the 
thought or thinking in the logic, which is not psychological, relates to reason and knowing as 
psychological reality and activity. Bearing this issue in mind, I examine in this section Hegel’s 
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notion of objective thinking. First, I pay special attention to the dialectic of form and matter 
presented in the sub-section on the Absolute Ground in the Doctrine of Essence and Hegel’s 
notion that the content of thought is a determinate substrate [Grundlage] of form and matter.50 
By putting this idea in the context of his reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I explore, second, 
the sense in which the subjective spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system can be considered to be 
the substrate of the absolute spirit. This section also offers a brief reconstruction of Hegel’s 
dialectic with the categories concerning actuality: possibility, contingency, and necessity. By 
working on this dialectic, I finally attempt to shed light on Hegel’s notion of actuality as the 
manifestation of the absolute.  
 
3.1. Hegel’s Notion of Objective Thinking  
As with Kant’s transcendental logic, Hegel’s speculative logic deals with pure forms of 
thought having no empirical origin. But Hegel argues that categories or pure forms of thought are 
not the forms of “subjective” thought external to things, but “the nature or essence of things,” 
i.e., “that which is truly permanent and substantial in the manifold and accidentality of 
appearance and fleeting externalization.”51 In the “Preliminary Conception” of the Encyclopedia 
                                                   
50 As I will later consider Hegel’s notion of Grundlage in reference to his lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Hegel 
seems to maintain the meaning of the Greek τὸ ὑποκείνενον as substrate or substratum. For this reason, I use the 
word “substrate” for the translation of his term Grundlage instead of the standard translation “foundation.” 
However, I am not suggesting “substrate” as an alternative translation of “foundation.” This standard translation 
should be maintained because Grundlage is in Hegel’s logic considered in the dialectical terms of the movement of 
self-grounding, that is, producing itself as Grund. My choice of the word “substrate” is to facilitate the investigation 
of the relationship between Hegel and Aristotle. I therefore confine my use of the word “substrate” for the 
translation of the term Grundlage only to the present chapter.   
51 GW 21, 14/ SL, 16. Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s subjectivist notion of category is found in §§40-60 of the 
Encyclopedia logic. To recapitulate, Hegel challenges Kant for turning the objectivity of thought into subjective 
objectivity (ENZ, § 26). Kant deals with categories only as forms of thought, whose contents are to be given through 
sensation. This Kantian approach is based on the view of the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, but 
both subjectivity and objectivity are the “element internal to experience” (ENZ, § 26). Consequently, the objectivity 
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logic, Hegel makes this point clearer by claiming that thoughts are to be considered as “objective 
thoughts.”52 Further, the logic treating objective thoughts may well be called “metaphysics” 
insofar as metaphysics means the “science of things captured in thought that have counted as 
expressing the essentialities of things.”53 However, Hegel’s notion of objective thinking is not to 
                                                   
of categories is unavoidably turned into something subjective. This problem is clearly seen, I suggest, from Kant’s 
argument about the objective validity of categories. His claim is that categories have objective validity in the sense 
that they have universality and necessity, and that they have universality and necessity because they are a priori. As 
Hegel indicates, the objective validity of categories in this Kantian sense hinges upon the internal feature of 
categories—the fact that they are a priori concepts. Correspondingly, the objectivity of categories considered in 
Kant’s transcendental logic has to do with how categories serve to our mind’s having a representation of a united 
object and not just a mere manifold of sensation. This objectivity cannot strictly be said to be “objective” since it 
applies to an object as a representation in our mind and not to an object outside our mind. For this reason, Hegel 
estimates that the old metaphysics establishes superiority over Kant’s Critical philosophy because it considers 
thought determinations as belonging to things in themselves. Thus, Hegel argues that Kant’s claim of the emptiness 
of categories is unjustified (ENZ, § 43 Z). This claim of Kant can be justified when one assumes that contents of 
categories are sensory, or spatial-temporal. However, Hegel argues that this is not necessary; categories are 
determinate in any way and can rightly be said to have contents in themselves. This contentful feature of categories 
further requires that the notion of knowing [das Erkennen] be corrected. For Hegel, knowing needs not to be 
confined to the cognition of a sensible object. Since categories or thought-determinations have contents in 
themselves and these contents eventually pertain to essentialities of a thing, one can rather speak of “knowing 
[wissen] an object in terms of its determinate content” that “contains multiple connections within itself and grounds 
connections with many other objects” (ENZ, § 46 A).  Pure forms of thought can therefore be examined, for Hegel, 
in their determinate contents which are somehow objective in themselves, without taking into consideration the 
conditions of sensibility, nor presupposing the opposition between a cognizing subject and a cognized object.  
52 ENZ, § 24. 
53 Ibid. Vittorio Hösle portrays Hegel’s position in the Encyclopedia system in terms of objective idealism, which he 
sets in the context of the Platonic tradition in which concepts or ideas are considered as general essences of 
particular things rather than subjective representations produced by the human mind. For Hösle’s comprehensive 
analysis of Hegel’s project of a philosophical system, see Vittorio Hösle, Hegels System. Der Idealismus der 
Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt,1998). 
Following Hösle, we can draw out two criteria for evaluating how successful Hegel’s system is in defending the 
position of objective idealism, or the idea that reason is in the world, without violating the Kantian critical spirit. 
First, Hegel’s logic should ground [begründen] itself without assuming any presupposition. Second, the logic should 
ground the Realphilosophie in a consistent manner. Hösle suggests, first, that Hegel’s logic successfully establishes 
the objectivity of thought-determinations through a dialectic exhibition of the thought’s self-grounding movement. 
For him, this Hegelian demonstration of the absolute subjectivity of thought whereby thought grounds itself in its 
objectivity remains unassailable. In relation to the Realphilosophie within the Encyclopedia system, however, Hösle 
points out that the absolute subjectivity of thought established in the logic seems to apply only up to the philosophy 
of subjective spirit. It is thus questionable, according to Hösle, why Hegel does not give a good account of how the 
philosophy of objective spirit and the philosophy of absolute spirit are grounded on the logic whereas he is earnest in 
showing how the Philosophy of Nature and the philosophy of subjective spirit are within the dialectical movement 
of the Concept’s self-development. Hösle therefore suggests that in the Encyclopedia system, the logic does not 
consistently ground the Realphilosophie, and that the principle of absolute subjectivity (the logic and the philosophy 
of subjective spirit) remains unreconciled with the principle of intersubjective subjectivity (the philosophy of 
objective spirit and the philosophy of absolute spirit).  
But Hösle’s intention is not to disclose Hegel’s failure in establishing a consistent philosophical system. He seems to 
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be regarded as a return to pre-Kantian old metaphysics. Hegel challenges the old metaphysics for 
being blind to “the opposition of consciousness in and against itself.”54 It lacks, in other words, 
the critical elements of Kantian philosophy in which pure reason makes itself into its object for 
the self-investigation of its own limits and legitimate boundaries. With the lack of the critical 
spirit, the old metaphysics takes thought-determinations to be valid per se and makes them into 
predicates of the truth without ever calling into question the validity of those thought-
determinations. What is predominant in the old metaphysics is such pre-Critical, naïve beliefs in 
the objectivity and the truth of thought-determinations. 
Thus, Hegel’s notion that his speculative logic takes objective thinking as its subject 
matter involves a twofold criticism of pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics and Kantian subjective 
idealism. Conversely, it can also be considered in terms of a twofold critical appropriation of the 
                                                   
be more concerned with the tension between the view of absolute subjectivity (the logical Idea and subjective spirit) 
and the view of intersubjectivity (objective spirit and absolute spirit). And this is related to his idea that objective 
idealism can provide us with a way to respond to what he takes to be a crucial philosophical crisis today, that is, 
skepticism in both epistemological and ethical senses: cf. Vittorio Hösle, “What Can We Learn from Hegel’s 
Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom?,” in 
The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Limnatis, Nectarios G. (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 216-236. 
Further, developing the objective-idealist position defensible against skepticism, for him, hinges upon elaborating a 
satisfactory model of intersubjectivity. Seen this way, the unsystematic connection between the logic and the 
Realphilosophie in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system implies that Hegel left the relationship between subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity somewhat obscure. Hösle further suggests that the tension between the two found in Hegel’s system 
is more fundamentally concerned with the tension between modern philosophy of subjectivity and contemporary 
philosophy of intersubjectivity. Hegel’s absolute idealism, Hösle suggests, thus left us with the question as to 
“whether one could think of a more contemporary form of absolute idealism that concerns objective reason, which 
would have to be interpreted primarily, not as subjectivity, but as intersubjectivity:” “What Can We Learn from 
Hegel’s Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and 
Brandom?,” 10.  
I here refer to Hösle because I find his works compelling in making sense of Hegel’s notion of “objective thinking” 
as a “metaphysical” subject matter, which might seem obsolete to some contemporary readers. Since my interest is 
in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit and its relation to the logic, I here do not enter the discussion about 
intersubjectivity Hösle introduces. But I find another formulation of his concerning the unsystematicity of Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia suggestive in thinking about Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. That is, why is it that spirit that is 
supposed to be de-naturalized through the philosophy of subjective spirit is to be re-naturalized as second nature in 
the realm of objective spirit? In Chapter 5, I attempt to answer this question by showing that for Hegel, there cannot 
be an absolute de-naturalization of spirit because spirit can reveal itself only through its other, i.e., nature.  
54 ENZ, § 26. 
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classic metaphysical notion of the objectivity of thought-determination and of the Kant-Fichtean 
notion of self-conscious activity as the self-grounding principle of a transcendental system of 
knowledge. Seen this way, then, the Objective Logic can be viewed as synthesizing two 
standpoints, namely the objectivity of thought and the subjectivity of thinking. This synthesis 
culminates in the exposition of the absolute in terms of actuality, which is at the same time the 
logical exposition of the thesis that the absolute is not only substance but is also subject. The 
Objective Logic thus establishes that the Concept is such a unity of being and reflection. From 
the perspective of the Concept, Hegel states that his logic first considers the Concept as being 
(the Doctrine of Being, where the Concept is only immediate, in-itself, and objective), and then, 
the Concept as the Concept (the Doctrine of Concept, where the Concept is mediated, for itself, 
and subjective). Hence, the Doctrine of Essence can be viewed as the place of mediation where 
the Concept as being is turned into the Concept as the Concept. My suggestion is that this 
mediation can be considered in terms of the synthesis I articulated above. 
With respect to the twofold critical appropriation of two different traditions constituting 
Hegel’s idea of objective thinking, it is worth noting that Hegel’s logic starts with “being” and 
being is regarded as a thought-determination. As such, being is being as thought in the sense that 
“being” as a word or a thought-determination expresses itself the unity of being and thought. 
From its beginning, Hegel’s logic thus twists the classic notion of being by introducing the 
Kantian idea of category as a form of understanding. As Longueness puts it, “metaphysics after 
Kant is a science of being as being thought” rather than “a science of being qua being or a 
science of the universal determinations of things as they are in themselves.”55 Correspondingly, 
                                                   
55 Béatrice Loungueness, Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics, trans. Nicole J. Simek (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), xvii. 
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if the objective thinking is relevant to the classic notion of thought as the essence or essentiality 
of a thing, essence is also to be shown in some elements involved in thought. Regarding this, the 
notion of pure reflection elaborated in the first section of the Doctrine of Essence, “The Pure 
Reflection Within,” can be viewed, I suggest, as offering a model of pure thinking that produces 
essence as essence. Thus, the unity of being and thought, which was immediately expressed in 
the simple word “being,” is posited as such by the active movement of pure reflection. If thought 
is essence or essentiality of a thing as the pre-Kantian metaphysicians rightly conceived, such an 
objective feature of thought is to be shown within the movement of reflection whereby essence 
determines itself as such an essential determination of a thing. The notion of essence as pure 
reflection, namely thought’s self-determining movement by virtue of its self-relating negativity 
can therefore be considered, I suggest, in terms of the Hegelian alternative to the Kant-Fichtean 
conception of the transcendental self-consciousness as the self-grounding principle of a system 
of knowledge. Of importance is that Hegel’s pure reflection significantly differs from Kant-
Fichtean transcendental self-consciousness because it belongs to essence itself and not to the I 
who thinks about essence.  
 Another element I find important with respect to the way in which Hegel’s notion of 
objective thinking relates to the two different traditions, is the idea that the objective thinking is a 
matter that has a form and, as such a matter, is content. In the second Introduction to the Science 
of Logic, Hegel writes: “the objective thinking is thus the content of pure science,” which is a 
“veritable matter,” namely “a matter for which the form is nothing external, because this matter 
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is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself.”56 Obviously, objective thinking—that 
is, the content which is a matter that has a form—does not pertain to empirical datum:  
 
Scattered in fixed determinations and thus not held together in organic unity, they [logical 
forms] are dead forms and the spirit which is their vital concrete unity does not reside in 
them. But, thus conceived, they lack solid content—a matter that would in itself be 
unreflected-content [Gehalt]. The content which is missed in the logical forms is nothing 
else than a fixed substrate [Grundlage] and a concretion of these abstract determinations, 
and such a substantial being is usually sought for them outside them. But logical reason is 
itself the substantial or the real which, within itself, holds together all the abstract 
determinations and constitutes their solid, absolutely concrete, unity.57 
 
While arguing that the objective thinking is the subject matter of the logic, in this passage Hegel 
criticizes the Kantian conception of transcendental logic for its “total disregard of metaphysical 
significance.”58 For Hegel, this non-metaphysical logic is right in leaving out solid contents—
that is, “content of the kind which ordinary consciousness would accept as reality”—from their 
consideration of pure forms of thinking.59 However, they are wrong in holding that thinking is a 
“mere form of cognition” abstracted from all content since the thinking constitutes “the content 
of its own.”60 For Hegel, the content of a logical form has nothing to do with empirical datum, 
which the phenomenological consciousness takes to belong to an object external to it. Instead, it 
                                                   
56 GW 21, 34/ SL, 29. 
57 GW 21, 32/ SL, 27-8. 
58 GW 21, 32/ SL, 27. 
59 Ibid. 
60 GW 21, 28/ SL, 24. 
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is a “fixed substrate” in which the abstract forms of thinking are concretized. Objective thinking 
as content is therefore a “substantial being.” Consequently, objective thinking as content is not to 
be found outside of the logical form. Instead, we find it within the logical reason, which brings 
together all the logical forms as well as all the phenomenological, conscious solid contents.  
 
3.2. The Move from Pure Reflection to Ground:  
From the Relation without Relata to the Real Relationship 
In what sense can we consider thought to be a matter that has a form? Holding that 
Hegel’s notion of objective thinking involves a twofold critical relationship with the two 
traditions, and that the Objective Logic can be viewed as a synthesis of the two standpoints, I 
examine the move within the Doctrine of Essence from pure reflection to the last reflection-
determination, i.e., ground. I pay special attention to the dialectic of form and matter presented in 
the “Ground” section, which establishes that the content is the “unity of form and matter” as a 
“determinate substrate [Grundlage] of both.”61 
In the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel elaborates on the notion of pure reflection to present 
the dialectical movement of pure thinking whereby essence determines itself by positing what it 
presupposes. Pure reflection thus denotes the pure activity of essence’s self-determination, which 
is made possible by virtue of the self-relating negativity inherent to essence. In the self-
determining activity of essence, a series of determinations including identity, difference, and 
contradiction appear and disappear one by one until the last determination, ground, appears. The 
last reflection-determination, ground, fundamentally differs from the other determinations that 
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precede it. Whereas these reflection determinations preceding ground appear and disappear in the 
movement of pure reflection, this movement of pure thought now disappears into the 
determination ground. As the German “zu grunde gehen” ambiguously means, essence thus 
determines itself and grounds itself by letting itself as a self-determining movement disappear in 
the determination ground. Indeed, the move from pure reflection to ground establishes the 
fundamental methodological facet of Hegel’s logic. For the meaning of “becoming” applicable to 
all of the dialectical movements in the logic consists in the “reflection of that which passes over 
into its ground.”62 But this methodological aspect is only half of the significance of the move 
from pure reflection to ground. The “Ground” section, I suggest, constitutes a watershed within 
the Doctrine of Essence, setting out a new discussion about real mediation—which is further 
developed into the dialectic between an inner essence and an outer appearance.  
With respect to this new element introduced in the “Ground” section, i.e., real mediation, 
we need a more detailed explanation of how the last reflection-determination, ground, differs 
from pure reflection. As the expression “reflection within” [Reflexion in him selbst (in dem 
Wesen)] implies, essence’s self-determining movement, i.e., pure reflection, is a purely internal 
movement, which has no outside, nor a distinction between inside and outside. Essence is thus a 
determining movement itself and nothing other than that movement. Describing essence’s self-
determination, therefore, involves a fundamental difficulty:  
 
Essence has a form and form-determinations. Only as ground does it have a fixed 
immediacy or is substrate. Essence as such is one with its reflection, inseparable from its 
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movement. It is not essence, therefore, through which this movement runs its reflective 
course; nor is essence that from which the movement begins, as from a starting point. It is 
this circumstance that above all makes the exposition of reflection especially difficult, for 
strictly speaking one cannot say that essence returns into itself, that essence shines in itself, 
for essence is neither before its movement nor in the movement: this movement has no 
substrate on which it runs its course.63 
 
Indeed, the difficulty Hegel mentions in the passage above with respect to a description of pure 
reflection seems to be inherent to any attempt to verbalize a movement or change. Verbalizing a 
movement or change involves a tension between being and becoming—the tension between the 
ever-changing nature of becoming and the fixed nature of a linguistic expression, more precisely. 
Now, pure reflection is a movement; it is the becoming of essence. In contrast with this, ground 
has a fixed immediacy or substrate. Ground thus differs in kind from the other reflection-
determinations that come before it. For it is a determination that has a self-subsistence separable 
from the movement of pure reflection—separable in the sense that it is not swallowed up by the 
movement of the becoming of essence but instead emerges as something positive from within the 
negative activity of pure reflection. It is no longer an essentiality in which essence only shines, 
and which is dissolved as a moment of pure reflection. It is the “sublated reflection” of which the 
immediacy is the “being as restored by essence.”64 
 The difference between pure reflection and ground relates to the distinction between 
relation [Beziehung] and relationship [Verhältnis]. While the relation has no relata, the 
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relationship is a connection among existents. Thus, whereas pure reflection is a relating 
[beziehen] within, namely “a pure relation without relata [die reine Beziehung ohne das 
Bezogene],” ground is the “real mediation of essence with itself.”65 Ground is a real mediation, 
in the sense that “it contains reflection as sublated reflection” such that “what is posited receives 
the determination of immediacy.”66 Consequently, ground pertains to “an immediate which is 
self-identical outside its relation or its shining.”67 It is something substantial which contains 
within itself the sublated reflection and has an externality separable from pure reflection. As 
such, it can serve as a relatum of a relationship. Thus, the “Ground” section can be read in terms 
of the genesis of a relatum for a real relationship. At the stage of ground, thought comes to have 
the form of a term of which the meaning is objectively associated with the existent it refers to.  
We can go further to say that objective thinking is here concerned with the objective form of 
thought in which it is expressed as a term of a real relationship rather than an internal, 
indeterminate movement of thought.  
 The “Ground” section thus introduces the notion that a thought-determination, which 
gains its determination by the movement of pure reflection that determines itself by letting itself 
disappear into ground, serves as a relatum of a real relationship among existents. The dialectic of 
form and matter presented in its first sub-section, “The Absolute Ground,” then, establishes that 
the thought-determination, conceived as a relatum of the real relationship, is a determinate 
substrate. Importantly, Hegel here brings up the distinction between form and matter, stating that 
the reflection-determinations that appeared previously in the movement of pure reflection—
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identity, difference, and contradiction—turn out to be form-determinations of essence. More 
precisely, it turns out that “the completed whole of reflection” pertains to a “form.”68 
Conversely, form is the activity of “determining,” “relating itself to itself as sublated positedness, 
and thereby relating itself to its identity as an other.”69 Yet, the completed whole of reflection, 
since it is not just a pure reflection but the reflection sublated into ground, involves two 
heterogeneous elements: the activity of determining or self-relating negativity (pure reflection) 
on the one hand, and positedness or a fixed identity that is posited through that self-determining 
activity (ground), on the other. Thus, the difference between pure reflection and ground is now 
developed into the distinction between form and matter. While form is concerned with the self-
determining activity of essence, matter is “the formless indeterminate” to which pure reflection 
relates itself [verhalten sich], or “the simple substrate undifferentiated identity,” which is “the 
other of form,” and “the proper substrate [Grundlage] of form.”70 This matter—which is the 
other of form and as such, the substrate of form—is not something that we can perceive, Hegel 
underlines, because what we perceive is a composite of matter and form and not the matter itself, 
which is formless and indeterminate.  
It seems that Hegel’s conception of matter as a formless, indeterminate substrate is 
closely associated with Aristotle’s notion that matter is an indeterminate substrate [τὸ 
ὑποκείνενον].71 Hegel also develops the idea that matter is passive whereas form is active, which 
echoes with Aristotle’s idea that matter is potentiality for a form, and form is the principle of 
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actuality. As I discuss below, Aristotle develops his notions of matter and form and the scheme 
of potentiality and actuality to explain the principle of change and the constitution of a sensible 
substantial being. But Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence is not so much concerned with the 
metaphysical principles of a sensible substance’s being, motion, and action as with the self-
determining movement of thought, which is not sensible. It is therefore important to note that 
when Hegel defines matter as an indeterminate substrate, he is considering it in terms of his 
scheme of pure reflection: matter has the reflection determination of identity, and it is the 
positedness or a posited being of a form. This being said, the distinction between form and 
matter is the self-division of essence into its moments, which were not separated in the 
movement of pure reflection: form as the movement of pure reflection, and matter as a positive 
that is determined by pure reflection.  
Now, through the dialectic form and matter, Hegel re-establishes the unity of form and 
matter: “matter is as such determined or necessarily has a form, and form is simply [schlechthin] 
material, subsistent form.”72 Thus, the dialectic of form and matter restores the identity of 
essence. But this restored identity of essence differs from the identity as a reflection-
determination that appeared and disappeared in the movement of pure reflection because it now 
has an externality or materiality, as “informed matter or “form that possesses subsistence.”73 It is 
therefore to be noted that the dialectic of form and matter displays a fundamentally different 
aspect from the movement of pure reflection. In contrast to this internal movement of essence 
without an outer, in the dialectic of matter and form, “in withdrawing into itself,” essence “has 
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repelled itself from itself and has determined itself.”74 Thus, the restored identity of essence, 
namely the identity of form and matter is a substrate [Grundlage], and this substrate, Hegel 
emphasizes, is their “determinate substrate.”75 This determinate substrate is defined as 
“content.”76 
 Through the dialectic of matter and form, therefore, it is established that essence is 
something substantial. Instead of being swept away in the indeterminate movement of pure 
reflection, essence serves as the underlying substrate of its self-determining movement and 
contains the same negative movement as sublated. For Hegel, this is the sense in which thought 
or thought determination, as an essentiality of a thing, is the content. As the content, thought is a 
determinate substrate; determinate, in the sense that it comes to have a determinate determination 
as a result of essence’s self-determining movement and can therefore be exhibited in the 
dialectical self-determining movement of pure reflection. In this sense, thought determination is 
for Hegel a substantial being, but this substantial being that determines itself is different from 
Aristotle’s substantial being of which the substrate is an indeterminate matter susceptible to this 
and that form.  
 
3.3. Hegel’s Lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
The dialectic of form and matter in the Doctrine of Essence re-establishes the unity of 
being and thought. While the Doctrine of Being begins with the simple term “being” that 
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immediately expresses that fundamental identity as a thought determination, the dialectic of form 
and matter restores the same identity as the dialectic, negative unity of pure reflection and 
ground. It thus established that thought is a determinate, substantial being that posits itself as 
what it is through a self-relating, self-determining movement, one that contains within itself a 
determination expressing what it is as a sublated reflection. Seen this way, the “Ground” section 
is the first place in Hegel’s logic where it is established that thought is a substance that has a 
subjectivity, the essential, ontological idea of Hegel’s logic that is further developed through the 
notions of actuality [Wirklichkeit], the Concept, and the logical Idea. It is therefore important to 
note that Hegel’s objective thinking contains subjectivity. Thought or thought determination for 
Hegel is the essence of a thing; however, it is an essence that determines itself as an essence and 
not a universal determination that can be abstracted from particular instances, nor a universal 
being in which particular things are supposed to participate. This notion of objectivity thinking 
as intrinsically involving subjectivity underpins Hegel’s absolute idealism exhibited through his 
Encyclopedia system. Now, it appears that one can shed more light on Hegel’s notion in the 
“Ground” section of thought as a determinate matter by investigating his lectures on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. This will also give a good clue for figuring out the connection between the logic 
and the philosophy of subjective spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system.  
To begin, Hegel’s high praise of Aristotle is well known. In the Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy, he states that Aristotle was “one of the most highly endowed, most learned, most 
comprehensive, and most profound geniuses ever to appear.”77 Specifically, Aristotle is superior 
to Plato in his theory of Idea. While “the rational must be determined as what is active,” the 
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Platonic Idea remains an inert universal lacking the “activity of actualization.”78 In contrast to 
this, the Aristotelian Idea is based on “the principle of life [Lebendigkeit] or the principle of 
subjectivity.”79 In Hegel’s view, the principle of subjectivity characteristic of Aristotle’s Idea is 
found in his theory of substance, and the notion of potentiality and actuality plays a key role in 
his theory of substance. Specifically, Hegel highlights that in Aristotle’s theory of substance, 
potentiality is “what is objective, what is in itself” rather than an “indeterminate possibility,” and 
actuality is “what is active or that which actualizes.”80 To be more precise, Aristotle’s actuality is 
“the moment of negativity, yet not as change and also not as nothing, but as what differentiates, 
what determines.”81 Thus, Hegel understands Aristotle’s notion of actuality in terms of the self-
determining movement of pure reflection and the self-relating negativity underlying that 
movement whereby essence rejoins itself in differentiating itself. In this narrow sense of the self-
relating negativity whereby essence determines itself, the Aristotelian actuality for Hegel 
exhibits the principle of life or subjectivity.  
Now, Hegel suggests that one can understand Aristotle’s theory of substance in the 
Metaphysics in terms of “the relationship of form to matter, of potentiality to actuality, to energy 
or entelechy.”82 Depending on the ways in which potentiality, actuality, and entelechy are related 
to each other, then, there are three different “ways or modes of substances:” (1) sensible 
substance, (2) the human nous, and (3) God. 
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 First, Hegel characterizes Aristotle’s notion of a sensible substance as a “finite 
substance” that “has a matter.” As we can see from this characterization, Hegel focuses on the 
issue of matter in his presentation of Aristotle’s notion of sensible substance. As Hegel points 
out, Aristotle holds that when there is a change, there must be something that underlies it and 
calls this matter.83 More precisely, matter for Aristotle is an indeterminate substrate, one that 
remains when all the forms and determinations are taken off.84 Now, Hegel comments that when 
a sensible substance undergoes a change, form remains external to matter; e.g., the form of a 
bronze status is separable from and indifferent to the bronze as an indeterminate matter. By using 
this example of the bronze, Hegel thus suggests that in the case of a sensible substance, either a 
natural or artful product, the matter is indifferent to the form or shape that it happens to receive. 
Since the actuality of the form remains external to the matter that undergoes the change caused 
by that actuality, a sensible substance for Hegel does not exhibit the principle of subjectivity, 
which consists in the self-relating, self-differentiating, self-determining, negative activity.  
                                                   
83 Cf. Aristotle, Physics 190 b10. Aristotle argues that there are three principles of change: form, matter, and 
privation of form. Accordingly, change can be explained in terms of a transition between contraries (form and 
privation of form) that occurs in the same matter: e.g., a non-musical person becomes a musical person. Those three 
principles are also the principles and causes of sensible substances: cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1069 b34-5. 
84 In Book 7 Chapter 3, Aristotle considers the four candidates of substantial being: essence, universal, genus, and 
substratum or substrate [τὸ ὑποκείνενον] and discusses the sense in which substrate can be considered as a substance. 
Substrate is defined as “that of which the others are predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else” 
(Metaphysics 1028b36-1029a1). Matter can be considered a substrate since it is what is left when one takes away all 
of the determinations including length, depth, and breadth from a body (cf. Metaphysics 1029a7-26). Matter is “that 
which in itself is neither a particular thing nor or a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by 
which being is determined” (Metaphysics 1029a21-22). Thus, substrate is considered a candidate of substance since 
its definition somehow overlaps the definition of substance as “that which is not present in a subject nor is 
predicated of a subject” (Categories 1b3-4). Thus, it seems as though we can make a syllogism that matter is a 
substance because matter is a substrate and substrate is a substance. Aristotle suggests, however, that this cannot be 
the case. Matter may be considered a substance, together with form and composite of form and matter, but in a 
different sense than the latter is called a substance. Form and composite of form and matter meet the standard 
criteria for substance, that is, “separability and individuality [τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι],” but matter as an 
indeterminate substrate does not (cf. Metaphysics 1029a26-34). If matter can be called a substance, therefore, this is 
only in an analogous and loose sense.     
 
 123  
   Second, the human nous differs from sensible substance because it has an activity [die 
Tätigkeit] which contains “what ought to be.”85 For Aristotle, the human soul can act as the 
moving cause for the production of an artifact; e.g., a housebuilder produces a house by putting 
the design or plan in his soul into the materials such as bricks and woods. The form of a house 
present in the house-builder’s soul also operates as a final cause in the production of a house 
because it is the ultimate end of the housebuilder’s building a house. In this sense, the actuality 
of the human nous is a teleological realization of an end as Hegel points out. Hegel therefore 
emphasizes that in the case of the human nous, actuality [ενέργεια] occurs as complete actuality 
[ἐντελέχεια]. Regarding the difference between ενέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, we need to pay attention 
to Aristotle’s distinction between motion [κίνησις] and action [πρᾶξις]. For Aristotle, motion is 
incomplete because it is directed towards an end, thereby having a limit. But action is a 
completion of an end at every moment, that is, being-at-an-end at every moment of the action.86 
Building a house is therefore not a motion but an action because every moment of the building is 
a realization of an end, i.e., a house. In this sense, action combines the moving cause and final 
cause (e.g., a builder and a design of a house in his soul) and further, ενέργεια and ἐντελέχεια 
(e.g., the presence of the form of a house in every moment of building as a final cause). For 
Hegel, this is the distinct characteristic of the activity [Tätigkeit] of the human nous, which 
contains what is ought to be.   
 Third, Aristotle’s God, namely the “absolute substance” is “what is unmoved, 
immovable, and eternal,” which is at the same time “pure activity [Tätigkeit], actus purus.”87 
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More precisely, Aristotle’s God is a substance that “in its potentiality also has actuality;” hence, 
“its essence (potentia) is activity [Tätigkeit] itself” and its “potentiality is not distinct from 
form.”88 For Hegel, this divine substance without matter is “what itself produces its content, 
what itself posits its own inner determination.”89 Thus, Aristotle’s God is for Hegel is the 
absolute substance in which δύναμις, ενέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια are all united. Now, it is to be 
noted that the Aristotelian God is a thinking [νόησις]: a thinking of thinking [νόησις νοήσεως], 
more precisely. Aristotle holds that God is the highest and most excellent kind of being; hence, it 
must be a self-thinking because it is absurd, Aristotle argues, for the most excellent being to have 
for its object something else that is less excellent than itself.90 Since the self-thinking is its 
prominent feature, Aristotle also holds that God is an eternal self-thinking and is thus in eternal 
actuality. Hegel suggests that with this notion of God Aristotle’s Metaphysics establishes the 
unity of thought and thinking, and that this unity of the thought’s substantiality and subjectivity 
implies that “the objective element and thinking, the energy and what is moved [by it], are one 
and the same.”91    
 Hegel’s articulation of the three ways or modes of substance, however, does not square 
with Aristotle’s distinction among the three kinds of substance in the Metaphysics Book 12: 
perishable sensible substantial beings (including natural and artful products), imperishable 
sensible substantial beings (heavenly bodies), and a non-sensible eternal substantial being 
(God).92 According to this classification, what Hegel calls the “human nous or understanding” 
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pertains to a perishable sensible substance. It is therefore to be noted that the human nous for 
Aristotle is not a theme for the first philosophy, i.e., metaphysics. Instead, it is the subject matter 
of psychology within the De anima, which can largely be considered as part of physics in the 
sense of a study of beings in change. Aristotle’s Metaphysics certainly considers nous; however, 
what this first philosophy thematizes is the divine noesis and not the human nous. And the 
human nous is in his De anima considered the rational part of the soul rather than a substance.  
By taking the human nous as a substance, Hegel thus seems to be suggesting that 
Aristotle’s notion of the human, poietic activity is to be integrated into his theory of substance  in 
the Metaphysics. The motivation behind this Hegelian reading of Aristotle would be to make 
Aristotle’s theory of substance more systematic in the light of his own philosophical system that 
considers the three realities: nature, finite human spirit, and infinite absolute spirit. But if 
Aristotle’s notion of the human nous is for Hegel to be treated as a distinct substance that does 
not fall into the group of perishable sensible substantial beings, the ultimate reason of this, I 
think, bears on the essential significance of finite human spirit for infinite absolute spirit in 
                                                   
sets out the discussion of the coming-to-be or change of sensible substances. He considers the coming-to-be in such 
a broad sense that it covers a change in any categories. Since the other categories are derivative of the first four 
categories—substance, quality, quantity, and place—there are four kinds of the coming-to-be: the substantial (being 
generated and perishing), qualitative (alteration), quantitative (growth and diminution), and locomotive one. Further, 
there are three principles of the coming-to-be or change: form, privation of form, and matter. Things come to be by 
nature or spontaneously; whichever way they come to be, however, the source of their coming-to-be is the moving 
cause, i.e., form. In the case of a natural product, the form that is present in the parents, for example, begets their 
offspring having the same form as itself (cf. Metaphysics 1032a 15-26). A product of art has its moving cause in the 
form that is present in the soul of the artist; e.g., the art of medicine or building is the form of health or a house (cf. 
Metaphysics 1032b1-15). The moving cause of the heavenly bodies is God, which is an unmoved mover. In Book 
12, Aristotle further argues that since all substantial beings share the same principles, potentiality and actuality apply 
to all substantial beings but only analogously, namely in different ways (cf. Metaphysics 1071 a3-11). In the case of 
imperishable sensible substances, i.e., the heavenly bodies, their matter only permits locomotion; their form is 
always in actuality since they are in a circular, eternal motion. Perishable sensible substances undergo all of the four 
kinds of coming-to-be. This is because they have different matters than those of the heavenly bodies; further, 
different sensible substances (e.g., wine, flesh, and human) have different matters. Of importance is that perishable 
sensible substances, unlike the heavenly bodies, do not always undergo the coming-to-be; hence, their form is not 
always in actuality. Now, God is a non-sensible substance that has no matter. Therefore, it has no potentiality. God is 
in eternal actuality without being in potentiality.  
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Hegel’s system. The crux of the matter here is his controversial interpretation of Aristotle’s 
divine actuality in terms of an activity [Tätigkeit]. Indeed, Hegel has been criticized for turning 
the Aristotelian, unmoving God into something moving by translating the divine “ενέργεια” into 
the German “Tätigkeit.”93 With this translation, Aristotle’s divine substance is understood as 
having potentiality, and this point is also explicit in Hegel’s statement that the divine substance 
unities potentiality, actuality, and complete actuality. As we have seen above, however, Aristotle 
considers God pure actuality that has no potentiality. Since it has no potentiality, the divine 
substance is always in the act of thinking. The divine thinking of thinking, therefore, 
fundamentally differs from the human nous, which does not always think because its potentiality 
is not always actualized.  
Thus, Hegel’s reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics turns the relationship between the 
human nous and the divine substance into a crucial problem. To make Hegel’s point clearer, we 
can pose a question as to what would happen to the relationship between the human nous and the 
divine substance if one assumes, as Hegel does, that the eternal thinking of thinking has 
                                                   
93 Pierre Aubenque points out that by this translation, Hegel makes the pure divine act into a motion [κίνησις]: cf., 
Pierre Aubenque, “Hegel et Aristote,” in Hegel et la pensée greque, ed. Jacques d’Hondt (Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1974), 103-4. He suggests that this misinterpretation of Hegel is based on the erroneous identification of the 
pure act of the divine substance with the circular motion of the heavenly bodies. Whereas the divine substance for 
Aristotle is transcendent to all celestial and sublunar motions, Hegel’s translation of the divine ενέργεια into the 
German Tätigkeit thus seems to take part in the Neo-Platonist tradition in which the Aristotelian God was (mis-) 
conceived as immanent to the created world. Regarding the controversy over Hegel’s translation of Aristotle’s 
divine ενέργεια into Tätigkeit, Alfredo Ferrarin suggests that Hegel correctly understood and translated Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, but his reading and translation was guided by the uncritical, Erasmus edition of Aristotle’s works, 
which was circulated among the Neo-Platonists as well: Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge : The 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2004), 120-128. Ferrarin further suggests that Hegel’s Neo-
Platonist reading of Aristotle can be viewed as a solution to the fundamental difficulty in the Aristotelian notion of 
God. When God is considered as pure actuality opposed to potentiality, this might entail, Ferrarin suggests, the 
unwanted consequence that it is an inert being isolated from the world. With the controversial, but correct 
translation, Hegel thus comes to the conclusion, Ferrarin underlines, that “the Aristotelian God is not just the most 
excellent, best, and most free being; the first substance becomes visible in the universe as heaven and thinking 
reason in which it appears and moves:” Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 124. 
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potentiality. Now, this question leads us to Hegel’s comments on Aristotle’s distinction between 
the passive nous and active nous. We notice that Hegel puts emphasis on the active aspect of the 
passive nous: he states that the passive nous is “none other than the in-itself, the absolute Idea as 
considered in itself” but “it is first posited as active [Tätiges];” the passive nous, “as distinct 
from activity,” “is nevertheless, as absolute, itself activity too” because “nous is active too and 
not merely ‘suffering’;” therefore, “nous is everything in itself, but it is actuality [Wirklichkeit] 
only through activity [Tätigkeit].”94 Hegel’s point is that the passive nous cannot entirely be 
passive insofar as it is nous. In his terms, Aristotle’s passive nous is the absolute that is 
everything in itself but is to actualize itself as such through its activity. This being said, the 
passive nous and active nous are not independent from one another. Instead, the passive nous is 
the absolute in potentiality and the active nous is the same absolute in actuality. As far as I see, 
the passive nous and active nous in the last passage of Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics roughly refer to the human nous and God respectively. They are thus related to the 
finite human spirit and infinite absolute spirit in Hegel’s system. This further relates to Hegel’s 
thesis that it is necessary for the absolute to actualizes itself in and through the finite beings 
because it cannot otherwise be a truly infinite being. That is, the absolute for Hegel is not 
transcendent but immanent to the world of the finite beings; its activity of self-actualization 
consists in manifesting itself as such a self-actualizing absolute in and through the finite beings. 
And this is possible because the finite being itself is the absolute in potentiality.  
In relation to Hegel’s philosophy, I suggest that the passive “nous” mentioned in his 
lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics can be understood in the following two terms. First, we can 
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consider it in terms of the “objective thinking” conceived in Hegel’s logic as “determinate 
substrate,” of which the actuality is to be established by the dialectical movement of absolute 
reflection at the end of the Objective Logic. Further, if Hegel’s conception of thought as a 
determinate substrate has little to do with Aristotle’s hylomorphic notion of an indeterminate 
matter as the underlying substrate of the change of a sensible substantial being, this is ultimately 
because thought is for Hegel the passive nous, which is everything in potentiality or something 
that contains everything in potentiality.95 The idea in Hegel’s logic that thought is a determinate 
substrate and is thus the content, therefore, also implies that it is a substantial being that contains 
everything in potentiality. This point leads us to the second meaning of the passive nous, namely 
the soul in the Anthropology of the philosophy of subjective spirit.  
Based on these two meanings of the passive nous in Hegel’s philosophy, I suggest, first, 
that the dialectical thinking in Hegel’s logic is the divine thinking that thinks itself, one that, 
however, has its actuality in the activity of the human spirit. By this, I mean that the logic is a 
sequential exhibition of the thinking of thinking by means of the human language. Second, the 
human spirit, which contains everything in potentiality, is the substrate that underlies all the 
dialectical thinking; more importantly, it is the substrate of the absolute spirit. This being said, 
the principle of subjectivity Hegel seeks to find in Aristotle’s Metaphysics would not merely be 
concerned with Aristotle’s notion of God as thinking of thinking but with the relationship 
between the human nous and God. If the Aristotelian God, for Hegel, has potentiality, one may 
                                                   
95 Hegel’s formulation that the passive nous is everything in itself, relates to Aristotle’s argument in the De Anima 
that the intellective soul (nous) can “think all things” or is the place of all intelligible things (cf. De anima 429 a13-
28). Hegel applies this formulation to his definition of the soul in the Anthropology: “the soul is […] the passive 
nous of Aristotle, which is all potentially” (ENZ, § 389). I discuss this definition of Hegel in Chapter 4. 
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say that the human nous is the God in potentiality; more precisely, the finite human spirit is the 
absolute spirit in potentiality in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system.    
 
3.4. Actuality: Manifestation of the Absolute  
Through an examination of the dialectic of form and matter in Hegel’s logic and his 
reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I have examined above Hegel’s notion of objective thinking 
as a determinate substrate and its implication for his philosophy of subjective spirit in the 
Encyclopedia. In what follows, I examine the last section of the Doctrine of Essence on the 
“Actuality” to spell out Hegel’s idea that the absolute is a substance that has subjectivity. Briefly 
stated, the Doctrine of Essence works on the truth of being, i.e., essence, by examining step by 
step how essence shines [Scheinen], appears [erscheinen], and manifests [offenbaren]. As we 
have seen above, in the “Ground” section Hegel establishes that essence is not just a pure 
reflection within it whereby determinations only appear and disappear, but a determinate 
substrate that involves a sublated reflection. Since it thus turns out that thought or thought 
determination has materiality or externality, one can move forward to the realm of existence, 
namely appearance. In the second sub-division of the Doctrine of Essence on “Appearance,” 
Hegel establishes the absolute immanence of the essential world to the phenomenal world.  
 In the last section of the Doctrine of Essence on the “Actuality,” Hegel further establishes 
that the unity of essence and existence consists in the manifestation of the absolute. That is, the 
absolute is the unity of essence and existence. Importantly, this unity is far from being a static 
relationship between the absolute substance and its attributes, which is considered in Spinoza’s 
philosophy. For Hegel, the unity of essence and existence can be the absolute only in and by the 
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dynamic movement of absolute reflection whereby the absolute externalizes itself and returns 
into itself in that externalization. It is therefore to be noted that the categories possibility, 
contingency, and necessity, which Hegel considers in the section on the “Actuality,” are not the 
Kantian modal categories, which are supposed to “only express the relation of the object to our 
faculty of knowledge.”96 For Hegel, “the mode is the externality of the absolute” or “the 
absolute’s own manifestation.”97 Thus, Spinoza’s consideration of the mode and modality of the 
absolute for Hegel is more truthful than Kant’s treatment of modal categories. The modality of 
the absolute, its externality in the realm of the being, however, must not be presupposed but 
posited as such by the movement of absolute reflection. This is what Hegel shows in the 
“Actuality” section with the categories of possibility, contingency, necessity, and actuality.  
In the first place, actuality is considered in its immediacy. As such, it is viewed as 
containing within itself its possibility, as it is said that “what is actual is possible.”98 Actuality 
can thus be defined as the unity with possibility. But at this first stage of absolute reflection, it is 
a unity with formal possibility. Thus, actuality in the sense of formal possibility allows us to say 
that “everything that is not self-contradictory is possible.”99 Not everything that has formal 
possibility, however, is actuality. Formal possibility makes it possible that the possibility of A 
involves the possibility of non-A. Considering this logical feature of formal possibility, it turns 
out that the actuality relating to formal possibility is contingency, which pertains to the realm of 
being and existence considered as a realm of limitless manifold. In this realm of determinate 
                                                   
96 KrV, B266. 
97 GW 11, 380/ SL, 477. 
98 GW 11, 382/ SL, 478. 
99 GW 11, 382/ SL, 478. 
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beings [Dasein], necessity only has a factual meaning that something is.  Something is said to be 
necessary, in other words, because it exists; its existence is itself its necessity.  
While possibility, actuality, and necessity are all formal in the case of formal actuality, 
Hegel draws from his consideration of this first form of actuality the conclusion that necessity 
must be an actuality that has contents. Thus, he further considers, secondly, real actuality, which 
involves the manifold content. Real actuality is concerned with the existing world. Yet, this 
world is not just a realm of the appearance of a sensible manifold but the one whose being-in-
itself involves within itself reflection-into-itself. That is, “what is actual can act” such that it 
announces its actuality “by what it produces.”100 It is what manifests itself in an other. In relation 
to real actuality, therefore, possibility no longer covers anything that is not self-contradictory but 
rather means a “being-in-itself full of contents,” namely “the determinations, circumstances, 
conditions of a thing [Sache].”101 This real possibility is itself the “manifoldness of existence,” 
which is itself an actuality. This real possibility, however, is not the possibility of its own 
actuality but the possibility of another actuality: in Hegel’s terms, it is “the in-itself of an other 
actual.”102 This character of real possibility makes it possible for the things in the existing world 
to have a conditioning-conditioned relation to each other, in such a way that the possibility of A 
as a real actuality serves as the condition for the actuality of B, and the possibility of B as a real 
actuality conditions the actuality of C, and so forth. When all conditions are present such that the 
thing [Sache] is actual, however, in this actual thing, possibility as real actuality does not transit 
to another actuality but rejoins itself as real actuality. When the thing [Sache] is considered, 
                                                   
100 GW 11, 385-6/ SL, 482. 
101 GW 11, 386/ SL, 482. 
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therefore, real possibility has a real necessity, which is expressed through the proposition that 
what is really possible cannot be otherwise. This real necessity, however, is a relative necessity 
since it starts with something contingent and has this real actuality for its presupposition.   
 The consideration of real actuality leads us, third, to the idea of an actuality that cannot 
be otherwise because its “in-itself is not possibility but necessity itself,” i.e., absolute 
necessity.103 The unity of actuality and possibility is thereby restored, and actuality is posited to 
be absolute. Now, nothing would be more misleading than taking these notions of absolute 
necessity and absolute actuality as implying the deterministic claim that the actuality is 
absolutely pre-determined such a way that there is nothing contingent in it. Indeed, through his 
consideration of real actuality, Hegel showed that a manifold of existing circumstances, which is 
real possibility of the thing [Sache], is itself actuality. Consequently, if the manifold is 
considered to be contingent, this is because the actuality that is a manifold of existing 
circumstances is converted into a possibility of something else. Likewise, possibility is converted 
into actuality when it is present in the actual thing. Thus, it turns out that real necessity consists 
in the “simple conversion of one of these moments [possibility and actuality] into the other.”104 It 
also turns out that contingency is not immediate but is posited as contingency. In Hegel’s terms, 
real actuality is not just implicitly contingency, but the contingency becomes in it.105  
Therefore, Hegel’s notion of absolute necessity has nothing to do with removing 
contingency. Rather, it is a free conversion between possibility and actuality with real actuality 
or contingency. Further, it is a formal movement whereby contingency is posited as contingency 
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and further, as an in-itself of something else which is, in fact, itself—namely, as absolute 
necessity. It is a movement of reflection whereby the distinction between form and content 
disappears, and this is how the absolute manifests. Absolute necessity is therefore the unity of 
being and reflection, which is free in its self-relating negativity. Hegel writes: “this contingency 
is rather absolute necessity; it is the essence of those free, inherently necessary actualities. […] 
Their essence will break forth in them and will reveal what it is and what they are. The simplicity 
of their being, their resting just on themselves, is absolute negativity; it is the freedom of their 
shining-less mediacy.”106 
Now, actuality as absolute necessity is an actuality as thought. This is how it differs from 
immediate being and existence as well as real actuality or immediate contingency. More 
significantly, it is a thought that involves thinking, in the sense that the free conversion between 
the formal determinations of real actuality, i.e., possibility and actuality, is the movement of 
reflection by virtue of its self-relating negativity. In this sense, actuality is a thought that has 
subjectivity. This does not imply, however, that actuality as absolute necessity is separable from 
contingency. Again, it is the reflection within the contingency or a reflected contingency. 
Actuality as absolute necessity is therefore not a passive reality which is assumed to be 
intelligible or rational; instead, it is an active reality that embraces absolute reflection whereby it 
discovers itself in what is reflected, thereby making itself identical with the latter while relating 
itself to the existing manifold. Further, it is to be noted that the absolute reflection which Hegel 
exhibits through his considerations of the categories of possibility, contingency, and necessity 
dose not add any new contents to the real actuality, i.e., contingency. It only makes it turn out 
                                                   
106 GW 11: 392/ SL, 488. 
 
 134  
that the real actuality is an absolute necessity. It is in this sense that the absolute is self-
manifestation. The unity of essence and existence is only manifested as such by absolute 
reflection, which, again, dose not add any new contents to contingency.  
 
Conclusion: Concreteness of Subjective Spirit 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to shed light on some crucial features of 
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. First, in trying to clarify why “subjective spirit” is not 
translatable into the English “mind,” I concluded that this is because the global problem of 
Hegel’s system, i.e., the relationship between nature and spirit, frames the philosophy of 
subjective spirit. This point has far-reaching implications for our study of Hegel’s philosophy of 
subjective spirit. Since the philosophy of subjective spirit is to show how spirit emerges out of 
nature and this systematic problem frames it, it thematizes the finite human spirit in terms of the 
bodily existence of the human being and its spiritualization. This point guides my analysis of the 
Anthropology in Chapter 5.  
By examining the transition from life to knowing in the dialectic of the logical Idea, I 
came to the same conclusion concerning the significance of the issue of bodiliness for Hegel’s 
philosophy of subjective spirit. Indeed, the dialectical transition of the Idea from life to knowing 
anticipates the last stage of the Philosophy of Nature, i.e., the “animal organism” but deals with 
this teleological existence in the logical terms of the dialectical process of the Idea. By analyzing 
this dialectic, I concluded that the finite human spirit thematized in the Psychology, i.e., knowing 
[das Wissen], is the reality adequate to the Idea, one in which the Idea posits its objectivity for 
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itself and thus turns back into itself. But Hegel also assumes that knowing is in the realm of 
finitude, i.e., that of life and death. By reflecting on the issue of death of an individual, I 
therefore concluded that the death of an individual remains an issue that is to be settled down in 
the first part of the philosophy of subjective spirit, i.e., the Anthropology. This being said, one 
cannot understand Hegel’s thematization of the bodily existence of the human spirit in the 
Anthropology as merely implying that the human spirit has biological life through its organic 
living body. What Hegel thematizes in the Anthropology is rather the sublation of the soul’s 
immediate bodily existence through habit. In this sense, habit for Hegel is that through which the 
soul comes to obtain a new body that can live a spiritual life, thereby sublating its physical death.  
While the first two sections of this chapter thus shed light on some significance of the 
issue of bodiliness for Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, rationality of the finite human 
spirit is another important axis of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. I drew out this point 
from Hegel’s definition of subjective spirit and through an interpretation of what Hegel 
formulates as spirit’s determination of itself to knowing as concerning the transition within the 
philosophy of subjective spirit from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology. Further, I 
focused on the fact that Hegel formulates this transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit 
in terms of the transition in the Logic from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic. To set 
the stage for my analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Psychology in Chapter 3, I 
therefore examined Hegel’s idea of “objective thinking” and some important arguments in the 
Objective Logic. By examining the move from pure reflection to ground in the Doctrine of 
Essence, the dialectic of form and matter, and Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I 
focused on the sense in which thought for Hegel is a substantial being, which is however distinct 
from a sensible substantial being. I thereby suggested that the finite human spirit is the substrate 
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of the divine, dialectical thinking in the logic as well as the absolute spirit in the Encyclopedia. 
Following this, I briefly reconstructed Hegel’s discussion of actuality with the related categories 
including possibility, contingency, and necessity. I attempted to show that actuality as absolute 
necessity for Hegel is the manifestation of the absolute, and that the manifestation of the absolute 
consists in dissolving the difference between form and content such that the contents of real 
actuality obtain an absolute form and not any new contents.  
Based on the studies I undertook in this chapter, I make the following remarks with 
respect to the transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit from the Phenomenology of 
Spirit to the Psychology. I note, first, that the Psychology exhibits the movement of spirit-as-such 
as a series of transformation. In other words, the Psychology only concerns to show how the 
contents of the finite human spirit come to take off the form of immediate givenness and obtain a 
new, rational form by inwardizing recollection [Erinnerung]. But what constitutes the contents of 
the finite human spirit and how they are formed are the subject matter of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Seen this way, the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology can be 
considered in terms of actuality, i.e., manifestation of the absolute, which is a formal movement 
of absolute reflection whereby contingency is posited as absolute necessity. These points, 
together with the conclusions I made above about the Anthropology, will guide my analyses of 
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit in Chapter 3.  
As a final remark, I would like to discuss the concrete nature of subjective spirit. In 
analyzing the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit, I stated that by “concrete spirit,” Hegel 
means the mind that is considered by empirical psychology or the soul that is treated by 
Aristotle. This interpretation I could offer within the context of the “Introduction” text, however, 
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does not really reveal Hegel’s idea about the concrete nature of the finite human spirit. Now, I 
draw attention to the Anmerkung of §25 in the Encyclopedia Logic, where Hegel makes a 
retrospective remark about his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. A short analysis of this remark 
will make it clearer what Hegel means by “concrete spirit” and what I have mentioned with 
respect to the spiritual contents of the mind.  
In the Anmerkung of §25 in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel gives a justification for the 
explosive expansion of his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit to the “Spirit” and “Religion” 
chapters. He states that it was necessary to move forward to “the concrete shapes of 
consciousness, such as morality, ethical life, art, and religion” because “the standpoint of 
philosophical knowing is inwardly the richest in basic content [Gehalt] and the most concrete 
one.”107 We may well doubt if Hegel was aware of this or was able to articulate the reason for the 
unexpected expansion of the Phenomenology of Spirit around the year of 1807. Regardless of 
whatever the case may be, the remark above gives an important clue for comprehending Hegel’s 
idea about the concrete nature of the finite human spirit. We notice that in the remark above, 
Hegel identifies the themes he dealt with in the “Spirit” and “Religion” chapters in the early 
Phenomenology of Spirit with “concrete shapes of consciousness.” Hegel thus explains how the 
experience of consciousness in the first half of the Phenomenology of Spirit from sense certainty 
to reason is linked to the appearances of spirit in the “Spirit” and “Religion” chapters. The link 
                                                   
107 “My Phenomenology of Spirit, which when it came out […], had been designated the first part of the system of 
science, began with the first, simplest appearance of spirit, namely immediate consciousness, and developed its 
dialectic up to the standpoint of the philosophical science, the necessity of which is shown by this progression. For 
the sake of this end, however, it was not possible to remain content with the formal aspect of mere consciousness, 
for the standpoint of philosophical knowing [Wissen] is in itself most basic [gehaltvollst] and concrete. Hence, 
emerging as [the development’s] result, that standpoint also presupposed the concrete shapes of consciousness such 
as morality, the ethical life, the arts, religion. Consequently, the development of the basic content [Gehalt] of the 
objects of the distinctive parts of the philosophical science likewise falls within the development of consciousness, 
which at first seems to be restricted to a merely formal aspect” (ENZ, § 25 A).  
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consists, in retrospect, in the fact that the moral, ethical, artistic, and religious appearances of 
spirit are in fact the concrete shapes of consciousness. By implication, consciousness is concrete, 
not in the sense that it has this and that content, but in the sense that it is filled with spiritual 
contents that concern morality, the ethical life, arts, and religion. In short, consciousness is 
concrete insofar as it is spiritual.  
In my view, Hegel’s above remark is more than a justification of his early 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The idea that consciousness is concrete insofar as it is spiritual, as far 
as I see, plays a key role in the transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit of the 1830 
Encyclopedia from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology. As I deal with in Chapter 3, 
the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia comprises the three chapters: Consciousness, 
Self-consciousness, and Reason. Following it, the Psychology starts its discussion of spirit-as-
such. With respect to the connection between these two parts of the philosophy of subjective 
spirit, we can perhaps say that both reason (the Phenomenology of Spirit) and spirit-as-such (the 
Psychology) are concrete and spiritual in the sense that they are filled with the contents 
concerning morality, the ethical life, arts, and religion.  
Thus, Hegel’s subjective spirit refers to the concrete psyche of the human being who 
lives moral-practical, ethical-communal, and cultural-historical lives. In this sense, it differs, 
again, from the conception of the mind as a recipient of sense data and information about the 
external world. Further, Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit requires that the human psyche or the 
mind be considered in the relationship with the world that it inhabits because the spiritual 
contents concerning morality, the ethical life, arts, and religion necessarily suppose one’s 
embeddedness in the world. This being said, the relationship of the mind with the world is not 
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something that can be thought of after the inner constitution of mind has first been explained by 
some epistemological investigations. On the contrary, according to Hegel’s notion of 
consciousness as spiritual and concrete, an epistemological investigation can have a significance 
only under the ontological assumption of the mind’s being embeddedness in the world. That is, 
there is no mind without the world, and this is the underlying assumption of Hegel’s 
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CHAPTER 3. Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology in the Philosophy of 
Subjective Spirit 
 
The philosophy of spirit is both the whole (the Encyclopedia) and a part (the third 
division of the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of Spirit) of Hegel’s system. Likewise, Hegel’s 
philosophical psychology is present in the whole body of his philosophy of subjective spirit and 
in its part, the Psychology. The philosophy of subjective spirit, in other words, forms one whole 
discourse that considers finite human spirit in its three aspects, i.e., soul, consciousness, and 
spirit-as-such. But it is in its third division, the Psychology, that Hegel displays his own 
speculative theory of the human mind. Any serious undertaking of Hegel’s philosophical 
psychology will therefore have to clarify how the Psychology is related to the first two divisions 
of the philosophy of subjective spirit, i.e., the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
This undertaking must also elucidate how the three divisions thematize altogether one and the 
same subject matter: subjective spirit.  
The goal of this chapter is to grasp the overall structure of Hegel’s philosophy of 
subjective spirit. Instead of assuming that spirit linearly develops to higher stages from 
Anthropology to the Phenomenology of Spirit and finally to the Psychology, this chapter shows 
how these three divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit are internally connected to each 
other, treating one and the same object, i.e., the finite human spirit, from different aspects. 
Further, it puts the connections among those three division in the context of the Logic, given 
Hegel’s notion that the connection with the Logic makes his philosophical psychology in the 
philosophy of subjective spirit speculative.   
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This chapter starts with a discussion on the status and role of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit in the Encyclopedia system, showing how it differs from the early Phenomenology of 
Spirit of 1807. It also offers a detailed analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the 
Encyclopedia, aimed at clarifying its role for and connection with the Psychology. Following 
this, it examines the Psychology and makes a brief discussion of the Anthropology. As I show, 
the Anthropology can be seen as part of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the sense that it considers 
the subject matter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, i.e., consciousness, in its negative, natural 
aspect, i.e., bodiliness and derangement. Further, the Psychology deals with the rational, which 
the Phenomenology of Spirit establishes as the truth of consciousness, in terms of a process 
whereby it is given a rational form. But this process of recollection [Erinnerung] entails the 
formation of a mindful repository, that is, the soul containing all things in potentiality including 
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1. The Phenomenology of Spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia 
 
1.1. The Problem of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia System 
In his Nurnberg years (1808-1816), Hegel shortened his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit 
to use it for his courses. The shortened Phenomenology of Spirit comprised of only the first three 
main chapters of the original version (Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason)1 and was 
titled by Hegel “a doctrine of consciousness.” He also included the short version of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia system. Despite the differences in the contents and 
organizations of the texts, all three versions of the Encyclopedia in 1817, 1827, and 1830 include 
the shortened Phenomenology of Spirit as part of the philosophy of subjective spirit and conceive 
it as a doctrine of consciousness. This doctrine of consciousness in the Encyclopedia system is 
given different meanings, different significances, and different status from the early gigantic 
Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. This leads us to pose a question about the status and role of the 
Phenomenology of Spirt for Hegel’s mature system in the 1830 Encyclopedia.  
One of the characteristics of the Phenomenology of Spirit of the Encyclopedia is its 
conciseness. Preceded by the Logic, the Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia system assumes 
that all conceptual, ontological, and methodological foundations are already well established. 
Accordingly, the Phenomenology of Spirit in the philosophy of subjective spirit does not exhibit 
the experiences of consciousness that were pivotal in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. Most of 
                                                   
1 For a study of Hegel’s idea of a phenomenology of spirit during his Nurnberg years, see: Udo Rameil, “Die 
Phänomenologie des Geistes in Hegels Nürnberger Propädeutik,” in Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der 
“Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,” ed. Lothar Eley (Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzboog, 1990), 84-130. 
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the detailed dialectical descriptions of the experiences of consciousness given in the early 
Phenomenology of Spirit are removed. The first sub-division of the Phenomenology of Spirit in 
the Encyclopedia, “The Consciousness-as-such” (sensory consciousness, perception, and 
understanding), is curtailed to six paragraphs (§§ 418-423). In this short account, there is no 
dialectical experiences of consciousness about “here,” “now,” and “I;” nor any dialectical 
analyses of the relationship between oneness of a perceived thing and multiplicity of its 
properties; nor the play of forces. The second sub-division, “The Self-consciousness,” defines 
self-consciousness as desire (§§ 424-429), presents recognition as the achievement of freedom, 
and conceptualizes the result of recognition in terms of the achievement of universal self-
consciousness (§§ 436-437). It thus maintains the master-slave dialectic given in the early 
Phenomenology of Spirit, but its overall account is not so much a dialectical exhibition as a 
summary. It further dispenses with the historical experiences of the thinking I that the early 
Phenomenology of Spirit described under the three forms of stoicism, skepticism, and unhappy 
consciousness. The third sub-division, “Reason,” has only two short paragraphs (§§ 438-439). 
All the lengthy descriptions of the three aspects of reason—observation, action, and 
production—are left out. Instead, it briefly defines reason as the certainty that the determinations 
of self-consciousness are “the determinations of the essence of things,” adding that it is however 
not only “the absolute substance” but the “truth as knowing.” With this conclusion, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit gives places to the Psychology which deals with “spirit-as-such.” Note 
that in the last paragraph of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel defines reason in logical terms 
of the objectivity of thought-determinations, which I discussed in Chapter 2. I turn back to this 
issue later on when I deal with the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the 
Psychology.  
 
 144  
Since the Phenomenology of Spirit of the Encyclopedia dispenses with the dialectical 
experiences of consciousness, this doctrine of consciousness within Hegel’s Encyclopedia 
system must have a different significance than the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. What draws 
our attention in this regard is Hegel’s characterization of Kantian philosophy under the rubric of 
a phenomenology of spirit. In the Anmerkung on § 415, Hegel states that Kant was able to 
consider spirit only as consciousness; consequently, Kantian philosophy knows only a 
phenomenology of spirit but is ignorant of a philosophy of spirit. As this statement illustrates, 
Hegel’s conception of a phenomenology of spirit is closely associated with his critical position 
against the Kantian standpoint of consciousness holding on to the opposition of subject and 
object and the dualistic framework of Kant’s philosophy concerning the relationship between 
understanding and reason, phenomena and noumena, nature and freedom, etc. Yet, his statement 
in the Anmerkung on § 415 makes the status of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia 
somewhat perplexing. While the early Phenomenology of Spirit aims at overcoming the 
antithetical standpoint of consciousness and introducing the speculative standpoint for the Logic, 
the Encyclopedia system starts with the Logic. The Encyclopedia system thus assumes the 
speculative standpoint of the unity of being and thought from the start; hence, it does not need to 
show how the standpoint of consciousness is overcome and how the speculative perspective is 
achieved. Consequently, we cannot assume that the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia 
performs a critical role in relation to the standpoint of consciousness as the early Phenomenology 
of Spirit did. Instead, it should represent Hegel’s theory of consciousness from the speculative 
standpoint underlying the Encyclopedia system. This being said, consciousness as an object that 
is treated in a philosophical system is to be distinguished from consciousness as a standpoint that 
is to be overcome.  
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However, a close examination of the philosophy of subjective spirit reveals some 
awkwardness in its incorporation of the Phenomenology of Spirit. While the Anthropology and 
the Psychology are primarily concerned with the internal constitution of the human spirit, the 
themes discussed in the Phenomenology of Spirit including desire, recognition, and universal 
self-consciousness seem to have little to do with psychological aspects of the human spirit.2 The 
strange position of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the philosophy of subjective spirit is also 
illustrated by the editor of Hegel’s posthumous works, Karl Michelet’s decision to take it off 
from the philosophy of subjective spirit. The problem of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the 
Encyclopedia system becomes more complicated when we consider the titles that Hegel used for 
announcing his courses on the philosophy of spirit. Hegel gave his courses on the philosophy of 
spirit five times in Berlin: in the summer semesters of 1820, 1822, and 1825, and in the winter 
semesters 1827/8 and 1829/30.3 In the years of 1820, 1822, and 1825, the course was announced 
under the title “Anthropology and Psychology;” in 1825, with the addition “i.e., Philosophy of 
Spirit.” In winter semesters of 1827/28 and 1829/30, Hegel changed the title of his course to 
“Psychology and Anthropology or Philosophy of Spirit.” It thus seems that Hegel considered the 
                                                   
2 Otto Pöggler points out that the philosophy of subjective spirit has two different layers of the text: the 
Anthropology and the Psychology on the one hand, and the Phenomenology of Spirit on the other: Otto Pöggler, 
“Psychologie und Logic der Idee,” in Hegels enzyklopädisches System der Philosophie. Von der „Wissenschaft der 
Logic“ zur Philosophie des absoluten Geistes, ed. Hans-Cristian Lucas, Burkhard Tuschling, and Ulrich Vogel 
(Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 2004), 28. Pöggler claims that the Phenomenology of Spirit is not dispensable in 
the philosophy of subjective spirit, but its role and significance are different from those of the 1807 Phenomenology 
of Spirit. Paying attention to the Realphilosophie of 1805/06 in which the triad of intuition, representation, and 
concept (the triad of theoretical spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia) is presented as corresponding to the triad of art, 
religion, and philosophy (the triad of absolute spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia) and the differences among the three 
versions of the Encyclopedia, he suggests that the philosophy of subjective spirit should perhaps contain an account 
of the differentiation of objective spirit and absolute spirit: cf., Otto Pöggler, “Psychologie und Logic der Idee,” 28-
29. The meaning of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia is accordingly to be considered in terms 
of guidance to the absolute spirit, and hence, in terms of the historicity of subjective spirit—not in terms of the 
grounding of practical philosophy (the philosophy of objective spirit).  
3 Cf. Burkhard Tuschling, “Einleitung: Hegels Philosophie des Gistes im Wintersemester 1827/28 in Berlin,” in 
G.W.F, Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes (1827). Vorlesungen: Ausgewälte Nachschriften und 
Manuskripte, vol.13 (Felix Meiner Verlang: Hamburg, 1994), x. 
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Anthropology and the Psychology to represent his philosophy of (subjective) spirit in an 
interchangeable way while taking the Phenomenology of Spirit as somewhat peripheral. We also 
notice that the Phenomenology of Spirit only contains a brief and limited account of 
consciousness in contrast to the comprehensive and detailed accounts of the soul and spirit-as-
such in the Anthropology and the Psychology. It thus seems that in the philosophy of subjective 
spirit, the Phenomenology of Spirit does not play a substantial role as much as the Anthropology 
and the Psychology do. 
 
1.2. Absolute Negativity: Consciousness and Spirit’s Scission 
As discussed above, the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia arises suspicion as 
to the structural consistency of the philosophy of subjective spirit. However, it does not seem 
that the Phenomenology of Spirit is dispensable in the philosophy of subjective spirit insofar as 
consciousness is considered as a necessary, negative moment in the development of spirit, that is, 
the scission of spirit. Indeed, Hegel introduces this idea of consciousness as the negativity of 
spirit in the Preface to his early Phenomenology of Spirit, and it seems that he reinstitutes that 
idea in the philosophy of subjective spirit of the Encyclopedia for its structural consistency. As I 
discuss below, however, the philosophy of subjective spirit thematizes the negativity of 
consciousness in a different way than the early Phenomenology of Spirit, that is, in terms of the 
derangement [Verrücktheit] of the feeling soul.  
To begin, Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian standpoint of consciousness involves his 
ambivalent attitude toward the philosophy of reflection—the philosophy of Kant and his 
successors, which Hegel finds confined to the antithetical view of the conscious opposition 
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between subject and object. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Hegel criticizes them for their inability 
to comprehend the unity of subject and object. But he also highly values the philosophy of 
reflection. In the Preface to the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, he characterizes “understanding” 
as holding “the tremendous power of the negative.”4 Understanding is here conceived as the 
faculty that represents the general ways in which reflection-philosophers perform their 
philosophical thoughts. For Hegel, its principal activity consists in turning familiar ideas into 
unfamiliar ones, thereby making what is taken granted into an object of critical investigation. 
Such a critical activity of understanding is based on its “analytic power” in the sense of 
“breaking an idea up into its original elements.”5 Understanding is therefore an activity of 
dissolution. As such, it has “the tremendous power of the negative,” which is “the most 
astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power.”6  
Hegel’s appreciation of the power of understanding goes hand in hand with his objection 
to Romanticism. He challenges the Romantic conception of the absolute for its shunning from 
the negative power of spirit. The true knowledge of the absolute for Hegel hinges upon the 
power to look the negative in face and tarry with it. The true knowledge of the absolute, in other 
words, consists in the conceptual labor that can be carried out by virtue of the power of absolute 
negativity. Therein lies the essential significance of the philosophy of reflection. But the 
dissolving power of understanding is not sufficient for obtaining the complete knowledge of the 
absolute insofar as it remains only dissolving. In contrast with it, spirit is a reflective power to 
recognize itself in the elements dissolved by it. It is, in other words, that which becomes for itself 
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by going through what is performed by understanding. This being said, the opposition of subject 
and object assumed by the philosophy of reflection constitutes a phase in the development of 
spirit: it is spirit’s own scission.7 If the power of understanding to dissolve is an absolute power 
of negativity, therefore, this is in the sense that consciousness constitutes a negative phase in the 
development of spirit such that the negativity essentially belongs to spirit.  
By assigning the absolute power of negativity to understanding, Hegel thus incorporates 
the activity of this faculty, which is representative of the philosophy of reflection, into the 
movement of spirit. The thesis of the absolute negativity of understanding found in the Preface 
to the early Phenomenology of Spirit, I think, reflects Hegel’s self-conception concerning the 
position he occupies in the history of philosophy. The philosophy of reflection, in other words, is 
the historical pre-condition under which his philosophy of spirit comes out. The early 
Phenomenology of Spirit thus exhibits Hegel’s attempts to go beyond the philosophy of 
reflection and critically incorporate it into his philosophy of spirit.  
The idea that understanding or consciousness represents spirit’s scission seems to play 
an important role for the philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia as well. Hegel 
writes: the soul is the truth, i.e., the identity of the subjective and the objective “in an immediate 
unconscious totality;” consciousness is the differentiation of this totality into the I and the object 
external to it, whose self-conscious constitution results in the same truth as a determination of 
knowing; spirit-as-such is the “verification [Bewährung]” of this knowing by virtue of its self-
knowing activity.8 That is, the soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such are three different forms of 
                                                   
7 For a study of Hegel’s idea of the split of spirit and its significance for the absolute knowing, see in particular: 
Jennifer Ann Bates, “Absolute Knowing,” Angelaki, vol.21, no. 3 (2016): 65-82.  
8 Cf. ENZ, 440 Z.  
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one and the same object, i.e., a totality in which the subjective and the objective are identical. 
And the philosophy of subjective spirit considers this one and the same object in terms of 
undifferentiated totality (the Anthropology), its differentiation into subject and object and their 
reunification (the Phenomenology of Spirit), and verification of this unity (the Psychology). In 
these three stages that subjective spirit passes through in its self-development, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit is where it is divided into two poles of subject and object. Thus, it 
seems that in the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel keeps the idea in his early 
Phenomenology of Spirit that ordinary consciousness, which stands in an essentially oppositional 
relation to the world, is spirit’s own scission.  
This schematic account of the status of the Phenomenology of Spirit of the 
Encyclopedia, however, does not reveal the full significance of consciousness for the 
development of subjective spirit. If consciousness marks an essentially negative stage in the 
development of spirit, this does not merely bear on the oppositional constitution of our ordinary 
consciousness. As mentioned above, Hegel associates the oppositional constitution of ordinary 
consciousness with the negative, analytic power of the understanding to dissolve an idea or 
representation into its elements. And understanding is considered to have the absolute power of 
negativity in the sense that the antithetical standpoint of the philosophy of reflection is overcome 
by the dialectical experiences of consciousness. Yet, the Encyclopedia system, presented two 
decades later than the early Phenomenology of Spirit, does not exhibits such a critical concern 
with the philosophy of reflection. While keeping the idea of consciousness as related to spirit’s 
scission into two poles, the philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia thematizes the 
negativity of spirit in other terms than the overcoming of the standpoint of the philosophy of 
reflection: derangement [Verrücktheit] of the feeling soul. We thus notice that the Anthropology 
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addresses the problem of the one-sided subjectivism of consciousness by identifying the feeling 
soul whose representation of the world is based on the particularity of her sensation with the 
“understanding in derangement.”9 That is, the Anthropology treats understanding or 
consciousness in its deranged form; consciousness as the subject matter of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit arises from the sublation of this deranged consciousness. Spirit is in the Anthropology 
involved in the diseased state in its development; it comes to exhibit itself in the form of spiritual 
life when it achieves the stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is how the negativity of 
spirit is thematized in the philosophy of subjective spirit of the Encyclopedia.  
 
1.3. The Phenomenology of Spirit and the Doctrine of Essence 
 
Consciousness constitutes the stage of the reflection or relationship [Verhältnis] of 
spirit, or of spirit as appearance. I is the infinite relation [Beziehung] of spirit to itself, 
but as subjective relation, as certainty of itself; the immediate identity of the natural 
soul has been raised to this pure ideal self-identity; the content of the natural soul is 
object for this for-itself [fürsichseiend] reflection. Pure abstract freedom for itself 
releases from itself its determinacy, the natural life of the soul, as free as an 
independent object. It is of this object, as external to it, that I initially knows, and is 
thus consciousness. I, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly identity in otherness; I is 
itself and extends over the object as an object implicitly [an sich] sublated, I is one side 
of the relationship and the whole relationship – the light, that reveals itself and an other, 
too.10  
                                                   
9 ENZ, § 380. 
10 ENZ, § 413. 
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This first passage (§ 413) in the introductory part of the Phenomenology of Spirit condenses 
all the elements with which Hegel defines consciousness in this final version of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and the other introductory passages (§§ 414-417) offer further detailed 
explanations of this passage. In § 413, Hegel characterizes consciousness as pertaining to the 
Doctrine of Essence in the Logic and as successive of the discussion on the soul in the 
Anthropology. He thereby attempts to fix the place occupied by the Phenomenology of Spirit 
within his system of the Encyclopedia. The meaning of the Phenomenology of Spirit of the 
Encyclopedia is therefore to be elucidated by examining those two systematic connections to the 
Doctrine of Essence on the one hand, and to the Anthropology on the other. In this section, I only 
focus on the connection with the Doctrine of Essence, and I will consider the connection with the 
Anthropology in the section devoted to the Anthropology below.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Doctrine of Essence presents the absolute negativity, 
namely the self-relating negativity as the logical form of pure reflection. To briefly recapitulate, 
in this second division of the Science of Logic, Hegel elaborates the dialectic of the reflection-
determinations, which fully exhibits the operation of absolute negativity. It is thereby established 
that identity is a whole relationship of identity and difference and not a term whose counterpart is 
difference, and that the identity of identity and difference can properly be understood only as a 
self-relating negativity [die sich auf sich beziehende Negativität]. At the stage of reflection and 
shine, this equally applies to difference. Just as self-identity of something (A=A) contains in 
itself self-difference (A≠A), so does the difference of something from something else (A≠non-A) 
contains the identity of the two. As with identity, difference is therefore the difference of identity 
 
 152  
and difference.11 Considered this way, both identity and difference have their logical meanings 
only in relation to their counterparts. In Hegel’s terms, they relate to themselves only by 
negatively relating themselves to their own others. The absolute negativity thus consists in self-
rejoining in self-differentiating.  
 Of importance here is that the absolute negativity is equally distributed to each of the 
terms, such that both terms equally take part in the self-relating negativity. It is therefore not 
something external to the terms but is itself a whole relation of the two which occurs in each of 
the two terms antithetical to each other and hence requires mutually dynamic and equally 
negative activities from both parts. Applied to consciousness, the absolute negativity then 
requires that consciousness be conceived as self-consciousness. Consciousness, in other words, 
exists only as a self-consciousness standing in a negative relation with another self-
consciousness—a negative relation in which both parts are within themselves self-differentiating, 
self-negating, and self-rejoining.  
 The thesis of the absolute negativity thus brings forth a thematic switch in the discussion 
of consciousness from an opposition between subject and object into the confrontation between 
two self-consciousness—from the epistemic constitution of consciousness to the recognitional 
mode of existence of self-consciousness. The transition from Consciousness-as-such to Self-
consciousness thus illustrates how Hegel critically appropriates the philosophy of reflection. 
Hegel characterizes Kantian philosophy as “conceiving spirit as perception.”12 That is, if 
consciousness is conceived in terms of a firm opposition between subject and object, this is 
                                                   
11 GW 11, 260-268/ SL, 356-362. 
12 ENZ, § 420 A. 
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because consciousness is chiefly understood in its sensory, perceptive operations. For Hegel, 
consciousness is, in its truth, not such an epistemic subject that is assumed to be ready to receive 
sensory information from outside, but a practical subject which is driven by desire and thus lives 
an intersubjective world of recognition. Further, sense perception for Hegel has a spiritual 
dimension as I show in Chapter 5 by an analysis of his notion in the Anthropology of the 
embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings.  
 
1.4. Desiring Self-Consciousness: Hegel’s Appropriation of the Philosophy of Reflection 
But the passage above (§ 413) suggests some intrinsic relationship between the 
antithetical notion of consciousness of the philosophy of reflection and Hegel’s notion of spirit. 
What draws our attention is the identification of the I with “the infinite relation of spirit to itself.” 
An isomorphism is thereby affirmed between the I and spirit on account of their common self-
referential structure. But this affirmation is somewhat surprising because the I for Hegel points to 
an “abstract, formal ideality.”13 The meaning of “ideality” is fundamentally to be understood in 
the context of spirit’s emergence from nature. But it would here be sufficient to note that the I, 
thus understood as an abstract, formal ideality, designates a subjectivity that constitutes itself as a 
totality only internally. More precisely, it is an empty I which has no concrete contents in it and 
hence, seeks its contents in external objects. In this context, Hegel states that the I deems its 
objects an independent subsistence outside of itself and the I makes an only external and 
superficial relation to its objects. To this empty consciousness, its object is thus analogous to 
                                                   
13 ENZ, § 414. 
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“darkness outside light.”14 What is surprising is therefore the point that the I, which is said to be 
“infinite relation of spirit to itself,” is indeed relevant to sensory, perceptive consciousness that 
Hegel critically assigns to the philosophy of reflection. To speak strictly, the notion of the 
abstract, formal I as such, critically characterized as a mere internal subjectivity that is empty, 
cannot therefore provide a foundation to Hegel’s own doctrine of consciousness.  
Worth noting in this regard is Hegel’s logical-ontological reformulation of the notion of 
the I given in the Zusatz to § 413. Hegel here first defines I as an “abstract universal 
particularity,” i.e., “the individually determined universal that relates itself only to itself in its 
determinacy, in its difference.” Hegel thus defines the self-referentiality of the I in terms of the 
logical determinations of universality, particularity, and individuality. Of more importance is his 
addition that this is not only essential determination of the I, but also constitutes the “being” of 
the I, such that the “I and my being are inseparably connected to each other.” In other words, the 
I has for its being no other ground than self-certainty; the I is by being certain of itself. Hegel 
thereby modifies the notion of the I into immediate self-certainty, and yet with the qualification 
that immediate self-certainty is the mode of the being of consciousness.  
 Indeed, immediate self-certainty does not seem to indicate something entirely different 
from the abstract, formal I. They would instead pertain to the same psychological phenomenon, 
i.e., self-feeling accompanying any cognition of an object. By reframing the I as immediate self-
certainty and characterizing self-certainty as the mode of the being of consciousness, however, 
Hegel builds a consistent trajectory in the Phenomenology of Spirit, such that all the three forms 
of consciousness (consciousness-as-such, self-consciousness, and reason) are considered as 
                                                   
14 ENZ, § 414 Z. 
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distinct forms of the self-differentiating identity. Immediate self-certainty is therefore said to be 
nothing but a mere internal, formal self-difference, which finds “an actual difference, i.e., 
determinate content” in an external object.15 This abstract, formal I should then “posit this being 
[self-certainty] as an other opposed to and identical to itself,”16 in accordance with the logical 
necessity for “the difference in itself” to “be posited, developed to an actual difference.” 17 While 
immediate self-certainty is at play at the level of a sensible, perceptive consciousness 
(Consciousness-as-such), this should be developed into a second type of self-certainty that 
involves real self-differentiation and relates to “the difference existing in the object”18 (Self-
consciousness). The thesis that consciousness is in truth self-consciousness, therefore, implies 
that consciousness is a really existing subject that confronts an equally real, self-conscious object 
and reflects into itself in and through a real relation with that self-conscious object. When self-
consciousness finally posits its being for itself through such a recognitional relation, it is then 
analogous to “the light which reveals both itself and darkness.”19 When this is achieved, self-
consciousness is turned into reason, that is, “the absolute certainty of its being.” Thus, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit describes how immediate self-certainty (Consciousness-as-such) 
becomes an absolute self-certainty (Reason) by mediation of a relation between real, existing 
self-consciousnesses (Self-consciousness).  
 We can then spell out why the I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, “but as subjective 
relation, as certainty of itself.” The formal, abstract I is the infinite relation of spirit, and yet only 
                                                   




19 ENZ, § 413. 
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implicitly. It is implicitly spirit’s self-relation insofar as it has self-conscious constitution. But it 
is only subjective, insofar as it is the abstract, formal I that is at work at the level of sensual, 
perceptive consciousness. Hegel therefore does not do away with sensual-perceptive 
consciousness and the standpoint of consciousness. Sensual-perceptive consciousness is rather 
the starting point of the Phenomenology of Spirit. But this is so under the condition that the 
abstract, formal I, which goes hand in hand with sensory, perceptive consciousness, is 
understood not just as an empty, epistemic subject, but as immediate self-certainty, that is, as a 
being whose epistemic, recognitional, and rational activities embody the logical space of identity 
and difference at different levels. The transition from Consciousness-as-such to Self-
consciousness thus shows, on the one hand, how Hegel preserves, transforms, and appropriates 
the conception of the one-sided subjectivity framing the philosophy of reflection. It reveals, on 
the other hand, the phenomenological significance of the Doctrine of Essence.  
 In this context, Hegel’s theorization of desire as the first stage of self-consciousness can 
be viewed in light of a transformation of the theme of the abstract I of (sensory) consciousness. 
In transitioning from Consciousness-as-such to Self-consciousness, Hegel first suggests that the 
problem of self-consciousness consists in resolving the contradiction between consciousness and 
self-consciousness. Although self-consciousness is presented as the truth of consciousness, it is 
assumed, at the same time, that it is not entirely disengaged from consciousness. Rather, self-
consciousness at first appears as consciousness. It is in this context that Hegel holds that desiring 
self-consciousness is the same empty I as consciousness.20 If consciousness, i.e., sensory, 
perceptive consciousness, is characterized by the opposition between the abstract I and the 
                                                   
20 Cf. ENZ, § 425. 
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manifold of an external world, desiring self-consciousness is likewise directed to an external 
object. Just as consciousness seeks its contents in an external object, so does self-consciousness 
seek to satisfy its desire through an external object. But they differ in that self-consciousness is 
an activity of nullifying its object, whereas consciousness does not have such a power. Due to a 
lack of activity, consciousness can hardly be said to be a subject in a proper sense. Lacking 
desire, it rather has the form of an object. In contrast with this, self-consciousness is a subject, 
one that exercises its power upon a self-less object.  
It is to be noted, however, that desiring is not an activity that is one-sidedly performed 
by self-consciousness upon an object. Hegel emphasizes that desire involves a twofold direction: 
self-consciousness’s becoming objective and the object’s becoming subjective. In desiring, in 
other words, self-consciousness knows itself as identical with its object, since it sees in the object 
the possibility of satisfying its desire. When an object is desired by self-consciousness, the object 
does not merely undergo an alien power because it is the object that arouses desire to self-
consciousness. To put it another way, self-consciousness sees itself in an object conformable to 
its desire, and an object capable of satisfying its desire exercises a power to arouse desire upon 
self-consciousness.21 
                                                   
21 With regard to the power of the object of desire, Hegel states that the object is sublated by virtue of “its own 
nature, its own concept, since its individuality does not correspond to the universality of its concept” (ENZ, § 413 
Z). The object of desire perishes, in other words, “by the power of its own concept which is only internal to it, and, 
just for that reason, appears to come to it only from outside” (ENZ, § 413 Z). By the power of the object of desire, 
Hegel thus means the conceptual necessity of its being consumed by self-consciousness. Hence, the subjectivity that 
the object is assumed to have in the process of desire pertains to the subjectivity of the Concept. Although Hegel 
mentions the object’s “arousing” desire in the same text, it is therefore untenable, to speak strictly, to construe the 
power of the object as the power of arousing desire.  
However, if I am right in interpreting desiring self-consciousness as sensory consciousness—not cognitively or 
epistemically, but appetitively and practically sensory—we can perhaps support the idea of the power of the object 
to arouse desire by referring to Aristotle’s theory of sense perception as potentiality as well as Hegel’s appraisal of 
it. We may think about the connection between the two theories—Hegel’s theory of desire and Aristotle’s theory of 
sense perception—on the two assumptions: (1) Hegel’s desiring consciousness is a type of sensory consciousness, as 
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 By defining self-consciousness in terms of desire, Hegel thus modifies the conception of 
(sensory) consciousness. As with consciousness, desiring self-consciousness stands in an 
oppositional, negative relation to sensory objects and is directed toward those external objects. In 
its activity of consuming, however, it is a subject in its relation to the object. Desiring self-
consciousness is therefore not just sensory consciousness but a sensory subject, in the sense that 
it is appetitively and practically sensory, not cognitively or epistemically sensory.  
 This sensory subject, however, involves some intrinsic problem. Hegel suggests that 
satisfaction is only transitory: desire always reproduces itself and hence, self-consciousness will 
never completely satisfy its desire. This implies that self-consciousness is supposed to find itself 
in an object, but it is only self-seeking [selbstsüchtig] without ever achieving self-identity.22 This 
theory of desire is far from being didactic. In the context of self-consciousness—in which it is 
                                                   
I am here articulating; (2) Hegel’s understanding of sense perception is indebted to Aristotle. The second assumption 
requires an extensive study that goes far beyond the scope of this footnote. But it will partially be dealt with in 
subsequent chapters when I pursue a study of Hegel’s theory of the soul in the Anthropology.   
Aristotle distinguishes between two distinct meanings of potentiality by using the analogy of learning (Physics, 
255a30-b13). Briefly stated, a learner has a potentiality of learning; this raw, undeveloped potentiality is actualized 
when the learner possesses the knowledge. But the possessor of knowledge can possess knowledge without 
exercising it. The actuality of the raw, undeveloped potentiality of learning is therefore itself a potentiality: the 
potentiality of putting the knowledge in practice. This is a developed, second potentiality, which is a dispositional 
state (hexis). Aristotle suggests that non-living bodies which are set in motion by being acted upon not by itself but 
by something else contain within themselves the source of motion, i.e., the potentiality of suffering motion. But this 
potentiality of suffering motion is not a raw potentiality but is analogous to the dispositional state of a possessor of 
knowledge, since a body (e.g., air) has a particular, natural tendency that decides the direction of its motion (e.g., 
upward and not downward motion). Assuming that sense perception is a type of motion, i.e., alteration, Aristotle 
applies the analogy of a possessor of knowledge to the case of sense perception (De anima, 417b16-27). He thus 
denies the view that sense perception is merely passive and has its source or cause only in an external object. 
Although sense perception cannot occur without an external object, neither can it occur if the sensor has no 
potentiality of suffering alteration.  
In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel highly rates Aristotle’s notion of sense perception: see, W 19, 
205-212. Paying attention to the Greek hexis [ἔζις] and the analogy of learning knowledge, Hegel reformulates that 
“sense perception [Empfindung] is in general a potentiality (we should say a receptivity) but this potentiality is also 
activity; it is therefore not to be conceived as mere passivity.” Hegel concedes that sense perception is essentially 
passive. But it is an erroneous view of subjective idealism that sense perception is only passive. Sense perception 
involves “activity in passivity.”  
22 Cf. ENZ, § 428. 
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assumed that sensory consciousness is a subject when it is desiring self-consciousness—the 
cliché that desire only reproduces itself and cannot be satisfied implies that self-consciousness 
cannot, in fact, be a subject as it is supposed to be. It is in this context that the subjectivity of the 
object becomes an important issue. The object of desire is nonresistant to the power of self-
consciousness, but it is not impotent. It arouses desire to self-consciousness. Consequently, 
desire, and hence the subjectivity of self-consciousness depends on its object.  
Now it becomes clearer why Hegel formulates that the key problem of self-
consciousness consists in resolving the contradiction between consciousness and self-
consciousness. What desire involves is the co-existence of antithetical elements: consciousness 
and self-consciousness. They are antithetical because the independent power of an external 
object (conscious element) frustrates self-consciousness’ satisfaction and thereby impedes its 
achievement of self-identity. Since the notion of consciousness is modified, the problem is 
accordingly reset. The problem is now how to sublate consciousness involved in self-
consciousness—more precisely, how “to sublate the objectivity that is given and to posit it as 
identical to itself [self-consciousness]” or “to liberate itself from sensoriness.”23 Hegel here 
assumes that this sublation is implicit in consciousness, insofar as its form, I=I, expresses the 
necessity for self-consciousness to constitute itself as self-identical. It should therefore be noted 
that desire of self-consciousness is not reducible to physical urge. It is eventually the desire “to 
posit what it is implicitly,”24 which makes possible the entire movement of self-consciousness 
toward reason.  
                                                   
23 ENZ, § 425. 
24 ENZ, § 425. 
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To sum up, Hegel’s theorization of consciousness and desiring self-consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit can be considered in terms of Hegel’s appropriation of the notion of an 
abstract, empty I shared by the reflection-philosophers. First, Hegel starts his discussion on 
consciousness by defining it as an empty, abstract I. But he develops this notion of the 
philosophy of reflection into the immediate self-certainty having the logical form of self-
differentiating self-identity. As I have suggested, this immediate self-certainty is not an empty, 
epistemic subject opposed to an object. Instead, it denotes a being whose all epistemic, 
recognitional, and rational activities embody the logical space of identity and difference. 
Secondly, Hegel’s desiring self-consciousness can be seen as a type of sensory consciousness. 
But this sensory consciousness is not cognitively or epistemically sensory, but appetitively and 
practically sensory. The most characteristic of this sensory consciousness is found in the idea 
that the object has a certain power on its side. For Hegel, even the lowest from of consciousness, 
namely sense-perception is not a one-sided relation in which the object is entirely passive to the 
subject’s activity. Nor is it a representation of an object as Kant theorizes in his Critique of Pure 
Reason. It is a real object that arouses desire to consciousness. This understanding of sensory 
consciousness as desire eventually leads Hegel to proceed to recognition in pursuit of a 
preferable type of the object in the relation with which self-consciousness can genuinely be self-
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2. Transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology 
  
In trying to show how Hegel appropriates the notion of an empty, abstract I shared by 
the philosophers of reflection, I have examined in the previous section some psychological 
implications of his conception of desiring self-consciousness. As I discussed, desiring self-
consciousness can be understood as a kind of sensory consciousness. However, it is to be noted 
that sensory consciousness is not the main concern of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Within the 
framework of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the section on desiring self-consciousness constitutes 
an intermediate stage between consciousness and self-consciousness, setting up the key problem 
of self-consciousness. That self-consciousness desires, in other words, is the problem of self-
consciousness. Briefly stated, this problem consists in the fact that self-consciousness cannot 
satisfy its desire, cannot be identical with itself in its appetitive relation to a sensory object, since 
its desire and existence depends on the object of its desire. Therefore, to exist as true self-
consciousness, it requires another kind of relation to an object, one that makes it possible for it to 
be identical with itself in its relation to that other. This is the recognitional relationship with 
other self-consciousnesses; in this relationship, self-consciousness exists as a free subject. With 
respect to the structure of the philosophy of subjective spirit, we can now pose the question of 
how Hegel’s notion of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit relates to the Psychology. 
While Hegel’s thought about recognition incorporates his social and political theories concerning 
the realm of objective spirit, what I examine in what follows is its significance for the philosophy 
of subjective spirit.  
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2.1. Recognition and Universal Self-consciousness 
According to our interpretation of desire above, desiring self-consciousness cannot be a 
genuinely free subject due to the independence of its objects. But this does not imply that Hegel 
views a subject to be a coercive power to subjugate an object to itself. The fundamental problem 
for desiring self-consciousness consists in the logic that it should not completely annihilate its 
object because the existence of the object is a prerequisite for the satisfaction of its desire. More 
importantly, self-consciousness is not a solipsist ego separable from the external world but an 
objective I which knows itself only in and through its object. In order for it to be identical with 
itself, therefore, self-consciousness needs an object. It should penetrate its object, not in the sense 
of annihilating the subjectivity of the object, but in the sense of becoming “the light which 
reveals both itself and its object.”25 For Hegel, self-consciousness can exist as such a genuinely 
free subject through a process of recognition.  
While desiring self-consciousness operates only as an individual, recognition is a 
relation between two particular self-consciousnesses. In the process of recognition, both parts are 
supposed to prove themselves to be free, specifically from sensory conditions, by exercising an 
equally subjective power upon its other. As we have seen earlier, recognition is thus a realization 
of the reflection within itself of essence, whereby the identity of identity and difference is 
established through the self-relating negativity, in the realm of existence. In the realm of 
existence where the human beings as desiring subjects are subordinated to natural conditions, 
however, recognition results in an asymmetric relation between master and slave, thereby 
                                                   
25 ENZ, § 413. 
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forming “a community [Gemeinsamkeit] of need and its satisfaction.”26 In this economic bond 
tying the members together through the mediation of recognition, the relation of needs and their 
satisfaction, Hegel underlines, preserves the objects of desire as the medium of the relation 
between master and slave rather than destroys them. More significantly, the slave’s service does 
not merely signify his being subjugated to the mater because the slave is the one who “works off 
his individual will and self-will in the service of the master.”27 It is, in other words, in and 
through the slave’s labor that self-consciousness is freed from individuality by yielding its 
egoistic particular will to universal will—to use Rousseau’s distinction as Hegel does. 
 But Hegel underlines that recognition, specifically the slave’s servile self-alienation is 
only the beginning of freedom. It is here to be noted that for Hegel, freedom has very little to do 
with an individual person’s right to exercise her particular will, nor the moral freedom in the 
Kantian sense. Instead, it is ultimately concerned with the unity between particular will and 
universal will that is realized at the level of the ethical life. In this context, the slave’s self-
alienation and yielding her egoistic individual will is the beginning of freedom; however, it is 
nothing more than the beginning since that negative activity alone cannot be called freedom in a 
positive sense. Freedom is therefore obtained when a completely reciprocal recognition is 
achieved in such a way that both parts are recognized by each other and recognize each other as 
an equally free subject. Hegel calls such a completely reciprocal recognition universal self-
consciousness. This theory of recognition and universal self-consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit contains some important elements of Hegel’s political thoughts about 
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the Sittlichkeit.28 But in the Encyclopedia system, the Sittlichkeit belongs to the realm of 
objective spirit, and the Phenomenology of Spirit in the philosophy of subjective spirit  does not 
present a systematic account of recognition and intersubjectivity as a political and social-
ontological notion. Instead, it puts emphasis on the “speculative, or rational” aspect of universal 
self-consciousness, i.e., “the unity of the Concept, of the subjective and the objective.”29 
Since Hegel does not give any political or historical account of universal self-
consciousness but instead places emphasis on the “speculative, rational” aspect of it, it is 
questionable whether Hegel here has in mind any historical reality that would instantiate the 
completely reciprocal recognition. By stating that universal self-consciousness is the “knowing 
itself as recognized by the free other,”30 Hegel seems to be suggesting that in order for there to 
be a completely reciprocal recognition, it is necessary for each individual to know the fact that 
she recognizes the other and is recognized by the other. However, this requirement, in my view, 
is too strong, insofar as we can assume that in order for us to recognize others and be recognized 
by others, we do not necessarily have to be aware of the fact that we are recognizing and being 
recognized. More significantly, if the knowledge here at issue indicates each individual’s 
personal awareness, this condition does not seem to fit well with the universal feature of 
                                                   
28 In the Phenomenology of Spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia, Hegel seems to be presupposing his theory of the 
Sittlichkeit presented in the Philosophy of Right (1827). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel presents civil society as an 
economic association based on the right to property. Hegel’s theory of civil society reflects his acute, swift 
awareness of the changes in the economic systems of the time, specifically with respect to the rise of capitalist 
system. But Hegel holds that such an economic association, which solely aims at protecting individuals’ properties, 
cannot be the true Sittlichkeit. Offering a model of the modern Sittlichkeit is the main concern of his theory of the 
state in the Philosophy of Right. For a thorough analysis of Hegel’s theory of the modern Sittlichkeit and his non-
nationalist and anti-fascist position presented, see in particular: Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State 
(Cambridge University Press, 1972).  
29 ENZ, § 436 Z. 
30 ENZ, § 436. 
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universal self-consciousness that involves the slave’s yielding her particular will to the universal 
will.  
In the framework of the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is therefore important to articulate 
the meaning of universal self-consciousness distinct from a political or a social-ontological 
notion of intersubjectivity. In this regard, it should be noted that universality of universal self-
consciousness consists in “reciprocity” itself; hence, universal self-consciousness does not 
simply involve mutual recognition between self-consciousnesses but more fundamentally the 
knowledge of the mutual recognition. Seen this way, the “speculative, or rational” aspect of 
universal self-consciousness is essentially concerned with the concept of recognition, or the 
knowledge of what recognition ought to be. It is not so much concerned with being aware of 
whether I or a certain self-consciousness is recognized as with conceptualizing the formal 
essence of recognition as such. This conceptual element characteristic of Hegel’s treatment of 
recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit would not be affected by whether it was present in 
the past, or is present now, or remains an ideal yet to come in the future.  
The conceptual dimension of universal self-consciousness, then, creates an important 
context in the philosophy of subjective spirit, as it brings into effect the transition from the 
Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology. The knowledge of recognition involved in universal 
self-consciousness cannot merely be an external analysis of the reciprocal structure of 
recognition. It is internal to the movement of the Phenomenological consciousness and hence, of 
subjective spirit. Once subjective spirit has undergone the recognitional mutuality and made it 
for itself what recognition is, a modification in the meaning of knowledge is needed in such a 
way that it can embrace the objectivity produced by the process of recognition. In this context, 
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Hegel’s following formulation of the truth of universal self-consciousness, i.e., reason, draws our 
attention. Reason is “the certainty that its determinations are objective, are determinations of the 
essence of things, just as much as they are its own thoughts. Hence, it is reason, which is […] not 
only the absolute substance, but the truth as knowing.”31 Reason is therefore far from being a 
subjective faculty of mind, but the certainty that one’s thoughts are themselves objective in 
reality. When this is proved, subjective spirit passes to the Psychology. Conversely, one can deal 
with “spirit-as-such” only when the objectivity of reason is proved.  
Hegel’s formulation of reason above echoes with the thesis in the Preface to the 1807 
Phenomenology of Spirit that the absolute is to be grasped not only as substance but equally as 
subject, and with the thesis of the Objective Logic that thought determinations are objective. 
Further, Hegel also defines reason as “the simple identity of the subjectivity of the Concept with 
its objectivity and universality.”32 Accordingly, we can rightly suppose that the movement of the 
last stage of the Objective Logic brings up the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the 
Psychology within the philosophy of subjective spirit. The Psychology can deal with spirit-as-
such after it has been established that reason is itself reality, just as the Subjective Logic can deal 
with the Concept after the objectivity of thought-determination has been proved. In this close 
connection with the speculative logic, the Psychology treats spirit-as-such in terms of the logical 
subjectivity of the Concept, i.e., spirit’s self-development. But more importantly it also 
reinstitutes the logical movement of actuality exhibited in the last stage of the Objective Logic. 
As I claim later by reconstructing Hegel’s theory of representation in the Psychology, Hegel’s 
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conception of mind can therefore be defined in terms of actuality. In this section, I focus on the 
remaining question concerning the role played by the Phenomenology of Spirit for the 
Psychology: what does the rational mean for Hegel’s philosophical psychology in his philosophy 
of subjective spirit?  
 
2.2. The Rational: From the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology  
 Again, the abstract, formal I is for Hegel an empty I of sensory, perceptive consciousness 
that contains within it no concrete contents. Yet, can we not say that sensory consciousness has 
sensory contents or raw sense data no matter where they come from or how they are constructed? 
We can therefore assume that sensory contents in the raw for Hegel have no value of true 
contents or do not deserve the name of concrete contents. Noteworthy in this regard is Hegel’s 
overview of the movement of self-consciousness as that in which self-consciousness “liberates 
itself from its sensuousness” and “gives contents and objectivity to the abstract knowledge of 
itself.”33 In reference to the suggestions I made in the previous section with respect to desiring 
self-consciousness, I therefore here suggest the following points. As discussed earlier, in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel modifies the problematic of sensory consciousness from its 
cognitive, epistemic operation to appetitive, practical existence by defining self-consciousness as 
desire; this is also the way in which he transforms the notion of an empty, abstract I established 
by the reflection-philosophy. Despite this, how the abstract I comes to have contents, in my 
view, remains a problem, insofar as the appetitive and practical constitution of desiring self-
consciousness does not explain anything about the kind of the content that makes self-
                                                   
33 ENZ, § 425. 
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consciousness concrete. With this respect, we can probably portray recognition as a process in 
which self-consciousness “gives contents” to itself by “liberating itself from sensuousness” as 
Hegel states. Insofar as recognition can thus be viewed as a process whereby consciousness fills 
its mind with concrete contents, then, the theory of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
has a psychological significance within the framework of the philosophy of subjective spirit.  
 In making this claim, I bear in mind another claim I made in Chapter 2 concerning 
Hegel’s unique conception of concrete nature of the human spirit. I there suggested that the 
human spirit is for Hegel a store of concrete contents, not in the sense that it has within it this 
and that content, but in the particular sense that it stores the spiritual contents—the moral, the 
ethical, the artistic, and the religious. If I have a point in claiming that recognition is a process by 
which consciousness fills its mind with concrete contents, this claim is therefore to be qualified 
as follows. It is a process by which self-consciousness fills its mind with those spiritual contents. 
This is, as far as I see, what reason in the Phenomenology of Spirit means.  
 This being said, the issue of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit boils down to 
what I discussed about the actuality of reason in Chapter 2. In this regard, I pay attention to 
Hegel’s reformulation of reason in the Psychology as the knowledge that “has no other content 
than itself” in “its division into pure infinite form, boundless knowledge, and into the object 
identical with this knowledge.”34 To this, he adds that spirit has “the certainty that in the world it 
will find its own self and the world must be friendly to it.”35 These formulations resonate with 
what I dealt with in Chapter 2 with respect to Hegel’s notion of reason. In treating the dialectical 
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transition of the Idea from life to knowing in the logic, I stated that the finite human spirit, 
insofar as it is reason, is the reality adequate for the Idea, and that reason as the reality of the Idea 
has a dual structure, namely the certainty of its unity with the world and the demonstration of 
this. I also suggested that this dual structure, which corresponds to the dual structure of the Idea, 
namely a positing of a presupposing, finds its fundamental logical form in the actuality—
specifically, manifestation as a logical movement in which the discrepancy between content and 
form is removed by a free conversion between contingency and necessity.  
Now, the formulations above in the Psychology establishes that reason has the certainty 
of its unity with the world and has itself for its content in the differentiation of this content, 
which is itself, into an infinite form and the object identical to it. In my view, the certainty here 
at stake can be understood as referring to the rational as the content of self-consciousness, which 
I have above construed as a product of recognition. It therefore has nothing to do with an 
individual person’s unexamined conviction, but only denotes that a production of recognition 
embodies the unity of self-consciousness and the world in a certain way. Further, that reason has 
itself for its content in its differentiation into an infinite form and the object, implies that it is 
something that reveals itself as the identity of form and content in their differentiation. It has no 
other content than itself, namely the rational that is produced as the content of self-consciousness 
by recognition; further, it reveals this rational content in its rational form, such that it can thereby 
reveal itself as the unity of content and form. In short, if the Phenomenology of Spirit presents 
the rational as a product of recognition for the concrete content of the mind, the Psychology 
exhibits the sense in which this rational content has a rational form. The Psychology, as 
successor of the Phenomenology of Spirit, thus reveals the movement of actuality at the level of 
subjective spirit.    
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3. Hegel’s Speculative Psychology: 
Representation and Memory of the Theoretical Spirit 
 
 In the previous section, I examined the meaning of Hegel’s theory of recognition in the 
context of the philosophy of subjective spirit. I have argued that recognition has a psychological 
signification insofar as it is considered a process whereby the concrete contents of the human 
mind are produced. I have also claimed that the Psychology can be considered as a case of 
actuality, exhibiting the movement of manifestation by which the discrepancy between content 
and form in the rationality of the human mind is removed. The goal of this section is to show 
how the Psychology, specifically its first part on the theoretical spirit, exhibits the actuality at the 
level of subjective spirit. 
 
3.1. Theoretical Spirit: Subjectivity of the Concept in the Psychology 
While the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology can be 
understood in terms of the actuality of reason as I have argued in the previous section, it is now 
to be mentioned that the Psychology treats its subject matter, knowing, in terms of the absolute 
subjectivity of the Concept. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the thesis of actuality put forward in the 
last stage of the Objective Logic is at the same time a demonstration of the subjectivity of the 
Concept. On this basis, the Subjective Logic establishes that the Concept is concrete universality 
that determines itself through self-development [Entwicklung]. As such, the Concept is the 
subjectivity that produces itself by thinking itself and conceptualizing [begreifen] itself. How 
then is the logical subjectivity of the Concept at play in the Psychology? 
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Let us first give an outline of the Psychology. Hegel divides the Psychology into three 
parts: theoretical, practical, and free spirit. Theoretical spirit pertains to intelligence which is in 
its turn considered in the three forms of intuition, representation, and thinking; practical spirit 
considers the will in the three forms of practical feeling, urges and willfulness, and happiness. 
With respect to these first two dimensions of spirit-as-such, Hegel puts emphasis on their 
common feature, i.e., productivity. Theoretical spirit produces from within itself an ideal world 
comprised of words; practical spirit produces enjoyment by the will’s self-determination. 
Although they differ in the direction of their productive activities—inward production of 
theoretical spirit and outward production of practical spirit—they are same in that they produce 
realities. Theoretical spirit is therefore as much as active, productive, creative as practical spirit. 
An important difference of the two consists in the fact that theoretical spirit has no resistance in 
its production of its inner world, whereas practical spirit externally confronts other human wills 
in its outward realization. For this reason, Hegel states that theoretical spirit is less restricted and 
less finite than practical spirit. But the distinction between theoretical and practical spirit is only 
relative rather than absolute since  since they are mutually incorporated. They are rather identical 
in that both productions are one-sided incomplete unities of the subjective and the objective:  
ideal unity in the case of theoretical spirit, and real unity in the case of practical spirit. Free spirit 
is then the synthesis of those equally one-sided unities of the subjective and the objective. It is 
the will that is at the same time intelligence, i.e., spirit that knows itself as free will and wills 
itself as the object of itself. Since it thus turns out that the concept of spirit is freedom, it can give 
a foundation to the philosophy of objective spirit, which considers the realizations of the freedom 
of spirit in the realm of objectivity. 
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Hegel seems to have a good reason for blurring the distinction between intelligence and 
will. In accordance with his overarching claim for a speculative consideration of spirit as 
intrinsically active, intelligence should be considered involving activity and hence its own will. 
Will should likewise be thought of as incorporating intelligence because not the contingent, but 
the rational operation of the will deserves a speculative analysis. Hegel’s claim of the 
inseparability of intelligence and will carries some interesting implications. Intelligence’s 
involvement of will makes intelligence more than just a passive activity of synthesizing received 
information; it is a creative activity of producing itself as a reality, that is, as a system of names 
and signs. By virtue of will’s incorporation of intelligence, rational agent is neither 
“understanding-less hearts” nor “heart-less understanding” but a bearer of a rational will36—as it 
is exemplified by historic figures whose passions express the rationality of the world-history. 
 
The progression [Fortschreiten] of spirit is development [Entwicklung], insofar as its 
existence, knowledge [Wissen], has within itself the in-and-for-itself determinateness, 
i.e., the rational, or its basic content [Gehalt] and end, and hence the activity of 
translating is pure, only the formal transition to manifestation [Offenbarung] and 
returning into itself in that manifestation. Insofar as knowledge is encumbered with its 
initial determinacy, is at first only abstract and formal, the goal of spirit is to produce 
the objective fulfillment and thereby the freedom of its knowledge at the same time.37 
 
                                                   
36 ENZ, § 445 A. 
37 ENZ, § 442. 
 
 173  
With respect to our question about the connection between the Psychology and the 
Subjective Logic, the passage above suggests that theoretical spirit displays the “development 
[Entwicklung],” i.e., the logical subjectivity of the Concept.38 Theoretical spirit has its own basic 
content and this for its end. The basic content here denotes, as far as I see, the rational as the 
contents of the mind that I have previously articulated as a production of recognition. According 
to the passage above, theoretical spirit exhibits a teleological movement of development by 
which its contents, which is initially only abstract and formal, is transformed into something 
objective and concrete. If psychological spirit has activity, subjectivity, and freedom, and for that 
                                                   
38 For an analysis of the relationship between the Psychology and the Subjective Logic, see in particular: Klaus 
Düsing, “Endliche und absolute Subjecktivität. Untersuchungen zu Hegels philosophischer Psychologie und zu ihere 
spekulativen Grundlagung,” in Hegel’s Theory des subjektiven Geistes in der “Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen 
Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,” ed. Rothar Eley (Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog, 1990), 33-58. Düsing suggests 
that the three divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit (the Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and 
the Psychology) correspond to the three parts of the Logic (the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the 
Doctrine of the Concept). Accordingly, the absolute subjectivity of the logical Idea underlies the Psychology in an 
important manner, which thematizes the finite subjectivity of the human spirit. That is, while the absolute 
subjectivity of the Idea consists in self-thinking and over-grasping [übergreifen] of objectivity, this dialectical unity 
of the subjective and the objective is in the Psychology presented through the self-development [Entwicklung] of 
subjective spirit. And the self-development of subjective spirit is found in the “increasing subjectification” of 
theoretical spirit. He thus states that in Hegel’s Psychology, “intuition, representation, and thinking are not explained 
as fundamentally heterogeneous faculties or powers, but as serial moments of the development, which consists in the 
increasing subjectification of the contents that are represented through those faculties or powers:” Klaus Düsing, 
“Endliche und absolute Subjecktivität. Untersuchungen zu Hegels philosophischer Psychologie und zu ihere 
spekulativen Grundlagung,” 50. Düsing also mentions another way of the development of subjective spirit, which I 
find has to do with the unity of theoretical and practical spirit: “determinations maintain themselves in their other 
such a way that this unity of themselves, which is in itself the fundamental essence of the two, is also posited as a 
subjective unity of them,” i.e., as subjective spirit (Ibid). 
As I notice in Düsing’s analysis, the development of subjective spirit in the Psychology can be seen in its two 
aspects: the inwardizing recollection of theoretical spirit, and the unity of theoretical and practical spirit. Indeed, 
what the Psychology eventually establishes is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit. It thus comes to the 
conclusion that the essence of spirit is freedom, thereby laying the foundation for the philosophy of objective spirit. 
In this chapter, however, I do not deal with the unity of theoretical and practical spirit and instead focus only on 
recollection. This is first because of the impression that in the Psychology Hegel gives priority to theoretical spirit 
and the account of the unity of theoretical and practical spirit is relatively short and not detailed. More importantly, 
this issue seems to have to do with the questionable status of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the philosophy of 
subjective spirit, namely the fact that it thematizes practical/objective spirit that is directed toward outer world, 
whereas the philosophy of subjective spirit primarily concerns theoretical/subjective spirit, which is still ideal in the 
sense of remaining internal to itself. As I attempted to make sense of the significance of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
for the Psychology, I leave the thesis in the Psychology of the unity of theoretical and practical spirit for a future 
study. 
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reason can be called spirit, this is the case insofar as the transformation of the basic content of 
and by theoretical spirit is a manifestation, i.e., the dissolution of the disparity between form and 
content.  
The above formulation of the subjectivity of theoretical spirit is based on an important 
assumption that knowledge [Wissen] is the existence of spirit and has the rational for its 
immediate determination. Assumed here is the connection of theoretical spirit with reason. As 
we have seen above, the Phenomenology of Spirit ends with reason, i.e., the certainty of the unity 
of the subjective and the objective—the certainty in which “reason finds its own self in the world 
and the world must be friendly to it.”39 This certainty is the rational, the knowledge, the 
existence of spirit. But theoretical spirit finds this rationality at first as a pre-given [vorfinden].40 
To theoretical spirit, the rational is a given basic content [Gehalt]; as such, it constitutes the 
immediate, unproved determination of theoretical spirit. Therefore, theoretical spirit is to 
appropriate its pre-given content, the rational, since the pre-givenness contradicts the subjective 
nature of spirit. More significantly, theoretical spirit is nothing but such an appropriation of its 
own content, the rational. Hegel therefore constructs theoretical spirit as a movement, that is, one 
process of knowing [erkennen] whose moments are the three activities of intelligence: intuition, 
representation, and thinking.  
Briefly stated, intelligence at first finds its content as pre-given, which is not produced 
by it (intuition); it liberates itself from this illusion of the pre-givenness of its content by 
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inwardizing it (representation); finally, the rational becomes completely subjective to 
intelligence (thinking).  
At this point, the terminological distinction between knowledge [Wissen] and knowing 
[Erkennen] and the related one between intelligence and theoretical spirit reveals more clearly 
what kind of subjectivity is here at play. While knowledge [Wissen] indicates the rational as it is 
immediately given from the Phenomenology of Spirit, knowing [Erkennen] narrowly defines the 
movement through which this given content is appropriated by intelligence itself. It is therefore 
neither a perceptive or cognitive activity, nor among other activities in addition to intuition, 
representation, and thinking. It is the comprehensive activity in which intelligence posits its 
immediate determination for itself by going through its moments. As the bearer of this 
comprehensive movement, intelligence is then more narrowly defined as theoretical spirit. In this 
narrow sense, theoretical spirit, not the intelligence, exhibits the logical subjectivity of self-
development. Such a teleological movement of theoretical spirit is, according to Hegel, the 
element that makes his treatment of what is usually called faculties of mind, i.e., intuition, 
representation, and thinking, distinct from other psychologies of the time.  
 To sum up, it is theoretical spirit that is assumed in the Psychology to realize the logical 
subjectivity of self-development. What the content of mind is, is already shown by the 
Phenomenology of Spirit: the identity of the subjective and the objective—more precisely, the 
rational as a concrete content of the mind, which is a product of recognition. Following this, the 
Psychology is concerned with granting an adequate form to this content. While pre-giveneness is 
not an adequate form to spirit which is intrinsically active and self-reflective, theoretical spirit 
actively transforms its content. This is, as far as I see, the way in which theoretical spirit 
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reinstitutes the logical movement of actuality exhibited in the last stage of the Doctrine of 
Essence. Again, the logical movement of actuality concerns the proof of the subjectivity of the 
absolute as substance by the absolute’s gaining the form adequate to its concept: manifestation. 
If theoretical spirit is a “manifestation,”41 as Hegel states, the meaning of this is be shown by an 
analysis of how the rational content of the mind is transformed into something rational through 
the movement of theoretical spirit.   
 
3.2. Representation: Transformation of the Given Rational Content by Theoretical Spirit  
 Now, we can pin down how the Psychology, as successive of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, exhibits Hegel’s speculative, philosophical psychology. Following the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, the Psychology presupposes that the content of mind is the rational, comprising the moral, 
the ethical, the right, the religious, etc. It is therefore not surprising that Hegel defines intuition, 
the first form of intelligence, as “consciousness fulfilled by the certainty of reason whose object 
has the determination of the rational.”42 At the stage of the Psychology, what is intuited is not 
raw sense data, but the rational. But theoretical spirit, at first, finds rational contents as pre-given 
which is not produced by itself. Even when we speak of the immediate feeling of the religious, 
for instance, there is semblance that intuition passively receives what is intuited. Theoretical 
spirit remains only half-rational unless this semblance is removed. The task of theoretical spirit 
therefore consists in showing how rational contents of mind come to have rational forms. For this 
reason, the proper activity of theoretical spirit consists in nothing but bringing about formal 
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changes in those rational contents, such that they are connected to each other in a certain rational 
manner. Intuition, representation, and thinking are those modes of transformation of the given 
rational contents by theoretical spirit.  
 The removal of the semblance of the externality of intuited rational contents first requires 
that intuition be thought of as an activity. Hegel therefore considers intuition as an activity of 
producing an image of an object, one through which what is intuited is transformed into an 
object present outside of mind in the temporal and spatial order. While images are such transient 
mental existents produced by intuition, Hegel secondly considers recollection [Erinnerung] as 
the process in which images are freed from their temporal, spatial particularity. By being 
recalled, images are appropriated by intelligence, made into intelligence’s own possession, and 
thereby unconsciously preserved in intelligence. While intelligence is thus made into 
“unconscious nocturnal pit” by recollection,43 imagination then creates connections among those 
contents stored in intelligence. In Hegel’s terms, imagination makes intelligence emerge from its 
being-within-it [Insichsein] into determinacy, such that the nocturnal darkness enveloping the 
wealth of images is dispelled by the luminous clarity of presence.44 More precisely, imagination 
makes images come into existence (reproductive imagination), makes them into universal 
representations by relating them to each other (associative imagination), and posits those 
universal representations identical with particular images by giving them pictorial existences 
(symbolizing, and sign-making phantasy).45  
                                                   
43 ENZ, § 453 A. 
44 ENZ, § 455 Z. 
45 For a study of Hegel’s theory of imagination, see in particular: Jennifer Ann Bates, Hegel’s Theory of Imagination 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
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Of importance here is the distinction between associative imagination and symbolizing, 
sign-making phantasy. According to Hegel, the so-called association of ideas is not a law, but the 
act of imagination by which only pictorial associations are created among the images. While 
those pictorial associations are made by categories of understanding such as likeness and 
unlikeness, ground and consequence, etc.,46 the symbolic, sign-making fantasy is an act of 
intelligence qua reason, i.e., of making itself into a being, into the thing [Sache].47 Insofar as we 
are concerned with rational connections among rational contents in mind, we can therefore 
assume that it is the third form of imagination whereby mental contents—those whose contents 
are rational, and which are unconsciously preserved in mind by recollection—gain rational forms 
adequate to their rationality. It is here not hard to see that by rationality of imagination qua 
reason Hegel first means an activity of self-producing as the thing. But this self-externalization 
into symbol and sign is at the same time a free activity because imagination here simultaneously 
produces connections between a rational content and its externalized form (sign and symbol). It 
is a free activity, more precisely, because it creates from within itself the relation of meaning 
between a content and its expression without relying on sensual elements of symbol or sign.  
The arbitrary connection between meaning and sign here plays the role of a proof of the 
freedom of intelligence. Hegel thus makes a sharp distinction between symbol and sign. 
Symbolizing is less free than sign-making because the symbolic connection between a content 
(e.g., the strength of Jupiter) and the selected material image (e.g., eagle) is still dependent on 
some sensual elements (e.g., the strength of eagle) of the latter. Symbols which do not rely on 
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sensual elements of images (e.g., a cockade, a flag, a tomb-stone) are signs. In sign-making, 
imagination arbitrarily imposes meanings to signs. This is even more so in the case of linguistic 
signs, which reveals the reason why linguistic signs must be learned. By sign-making, 
intelligence becomes “the pyramid into which an alien soul is transferred and preserved.” 48  
 Consequently, we can conclude that the rational form adequate to a rational content for 
Hegel is eventually a linguistic expression; the rational connection among rational contents is a 
connection of meaning. The thing [Sache] which is the counterpart of imagination turns out to be 
“name.”49 The pyramid into which the intelligence is transferred turns out to be a mental world 
comprised of meanings, freed from all sensual, natural restraints. A rational intelligent being can 
then be said to be a subject capable of using language. It is also a subject capable of thinking 
because it is in words, according to Hegel, that we think.50  
 Hegel thus adds a psychological account of how one appropriates a language system. 
This is the issue of memory, which is considered in the three forms: name-retaining, reproducing 
the meaning of a certain given word (e.g., “lion”) without relying on any sensory elements, and 
leaning to speak and write a language. Indeed, if mind can be conceived as a world in which 
names are arranged according to their meaning-connections, an account of how such a language 
system is appropriated by mind is necessary. For it cannot otherwise be affirmed that it is the 
inner word of “mind.” Hegel does not assume that the meanings of words and their connections 
originate from an individual speaker’s or writer’s personal intention. What he assumes is rather 
the objectivity of the meaning-connections. This explains why Hegel puts great emphasis on 
                                                   
48 ENZ, § 458 A. 
49 ENZ, § 461. 
50 ENZ, § 462 A. 
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mechanical memory. Mechanical aspect of learning language consists in this: “certain signs, 
tones, etc., are grasped in their merely external association and then reproduced in this 
association, without attention being thereby explicitly directed to their meaning and inward 
association.”51 Shortly, we learn a language by rote. And learning language by rote is the 
sublation of the disparity between name and meaning in the sense that the net of meanings which 
confers objective values and orders to the world of words is implanted to the mind.  
 But this is also that which makes the mind of the one who mechanically memorizes 
words have subjectivity. When one memorizes, for instance, a senseless sequence of words or 
recites a text without understanding its meaning, this evidences the power of the I over names, 
that is, the power of holding together words and keeping them in stable order even without 
understanding their meanings. Since it is thereby established that theoretical spirit is a subject 
capable of language, Hegel can finally deal with thinking at the last stage in the development of 
intelligence by analyzing it into understanding, judgement, and inference.  
While the Phenomenology of Spirit brings forth the rational, concrete contents of mind 
as the subject matter of the Psychology, the Psychology—specifically, the second sub-division of 
theoretical spirit, “Representation”—establishes that those rational contents have rational forms 
in the linguistic meaning-connections. Together with the Phenomenology of Spirit, the 
Psychology thus suggests that the mind is a totality of rational contents in which these contents 
are transformed into representations and into linguistic signs. By this transformation, they are 
freed from the particular and momentary forms of time and space and stored in intelligence. This 
is how they are materially produced by intelligence.  
                                                   
51 ENZ, §195 Z. 
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3.3. The Actuality of Mind and the Mechanism of Spirit 
Now we can return to the thesis concerning the transition from the Phenomenology of 
Spirit to the Psychology: consciousness achieves the truth, i.e., the identity of the subjective and 
the objective as a determination of knowledge, while spirit-as-such is a verification [Bewährung] 
of this knowledge. Again, reason, the last stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit, is the certainty 
that “its [self-consciousness’s] determinations are objective, are determinations of essence of 
things”52—or, the certainty of the rationality of the world. But this certainty is not only “the 
absolute substance” but “the truth as knowledge.”53 By this statement, Hegel makes it clear that 
the identity of the rational and the real here is an issue of knowledge. The Phenomenological 
identity of the rational and the real is indeed relevant to the logical objectivity of thought-
determinations. But the same truth, which is phenomenologically expressed as the identity of the 
rational and the real and logically formulated as the objectivity of thought-determinations, is here 
in the Psychology considered as having a peculiar form: a psychological knowledge, i.e., the 
content of mind.  
From this connection with the Objective Logic, we can then more aptly spell out the 
specific meaning of Hegel’s theory of representation. As we have seen earlier, the Objective 
Logic establishes that thought-determinations can eventually be said to have objectivity when it 
is shown how the absolute has actuality—how the absolute as substance proves itself to have 
subjectivity and reveals itself as the absolute by the absolute reflection which dissolves the 
disparity between its content and form. Likewise, the theory of representation in the Psychology 
                                                   
52 ENZ, § 439. 
53 ENZ, § 439. 
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leads us to narrowly define Hegel’s conception of mind as actuality, that is, as an activity by 
which the disparity between content and form of mind is dissolved. From this perspective, 
recollection and sign-making are not just among other psychological operations. They are rather 
concerned with the verification of the truth, i.e., of the rationality of reality. Inversely, the 
verification here at issue has nothing to do with argumentative demonstrations, but with 
transformations of rational, mental contents by the activity of theoretical spirit. In this sense, the 
mind is for Hegel something actual, something that manifests itself as rational. 
If our interpretation of Hegel’s theory of representation in terms of mind’s actuality has 
a point, then, we encounter an ironic conclusion with regard to the freedom of spirit (mind). 
Spirit’s freedom eventually consists in its ability to produce itself as something material, that is, 
as linguistic signs. According to Hegel’s doctrine of mechanic memory, however, it is by 
mechanic repetitions that spirit comes to be free. In Hegel’s terms, “the highest recollection of 
representation is the highest alienation of intelligence.”54 How can we make sense of this 
seemingly self-contradictory idea that spirit’s freedom consists in its mechanism? I will turn 





                                                   
54 ENZ, § 463. 
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4. The Anthropology as a Negative Part of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
As mentioned above, in the first passage of the introductory part of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit (§ 413), Hegel articulates the meaning of this second division of his philosophy of 
subjective spirit in its two systematic connections to the Doctrine of Essence and to the 
Anthropology. With respect to the relationship between the Anthropology and the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, we can refer to § 413 where Hegel states that the object of 
consciousness is “the content of the natural soul” or “the release of the natural life of the soul.” 
As discussed earlier, this notion of consciousness as the release of the soul can broadly 
understood in terms of the differentiation of the soul’s undifferentiated totality into subject and 
object. But the concrete meaning of this differentiation requires a comprehensive analysis of the 
Anthropology. As I undertake an analysis of the Anthropology in Chapter 5, I here only examine 
Hegel’s conception of the soul as a deranged form of consciousness to show how the 
Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit are intrinsically connected to each other:  
 
“The concrete nature of spirit brings with it the peculiar difficulty for consideration [of 
spirit] that the particular stages and determinations of the development of its concept do 
not also remain behind as particular existences in contrast to its deeper formations. […] 
The determinations and stages of spirit, […] are essentially only moments, states, 
determinations in the higher stages of the development. As a consequence of this, a higher 
determination of spirit displays itself as present, even empirically, in a lower and more 
abstract one; e.g., all the higher that is spiritual [is present] in sensation as a content or 
determinacy.  […] But all the same, when lower stages are under consideration, it becomes 
necessary, in order to draw attention to them in their empirical existence, to refer to higher 
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stages in which they are present only as forms, and, in this way, to anticipate a content 
which exhibits itself only later in the development (e.g., consciousness, in dealing with 
natural waking; understanding, in dealing with derangement).”55 
 
In the passage above, Hegel suggests that in the philosophy of spirit, the concrete nature 
of spirit makes it necessary to construe a lower stage as anticipating a higher one. For example, 
the spiritual (the moral, the ethical, the artistic, the religious) is present in sensation as the 
content or determinacy; consciousness and understanding (the Phenomenology of Spirit) are 
present in the waking and derangement of the soul (the Anthropology) as the content. The first 
example suggests that the spiritual content may have a sensory form; the soul can sense and feel 
the spiritual content. According to the second example, the waking and derangement of the soul 
may be considered in terms of a natural form in which consciousness is present. These two 
examples relate to the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings and derangement of the feeling 
soul treated in the Anthropology, respectively. Thus, one can say that the Anthropology deals 
with consciousness but considers this subject matter of the Phenomenology of Spirit in terms of 
bodiliness and derangement. The Anthropology, in other words, thematizes consciousness in its 
negative, natural aspect and shows how this is overcome. As such, it can be understood as part of 
Hegel’s theory of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
Given the connection between the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, then, it 
is untenable to maintain that the movement of subjective spirit constitutes a linear progression 
towards ever higher stage. Just as the Anthropology can be considered as part of the 
                                                   
55 ENZ, § 380. 
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Phenomenology of Spirit, so is the Phenomenology of Spirit not just a lower stage to the 
Psychology that is discarded by the latter. The Psychology has no meaning without the 
Phenomenology of Spirit because the Phenomenology of Spirit offers the view of the rational 
constitution of the mind, which the Psychology considers in terms of form. If Hegel’s speculative 
approach to the mind consists in dealing with it in its totality without arbitrarily dismembering it, 
therefore, one would also have to apply this speculative approach to our reading Hegel’s 
philosophy of subjective spirit.  
 
5. The Manifestation of Spirit: The Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
The considerations above about the concrete nature of spirit make us free from the 
pervasive understanding of the Hegelian dialectic in the philosophy of subjective spirit according 
to which a lower stage is only a moment for a higher one. Although this does not deviate much 
Hegel’s own formulation of his dialectic as well as of the structure of his philosophy of 
subjective spirit, we also pay attention to the fact that Hegel blurs a firm distinction between the 
Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit by highlighting the concrete nature of spirit. I 
claimed earlier that the Phenomenology of Spirit specifies the kind of content that deserves an 
analysis of a speculative psychology and examined how the Psychology treats this particular 
content offered by the Phenomenology of Spirit. Now in this section I clarify how the 
Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit address together the issue of the content of mind, 
while bearing in mind the twofold division of the speculative logic into the Objective Logic and 
the Subjective Logic.  
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In the passages titled “the Concept of Spirit” (§§381-384) in the “Introduction” to the 
Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel defines spirit in terms of ideality, freedom, and manifestation. 
Ideality means sublation of the externality that the logical Idea has in nature. It is the essence of 
spirit because all activities of spirit consist in making what is external into something internal to 
itself. For Hegel, this ideality fundamentally belongs to spirit’s freedom because it is spirit’s 
activity of assimilating all externalities to itself. This being assumed, it is said that manifestation 
is the determinacy of spirit. Again, Hegel underlines that manifestation is not a disclosure of 
something else or an addition of an external form to a certain content. While these conceptions 
presuppose the mutually external relation between form (that which manifests) and content (that 
which is manifested), manifestation for Hegel consists in a dynamic, internal identity of the two. 
It is, in other words, a form that is itself content, or a form that expresses the content in its 
entirety. In this sense, manifestation is for Hegel all the time self-manifestation. That spirit’s 
determinacy is manifestation, therefore, means that spirit’s free act of idealizing of all 
externalities is a formal activity that makes all its contents properly expressed in their entirety.  
 
The manifesting [das Offenbaren], which, as the manifesting of the abstract Idea or 
immediate transition, is the becoming of nature, is, as the manifesting of spirit, which is 
free, the positing of nature as its world; a positing, which is, as reflection at the same 
time, a presupposing of the world as self-subsistent nature. The manifesting in the 
concept is the creating of the concept as its being in which the concept gives itself the 
affirmation and truth of its freedom.56 
 
                                                   
56 ENZ, § 384. 
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 In the passage above, Hegel specifies three forms of spirit’s self-manifestation: (1) 
the becoming of nature; (2) presupposing nature as an external world to itself and positing it 
as its own world; (3) grasping itself as that which posits its own being and produces its 
other, i.e., nature and finite spirit.57 We can accordingly point to the three places in the 
system of the Encyclopedia where spirit manifests itself: (1) transition from the logical Idea 
to the philosophy of nature, (2) the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit in the 
philosophy of subjective spirit, and (3) the philosophy of absolute spirit. This specification 
of the three places of spirit’s self-manifestation, however, raises the question about the 
meanings of other parts which are not listed in the passage above. Does Hegel mean, for 
instance, that the logic, the Psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and the 
philosophy of objective spirit have nothing to do with spirit’s self-manifestation? This is 
untenable, given the ubiquitous, omnipresent nature of spirit in Hegel’s system. It would 
therefore be more relevant to construe that Hegel picked up those three stages to 
characterize the whole movement of spirit within the Encyclopedia system rather than took 
them to be three different places where spirit manifests itself differently at each time. Spirit 
manifests itself, in other words, through the whole movement in which it externalizes itself 
into nature, turns back into itself by inwardizing its own externality in nature, and posits this 
inwardness for itself. It manifests itself in and through the system of the Encyclopedia.  
 According to the passage above, the meanings of the first two divisions of the 
philosophy of subjective spirit—the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit—should 
be considered in the framework of spirit’s self-manifestation. To speak somewhat 
                                                   
57 Cf. ENZ, § 384 Z. 
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schematically, it is not the Psychology but the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of 
Spirit that have a true significance for the whole movement of spirit in the encyclopedic 
system. By implication, one cannot properly understand those two first divisions of the 
philosophy of subjective spirit without putting them in the context of the emergence of spirit 
from nature or its sublation of nature. The psychological meanings of the Anthropology and 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, in other words, are to be examined in terms of spirit’s natural 
constraints and liberation from them. This is the spot where Hegel’s philosophy of 
subjective spirit exceeds the framework of an ordinary psychology. 
 In this context, it is noticeable that in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel formulates 
recognition in terms of the sublation of bodiliness. As we have seen earlier, recognition is a 
relation between two different particular self-consciousnesses. They confront each other to prove 
themselves to be a free subject. But Hegel suggests that what each self-consciousness is 
supposed to sublate is not the other self-consciousness. Instead, each self-consciousness is to 
sublate his own immediacy, i.e. his “bodiliness.”58 Bodiliness here means that “in which, as in its 
sign and instrument, self-consciousness has its own self-feeling, as well as its being for others 
and its relation that mediates between itself and them.”59 The subjects who are engaged in the 
struggle for recognition are therefore natural, bodily subjects. Further, this fact that they are 
natural, bodily subjects are the key problem of recognition. Specifically, self-consciousness is to 
sublate his own bodiliness to prove himself to be a free subject.60   
                                                   
58 ENZ, § 431. 
59 Ibid. 
60 In relation to my interests in the systematic connection of the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, I 
here focus on the issue of bodiliness. In the encyclopedic Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel emphasizes that the 
struggle for recognition is not a duel, which I understand in relation to medieval feudalism. More importantly, Hegel 
suggests that the life-or-death struggle might have occurred in the state of nature and might have contributed to the 
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 The formulation of recognition in terms the sublation of bodiliness suggests that the 
theory of the soul exhibited in the Anthropology underpins the issue of self-consciousness’ 
liberation in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Returning to the formulation given in § 431, 
bodiliness is that in which, “as in its sign and instrument,” self-consciousness has its self-feeling. 
This formulation condenses the theory of the sentient soul and the habit presented in the 
Anthropology. It is therefore important to note that the bodiliness of self-consciousness is not just 
a physical organism, but a soulful body that immediately embodies inner sensations61 and is 
instrumentalized as the soul’s own body through the process of habituation.62 The self-
consciousness engaged in the process of recognition is a subject who has such a soulful body. 
The natural element that contradicts self-consciousness’ freedom and is therefore to be sublated, 
is the same soulful body.  
 The theory of the soul in the Anthropology thus qualifies the kind of the natural element 
that is to be sublated for the sake of self-consciousness’ proof of its freedom. This qualification 
                                                   
beginning of a state, but it is not present in the civil society or a political state (ENZ, § 432 Z). What we have in the 
civil society, in other words, is not the real struggle for recognition, but its result, i.e., recognition. Given that the 
civil society and the state are the political institutions that Hegel deals with in his Philosophy of Right, the political 
context of Hegel’s theory of recognition is also to be considered in order to understand the problem of self-
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. We can therefore construe that the result of recognition, specifically 
the asymmetric relationship between salve and master, is concerned with the rise of capitalism or of an economic 
association of needs and care for their satisfaction, which Hegel calls a civil society. But Hegel views the economic 
association instituted only on the basis of each person’s right to possession to be a mere external bond. Instead, a 
true Sittlichkeit can be achieved at the level of the state, that is, by a political community that creates an internal 
bond among its members. Considering this framework of Hegel’s theory of modern Sittlichkeit in his Philosophy of 
Right, perhaps we can put the problem of self-consciousness’ liberation from its bodiliness in the context of the 
sublation of the civil society by the state. In this case, we would have to show, first, how the modern state can create 
a political bond that internally ties its members to each other; second, how this political achievement of the 
completely reciprocal recognition can be understood in terms of the emergence of spirit from nature, that is, spirit’s 
denaturalization. This requires an expansive study of Hegel’s political philosophy. Instead of pursuing a study of 
Hegel’s political philosophy, which goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation, I discuss in Chapter 5 whether 
there can be an absolute denaturalization of spirit in Hegel’s system, focusing on Hegel’s idea of the family as 
spirit’s re-naturalization.  
61 Cf. ENZ, § 401. 
62 Cf. ENZ, §§ 409-410. 
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is important because the sublation at stake, inasmuch as it is more broadly concerned with 
spirit’s sublation of nature, can hardly take place in or by a raw nature. Sublation of bodiliness 
therefore does not simply mean that bodiliness is to be negated. Bodiliness is that which makes 
the sublation at stake possible. It is in this sense that it is defined as that in which self-
consciousness has “its being for others and its relation that mediates between itself and them.” 
To put it another way, bodiliness is the mode of the being of self-consciousness that makes it 
possible for it to engage in the process of recognition; further, it is the medium through which the 
recognition takes place.  
 If spirit manifests itself in the first two divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit, the 
Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, this is therefore so in the sense that they 
thematize together denaturalization of spirit. Only on this basis of the denaturalization of spirit, 
the Psychology can begin its speculative discussion about spirit as such. It is thus the main theme 
of the preliminary discussions that are offered by the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of 
Spirit for the Psychology.  
 
Conclusion: Hegel’s Dialectical Rationalism 
 
 Reason is the fundamental notion of Hegel’s philosophical psychology. As I have 
attempted to show by analyzing the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Psychology, the human 
mind for Hegel has rational contents, and the rational contents of mind have rational forms. 
Hegel’s rationalism, however, has far-reaching significances that are not reducible to some 
traditional understandings of reason. As concluding remarks, I shed light on how Hegel’s 
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conception of reason exceeds the traditional framework in which reason is largely considered in 
terms of a certain power of the human mind. Further, I make a few suggestions about the 
systematic connections among the three divisions of his philosophy of subjective spirit.  
 As I attempted to show throughout this chapter, Hegel’s notion of reason involves the 
idea of the unity of reason and reality. To put it simply, the underpinning of the Psychology is the 
idea that the world is rational, which the Phenomenology of Spirit presents with the theory of 
recognition. In this context, the rationality of the world is concerned with recognitional 
institution of an intersubjective social order. However, Hegel’s notion of the unity of reason and 
reality cannot simply be understood in terms of intersubjectivity. Far more importantly, it is 
concerned with verification in the specific sense that the unity of reason and reality, which 
defines reason, is to be verified as such in and through that reality. To explain this, I attempted to 
reconstruct Hegel’s theory of the theoretical spirit in the Psychology in terms of actuality, 
namely the manifestation of spirit by which the discrepancy between content and form is 
removed. Now, we can then state that the human mind is rational insofar as its contents somehow 
square with the rationality of the world and the rationality of those mindful contents are verified 
by an active psychological process of endowing them with rational forms, i.e., linguistic 
expressions.  
 The consideration above about Hegel’s notion of reason leads us to reconsider the 
meaning of the process of representation. I have attempted to reconstruct the movement of the 
theoretical spirit in terms of the psychological verification of the unity of rationality and reality. 
My claim was that the process of representation by which the rational content is transformed into 
a linguistic expression is the verification at issue, and that the mind for Hegel can be defined as 
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actuality in this particular context. If this claim has a point, then, we come to make an 
unanticipated conclusion concerning Hegel’s rationalism: the rationality of the human mind is 
eventually concerned with the irrational realm of imagination and the operation of representation 
that occurs in it.  
 This gives an important clue for thinking about the connection between the Psychology 
and the Anthropology. According to Hegel’s analogy, what happens in the process of 
representation is the transformation of “the unconscious nocturnal pit” into “the pyramid into 
which an alien soul is transferred and preserved.”63 As far as I see, the nocturnal pit, which is the 
unconscious store of the contents of mind, does not differ from the soul, that is, the 
undifferentiated substantial totality of concrete contents dealt with in the Anthropology. Again, 
Hegel puts emphasis on the concrete nature of spirit, stating that the lower stage anticipates the 
higher one and the higher one presents in the lower one. Hegel does not apply this idea to the 
Psychology. But we can make Hegel’s claim of the concrete nature of spirit more complete by 
construing that the soul in the Anthropology anticipates the nocturnal pit in the Psychology. By 
an analysis in this regard, we can therefore show how the Psychological spirit is rooted in the 
Anthropological soul. Further, we can also address the questions as to how reason comes forth 
from un-reason and how spirit emerges as spirit in the human mind. This is a topic I deal with in 
later chapters.  
 With regard to Hegel’s non-traditional rationalism in his philosophy of subjective spirit, 
his notion of desiring self-consciousness should also be mentioned. I have considered Hegel’s 
notion of desiring self-consciousness specifically in terms of his transformation of the notion of 
                                                   
63 ENZ § 453 A, § 458 A. 
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the abstract I that he critically assigns to the Kantian philosophy. By this conceptual 
transformation, Hegel switches the framework of the discussion on consciousness: from the 
epistemic, self-enclosed, abstract I, to the practical, appetitive, object-relational subject. This 
switch of the direction in the discussion about consciousness echoes with Heidegger’s 
existentialist notion of the Dasein. Heidegger claims that the primordial mode of being of the 
Dasein is the being-in-the-world, and that the relationship between Dasein and the world differs 
from the relationship between subject and object. For Heidegger, the Dasein therefore is already 
embedded in the world and encounters the objects in the world with its practical concerns. 
Knowledge and cognition are only secondary to the Dasein’s existence and its practical relation 
with the world. In a similar vein, what derives Hegel’s self-consciousness is its practical interest: 
satisfying a desire. His refutation of the notion of the abstract I thus entails the claim for the 
practical nature of the human being. But the practical constitution of desiring self-consciousness 
has little to do with the calculative reason by which one compares a variety of possible means for 
realizing a particular end and chooses the most likely effective one. More fundamentally, it is 
concerned with the directionality of self-consciousness in relation to the objects in the outer 
world. Self-consciousness, in other words, is directed toward its objects. But this directionality 
toward the world is not something that it may or may not choose according to calculative 
reasoning; one is rather already endowed with that directionality on account of her appetitive 
power, i.e., desire. In short, self-consciousness is fundamentally open to the world because of its 
appetitive constitution.  
 Hegel develops the issue of desire into that of recognition. The ways in which the two 
German philosophers deal with the practical nature of the human being significantly differ from 
each other. But the openness of self-consciousness to the world, which I find compatible with 
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Heidegger’s idea of the Dasein’s being-in-the-world, gives a clue for thinking about how the 
Anthropology grounds the Phenomenology of Spirit. Of importance is that consciousness does 
not come to be from nothing. It is something that is formed, and the formation of consciousness 
cannot occur without certain relations with the world. With regard to the formation of 
consciousness, the relation with the world is to be considered in its most wide sense: including 
all life experiences that we are always making as far as we are alive. These experiences include, 
for instance, experiences of sensual objects that are repetitive but are different at every time, 
daily interactions with the natural environment that we may not be aware of, intercommunication 
with other people that we have at various levels depending on the age and the stage of life, etc. 
Considering this, mind does not exist without the world, in the sense that the current constitution 
of the mind of each person is the result of a life-long process comprised of those experiences. 
Further, the life-long formation of our mind is not always conscious of. In many respects, it is 
rather pre-conscious, pre-reflective, unplanned, and uncontrollable. This is one of the main 
concerns of Hegel’s discussion of the natural soul in the Anthropology, which I discuss in 
Chapter 5. Further, consciousness as such a worldly existent is at the same time a bodily existent. 
In this respect, the Anthropology carries an important meaning for Hegel’s philosophical 
psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit.  
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CHAPTER 4. Kant and Hegel:  
Different Understandings of Nature and Different Ideas of an Anthropology 
 
The term anthropology stems from the Latin word “anthropologia,” which combines the 
Greek words, ἄνθρωπος and λόγος. As such, anthropology means a study of man or humanity. 
However, this plain meaning of the term anthropology does not seem to fit well with the 
Anthropology in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. As Michael Wolff points out, Hegel 
never uses the term “man [der Menschen]” in his Anthropology; instead, the adjective “human 
[menschlich]” appears only once in § 411.1 Further, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel states that 
it is only from the perspective of needs peculiar to the civil society that we have before us for the 
first time the concrete correlate of what we call “man.”2 This being assumed, one would have to 
say that the part in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit where Hegel exhibits his study of man 
is the Phenomenology of Spirit rather than the Anthropology.  For the Phenomenology of Spirit 
thematizes the intersubjective life of self-consciousness by which “the community of need and of 
care for its satisfaction”3 is established.  If this is the case, how can we make sense of the title 
“anthropology” Hegel puts on his treatment of the soul in the philosophy of subjective spirit?  
This chapter undertakes a historical study concerning the notion of philosophical 
anthropology to fill the gap between the general meaning of anthropology as a study of man and 
Hegel’s employment of the term for his theory of the soul in the philosophy of subjective spirit. 
                                                   
1 Michael Wolff, Das Körper-Seele-Problem. Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830), § 389 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992), 29. 
2 PR, § 190 A. 
3 ENZ, § 434. 
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Noteworthy in this regard is the consensus among the scholars that the remarkable development 
of anthropology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has its origin in the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment. The contemporary American anthropologist, Marvin Harris, suggests that 
anthropology was not able to achieve its disciplinary identity before the sociocultural sphere of 
the human life was identified as a legitimate field of inquiry. According to Harris, various, new 
theoretical attempts in the eighteenth-century were pivotal in such an identification of the 
sociocultural sphere as a legitimate field of inquiry and hence, in the formation of anthropology 
as an independent discipline.4 Odo Marquard suggests that the remarkable development of 
philosophical anthropology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is indebted to a double 
theoretical turn accomplished in the eighteenth-century: a turn toward the life-world away from 
                                                   
4 For the history of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment with respect to the formation of anthropology, see: Marvin 
Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory. A History of Theories of Culture (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1968), 8-52. To list some important theoretical factors of the Enlightenment that contributed to the rise of anthropology 
as he portrays, (1) Locke’s theory of the human mind as a tabula rasa gave foundation to this new discipline by 
fostering the notion of enculturation. Also, ethnographic, synchronic studies of behavior patterns observed among 
different group of people provided empirical data concerning different customs. (2) Vico saw cultural events as 
governed by universal laws and suggested that the human being is the author of history. Vico’s view entailed the 
philosophical conundrum concerning the relationship between universal, quasi-deterministic laws of history and the 
human free will. Despite this, it made a great contribution to the paradigm shift in the discussion about the orderliness 
of human history: from divine providence to this-worldly causes of socio-cultural phenomena. The works of 
Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau can be viewed in this respect. (3) La Mettrie put forward the materialist idea of 
“man-machine” to portray human behavioral capacities as continuous with those of non-human organisms. This line 
of thought contributed to the development of physiology and physiological anthropology. D’Holbach’s radical 
materialism is also important, in that it rejected all traditional religious ideas. (4) There were a series of attempts at 
the universal history of mankind: the representative of such an attempt is Vico’s idea that each nation evolves through 
the three ages of the gods, heros, and men, and Turgot’s history of mankind through the stages of hunting, pastoralism, 
and farming, which was further developed by Furguson. (5) This was followed by a set of evolutionary models of 
culture. This includes: Millar’s account of evolution of the family (including sex relations and marriage forms) and 
the development of class differences and political systems, Robertson’s evolutionary typology going from savagery 
to barbarism to civilization, and Condorcet’s ethnocentric ten-stage scheme concerning intellectual development of 
human rationality going from tribal society to the invention of alphabet, and up to the modernity from Descartes to 
the French Republic. 
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the traditional Scholastic metaphysics by Kant’s transcendental philosophy and a turn toward 
nature away from mathematical natural science by the Romantic philosophy of nature.5 
Interestingly, both Harris and Marquard portray the rise of anthropology in both terms of 
association and dissociation with the Enlightenment philosophy of history. Harris’ thesis is that 
anthropology began as the science of history with the vision of universal history of mankind, but 
the development of cultural anthropology developed since the nineteenth century was no longer 
within this framework. Marquard suggests that Kant’s pivotal contribution to the rise of 
anthropology is found in his notion of knowledge of the world [Weltkenntnis]. Kant distinguishes 
this popular knowledge concerning the ways of life of other humans from the scholastic, 
theoretical knowledge dealing with pure concepts. The notion of knowledge of the world, thus 
defined, contributed to a recognition of a new domain of inquiry, which evades both the 
scholastic metaphysics and mathematical natural philosophy, i.e., the life-world. Were there not 
such a turn toward the human life-world which is not properly grasped either metaphysically or 
mathematically, the development of philosophical anthropology throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries would not have been possible. To that extent, Kant may well be called, 
Marquard underlines, the founder of philosophical anthropology. However, Marquards also 
emphasizes that anthropology did not enjoy an independent status in Kant’s philosophy. In 
Kant’s philosophy, anthropology remained subjugated to the philosophy of history; its role 
consisted in preserving the domain of the philosophy of history by offering supplementary 
accounts of geographical, physiological, psychological, and aesthetical phenomena of humanity. 
Conversely, Kant’s philosophy of history needed, Marquard suggests, the assistance of 
                                                   
5 Odo Marquard, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs ‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten 
Jahrhunderts,” in Collegium Philosophicum. Studien Joachim Ritter zum 60. Geburtstag (Basel: Schwabe, 1965), 
209-239. 
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anthropology, since it lacked any principle for explaining historical reality and thus could only 
appeal to conjecture and faith. For Marquard, Kant’s philosophy of history, specifically the 
unjustifiable belief in the progress of humanity throughout history was challenged by the 
Romantic philosophy of nature which brought up an alternative, physiological view of the human 
beings.6 This is what he calls the turn toward nature. For Marquard, such a turn toward nature 
contributed to the liberation of anthropology from its disciplinary subjugation to a history of 
philosophy, which gave the foundation for its remarkable development in the nineteenth century.  
Now, Hegel’s anthropology receives a poor evaluation from both Marquard and Harris. 
Marquard suggests that the first sub-section of Hegel’s Anthropology on the natural soul may be 
viewed in terms of Hegel’s acceptance of the conception of Romantic natural philosophy—or 
better, the naturalist approach of the Romantic natural philosophy to humanity, as far as I 
understand—but Hegel’s fundamental intention is rather to criticize it.  Of importance is that 
Hegel’s Anthropology thematizes “the in-itself, i.e., the δύναμις, of the human being” whereas 
“the theory of human actuality” for Hegel belongs to the philosophy of history.7 This implies, for 
Marquard, that “Hegel’s attempt to adapt anthropology to the philosophy of history implies the 
demotion of anthropology.”8 This demotion of anthropology in Hegel’s philosophy, for him, is 
                                                   
6 For Marquard, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology plays a supplementary role for his philosophy of history. But 
anthropology became an independent discipline, he argues, when the central belief of the Enlightenment philosophy 
of history, which underlies Kant’s understanding of history as well, was called into question. In his view, the crisis 
of the Enlightenment philosophy of history went together with the formation of the Romantic philosophy of nature. 
In his terms, “the infinite progress of history becomes charming as an infinite absence of its goal” and “this crisis 
established the Romantic philosophy of nature:”cf. Odo Marquard, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs 
‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts,” 214 (my emphasis). With respect to the Romantic 
philosophy of nature in this respect, he refers to Schelling’s Idea concerning the Philosophy of Nature (1797), On 
the World-Soul (1798), First Plan of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), and the works of Baader, 
Eschenmayer, Steffens, Wagner, Windischmann, Ritter, Görres, Treviranus, Oken, Schbert, Novalis, and so forth: cf. 
ibid. footnote 49. 
7 Odo Marquard, “Zum Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs ‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten 
Jahrhunderts,” 216. 
8 Ibid. 217.  
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comparable to what happened to Kant’s pragmatic anthropology—the disciplinary subordination 
of anthropology to the philosophy of history. In a similar way to Kant, the human actuality is in 
Hegel’s philosophy conceived as the business of the philosophy of history. But this entailed 
degradation of anthropology according to Marquard. On the other hand, Harris argues that 
although Hegel was regarded among Marxists as a hallowed steppingstone of dialectic 
materialism, Hegel shares with cultural idealists the belief in the progress of rationality in 
history. For him, Hegel is worse than any other Enlightenment figures due to the nonsensical or 
meaningless metaphysics of spirit, as he puts it, which even the greatest of the nineteenth-century 
cultural materialist, Marx, failed to throw off. In short, “most of Hegel’s philosophy is a 
worthless ruin.”9  
The criticism of, and aversion to Hegel’s philosophy of this kind is nothing new. Indeed, 
Hegel claims that philosophical understanding of world history consists in grasping the progress 
of consciousness of freedom—from the acknowledgment of only one person’s freedom (Orient’s 
monarchy) to the modern political principle that all humans are free (Germany), via the limited 
democratic approval of some people’s freedom (the Greek antiquity). To that extent, it is hard to 
deny that Hegel’s philosophy of world history takes on the Enlightenment conception of the 
universal history—the Eurocentric, racist view of human history as well as the idea of the 
progress of humanity in history.  It is also true that the first sub-section of Hegel’s Anthropology 
on the natural soul includes some discussion about geographical distribution of different human 
races that is framed by his Eurocentric conception of history. However, it is questionable 
whether Hegel’s Anthropology finds its theoretical foundation in his philosophy of history. Does 
Hegel’s Anthropology take on the Enlightenment conception of universal history as its 
                                                   
9 Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory. A History of Theories of Culture, 67. 
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methodological, or ideological bases? Or, can we say that the Anthropology endorses the 
Enlightenment conception of the progress of humanity by giving some psychological, 
epistemological foundation to the philosophy of world history? These are the questions I pursue 
in this chapter.  
As it will turn out throughout this chapter, a close examination of Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature and the Anthropology make the pervasive assumption concerning the theoretical 
connection between his Anthropology and philosophy of history doubtful. To show this, I pay 
attention to the relationship between nature and culture as it underlies Kant’s idea of pragmatic 
anthropology on the one hand, and the relationship between nature and spirit as it frames Hegel’s 
Anthropology. I thereby show that Hegel’s Anthropology, unlike Kant’s pragmatic anthropology 
and what has largely been assumed, does not take on a teleological understanding of history as 
its theoretical basis. But my intention is not just to compare two different conceptions of 
anthropology. Of importance in understanding the development of philosophical anthropology in 
the eighteenth century, I think, is the emergence of what we call today biology. An important 
consequence of this is the rise of the view of the human being as an organic living being, which I 
see underlies Hegel’s Anthropology in an important manner. Therefore, what I would like to 
address in this chapter by a comparison of Hegel’s anthropology with Kant’s one is the question 
of how different understanding of nature and different ways of dealing with an organism result in 
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1. Kant’s Idea of a Pragmatic Anthropology 
 
Nobert Hinske claims that Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology traces back to the year 
of 1762-64, a decade before his first lectures on anthropology in 1772-73.10 Hinske refers to the 
Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766 
where Kant mentions some changes he made to the Wolffian metaphysics. Kant “put empirical 
psychology at the beginning of metaphysics” and he means by empirical psychology “a 
metaphysical, empirical science of man [die metaphysische Erfahrungswissenschaft von 
Menschen].”11 Thus, the Nachricht shows, according to Hinske, that Kant’s idea of anthropology 
has its origin in the Wolffian notion of empirical psychology. Wolff inaugurated the notion of 
empirical psychology as a study of the faculties of the human mind based on observation and 
experiment and called it “empirical doctrine of the soul,” namely “anthropology.”12 This 
Wolffian notion of empirical psychology explains the background against which Kant’s 
                                                   
10 Nobert Hinske, “Kants Idee der Anthropologie,” in Die Frage nach dem Menschen. Aufriss einer Philosophischen 
Anthropologie, ed. Heinrich Rombach (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber GmbH, 1966), 410-427. 
11 Nobert Hinske, “Kants Idee der Anthropologie,” 412. Baumgarten’s compendium Metaphysics comprises four 
parts: (1) ontology, (2) cosmology, (3) psychology, (4) natural theology, following Wolff’s division of theoretical 
philosophy into general metaphysics (ontology) and special metaphysics (cosmology, empirical and rational 
psychology, and theology). What Kant states in the Nachricht is that he will use Baumgarten’s compendium as the 
textbook for his lectures in the winter semester of 1765-66 but disrespect the order of the textbook; he will start his 
lectures with empirical psychology contained in (3) psychology before proceeding to (1) ontology, (2) cosmology, 
(3) rational psychology, (4) theology. Kant states: “I hope I shall be able in the near future to present a complete 
account of what may serve as the foundation of my lectures in the aforementioned science [metaphysics]. Until that 
time, however, I can easily, by applying gentle pressure, induce A.G.Baumgarten, the author of the textbook on 
which this course will be based—and that book has been chosen chiefly for the richness of its contents and the 
precision of its method—to follow the same path. Accordingly, after a brief introduction, I shall begin with 
empirical psychology, which is really the metaphysical science of man based on experience” (Ak 2, 308-9/ TP, 294-
5). Note, as Hinske underlines, that Kant defines empirical psychology as “empirical science of man” of the 
Wolffian metaphysics and appreciates the “richness in the contents” of the empirical psychology in Baumgarten’s 
compendium.    
12 Nobert Hinske, “Wolffs empirische Psychologie und Kants pragmatische Anthropologie: Zur Diskussion über die 
Anfänge der Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert,” Aufklärung, vol.11, no.1, Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1999), 
98. 
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pragmatic anthropology treats various faculties of the mind by appreciating the method of 
observation.13  
But Hinske’s point is not just to disclose the historical origin of Kant’s conception of 
anthropology. As a reply to Marquard’s thesis that the development of philosophical 
anthropology in the nineteenth century was made possible when anthropology escaped its 
subordination to the philosophy of history characteristic of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, 
Hinske highlights that no philosophical anthropology has so far succeeded in getting rid of its 
disciplinary unstableness. For him, we do not have yet a consistent, systematic philosophical 
anthropology; he thereby implies that our era is characterized by the crisis in our self-
understanding. As far as I see, Hinske’s point is that given that all philosophical anthropology is 
unstable, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is as relevant today as it was in the eighteenth century 
as a case of philosophical anthropology, despite its unstableness and the fluctuation in Kant’s 
idea of pragmatic anthropology.  
As a response to Marquard, Hinske argues that Kant’s anthropology is subordinated to his 
metaphysics of morals and not primarily to the philosophy of history. Regarding this, we can 
refer back to the Nachricht where Kant mentions of “putting empirical psychology at the 
beginning of metaphysics.” Indeed, Kant’s intention of making this change was straightforward; 
what he intended was to have students to become familiar with concrete materials of experience 
before entering metaphysical studies. But Hinske points out that this change entailed a significant 
theoretical consequence. While empirical psychology in the Wolffian philosophy remained a part 
                                                   
13 It is noticeable that Kant’s anthropology adopts a different model of an observation than the Wolffian one. While 
the Wolffian empirical psychology assumes “self-observation,” Kant’s pragmatic anthropology takes the 
“observation of others;” cf., Nobert Hinske, “Wolffs empirische Psychologie und Kants pragmatische 
Anthropologie: Zur Diskussion über die Anfänge der Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert,” 103-4. 
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of metaphysics, Kant somehow separated that anthropological study from metaphysics by 
making it into a preliminary empirical study for the latter. As Brandt suggests,14 this can be seen 
as Kant’s criticism of the previous metaphysics for neglecting empirical aspects of the human 
mind and life. However, in Kant’s philosophy, anthropology cannot be recognized as an 
independent branch of knowledge since, for Kant, no empirical studies can bring forth the 
principles for their investigations. Hinske therefore emphasizes that determining the nature of the 
human being is in Kant’s philosophy the task of the metaphysics of morals and not that of 
anthropology. Correspondingly, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is subordinated to the 
metaphysics of morals in the sense that it is to be provided with fundamental principles for its 
empirical investigations from the a priori pure consideration of human nature.  
Thus, for Hinske, Kant’s anthropology is subordinated to the metaphysics of morals as an 
observational study of man is subordinated to an a priori determination of the human essence. To 
that extent, the subordinate character or the unstable status of Kant’s anthropology, he argues, is 
                                                   
14 For a similar approach to Hinske, see in particular: Reinhard Brandt, “Die Leitidee der Kantischen Anthropologie 
und die Bestimmung des Menschen,” in Erfahrung und Urteilskraft, ed. Rainer Enskat (Würzburg: Königshausen u. 
Neumann, 2000), 27-40. As with Hinske, Brandt suggests that the formation of Kant’s idea of pragmatic 
anthropology can be considered in terms of the association with Wolffian notion of empirical psychology and the 
pragmatic turn away from it. In his view, Kant’s claim in the 1772-3 lectures on anthropology that empirical 
psychology or anthropology as such does not belong to metaphysics, and that the study of the human being has so 
far been neglected, involves Kant’s criticism of previous metaphysics for having disregarded empirical resources of 
the human life in their considerations of the human being: cf., ibid., 30. This view of Brandt makes it relevant, I 
think, to put Kant’s turn away from Wolffian empirical psychology in the context of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment movement, given Kant’s suggestion that anthropology makes use of empirical knowledge of the 
world obtained through traveling, reading travel books, and having social intercourse with others (cf. Ak 7, 121/ AP, 
232). Thus, Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology incorporates both traditional and modern elements concerning a 
study of the human being. As I will discuss below, one of the important instances of this is the combination of the 
traditional, cosmological viewpoint and the modern, natural history which underpins his conception of the physical 
geography. In Brandt’s argument, we also find such a combination of the traditional and modern elements 
underlying Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. Brandt sees that Kant’s notion of the Bestimmung des Menschen 
(destination or vocation of the human being) admits Rousseau’s idea of “perfectibilité de l’homme” but is framed by 
the stoic-Christian finalism which sees nature or the universe as a teleologically organized whole, one whose final 
end is the human being and in which evil is understood as the means for the good.  For Brandt’s analysis of this 
connection, see in particular: ibid. 30, 32-40.  
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no problem.15 As far as I see, this is his strategy for saving Kant’s anthropology from the 
criticism for its association with the Enlightenment belief in the progress of humanity throughout 
history—the criticism that Marquard’s problematization of the subordination of Kant’s 
anthropology to the philosophy of history may raise. However, although Kant’s anthropology is 
subordinated to the metaphysics of morals and not to the philosophy of history as Hinske 
suggests, this does not imply that Kant’s anthropology has no relationship with his philosophy of 
history. Rather, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is connected with his philosophy of history in an 
important way and this remains yet to be thoroughly examined.  
In the following, I spell out Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. I examine (1) Kant’s 
definition of pragmatic anthropology in the 1798 Anthropology and the way in which this work 
thematizes the issue of morality, (2) his early notion of knowledge of the world [Weltkenntniss] 
and the way in which this notion possibly allows both a naturalist and a moralist approach to the 
human being. By working on these topics, I develop the point that the relationship between 
nature and moral is the key problem in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. I then examine (3) Kant’s 
argument about a teleology of nature in order to articulate the relationship between nature and 
moral since I find this essential for his anthropology. Through this analysis, I show how Kant’s 
reconciliation of nature and moral by a teleology of nature introduces a teleology of history, one 
that sees the modern civil society and the achievement of moral perfection by the human species 
as the end of nature.  
 
 
                                                   
15 Cf: Nobert Hinske, “Kants Idee der Anthropologie,” 419. 
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1.1. The Question and Answer of Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology 
Kant gave his lectures on anthropology for twenty-three years from 1772/3 throughout 
1796 and turned those lectures into a book, the Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View, 
in 1798. In the introduction to the 1798 Anthropology, Kant highlights that his pragmatic 
anthropology differs from physiological anthropology. Whereas physiological anthropology 
examines “what nature makes of the human being,” pragmatic anthropology addresses the 
question as to “what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of 
himself.”16 Pragmatic anthropology, in other words, assumes the view of the human being as an 
agent of a free will and does not pursue a study of mutual interactions between the soul and the 
body as the physiologist Ernst Platner does.17 The distinct feature of pragmatic anthropology 
thus consists in the view of morality, which Kant is supposed to bring into the center of his 
lectures. Accordingly, if one wants to elucidate Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology, one 
would have to examine how his empirical studies of the human being as a free agent in the 
Anthropology relate to his a priori account of morality in the Critique of Practical Reason and 
the Metaphysics of Morals.  
However, in the most of the Anthropology Kant does not really thematize the human 
being as a free agent. Nor does he consider the human mind and life from the perspective of 
morality. As a brief outline, the Anthropology comprises two parts: (1) the Didactic, which treats 
                                                   
16 Ak 7, 119/ AP, 231. 
17 See the last page of Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz in 1773 (Ak 10, 145-146/CO, 140-141) where he mentions 
Herz’s review of Ernst Platner’s Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise (Leipzig, 1772) in the Allgemeine deutsche 
Bibliothek, XX (1773), no.1: 25-51. In this letter, Kant states that he “intends to make [anthropology] into a proper 
academic discipline” and emphasizes that his plan is unique. Specifically, he plans with his anthropology to 
“disclose the sources of all the [practical] sciences, the science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way 
to educate and govern human being, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical.” This anthropology differs 
from Platner’s one, which is an “eternally futile inquiry as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with 
thought.”   
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the cognitive faculties of the mind including inner sense and imagination, the feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure, and the faculty of desire), and (2) the Characteristic, which examines the inner 
constitution of the human mind in terms of a character considered at the levels of person, people, 
race, and sex. In the Didactic, Kant does not relate his accounts of cognitive, aesthetic, appetitive 
faculties of the mind to the issue of free action or moral freedom. The only place where Kant 
brings up the issue of morality is the three and a half pages long section in the Characteristics, 
titled “On Character as the Way of Thinking.”18 While defining character as a moral property of 
the will to act according to principles, Kant here suggests that it is not naturally given but is 
acquired and created out of oneself over time. In other words, it does not depend on “what nature 
makes of the human being” but pertains to “what the human being makes of himself.”19.  From 
this, one may presume that the formation of moral character should be the vital issue of Kant’s 
anthropology which makes it pragmatic. However, Kant does not offer any consistent account of 
the formation of moral character, nor does he thematize this seriously.20 Moreover, except for the 
three and a half pages section, the Characteristic is mostly devoted, as Louden points out, to the 
issues of non-moral or physical characters, or “what nature makes of the human being.”21 Thus, 
Kant’s anthropology does not seem to be answering the pragmatic question as to what the human 
being as a free agent can and should make of himself as it is supposed to do.22  
                                                   
18 Ak 7, 292-95/ AP, 389-93. 
19 Ak 7, 292/ AP, 390. 
20 In the Anthropology, Kant suggests that formation of moral character is like “a kind of rebirth” rather than gradual 
acquirement over time (Ak 7, 294/ AP, 392). But Louden points out that this account in the Anthropology does not 
match with the idea in the Menschenkunde manuscript that education and instruction are the means to the acquisition 
of a character: cf., Robert R. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Being to Human Beings (New 
York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 76. 
21 Cf. Robert R Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Being to Human Beings, 77. 
22 Brandt suggests that Kant does not seem to have had a consistent idea conducive to a clear articulation of what 
pragmatic anthropology concerns: cf., Reinhard Brandt, “Die Leitidee der Kantischen Anthropologie und die 
Bestimmung des Menschen,” 29. According to Brandt, the titles of the two parts of the 1798 Anthropology—didactic 
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1.2. Knowledge of the World 
Given that the 1798 Anthropology is a distillation of the twenty-three years of lectures, 
we can also refer to some early works of Kant which help clarify Kant’s idea of pragmatic 
anthropology. What I find the most important in this regard is the notion of the knowledge of the 
world [Weltkenntnis], which is found in his 1775 essay, On the Different Races of Human Beings 
[Von den Verschiedenen Racen der Menschen]. Knowledge of the world consists in making 
“acquired science and skill useful not only for school but instead for life,” such that “the 
accomplished apprentice is introduced to the scene of his vocation [auf den Schauplatz seiner 
Bestimmung], namely the world.”23 In other words, it has the goal of preparing senior students 
for their future lives in the world after graduation. As such, there are two parts of the knowledge 
of the world: physical geography and anthropology, which treat nature and the human being, 
respectively. These two are both cosmological not with respect to particular features of their 
objects but with respect to “their relation as a whole in which those objects stand and in which 
each one takes its place.”24  
The notion of the knowledge of the world exhibits some crucial factors concerning 
Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. First of all, we notice the sense of usefulness which 
characterizes knowledge of the world. As we have seen above, knowledge of the world, or 
Kant’s lectures on anthropology and geography, is not so much concerned with theoretical 
                                                   
and characteristic—are not made by Kant; further, they are not informative with respect to the contents of the 
Anthropology. Nor do the subtitles give any clue for making sense of the “pragmatic view” which is supposed to 
integrate them into one anthropology. For they are not concerned with the human being as a free acting being or the 
issue of “ought to,” but with “non-normative [normfrei] observations of the human beings in terms of their factual 
motive that is hidden to us” (cf. ibid. 27).  
23 Ak 2, 443/ AP, 97.  
24 Ibid.  
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instruction or technical training as with having students be ready for making use of what they 
have learned in the school. Knowledge of the world is thus useful. But the usefulness of 
knowledge of the world is not only concerned with practical utility or means-ends calculations 
based on prudence.25 What is implicit in Kant’s mention about “the scene of one’s vocation” is 
perhaps his view of the world as a place where the human species is heading to moral perfection, 
as I will later discuss in more detail. Consequently, the usefulness of anthropology and physical 
geography consists in having students to get a sense of the world or to form a world-perspective, 
rather than delivering this and that knowledge about this and that thing in the world. This point 
relates, second, to the cosmological feature of the knowledge of the world. If both anthropology 
and geography are cosmological, this is because they lead one to situate oneself within a whole 
world and consider oneself and one’s objects in relation to that whole world, namely from a 
cosmological perspective.  
Kant’s notion of the knowledge of the world somehow blurs the borderline between 
nature and human by assuming that anthropology and geography are both cosmological. 
Regarding this, we notice that Kant’s anthropology does not exclude the issue of nature from its 
considerations of the human being. Instead, it portrays the human mind from its natural aspects 
with a treatment of natural predispositions, temperaments, sexualities, races, etc. Nor does 
geography assume a clear-cut distinction between nature and human. It treats the distribution of 
various human races on the earth as an important topic. Thus, those two parts of knowledge of 
the world, i.e., physical geography and anthropology, somehow overlap each other around the 
                                                   
25 Kant’s discussion about prudence [Klugheit], see: Ak 4: 416-419/ GM: 68-71. Prudence is for Kant a hypothetical 
imperative concerning deliberation of the means for achieving happiness. It is narrowly defined as “skill in the 
choice of means to one’s own greatest well-being” It thus differs from categorical imperative which only concerns 
the “form of action and the principle from which it follows” and not “the matter of action.”  
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issue of the human existence considered from its natural aspects. Kant’s notion of knowledge of 
the world, therefore, does not take on the Critical, transcendental dualism between the 
phenomenal realm of mechanistic natural laws and noumenal realm of moral freedom. Instead, it 
rests on the idea that human existence can be examined as part of nature. More importantly, 
nature, which is here considered incorporating the human existence, is not concerned with the 
Critical notion of nature as a totality of appearances. Instead, the notion of nature which is at 
stake in the case of anthropology and geography is a cosmological one which is embedded in the 
traditional, cosmological paradigm of the great chain of being on the one hand26 and is associated 
with the rising, new paradigm of the natural history on the other. 
                                                   
26 With respect to the cosmological paradigm of the chain of being, I am indebted to Arthur O Lovejoy’s The Great 
Chain of Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1936, reprinted in 2001). The 
history of cosmological thoughts which Lovejoy presents in his monumental work The Great Chain of Bing is very 
helpful but very dense as well. So, I would here like to recapitulate only some points in his work by focusing on the 
association of the understanding of the universe with the contemplation on the meaning of the human existence in 
the world.  
Lovejoy suggests that the conception of the universe as the chain of being, which was largely accepted from the 
Greek antiquity down to the close of the eighteenth century, is based on the three principles: (1) plenitude, the notion 
that the universe is full of all kinds of beings, which he draws out from Plato’s idea in the Timaeus that the universe 
is an exhaustive replica of the world of Ideas; (2) continuity, the idea that things in the universe can be classified 
according to common features shared by adjacent kinds of things and distinct features that one kind has and the 
other does not, as Aristotle articulates continuity as that which has one and the same limit of two things wherein they 
overlap; (3) graduation, the notion of an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the lowest kind 
of existents up to the highest possible one, which was made into a coherent general schema of existents by 
Neoplatonism.  
In line with this, Lovejoy suggests that the switch in the cosmological perspective from the Ptolemaic system to 
Copernican heliocentrism was not a turn toward a non-geocentric view in the literal sense. Within the Neoplatonic-
medieval worldview, the change in the cosmological perspective was associated with the glorification of the earth, 
namely the idea that this planet is the only place where rational creatures dwell in. Thus, he pays attention to the 
paradoxical aspect in the history of the concept of the chain of being that the genuinely geocentric view was not 
present in the Ptolemaic system but in the era when the infinity of the universe was conceived, and the place the 
earth occupies in the universe was considered in relation to the infinite space. In his view, this paradoxical element is 
also present in Kant’s cosmological claim from the 1750s that the infinity of universe does not assure that all planets 
are inhabited by living creatures, just as the abundance of nature does not contradict the existence of sandy desert. 
This claim of Kant connects the awareness of the infinity of the universe with the sense of superiority of the earth 
over other planets having no leaving creatures. Lovejoy thus underlines that “it was not in the thirteenth century but 
in the nineteenth that homo sapiens bustled about most self-importantly and self-complacently in his infinitesimal 
corner of the cosmic stage:” Ibid. 143.  
But this does not imply, for Lovejoy, that the medieval, geocentric view and Kant’s cosmology were necessarily 
anthropocentric. Lovejoy features the eighteenth-century thought in terms of the rise of the Christian-
anthropocentric theology and philosophical objections to it. The glorification of the earth was transformed into the 
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In this way, Kant’s early notion of the knowledge of the world allows, I claim, a 
naturalist approach to human existence without assuming the view of pure practical reason—
naturalist, not in the sense of natural science, but in the sense of a cosmological consideration 
which sees the human being as a part of the whole universe and a part of nature as well. 
However, does not this claim contradict Kant’s fundamental position that human existence is to 
be considered in terms of moral freedom? Alternatively, does Kant develop any theory that can 
reconcile the cosmological investigation of the human existence as a natural being with another, 
moral consideration of the same subject matter as a being of freedom?  
These questions lead us to Kant’s re-formulation of his notion of the knowledge of the 
world as cosmopolitan in the introduction to the1798 Anthropology. Kant here states that 
anthropology is called knowledge of the world insofar as it considers the human being 
“according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason.”27 But this knowledge of the 
world, which also contains “an extensive knowledge of things in the world, for example, 
animals, plants, and minerals from various lands and climates,” is pragmatic “only when it 
                                                   
glorification of humans with the Christian conception that all other creatures exist for the human being’s sake. But 
this teleology was challenged by the view of the human being as the middle link in the chain of being, namely the 
point of transition from the merely sentient to the intellectual forms of being. One example of this challenge, 
Lovejoy suggests, is Kant’s notion in the Universal Natural History and the Theory of the Heavens (1755) that the 
human being occupies the middle rung of the Scale of Being. Kant’s argument is that if the inhabitants of the earth, 
humans, envy the most sublime class of rational creatures inhabiting Jupiter or Saturn, they may console themselves 
by turning their gaze upon Venus and Mercury of which the inhabitants have less degree of perfection than human 
beings. Lovejoy notices in this old-fashioned speculation of the early Kant his preoccupation with human morality. 
For Kant here argues that the greater the distance the planet is from the sun, the lighter and finer the matter of its 
inhabitants’ bodies, and that the moral imperfection of the human being hinges upon the human mind’s dependency 
upon a coarse and inert matter: cf. ibid. 193-4. 
Although Kant’s early cosmological thought does not necessarily involve an anthropocentric view as Lovejoy 
suggests, Kant seems to be developing an anthropocentric view in his third Critique. As I will later discuss, Kant’s 
discussion of teleology of nature in the third Critique leads to the idea that the human being, considered as cultural 
and moral being, is the end of nature. By implication, civilization and moral perfection constitute the ultimate 
meaning of the existence of the world, the fundamental reason why this world exists.  
27 Ak 7, 119/ AP, 231. 
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contains knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world.”28 In other words, 
anthropology pursues cosmological knowledge of the human species in relation to its habitation, 
i.e., the earth that comprises the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms. But this cosmological 
knowledge serves to pragmatic anthropology only when it promotes a cosmopolitan perspective. 
At this point, perhaps one may roughly say that the project of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology 
consists in completing our cosmological understanding of the earth as the human habitation into 
the cosmopolitan realization of the same world as a kingdom of ends,29 as a place where all 
                                                   
28 Ak 7, 120/ AP, 231-32. 
29 In the second section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant produces three different formulations 
of the categorical imperative: (1) “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law” (Ak 4, 421/ GM, 73); (2) “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Ak 4, 429/ GM, 
80); (3) “act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws 
of nature” (Ak 4, 437/ GM, 86). These three formulations constitute three stages of the argument of the second 
section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals concerning the universal principle of moral action, which is 
to be performed by the obligation to duty and respect for the moral law as it is discussed in the first section. The first 
formulation establishes that the universal command for moral action consists in self-legislative autonomy of reason. 
After having established this, Kant poses the question as to whether the categorical imperative can work as a 
universal law to all rational beings. In relation to this question, the second formulation specifies the ground on which 
the categorical imperative can serve as the standard for estimating whether an action is moral. Kant’s argument is 
that the evaluative role of the categorical imperative is affirmed insofar as “the human being and in general every 
rational being exist as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this and that will at its discretion” (Ak 4, 
428/ GM, 79). Thus, the respect for humanity, either in myself or in others, is the ground for the respect for the 
moral law either in performing or in estimating an action. With the third formulation, Kant returns to the issue of the 
good will, with which sets up his discussion about morality in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Since it 
turns out that the categorical imperative has universal validity for all human beings’ moral action, the good will can 
be said to be absolutely good when it follows the categorical imperative. The third formulation confirms this by “an 
analogy” of “the will as a universal law for possible actions” with “the universal connections of the existence of 
things in accordance with universal laws” (Ak 4, 437/ GM, 86). 
In the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, the idea of a kingdom of ends occurs after the second formulation. 
Kant stipulates that the kingdom of ends is “a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws:” “a 
whole of all ends in systematic connection,” which “we shall be able to think of” “if we abstract from the personal 
differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of their private ends” (Ak 4, 433/ GM, 83).  As this 
formulation suggests, the kingdom of ends is a thought experiment performed by an abstraction of all personal 
differences and all private ends.  Kant’s thought experiment has an important significance for his cosmopolitanism 
since it establishes that all human beings, regardless of their personal differences including sex, race, and 
educational and cultural background, have the same dignity. But the role it plays for the whole argument of the 
second section is controversial. Whereas the categorical imperative in all its three formulations mainly concerns an 
individual agent’s action, the idea of the kingdom of ends introduces the issue of a commonwealth constituted by a 
plurality of rational agents. Therefore, we may well assume a close connection in Kant’s philosophy between the 
individual’s moral life based on his self-legislating autonomous pure reason and his communal life among diverse 
rational agents. But the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals does not provide any well-elaborated theory 
concerning how those two dimensions of a rational agent’s life are connected to each other. Regarding the way in 
which one proceeds from the categorical imperative to the kingdom of ends, we only find Kant’s loose comment: 
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human beings as rational agents are equally treated as an end in itself regardless of their sexual, 
racial, cultural, or religious particularities.  
 
1.3. Kant’s Teleology of Nature: Culture as the Link between Nature and Morality   
I have suggested that Kant’s conception of pragmatic anthropology hinges upon grasping 
the human world both as part of nature and the kingdom of ends. But what does this “both” 
                                                   
that the kingdom of ends is “a very fruitful concept dependent upon it [the concept of every rational being as the 
self-legislative autonomous moral subject of the categorical imperative]” (Ak 4, 433/ GM, 83). 
Therefore, Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends cannot properly be understood without examination of how his moral 
theory is systematically connected with his ethical, political, religious, and historical thinking; for a concise 
introduction to this problem in Kant’s philosophy and a systematic interpretation of the argumentative role of the 
idea of the kingdom of ends in the second section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, see: Barbara 
Herman, “A Cosmopolitan Kingdom of Ends,” in Reclaiming the History of Ethics. Essays for John Rawls, eds. 
Reath, Andrews. Herman, Barbara. Korsgaard, and Christine M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
187-213. Since this goes far beyond the scope of the present work, I would here like to refer to Cavallar’s 
comprehensive analysis of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Cavallar’s main point is that there are different types of 
cosmopolitanism in Kant’s philosophy. Whereas Kant’s cosmopolitanism has been studied, he points out, with the 
focus on legal or political cosmopolitanism put forward in Toward Perpetual Peace concerning international 
organizations and laws, he argues that there are also cognitive, economic or commercial, moral, religious, and 
cultural cosmopolitanisms in Kant: cf. Georg Cavallar, Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism. History, Philosophy, 
and Education for World-Citizens (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015), 23-43. From his viewpoint, the 
kingdom of ends in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals presents a moral cosmopolitanism which concerns 
the ethical commonwealth, whereas the Idea for an Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, together with the 
Toward Perpetual Peace, presents a legal or political cosmopolitanism. But Kant’s moral cosmopolitanism is deeply 
associated with his religious cosmopolitanism in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, which 
conceives of the ethical commonwealth as the kingdom of God on earth, one in which a people of God is supposed 
to be governed by an invisible church. Cavallar suggests that Kant’s ethico-theological cosmopolitanism is similar to 
the conception of religious commonwealth of the pre-Kantian theologians and Christian philosophers; however, it is 
distinct from traditional religious cosmopolitanism in that it takes the ethical commonwealth as a matter of practical 
philosophy and not of metaphysical knowledge. Additionally, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
exemplifies a cognitive cosmopolitanism whereby one puts oneself into a cosmopolitan perspective by his 
knowledge of the world; the Critique of Pure Reason also exhibits cognitive cosmopolitanism with the idea that 
philosophy is concerned with the “world-concept” and not the “scholastic concept” (KrV, A838/ B866).  
Cavallar’s approach to Kant’s cosmopolitanism, I think, has a great advantage in considering the relation between 
Kant’s moral theology and the Critical philosophy with reference to his philosophy of politics and history. When I 
use the term “kingdom of ends” in this chapter, I focus on the moral dimension of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, namely 
the idea of an ethical commonwealth in which all members are equally respected as ends in themselves. Thus, I 
largely equate it with the transcendental ideal of moral perfection and put it into the context of Kant’s philosophy of 
history. How does the ideal of moral perfection guide Kant’s thinking about human history in a teleological manner? 
In this chapter, I pursue this question by examining Kant’s notion that moral perfection is a transcendental ideal, 
namely a noumenon that is not realizable in space and time.  
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mean? Indeed, Kant’s thesis that the cosmological knowledge of the world is pragmatic only 
when it is cosmopolitan at the same time, shows that the relationship between nature and moral 
is the underlying theme of his anthropology. But the thesis itself does not explain anything about 
how the two views concerning nature and moral relate to each other. Further, Kant does not seem 
to have succeeded in developing his idea of the connection between cosmological and 
cosmopolitan views into concrete analyses and accounts in his anthropology lectures. Regarding 
this, Foucault observes that the idea of the 1775 essay that nature and human are considered two 
domains of the cosmological knowledge of the world is no longer present in the 1798 
Anthropology: 
 
[…] physical geography and anthropology are no longer set alongside one another as the 
two symmetrical halves of the knowledge of the world. The task of directing us toward a 
Weltkenntnis is now the sole responsibility of an anthropology which encounters nature in 
no other form than that of an already habitable Earth [Erde]. As a result, the notion of a 
cosmological perspective that would organize geography and anthropology in advance and 
by right, serving as a single reference for both the knowledge of nature and the knowledge 
of man would have to be put to one side to make room for a cosmopolitical perspective 
with a programmatic value, in which the world is envisaged more as a republic [cité] to be 
built than a cosmos given in advance.30  
 
As Foucault suggests, one of the important changes in Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology is 
the replacement of the cosmological view with the cosmopolitan view. But this replacement is 
not discarding of the cosmological view. By this, I do not mean that Kant maintained the idea 
                                                   
30 Michael Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, trans. Nigro, Robert & Briggs, Kate (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext, 2008), 32-3. 
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that both geography and anthropology constitute together the knowledge of the world. 
Obviously, Kant gradually gives less significance to geography while giving more concern to 
anthropology. But what Foucault calls “cosmopolitical perspective with a programmatic value” 
does not consist in conceiving the human world as a world of pure morality or a political world 
based on pure morality which has no connection with nature. The relative devaluation of 
geography, in other words, does not necessarily entail a disregard of nature in anthropology. 
Instead, the cosmopolitan view, which is supposed to define anthropology as pragmatic, takes on 
the view of a certain continuity between nature and morality. To support this point, I reconstruct 
Kant’s discussion about the teleology of nature put forward in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement.  
In the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment,” Kant discusses teleological 
judgments concerning (1) organisms, (2) all natural beings, and (3) nature as a whole. First, there 
are some natural objects whose possibility is not comprehensible in terms of mechanistic 
principles, ones that instead require teleological principles. Organisms are such objects that call 
for our teleological judgment since their life activities such as growth and generation as well as 
their bodily constitution are not comprehensible if not through the teleological notion of a natural 
end [Naturzweck], namely the notion of “cause and effect of itself.”31 Specifically, an organism 
organizes itself in the sense that it maintains its life through a constant process of reproducing its 
bodily organs. The distinct character of an organism, in other words, consists in the fact that its 
“parts are possible only through their relation to the whole” and “its parts are combined into a 
whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form.”32 Thus, an organism has itself as 
                                                   
31 Ak 5, 370/ KU, §64. 
32 Ak 5, 373/ KU, §65. 
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the means and end for itself. In this sense, it has internal purposiveness. Second, natural products 
may serve as a means for something else. For instance, soils carried with by rivers, Kant 
suggests, may be advantageous for the growth of plants; to that extent, they can be said to serve 
as the means for the growth of plants.33 In general, we can say, Kant suggests, that a natural 
product has external purposiveness when its existence turns out to be advantageous for the 
existence of another natural product. Kant highlights that the notion of external purposiveness is 
merely hypothetical. Despite this, the fact that “the grass is necessary to the livestock, just as the 
latter is necessary to the human being as the means for his existence” makes us think, third, of a 
chain of natural products for the sake of the existence of an organism and thereby leads us to the 
view of nature in general as a system of ends.34 It is therefore important to note that an organism 
is a natural end, not only in the sense that it is the end of itself (internal purposiveness), but also 
in the sense that it can be thought of as an end for the sake of which other natural products exist 
(external purposiveness). Again, the notion of external purposiveness is only hypothetical, but it 
can be used for our pursuit of the study of nature insofar as it is based on the maxim for our 
reason that “everything in the world is good for something, that nothing in it is in vain.” 35 Thus, 
one can hypothetically assume, Kant suggests, that the existence of plants is the means for the 
existence of herbivorous animals and the latter is the means for the existence of carnivores 
whose end is the existence of the human being.36 
Worth noting with respect to Kant’s discussion in the “Critique of the Teleological Power 
of Judgment” is such an expansion in his conception of the teleology of nature from that 
                                                   
33 Ak 5, 367/ KU, §63. 
34 Ak 5, 378/ KU, §67. 
35 Ak 5, 379/ KU, §67. 
36 Ak 5, 426-427/ KU, §82. 
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concerning an organism to that concerning nature as a whole. But this expansion is not 
something arbitrary. Kant argues that the teleological concept of an organism as a natural end 
“necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rules of 
ends.”37 That is, our experience of an organism as a natural product that requires teleological 
causality necessarily leads us to the notion that nature constitutes a systematic whole, one in 
which all natural beings, including both animate and inanimate beings, are connected to each 
other in an orderly manner. The expansion in Kant’s argument from the teleology of an organism 
to the teleology of nature as a whole, I think, is concerned with the issue of establishing a 
consistent philosophical theory of nature, one that can give an account of both animate and 
inanimate beings based on one single principle. But it is also concerned, more significantly, with 
the idea that our experience of a living being often leads us to pose the teleological question as to 
why nature exists. Thus, Kant’s point is that such a question about the raison d’être of this world 
leads us to think about nature as a chain of means and ends and to seek for an unconditioned end 
that grounds that chain.  
Yet, the unconditioned end grounding the chain of natural beings cannot be found inside 
nature since it would then itself be something conditioned. If it were found inside nature, our 
reason would unavoidably get entangled in an infinite regress since what conditions that 
something is to be found in something else, and what conditions this something else, in another 
something else, ad infinitum. Therefore, the end that grounds nature as a whole must to be found 
outside nature. Kant calls this unconditioned end that is found outside nature a final end 
[Endzweck] and distinguishes it from an ultimate end [letzer Zweck], i.e., the last end in the chain 
                                                   
37 Ak 5, 378-79/ KU, §67.   
 
 217  
of ends, which is therefore inside nature.38 Seen this way, nature is for Kant not just a chain of 
ends. According to Kant, the fact that nature constitutes a chain of ends leads to the idea that 
there must be something that grounds it without belonging to the order of natural beings. 
Therefore, nature as a whole is not just a chain of ends but a teleological whole in which that 
chain of all natural beings on earth is grounded by a super-natural end.  
Kant’s notion of nature in general as a teleological whole hinges on the special status that 
he believes the human being takes in relation to that teleological whole of nature. First, Kant 
suggests that the human being is not just an organism but the ultimate end of nature insofar as it 
can set up an end for itself and seek to accomplish that end. Further, the human being, when 
considered as noumenon, namely as a moral being endowed with the supersensible faculty of 
freedom, is the final end of nature.39 The human being as a moral being, in other words, the 
“highest end” of which “it cannot be further asked why it exists.”40 By expanding his discussions 
about teleological judgments from those concerning an organism to natural beings in general and 
to nature as a whole, Kant thus assigns a twofold status to the human being: the human being is 
the last end in the chain of natural beings and is the final end that grounds that chain. That is, the 
human being is a natural being and a being beyond nature as well; it is a phenomenon that exists 
and appears in space and time and a noumenon that concerns a priori moral laws. By 
implication, the human being is a natural being who can make use of all other natural beings for 
her sake, or a natural being for the sake of whom all other natural beings supposedly exist. It is 
also a super-natural being that grounds the chain of all other natural beings. Kant’s idea would be 
                                                   
38 Cf. KU, §§ 82-84.  
39 Ak 5, 435/ KU, § 84. 
40 Ibid. 
 
 218  
that the human being, insofar as it is considered a moral being, is the fundamental ground of the 
existence of this world. One may roughly say that the fundamental meaning of the existence of 
this world for Kant consists in the human being’s pursuit of a moral life.  
But Kant’s discussion in the third Critique of the human being’s twofold status in relation 
to nature as a whole makes us pose the question as to how the same subject matter, the human 
being, can be considered a natural being and a being beyond nature at the same time. This 
question is fundamentally concerned with the issue of the relationship between nature and 
morality, which is in the first Critique considered in the dualistic terms of the antinomy between 
mechanical necessity and moral freedom. Therefore, the notion in the third Critique that the 
human being is the ultimate end and the final end of nature as well, does not simply imply that 
the fundamental meaning of the existence of the world consists in the human being’s pursuit of 
morality. Far more significantly, it suggests, I argue, that nature and morality constitute a 
continuum in a certain way.  
To spell out the way in which nature and morality constitute a continuum, I examine 
Kant’s argument in § 83 that culture is the ultimate end of nature. Kant suggests that the only 
way to know what the ultimate end of nature is, is to look into the ways in which the human 
being sets up its end and strives to achieve it. For, in doing these activities, we eventually relate 
ourselves to ourselves and not to an object outside us. Now there are two ends, Kant suggests, 
which the human being strives to achieve: happiness and culture. But Kant maintains that 
happiness is eventually unrealizable.41 While pointing out that our pursuit of happiness is often 
                                                   
41 Kant’s idea that happiness is unrealizable is also found in the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ak 4, 417-
419/ GM, 71-2). Kant argues that the concept of happiness is “an indeterminate concept” in the sense that nobody 
can say “determinately and consistently with himself what he really wishes and wills.” The will to riches, Kant 
states, may involve negative feelings such as anxiety and envy and unvirtuous behaviors such as intrigue. The one 
who has a will to a great deal of knowledge and insight may neglect his health. A long life one enjoys may be a long 
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frustrated by some natural conditions, Kant further highlights the relative vulnerability of human 
beings in nature. We, humans, are more vulnerable than any other animals, Kant states, to 
hunger, the danger of flood, cold, attacks by other animals. For him, nature does not seem to 
have favored the human beings over other animals. More significantly, nature has implanted in 
the human beings the propensity for conflict as their natural predisposition to such an extent that 
they create wars and destroy their species. Kant therefore argues that even if an intellectual being 
designed nature in such a way that the human happiness is its ultimate end, this end cannot be 
attained due to the human nature which is antagonistic and dissentious. Therefore, the ultimate 
end of nature cannot be happiness but culture, which is achieved by the human being’s aptitude 
and skill. In cultural life, we set an end for ourselves and make use of objects to realize that end. 
We actively relate ourselves to our end and the objects for that end. The realization of an end 
here depends on ourselves and not the beneficence of nature. If the human being can be regarded 
as the ultimate end of nature, namely the last end within the chain of ends for the sake of which 
other earthly beings such as minerals, plants, and animals may be supposed to exist, this is for 
Kant insofar as the human being is considered a cultural being capable of making use of other 
natural beings for her own sake. That culture is the ultimate end of nature, implies that the 
human being is a distinct kind of a natural being, namely the master of nature.  
Yet, Kant further elaborates the notion of culture as a stepping-stone to the final end of 
nature: culture is a process whereby nature “prepares the human being for what he must himself 
do in order to be a final end.”42 This being said, culture is not only about making use of natural 
                                                   
misery. Kant’s assumption is that the idea of happiness requires “an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my 
present condition and in every future condition.” Determining the idea of happiness, in other words, requires 
“omniscience.” But this is impossible because happiness is an ideal “of imagination, resting mere upon empirical 
grounds.” 
42 Ak 5, 431/ KU, §84. 
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objects for human sake. More fundamentally, it is concerned with the “production of the aptitude 
of a rational being for any ends in general” to such an extent that this rational being becomes apt 
for the highest end, i.e., the moral agent having the faculty of freedom which is the final end of 
nature.43 This is carried out by the “culture of training (discipline),” namely by an education of 
beautiful arts and sciences which brings about “the liberation of the will from the despotism of 
desires.”44 Insofar as, in other words, one is educated by the culture of training, this person is not 
merely an ultimate end of nature. Instead of being a mere master of nature capable of making use 
of other natural beings, she is in preparation for becoming a moral being whose will does not fail 
to follow a priori moral laws. If the human being, as a cultural or encultured being, is distinct 
from all other kinds of natural beings, this is in the sense that it is a natural being who can 
transcend its naturalness. Culture in the Kantian sense is therefore an intermediary stepping-
stone from nature to morality rather than the opposite of nature.  
 
1.4. Unsociable Sociability: The Teleology of History concerning Modern Civil Society 
Kant’s notion of culture in the third Critique, I suggest, involves a historical-political 
view of modern civil society. My focus is on his argument that civil society is the greatest 
development of the natural predisposition of the human species and, as such, is the end of nature:  
 
But with the progress of this culture [culture of a higher class] (the height of which, when 
the tendency to what is dispensable begins to destroy what is indispensable, is called 
luxury) calamities grow equally great on both sides, on the one side because of violence 
                                                   
43 Ibid. 
44 Ak 5, 432/ KU, §84. 
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imposed from without, on the other because of dissatisfaction from within; yet this 
splendid misery is bound up with the development of the natural predisposition in the 
human race, and the end of nature itself, even if it is not our end, is hereby attained. The 
formal condition under which alone nature can attain this its final aim is that constitution in 
the relations of human beings with one another in which the abuse of reciprocally 
conflicting freedom is opposed by lawful power in a whole, which is called civil society; 
for only in this can the greatest development of the natural predispositions occur.45 
 
When a high culture excessively develops to such an extent as to become luxurious, this may 
cause a violent class struggle to the society and a feeling of emptiness to the members of the 
community. But Kant here seems to be not so much concerned with giving a general account of 
the progress and decline of a culture as with portraying some negative aspect of modern civil 
society. For we notice in his argument that the “splendid misery” is somehow equated with the 
opposition between individual freedom and national, lawful coercion, which is characteristic of 
“civil society.” Kant’s argument is that this opposition, which is paradigmatic of the political 
constitution of modern civil society, is in fact the greatest development of the natural 
predisposition of the human species. The underlying of this argument is the notion of unsociable 
sociability put forward in the “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.”46 
Kant holds that although human beings cannot live alone by satisfying all their needs for 
themselves and, for this reason, form a society, they have by nature a propensity for conflict and 
antagonism, namely a selfish, individualist resistance to socialization. Characteristic of the 
human species is unsociable sociability in this sense, and this is part of Kant’s account of human 
                                                   
45 Ak 5, 432/ KU, §83. 
46 Ak 8, 21-21/ IaG, 111. 
 
 222  
nature with respect to the human being considered as a natural being. Now the passage above 
from the third Critique suggests that unsociable sociability as human nature is for Kant 
something that develops in time, implying that it may or may develop and may or may not well 
develop. Kant further claims that it develops itself to the highest degree with the rise of modern 
civil society. Thus, we can say that civil society is the highest development of human nature; the 
political conflict between individual freedom and national coercion is the expression of the full 
development of human nature.  
 But Kant’s notion that civil society is the full development of unsociable sociability, is 
not just a psychological or sociological account of how the political constitution of civil society 
goes hand in hand with the natural propensity of an individual. Kant suggests that the greatest 
development of the human nature, i.e., civil society, is the attainment of “the end of nature itself” 
although this is not an end we humans set up by ourselves. We are here concerned with the 
fourth aspect of Kant’s notion of the teleology of nature. While the third Critique discusses 
teleological judgments of nature in its three dimensions—i.e., internal purposiveness of an 
organism, means-ends connections among all natural beings in virtue of external purposiveness, 
and nature as a teleological system of which the ultimate and final end are the human being—
Kant puts forward a somewhat different version of a teleology of nature in the “Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.” He states, “nature does nothing in vain and is 
not wasteful in the use of means to its ends.”47 By implication, antagonism and conflicts among 
the human beings observed throughout history are not just moral vices without which this world 
would be better off. Instead, they should be, for Kant, a means that nature uses for attaining its 
end. Also, the end for the sake of which nature employs antagonism consists in “bringing about 
                                                   
47 Ak 8, 19/ IaG, 110. 
 
 223  
the development of all its [the human being’s] predispositions”48 because “all natural 
predispositions of a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and 
purposively.”49  
Kant’s discussion of unsociable sociability in the “Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose” sheds light on the sense in which the teleology of nature in the third 
Critique involves a teleology of history. I have above put emphasis on Kant’s argument in the 
third Critique that modern civil society is the attainment of the end of nature. Of importance is 
that what is supposed to be attained with the rise of civil society is the ultimate end of nature, 
that is, an end inside nature. Correspondingly, the human being living in modern civil society is 
within the framework of the teleology of nature put forward in Kant’s third Critique treated as a 
natural being, a phenomenon that exists and appears in space and time. However, the fact that the 
human being is a natural being does not make it necessary, of course, that culture is the ultimate 
end of nature. The argument in the third Critique that culture is the ultimate end of nature thus 
seems to be missing links between the two notions: the human being as a natural being and 
culture as the ultimate end of nature. The link between the two, as far as I see, is provided by the 
notion of unsociable sociability in the “Idea for a Universal History with the Cosmopolitan 
Purpose.” The notion of unsociable sociability in the “Idea for a Universal History” portrays the 
human being as a natural being endowed with natural, egoistic propensities. It gives the ground 
for how the rise of modern civil society, which is a historical phenomenon, can be considered the 
end of nature by providing the view of human nature as antagonistic, and of the political conflict 
characteristic of modern civil society between the right to individual freedom and the coercive 
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legal system of a state as the full development of the antagonistic human nature. Seen in this 
way, modern civil society is not just a historical accident which happened to emerge in 
eighteenth-century Europe. Instead, it is a teleological phenomenon in which nature 
accomplishes its end, i.e., the complete development of human nature.   
 
1.5. The Human Bestimmung: The Teleology of History Towards Moral Perfection 
Now, the way in which Kant’s teleology of nature leads to a teleological understanding of 
history is to be made clearer in relation to his view of the human being as the final end of nature: 
an end of nature that finds itself outside nature and grounds nature as a whole—nature 
considered a teleological whole in which all natural beings are connected to each other as means 
and ends of each other. That is, the human being is in Kant’s teleology of nature not merely the 
master of nature who relates itself to other natural beings on the basis of utility, but a being 
beyond nature who grounds nature as such a chain of means and ends, namely the ultimate 
raison d’être of this world. To be more precise, the final end of nature, which grounds nature as 
a whole, is the human being “considered as noumenon,” namely the “only natural being in which 
we can cognize […] a supersensible faculty (freedom).”50  
To begin with, I draw attention to the fact that morality is the primary category in Kant’s 
understanding of humanity; however, the deontological notion of morality concerning the 
relationship between our will and a priori moral laws is only part of his moral theory. Indeed, 
Kant puts emphasis on the immoral, egoistic tendency of a human being in many places of his 
works. As we have seen above, the distinct character of the human being for him consists in 
                                                   
50 Ak 5, 435/ KU, §84. 
 
 225  
unsociable sociability. He also maintains that evil consists in the “fundamental propensity that 
belongs to our nature,” namely the human being’s innate propensity to subordinate the moral law 
to egoistic maxims.51 Thus, it is important to note that Kant’s philosophy of history, developed in 
the “Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” concerns the human being 
as a natural being, i.e., an empirical, egoistic agent who does not always obey, by nature, the 
command of the moral law as his metaphysics of morals suggests. In a similar vein, Kant’s 
pragmatic anthropology portrays morality in its empirical aspects. Kant characterizes his 
anthropology as pragmatic in the sense that it pursues the question as to “what the human being 
as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.”52 The pragmatic 
anthropology thus deals with the human being as a being with the faculty of freedom, which is 
the faculty of morality. But the anthropology is for Kant an empirical discipline that considers 
diverse phenomena of the human life and psychology varying depending on geographical, 
cultural, racial, and sexual differences. As such, it thematizes morality in terms of the formation 
of moral character and not in terms of a duty to obey a priori moral laws. Noteworthy in this 
regard is Kant’s claim that moral perfection or the “complete conformity of the will with the 
moral law” is a “perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable of at any 
moment of his existence;” there can only be an “endless progress toward that complete 
conformity” and this “practical progress” is the “real object of our will.”53 Moral perfection, in 
other words, is for Kant a transcendental ideal, a noumenon that the human being as a moral 
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existent seeks to achieve but is not realizable in space and time. This is, as far as I see, what 
underlines Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology.  
In Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology, therefore, morality is not a 
matter of a priori, a-temporal operations of pure practical reason. Instead, it is temporalized with 
the view of the human being as a phenomenon, that is, as one who exists and appears in space 
and time with natural, egoistic inclinations. But the sense in which morality is temporalized in 
Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology is to be more aptly spelled out by 
showing how the notion of the human being as the final end of nature, i.e., as a noumenon 
concerning moral perfection, is at play in those disciplines in which the human being is primarily 
considered to be a phenomenal, natural being.  
In this regard, I pay special attention to the point that the question of Kant’s pragmatic 
anthropology, as to what the human being as a free agent should make of herself, concerns the 
human species’ self-determination in history. This point requires an examination of Kant’s claim 
concerning the Bestimmung (determination or destiny or vocation) of the human being. Kant 
claims that the Bestimmung of a non-human animal is achieved by every single individual 
belonging to the species, but the Bestimmung of the human being is accomplished only by the 
human species: “the human species can work its way up to its determination only through 
progress in a series of innumerably many generations.”54 In the case of non-human animals, in 
other words, every single individual develops all its predispositions and capacities. But the 
animal endowed with “the capacity of reason can make out of himself a rational animal” by 
“brining about the perfection of the human being through progressive culture.”55 This claim of 
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Kant can be viewed as a twist of the traditional, Aristotelian definition of the human being as a 
rational animal. The twist consists in transforming the definition of the human being by genus 
and differentia into a determination or destiny that the human species is supposed to achieve in 
an infinite period, through an infinite series of generations.  
Kant’s discussion of the human Bestimmung in the “Anthropology from the Pragmatic 
Point of View” is worth noting in that it counts the capacity of reason as one of the natural 
predispositions of the human being and views this natural predisposition, like the other non-
rational, egoistic ones, as that which develops in time—that which may or may not develop and 
may or may not fully develop. But Kant also conceives of the capacity of reason as essentially 
distinct from the other natural predispositions of the human being. It is distinct in that its full 
development is carried out by the human species and not by any single individual. Further, the 
full development of the capacity of reason by the human species is something that the human 
species is supposed to be approaching in an infinite series of generations. The significant 
consequence of Kant’s discussion of the human Bestimmung therefore consists in the fact that 
human reason is historicized with the view of its full development as involving a temporality 
concerning the species and not an individual. More significantly, the temporality for the full 
development of human reason hinges on the futurity as noumenal temporality, that is, the 
temporality of the perfection of human rationality toward which the human species is supposed 
to be approaching in an infinite series of generations but can never be realized in our world. The 
futurity that is viewed as concerned with the infinite progress toward the full development of the 
capacity of reason or moral perfection, I argue, constitutes the distinct historical temporality 
underlying Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology.  
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The above consideration about Kant’s discussion of the human Bestimmung sheds light 
on the sense in which Kant’s teleology of nature involves a teleology of history. As we have seen 
above, Kant’s teleology of nature assumes that nature does nothing in vein, such that all natural 
beings are destined to fully develop their natural predispositions. In the case of the human being, 
the capacity of reason is particular in that its full development is a destiny that the human species 
is supposed to be ever approaching. This is a teleological conception of human history since it 
takes on the view of a direction or destination of human history. But, again, the direction or 
destination of history assumed in Kant’s philosophy is concerned with the future conceived as a 
noumenal time.  
Now, Kant’s teleological, optimistic view concerning the progress of humanity in history 
is not comprehensible without taking into consideration the notion of rational theology that the 
Bestimmung debate of the German Enlightenment revolved around. As a brief introduction, the 
debate on the Bestimmung of the human being is inaugurated by Spalding and developed by 
Abbt and Mendelsshon.56 The debate was on the human soul’s task in this life and its destination 
in the afterlife. Spalding defended theological rationalism by arguing that the Bestimmung of the 
human being consists in leading a rational, virtuous life, which is higher than the life of sensual 
pleasures, and that injustice of this world—that is, the experience of virtue not rewarded and vice 
profitable—is the proof of the immortality of the soul.57 While Mendelsshon supported 
                                                   
56 Zammito suggests that the Bestimmung debate was one of the most important events in the history of the German 
Enlightenment. For the summary of this debate, I refer to his reconstruction in John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, the 
Birth of Anthropology (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 165-171.  
57 Printy examines the influence of Splading’s Bestimmung des Menschen (1748-1794) on the transformation of 
German Protestantism in the second half of the eighteenth century; Michael Printy, “The Determination of Man: 
Johann Joachim Spalding and the Protestant Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 74, no.2 (2013): 
189-212. It offers a helpful analysis concerning the historical context in which Splading’s Bestimmung des 
Menschen exerted a great philosophical influence on the formation of German popular philosophy, the development 
of the debate on philosophical anthropology, and even Kantianism.  
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Spalding’s optimistic view that affirms the divine providence in this world, Abbt dismissed the 
idea of divine providence in human history. Herder sided with Abbt’s skepticism and further 
suggested that one should specify as to whether the Bestimmung refers to the destiny of an 
individual being or of the whole species. He claimed that one does not need to introduce the 
question about the human species in order to think about how one should lead one’s life. Thus, 
Kant significantly differs from Spalding in that he historicizes the Bestimmung of the human 
being. But he sides with Spading’s rational theology and Mendelsshon’s optimism rather than 
with Abbt’s and Herder’s skepticism because he maintains that the human Bestimmung consists 
in the rational, moral life and conceives this Bestimmung as that which the human species is 
destined to approach in an infinite period of time in history.  
The teleological aspect of Kant’s view of human history is thus inseparable from his 
endorsement of rational theology and his own notion of moral theology. Regarding this point, I 
refer to Brand’s suggestion that Kant’s Bestimmung takes on the conception of nature that 
combines “the finalism of Christianity and the finalism of Stoicism.”58 First, stoic finalism views 
cosmic nature as a rationally organized system by the Zeus-reason. In this system, the human 
being is supposed to be distinct from other beings by the ability to reason; this rational being is 
also supposed to be capable of appropriating the cosmic, Zeus-reason by fully developing the 
moral, virtuous state of the soul. Second, Christianity suggests that everything in the world is 
good since God created the world from nothing; evil is a means for the good, which 
demonstrates divine providence. Brandt claims that “Kantian morality is chimerical and sets to 
nothing” “without the deistic, namely the Christian-Stoic foundation” since this warrants that the 
world inhabited by a moral, free agent is not the hell where her moral action is nothing but a vain 
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effort of Sisyphus rolling a boulder up a hill only for it to roll down.59  Brand’s claim well 
illustrates the religious-philosophical background against which Kant understands humanity and 
history. In supporting his claim, I argue that what grounds Kant’s teleology of history, which I 
see as embedded in his teleology of nature, is the view of moral theology—the view that the 
ethical commonwealth is the kingdom of God on earth, one in which a people of God is 
supposed to be governed by an invisible church, as it is described in the Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason. 
*** 
As I have attempted to show, Kant’s teleology of nature in the third Critique involves a 
teleology of history, one that views modern civil society as the ultimate end of nature, and moral 
perfection as the final end of nature. Kant’s teleology of history, thus considered as part of his 
teleology of nature, reveals Kant’s concern about the historical actuality of modern civil  society 
on the one hand, and about the perfection of humanity, i.e., morality, in the future on the other. 
Seen this way, the notion of culture as the ultimate end of nature can be understood, I suggest, as 
Kant’s philosophical justification of the historical actuality he was living in, and the notion of 
moral perfection as the final end of nature as his philosophical suggestion with respect to where 
to go—where we, the human race, should be heading.  
As far as I see, these two concerns, one about the actuality of modern civil society and 
the other about the future of humanity, are in Kant’s teleology of nature closely related to each 
other. As I have suggested, Kant develops the notion of culture as a stepping stone between 
nature and morality. This being said, the teleology of nature of the third Critique allows the view 
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that nature and morality constitute a continuum of which the joint is the human being. This 
implies that the human being is not just a master of nature but a being that transcends its 
naturalness. By implication, the human being living in modern civil society is not merely a 
natural being that lives a political life and undergoes a conflict with the latter due to its egoistic 
propensities, but a being heading toward moral perfection. This further implies that modern civil 
society is the historical precondition for achieving the perfection of humanity in the future.  
Thus, we eventually come to face the controversial, uncomfortable issue concerning 
Kant’s commitment to racism. If Kant’s notion of modern civil society as the ultimate end of 
nature can be understood as Kant’s philosophical justification of the historical actuality he was 
living in as I have suggested, it is also to be noted that this justification of Kant may well be 
associated with the Eurocentric, racist view that takes the European culture of the eighteenth 
century to be the end: the ultimate end of nature, to be more precise, that is allegedly necessary 
for the human species to progress toward the perfection of humanity.60  
                                                   
60 Whereas Kant’s racist commitment is one of the most controversial issues in today’s Kant scholarship, what 
Kant’s position is cannot be decided only on the bases on the study I have undertaken in this chapter. I would 
therefore like to refer to Cavallar’s remark that Kant kept refining his theory of race; “the Kant of the early 1780s is 
very different from the Kant of the late 1790s” such that the horrible racism of the early Kant gradually disappears 
with the refinement of his theory of universal cosmopolitanism; cf., Georg Cavallar, “Cosmopolitanism in Kant’s 
Philosophy,” Ethics and Global Politics, vol. 5, no. 2 (2012): 97-8.  
But the chronological evolvement of Kant’s thinking about race, as Cavallar suggests, would not exempt Kant from 
the criticism and suspect of his racist commitments. For a helpful overview of the recent debates on Kant’s 
commitment to racism, see in particular: Jon M. Mikkelsen, Jon.M, Kant and the Concept of Race. Late Eighteenth 
Century Writings (New York: State University of New York Press, 2013), 3-18.  
To list just a few of the recent studies concerning Kant’s racism, Eze highlights that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology 
and physical geography constitute together Kant’s theory of man, pursuing the knowledge of inner-moral, and outer-
physical nature of man, respectively; cf. Immanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in 
Kant’s Anthropology,” in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publisher, 1997), 103-140. By paying attention to the connection of the two, Eze sheds 
light on Kant’s view that the white (Europeans) is the race with the full capability for moralization, civilization, and 
history whereas the yellow (Asian), black (Africans) and red (American Indians) lack the capability the white has. 
According to his critical remark, Kant’s preoccupation in his anthropology can be summarized as “an exercise in the 
sympathetic study of European humanity, taken as humanity in itself, and a demonstration of how this ‘ideal’ or 
‘true’ humanity and its history is naturally and qualitatively (spiritually, morally, rationally, etc.) and quantitatively 
(bodily, physically, climatically, etc.) superior to all others:” ibid. 117.  
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2. Hegel: Nature as an Inorganic Whole and the Sentient Soul in the Anthropology 
 
In his extensive work on the history of psychology, Fernando Vidal discusses the change 
of the meanings of the “scientia de anima” and “psychologia” that happened around the end of 
the sixteenth century.61 Throughout the sixteenth century, the scientia de anima, Vidal states, 
remained a general science of living beings, which investigates the soul in its three aspects—
vegetative, sensitive, intellective—following the Aristotelian framework of De anima. During 
this time, psychologia could refer to any domain of the scientia de anima; it was not 
conceptually differentiated from the latter. But the term psychologia began to receive a more 
specific sense than the general sense of scientia de anima around the end of the sixteenth 
century. It began to narrowly refer to a study of the rational human soul which is united with the 
body. Following this, the meaning of psychologia was somehow settled down around the mid-
seventeenth century: a doctrine of the human soul which is separable from but united with the 
body. Vidal explains that this shift in the meaning of psychologia that happened in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries was a shift from the Aristotelian hylomorphic notion of the soul-form 
                                                   
Bernasconi points out that in the era of the Enlightenment, cosmopolitanism readily accommodated racism, and 
argues that Kant’s philosophy, despite the avowed cosmopolitanism, offers a theoretically based racism; cf., Robert 
Bernasconi, “Kant as an Unfamilar Source of Racism,” in Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays, eds. Julie K. Ward 
and Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 145-166. He also claims that Kant was the inventor of 
the concept of race, one who gave a scientific status to the concept of race; cf., Robert Bernasconi, “Who Invented 
the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race,” in Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), 11–36. The philosophical motive for Kant’s invention of the concept of race is found, 
according to Bernasconi, in his rejection to polygenesis. The debate between polygenesis and monogenesis of Kant’s 
time is concerned with the question of how to account the variety and dispersion of different people on earth. While 
polygenesis took some peoples to be non-human, Kant accepted Buffon’s definition of species as a group of 
individuals capable to produce fertile offspring to defend monogenesis. However, he found Buffon’s notion of 
species insufficient for explaining the difference within the same species and put forward the notion of race as 
concerning the difference among diverse peoples. As Bernasconi highlights, Kant holds that the criterion for 
distinguishing between different peoples is the color of skin; race, thus considered in terms of the color of skin, is 
preformed and irreversible.  
61 Fernando Vidal, The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, trans. Saskia Brown 
(Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
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to the anthropological notion of the soul-mind [mens]. For Vidal, psychology thus emerged as an 
anthropological discipline and the connection between psychology and anthropology became far 
stronger in the eighteenth century.62  
Vidal’s historical research illuminates the eighteenth-century context in which 
anthropological and psychological studies were not separated from each other as distinct 
disciplines. It was the time, as Vidal portrays, when the terms anthropology and psychology were 
used somehow interchangeably around the notion of the human soul as separable from but united 
with the body. This point is illuminating concerning Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. First 
of all, by situating Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit within the anthropological-
psychological discussion about the human soul as separable from and united with the body, we 
can perhaps roughly say that the Anthropology deals with the human soul as united with the 
body, and the Psychology, with the intelligence as it is separable from the body. These two 
considerations of the human soul are then mediated by the Phenomenology of Spirit, by an 
examination of conscious, practical life-forms of the human being such as desiring and 
consuming sensory objects and living an intersubjective life in a community. Second, the 
anthropological preoccupation characteristic of the eighteenth-century psychology explains the 
context in which Wolff identified empirical psychology with anthropology and Kant called 
Wolff’s empirical psychology an empirical study of man of the metaphysics. In a similar vein, 
the way in which the Wolffian notion of empirical psychology is somehow developed and 
transformed by Kant into pragmatic anthropology offers an important historical insight 
                                                   
62 Vidal challenges Foucault’s thesis that “man” did not appear as an object of knowledge until the nineteenth 
century. On the contrary, “psychology of the eighteenth century cannot be considered independently of the ideal of 
‘science of man’:” cf. ibid. 99. He argues that “man” was the essential preoccupation of the eighteenth century and 
one of the most important ambitions of this time was to produce a general science of man, comprehending man from 
all the aspects of his life—individual, social, and historical—and incorporating all sorts of knowledge concerning 
man—from anatomy, biology, to cultural history. I discuss Vidal’s challenge of Foucault in Chapter 5, note 96. 
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concerning why Hegel’s subjective spirit cannot be identified with what we call mind today. As 
Kant’s anthropology is a psychology whose eventual concern is humanity, Hegel’s philosophy of 
subjective spirit does not concern the mind in a narrow sense but an individual human existence 
who has the embodied soul, conscious relations with the world, and intelligence and will.  
 However, Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit introduces a new scheme which was 
not present in the tradition of the scientia de anima and psychology: the relationship between 
nature and spirit. Again, the embracive issue that frames the relationship between the soul and 
the body in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, is the spirit’s immergence in and emergence 
out of nature.  
We can now therefore ask the meaning and significance of the introduction of the nature-
spirit relationship for a theory of the human soul. In this section, I reflect on the way and sense in 
which the issue of nature frames Hegel’s Anthropology. I first examine Hegel’s appraisal and 
criticism of Kant’s teleology of nature to make it clearer how Hegel’s anthropology takes on a 
different worldview and a different method from Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. Following this, 
I consider some basic elements of Hegel’s idea of the philosophy of nature. This examination 
will offer a basis for further investigation of Hegel’s notion of the soul. It will also make it 
apparent that Hegel’s understanding of nature is radically different from Kant’s teleological 
notion of nature. Based on this, I analyze § 389 of the 1830 Encyclopedia to outline Hegel’s 
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2.1. Kant’s Inner Purposiveness and Hegel’s Teleology of the Concept  
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant suggests that the antinomy of the power 
of reflective judgment can be solved by his notion of teleology of nature. The power of reflective 
judgment gets involved in the conflict between two a priori principles concerning the cause of 
natural products. While the thesis states that all natural products are possible by mechanical laws, 
the antithesis states that it is necessary to introduce the notion of a final cause for some natural 
products that are not possible by mechanical laws.63 Kant holds that it is necessary and 
unavoidable for the power of reflective judgement to introduce teleological causality for the 
objects of which the possibility is inexplicable by mechanical causality, i.e., a living organism. 
This is because our reason does not possess any universal principles for explaining its possibility 
while our understanding needs to be provided with universal laws under which to subsume 
particular phenomena. When reason cannot provide it with such universal principles, the power 
of reflective judgment intervenes to provide a hypothetical universal law to assist our 
understanding’s investigation of nature. For Kant, teleological causality is such a heuristic law 
posited by the power of reflective judgement. Thus, the necessity of teleological causality rests 
on the condition of our cognitive faculties and not that of the objects that are investigated. It is a 
maxim that assists our cognitive faculties in pursuit of a study of nature rather than a 
metaphysical principle that affirms the existence of a final cause in nature. Consequently, one 
may well say that the possibility of organisms is made comprehensible to us only when we posit 
teleological causality. But one cannot say, Kant maintains, that organisms exist in accordance 
with teleological causality. Thus, teleological causality for Kant only has subjective validity. 
This being assumed, mechanical and teleological causality are compatible as two different 
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maxims for our understanding that apply to different objects, and the antinomy of the power of 
reflective judgement is resolved in this way.  
For Hegel, Kant’s notion of “intuitive understanding, of inner purposiveness” is the 
speculative element of Kant’s philosophy,64 which opens up “the concept of life, the idea.”65 
Hegel criticizes, however, that Kant’s inner purposiveness does not offer a satisfactory resolution 
of the antinomy of the power of reflective judgment. Indeed, Kant’s strategy for the resolution of 
the antinomy between mechanism and teleology hinges on the dualistic scheme of his 
transcendental philosophy that concerns the distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves, and between constitutive and regulative use of reason. Within this dualistic 
framework, Kant’s delimits the relative legitimacy of our cognitive faculties in the use of 
mechanical and teleological principles. His resolution, however, does not really address the 
reconciliation between mechanism and teleology with respect to the objective conditions of 
natural products. Thus, Hegel’s criticism targets his claim that teleological principles are to be 
regarded as subjective maxims for our cognitive faculties and not as objective principles 
concerning how things are in themselves. By challenging Kant, therefore, Hegel claims that inner 
purposiveness is to be regarded as objective. This is one of the crucial claims made in the 
Doctrine of the Concept of the Science of Logic. Briefly stated, Hegel’s claim is that 
purposiveness is immanent to natural beings insofar as the Concept has objectivity in the realm 
of nature encompassing mechanical, chemical, and teleological objects. As I discuss in what 
follows, what Hegel eventually develops with his argument for the immanence of purposiveness 
                                                   
64 ENZ, § 55 A. 
65 GW 12, 157/ SL, 654. 
 
 237  
in nature is the idea that the Concept or the Idea has life. This is, for Hegel, what Kant failed to 
see due to his subjectivist understanding of inner purposiveness.  
One might be tempted to articulate Hegel’s teleology of nature by referring to his claim 
that purposiveness is immanent to nature and compare this with Kant’s teleology of nature, 
which considers purposiveness a heuristic assumption assisting our study of nature. To be 
precise, however, Hegel’s teleology is the teleology of the Concept and not that of nature 
because what has inner purposiveness or life, for Hegel, is the Concept. Again, Hegel’s claim in 
the Doctrine of the Concept is that the Concept is immanent to all kinds of natural beings—
mechanical, chemical, and teleological—and that it exists in them as a purpose. By this, he does 
not mean that the Concept is the purpose for the sake of which all natural beings exist. What he 
instead suggests is that the Concept has itself for its purpose in nature. That is, the Concept is 
that which actualizes itself by passing through the stages of nature comprising mechanical, 
chemical, and teleological ones.  
In what follows, I examine the relationship between the Concept and nature in Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia system. One of the key working assumptions of this chapter is that the different 
conceptions of anthropology held by Kant and Hegel go hand in hand with their different views 
of nature. Since I have examined Kant’s teleology of nature in detail, I spell out in this section 
what I have defined as Hegel’s teleology of the Concept and consider how nature is understood 
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The Dialectic of Syllogism in the Doctrine of the Concept  
 The most distinct character of the Concept is that it is a self-determining, concrete 
totality. The Concept is an active totality that differentiates itself and posits itself as something 
simple and self-identical in the determinacy obtained through its self-differentiation. As such, it 
is the determinate determinacy that has simplicity and self-identity by virtue of its self-relating 
negativity. Therefore, the concreteness of the Concept has nothing to do with an immediate, 
external given. The Concept is concrete because its content involves the self-determining 
movement. In this sense, it is dialectically concrete. And the dialectical self-determination of the 
Concept has three moments: universality, particularity, and singularity. Thus, the Concept is a 
universal that particularizes itself into its species and makes itself into a singular by negating the 
first self-negation made in its self-particularization.  
Hegel thus emphasizes that the Concept constitutes the realm of “subjectivity or of 
freedom” in the sense that it is a posited self-identity in its determinations.66 Of importance is 
that the subjectivity of the Concept embraces objectivity rather than opposes it. In other words, 
the Concept that essentially has a dialectical subjectivity somehow exists in the realm of 
objectivity. This truth of the Concept is at first only implicit but is made explicit by the 
dialectical exhibition of the Concept itself. What Hegel offers in the first sub-section of the 
Doctrine of the Concept on “Subjectivity” is such a dialectical movement of the Concept 
whereby its objectivity is established. Now, the dialectic of the Concept in the “Subjectivity” 
section comprises three stages: the Concept, judgement, and syllogism. At this point, it is worth 
noting that the dialectical movement of the Concept in these three stages differs from those of 
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Being and Essence. In the case of the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence, the 
dialectical movement has the form of passing over [Übergehen] into an other (Being) or that of 
reflection into itself as an other (Essence). Whereas the dialectical movements in being and 
essence thus essentially involve a relation to an other, the Concept is the movement of self-
development [Entwicklung]. This being said, the three stages of its self-development, i.e., the 
Concept, judgment, and syllogism, constitute different forms of the concrete totality of the 
Concept, or different ways in which its three moments, i.e., universality, particularity, and 
singularity, relate to each other. Briefly stated, the Concept is first presented as a concrete, 
determinate totality involving universality, particularity, and singularity (the Concept); this 
totality is divided into the subject and predicate in a proposition (judgment) and is restored as a 
concrete totality by the syllogistic mediation (syllogism). Thus, the Concept, judgment, and 
syllogism constitute all together one dialectic movement of the Concept’s self-development.  
To spell out Hegel’s idea that the Concept exists as a self-purpose in nature, I here 
reconstruct the third stage of the Concept’s self-development in the “Subjectivity” section, i.e., 
syllogism, because this is where it is established that the Concept has objectivity in the realm of 
nature. Hegel sets out the dialectic of syllogism with the formalist notion of syllogism that it is a 
connection of three successive judgements in which the conclusion is drawn out from the link 
between the extremes made by the mediation of the middle term. Syllogistic inference is largely 
assumed to have universal validity due to the necessary connection between the three terms. For 
instance, we conclude that the singular (e.g., Socrates) belongs to the universal (e.g., being 
mortal) from the fact that it inheres to the particular (e.g., man) that inheres to the same 
universal. We take this inference to be valid on the ground of the relationship of inherence 
between the three terms. But Hegel challenges this formalist view of syllogism by arguing that 
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the syllogistic connection between the terms is contingent. The syllogistic connection is not 
internal but only external to the terms that are connected because the “therefore” in the 
conclusion belongs to the external reflection of the one who makes the inference.67 More 
significantly, while there are multiple particulars that may link the singular and the universal, 
which particular is taken as the middle term is contingent. One can infer, for instance, that 
Socrates is mortal because he is a man and a man is mortal. But one can make the same 
conclusion from another premise that he is a biped. Socrates is put into different contexts of his 
existence depending on whether he is considered a man or a biped. For “man” and “biped” have 
different sets of determinations that circumscribe their meanings. But this difference, which 
eventually concerns the content of the subject matter, is ignored in the formalist notion of 
syllogism. For the same reason, even contradictory conclusions may be drawn with respect to 
one and the same subject matter, Hegel claims, depending on which particular is taken as the 
middle term. For instance, “from sociability as the middle term, the community of goods among 
citizens can be inferred; however, from individuality as the middle term, there follows the 
dissolution of the state.”68 Consequently, the alleged validity and necessity of syllogistic 
inference is called into question when the content of the terms is considered.   
All the deficit of syllogism rests on its formalist feature, namely the fact that the 
mediation by the middle term is only formal and all the three terms are treated in their abstract 
aspects alone. Thus, the syllogistic connection between the universal, particular, and singular 
does not exhibit the Concept in its concrete totality since it is, again, merely external and 
contingent. It is therefore to be noted that the Concept has subjectivity only in this negative sense 
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of being a formal, external, and contingent totality of determinations before it is established that 
it has objectivity in nature, and that the truth of its objectivity in nature consists in the Idea, 
which is life. To make clearer what the dialectic of syllogism carries out, I therefore make a 
distinction between two different meanings of the subjectivity of the Concept. As mentioned 
earlier, the Concept has subjectivity in the sense that it is a self-determining totality and its 
dialectic movement consists in its self-development. I define this as the absolute subjectivity of 
the Concept in contrast with what I specify as its one-sided subjectivity, that is, the subjectivity 
that the Concept has before it achieves the stage of objectivity. This one-sided subjectivity of the 
Concept is removed by Hegel’s dialectical treatments of various forms of syllogism. Since this 
dialectic of syllogism is part of the Concept’s self-development, it can be viewed, I suggest, in 
terms of the dissolution of the one-sided subjectivity of the Concept by its absolute subjectivity.  
To begin with, the dialectic of syllogism comprises three stages: (1) the syllogism of 
determinate being [Dasein], (2) the syllogism of reflection, and (3) the syllogism of necessity. In 
the syllogism of determinate being, Hegel shows how the figure S-P-U is necessarily turned into 
the second figure P-S-U, and into the third S-U-P. What he shows by these successive 
transformations of the syllogism is the fact that the mediation by the middle term (P) in the first 
figure is an immediate mediation which depends on some contingent element of the singular (S). 
While the singular thus takes the position of the middle term in the second figure, the second 
figure reveals the fact that the mediation is in fact a mediation by an abstract universality (U) that 
connects the extremes only as abstract determinations. The third figure S-U-P thus makes 
explicit the truth of the formal syllogism, namely the fact that it is based on a merely formal 
mediation. What is revealed is that the connection between the universal, particular, and singular 
in a syllogism is not determinate but is contingent with respect to the content.  
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However, this exposition of the one-sided subjectivity of the formal syllogism is at the 
same time a demonstration of its dialectical truth: the mediator of the syllogism is “essentially a 
universal” in which the moments of the Concept only shine and disappear into their ground.69 In 
the course of the dialectical transformations of the syllogism of determinate being, each of the 
three moments of the Concept appears to the position of the middle term and disappears. 
Consequently, the formal difference between universality, particularity, and singularity is 
removed. This dialectical truth of the syllogism of determinate being is expressed by the fourth 
figure U-U-U. Importantly, the dialectic of the syllogism of determinate being thus brings about 
the mediation of the middle term. Whereas the middle term appears as the immediate particular 
in the first figure, it is turned into a singular in the second figure, and into a universal in the third. 
This mediation of the middle term entails removal of the immediate givenness of the two 
premises of the first figure: S-P is mediated in the second figure and P-U is mediated in the third 
figure.  
Second, the syllogism of reflection differs from the syllogism of determinate being in that 
its middle term is a reflected totality of determinations that encompasses the extremes within 
itself and not an abstract universality which connects the extremes only in an abstract, external 
manner. There are three forms of the syllogism of reflection: the syllogisms of allness, induction, 
and analogy. (1) In the syllogism of allness, the middle term has the quantifier “all;” it has the 
concrete meaning that it encompasses all singular things belonging to the class of the middle 
term. But this syllogism presupposes the conclusion (e.g., Socrates is mortal) in its premise (all 
men are mortal). It thus turns out that the validity of the syllogism of all depends on inductive 
inferences with respect to the completeness of the “all” of the middle term. (2) The syllogism of 
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induction can be considered a variation of the figure U-S-P: U-(s1, s2, s3,…)-P. But the middle 
term of this syllogism is no longer the abstract singular that neither subsumes, nor is predicated 
of the particular. For the “all singulars” in an inductive inference assumes their immediate unity 
with the universal to which they belong. That is, the “all singulars” immediately expresses the 
genus: “lion, elephant, etc., constitutes the genus of quadruped”.70 Thus, the syllogism of 
induction is close to the concrete totality of the Concept insofar as its middle term expresses the 
determinate connection between the singular and the universal—although only immediately. 
However, Hegel points out that inductive inference cannot achieve the completeness of the “all” 
of the middle term insofar as there remains the possibility of counter-cases. The conclusion of an 
inductive inference is therefore only problematic. The syllogism of induction remains a 
subjective syllogism subordinated to an external reflection; hence, the external universality, i.e., 
the genus, remains internal. (3) The dialectical truth of the syllogism of induction—that is, the 
fact that the middle terms is “a singular taken in its universal nature”—is expressed in all the 
more superficial form of an inference: the syllogism of analogy.71 For instance, the syllogism of 
analogy that “the moon has inhabitants since the earth has inhabitants and the moon is an earth” 
rests on the ambiguity of the middle term “earth.” In this syllogism, the middle term is posited as 
singularity (the earth that has inhabitants) but “immediately also as the true universality of the 
singular” (an earth which has inhabitants by its nature).72 In the syllogism of analogy, we 
therefore have four terms: two singulars (the earth and the moon), the particular (“being 
inhabited” as the particular determination of the earth), and the universal (“being inhabited” as 
the universal nature of the earth or the heavenly bodies in general). It thereby makes it explicit 
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that like the conclusion (the moon is inhabited), the premise (the earth is inhabited) is S-P. 
Consequently, it makes it explicit the fact that the middle term, i.e., the universal nature of the 
heavenly bodies in general, is only immediately assumed. In short, the syllogism of analogy 
expresses the “demand that it be mediated,” namely the demand for “the sublation of the moment 
of singularity” so that the middle term is “the objective universal, the genus purified of 
immediacy.”73   
In this way, the dialectic of the syllogism of reflection moves forward to an increasingly 
superficial form of an inference. By proceeding from the syllogism of allness, to induction, and 
to analogy, one gets farther and farther away from the syllogistic self-evidence that is assumed to 
consist in the formal relationship of subsumption or inherence between the terms. If the dialectic 
of the syllogism of determinate being entails the dissolution of the fixed, formal differences 
between universality, particularity, and singularity, the dialectic of the syllogism of reflection 
further dissolves the formal validity of syllogism.  
It is therefore important to note that the third stage of the dialectic of syllogism, i.e., the 
syllogism of necessity, concerns the necessity of the content rather than formal necessity. More 
precisely, it is the syllogism “full of contents,” which has necessity in the sense that “its middle 
terms is not any adventitious immediate content but is the reflection of the determinateness of the 
extremes into itself.”74 (1) Thus, the first form of the syllogism of necessity, i.e., categorical 
syllogism, for Hegel, does not concern the formal relationship of inherence between the terms. 
The middle term of a categorical syllogism is the “essential nature of the singular.”75 It is not just 
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one or the other quality that is contingently chosen among many possible particulars and links 
the subject and predicate in a merely formal, external manner, which is the case of the syllogism 
of determinate being. Instead, the middle term of a categorical syllogism is “the identity, full of 
content, of its extremes, and these are contained in it in their self-subsistence.”76 In the 
categorical syllogism, the substantial content thus runs through the three terms as one and the 
same essence, such that universality, particularity, and singularity are only formal moments. The 
necessity of the categorical syllogism rests on the identity of the content, which runs through the 
three terms. Consequently, the categorical syllogism, Hegel highlights, is “no longer subjective” 
and “in that connection of identity, objectivity begins.”77 The one-sided subjectivity of the 
syllogism of determinate being is thereby removed. But this removal is not yet complete since 
the formal difference between the three moments of the Concept remains un-reflected and the 
identity of form is not yet posited.  
(2) The hypothetical syllogism is the second form of the syllogism of necessity. It 
concerns the identity of form, which is not posited in the categorical syllogism. The hypothetical 
syllogism starts with the necessary connection between A and B (if A is, so is B), proceeds to the 
being of A (A is), and concludes with the being of B (B is). What mediates the being of A and 
the being of B in this syllogism is the identical content underlying them as their foundation. This 
content first appears as a “dismembered and dispersed appearance” and gains “actuality” in the 
conclusion.78 This is a translation of the “totality of determinations” of appearance into 
“actuality,” or the transformation of universality into singularity. Thus, one may well say that 
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since the being of A and the being of B share the identical content, which side is taken as 
universality and which one, as singularity, does not matter. But Hegel further argues that the 
being of A is not an immediate being but the being according to the Concept,  i.e., the 
“singularity as self-relating negative unity.”79 That is, the being of A as the middle term of a 
hypothetical syllogism mediates its being as contingency in the premise with its being as 
actuality in the conclusion. Therefore, the mediating term (the being of A) and the mediated (the 
being of B) have the same, absolute content due to the self-relating, negative activity, or the form 
activity of the middle term. In this sense, the unity of the two is a unity of form. To that extent, 
the hypothetical syllogism, Hegel argues, concerns not only necessity but the necessary. The 
middle term of the hypothetical syllogism, in other words, is not just objectivity or objective 
universality but the “self-identical existent content.”80 
 (3) This truth of hypothetical syllogism is made explicit in the disjunctive syllogism. In 
the first premise of a disjunctive syllogism (A is either B or C or D), the universal A is 
particularized into its species. In the second premise (A is neither C nor D), the same subject A 
appears as the singularity that excludes the others. This singularity of A is positively posited in 
the conclusion (A is B) in a determinate manner. The disjunctive syllogism is therefore the 
mediation of the universality of A with the singularity of A by virtue of A’s self-particularization 
into its species and the determination of itself as a singular. It presents, in other words, the self-
mediation of the Concept whereby the mediator and the mediated are united. Its middle term is 
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“the totality of the Concept itself” that “contains the two extremes in their complete 
determinateness.”81 
I have suggested that the dialectic of the syllogism of determinate being dissolves the 
fixed, formal difference between universality, particularity, and singularity; the dialectic of the 
syllogism of reflection dissolves the formal notion of syllogistic validity. Now, the dialectic of 
the syllogism of necessity is the dissolution of the formal syllogism as such. In Hegel’s terms, 
the disjunctive syllogism is “no longer a syllogism at all” since the distinction between the 
mediator and the mediated is collapsed.82 Thus, the whole series of dialectical transformations of 
the syllogism brings about the self-dissolution of the formal syllogism as such. Along with this 
self-dissolution of the syllogism, it is established that the Concept is the self-mediating content, 
or such a concrete totality that contains its determinations in a determinate manner by virtue of 
its self-relating negativity. To that extent, the self-dissolution of the formal syllogism is at the 
same time the sublation of what I specified as the one-sided subjectivity of the Concept in 
contrast with its absolute subjectivity. In Hegel’s terms, what is sublated by the dialectic of 
syllogism is “the formalism of the syllogistic inference, and consequently the subjectivity of the 
syllogism or the Concept in general.”83  
The sublation of the one-sided subjectivity of the Concept entails the notion that the 
Concept is objectivity. In Hegel’s terms, what is established through the dialectic of syllogism in 
the “Subjectivity” section is that “it is not just that the syllogism is rational but that everything 
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rational is a syllogism”;84 further, “everything is a syllogism.”85 That is, the Concept is 
something rational that exists in reality. But the sense in which the Concept is objectivity, I 
think, requires a subtle interpretation. It is noticeable that the dialectic of syllogism as a whole 
reinstitutes the stages of the Objective Logic on a larger scale. The syllogism of determinate 
being is concerned with the qualitative determination of being (the Doctrine of Being); the 
syllogism of reflection realizes the reflection of essence, and the syllogism of necessity 
reinstitutes the notion of appearance and actuality (the Doctrine of Essence). Accordingly, 
Hegel’s notion that the Concept is objectivity cannot simply be regarded as an affirmation of the 
existence of the order of rational or ideal in the order of the material or real. Since the Concept in 
the last stage of its subjectivity, i.e., syllogism, re-passes through the stages of the Objective 
Logic, its objectivity resulting from the dialectic of syllogism contains within it the sublated 
unity of being and reflection. It is the objectivity that posits itself as contingency and reflects into 
itself as necessity in actuality. As such, it is the objectivity that contains within it the absolute 
subjectivity of the Concept.  
 
The Objectivity of the Concept in Nature  
Therefore, it is important to note that the objectivity of the Concept in the realm of nature 
encompassing mechanical, chemical, and teleological objects is concerned with a dialectically 
active reality of the Concept and not a static, inactive, given reality of the phenomenal world 
itself. In other words, nature is in Hegel’s system the objectivity of the Concept, namely the 
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objectivity in which the Concept exists as the self-developing absolute subjectivity purified from 
the one-sided, formal subjectivity. By implication, the absolute subjectivity of the Concept no 
longer remains internal to the Concept but has externality in nature. Accordingly, the Concept is 
re-defined: it is that which, “as the identity in its being-for-itself [die fürsichseiend Identität], is 
differentiated from the objectivity in a being-in-itself [die ansichseiende Objektivität], and  
thereby has externality, but in this external totality is the self-determining identity of that totality. 
So the Concept is now the Idea”86 The Concept, in other words, is a self-actualizing totality, that 
is, a concrete totality that makes all the determinations implicit in it into an external objectivity, 
thereby mediating itself with itself in that external objectivity to become the explicit identity of 
the totality of its own. This truth of the Concept is the Idea, which is at first life (organic nature), 
develops itself into cognition and will (subjective spirit), and finally achieves the absolute 
knowledge of itself (absolute spirit).87 Thus, the Concept or the Idea is an essentially teleological 
totality, one that actualizes itself by externalizing itself and turning back into itself in that 
externality. Again, what is teleological and what has life, for Hegel, is the Concept or the Idea.  
Since the Concept or the Idea is a teleological totality, a living organism has special 
meaning for Hegel’s system. An organism is alive through the activity of self-organization; it 
thus embodies the teleological constitution of the Concept. Hegel thus writes: “life, or organic 
nature, is the stage of nature where the Concept comes on the scene” although only “as a blind 
Concept that does not comprehend itself.”88 Although the Concept exists in all three realms of 
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natural beings, Hegel therefore highlights that teleology concerns “a higher nature” than 
mechanism and chemism.89  
It is in this context that Hegel makes a high evaluation of Kant’s notion of inner 
purposiveness that it opens up “the concept of life, the Idea.”90 As I have suggested, Hegel’s 
favorable evaluation of Kant’s inner purposiveness is concerned with the fact that the Concept or 
the Idea, like a living organism, has a teleological constitution. Instead of recapitulating Hegel’s 
criticism of Kant’s subjectivist limitation of the teleological principle to a regulative use of 
reason, I would here like to spell out the relationship between the Concept and an organism in 
Hegel’s system. I have suggested that both the Concept and an organism are teleological and for 
that reason, an organism has special significance for Hegel’s system. But if we can say that the 
Concept or the Idea has life, this is in the analogical sense that both the Concept and an 
organism share the same, teleological constitution. Therefore, we need to recall that the life of 
the Concept consists in its dialectical self-development throughout the philosophical system—the 
entire trajectory of the Encyclopedia system in which the Idea externalizes itself into nature, 
internalizes itself into spirit, and develops itself until the equilibrium of subjective spirit and 
objective spirit is attained. But the two meanings of life are not just analogically connected. The 
dialectical life of the Concept in the philosophical system involves the sublation of the biological 
sense of life, as I have discussed, in Chapter 2, Hegel’s notion that the death of an individual 
organism is the spirit emerging. Therefore, the Kantian sense of inner purposiveness of an 
organism is for Hegel quintessential to the extent that it anticipates the teleological notion of the 
Concept; but it is that which is to be sublated by the dialectical life of the Concept in the system. 
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To put it another way, in the view of Hegel’s teleology of the Concept, Kant’s notion of inner 
purposiveness is appreciated insofar as it can be understood analogically in relation to the 
Concept; however, the biological sense of life is to be sublated in and by the dialectical life of 
the Concept.  
As a final analysis, I make a brief remark on Hegel’s position about the notion of external 
purposiveness. As we have seen above, Kant claims that our experience of an organism as a 
teleological object necessarily leads us to the notion of nature as a whole. Considered in this 
way, nature for Kant constitutes a teleological whole in which all natural products are linked to 
each other by relative means-ends relations, i.e., external purposiveness, and which has a 
suprasensible end for its ground. By clarifying Hegel’s position about external purposiveness, 
then, we will be able to clarify whether he admits of the Kantian notion of nature as a 
teleological whole, one that considers humanity, considered in its cultural and moral terms, to be 
the end of nature.  
Hegel points out that external purposiveness takes on the “viewpoint of utility” and the 
purpose is here only “finite.”91 But he does not believe that we, humans, can master nature as the 
viewpoint of utility assumes. Indeed, there is “an endless variety of ways of using and mastering 
nature” as we develop various ways of countering the negative and destructive powers that 
nature exercises on us including unfavorable natural conditions such as extreme weather 
conditions and the threat of wild animals. However, our reason “cannot overcome nature herself 
in this way,” “nor can he turn her to his own purpose.”92 For whereas we enter into a practical 
relationship with natural objects through our faculty of desire, our desire for an external, material 
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object cannot be satisfied due to its dependence on the latter.93 Further, Hegel challenges the 
concept of external purposiveness for its resulting in the “trivial reflection where God’s wisdom 
is admired in that He has provided cork trees for bottle-stoppers, or herbs for curing disordered 
stomachs, and cinnabar for cosmetics.”94 Hegel here rejects the conception of divine providence 
that underpins the idea of the chain of natural beings by the means-ends relationship. Thus, 
Hegel dismisses the notion of external purposiveness by dismissing the two main theses 
underlying it: the viewpoint of utility and the conception of divine providence. Consequently, 
nature for Hegel does not constitute a teleological whole in which natural beings are linked to 
each other as means and ends of each other, and the human being is the ultimate and final end of 
that whole. In Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, nature is rather inorganic, as I argue in what 
follows. 
 
2.2. Hegel’s Notion of Nature as an Inorganic Whole 
In § 251 of the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel states that “nature is in itself a living whole.” 
Hegel here seems to be suggesting that nature somehow constitutes an organic whole. One can 
therefore pose a question as to whether he considers nature a teleological whole in a similar way 
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to Kant. However, what Hegel means by a living whole in the statement above has very little to 
do with the notion of nature as a teleological whole in which natural beings are supposed to be 
linked to each other by external purposiveness. Instead, nature is a living whole, for Hegel, in the 
sense that it involves the “movement of its stages” whereby “the Idea posits itself as that which it 
is in itself.”95 As I have discussed earlier, what has life, for Hegel, is the Concept or the Idea—
or, the philosophical system understood as the latter’s teleological self-development. It is 
therefore important to note that nature is in itself a living whole. It is, in other words, in itself the 
Idea; conversely, the Idea is only in itself and not yet for itself in nature. The Idea becomes for 
itself by going through the stages of nature.  
Thus, in Hegel’s system, the Idea-Nature-Spirit constitutes an organic whole, but nature 
does not. Nature is only part of that triad constituting the philosophical system within the 
Encyclopedia. And yet, it is part of the system only as the alterity or otherness of the Idea. In 
Hegel’s terms, nature is “the Idea in the form of otherness [Anderssein].”96 This being said, 
nature is not the Idea. Accordingly, there is an essential difference between the Idea and spirit on 
the one hand, and nature on the other. Whereas the Idea and spirit have interiority, nature is 
characterized by externality. This difference can first be understood in terms of the dialectical, 
teleological movement of the Idea: the movement in which the Idea externalizes itself into nature 
and turns back from nature into itself as spirit. In this dialectical movement, the Idea remains 
internal to itself until it is considered in its external existence in nature; spirit has a reflected 
interiority because it is the Idea’s turning back from nature into itself as spirit. However, it is to 
be noted that the externality of nature does not only concern the externalization of the Idea into 
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nature, or the dialectical transition from the Idea in the logic to the Philosophy of Nature. Indeed, 
this transition in Hegel’s system is made on the basis of the assumption that the objectivity of the 
Concept in the realm of nature is already established, and that this is what the Idea means. But 
another crucial assumption is that externality is the essential feature of nature as such.  
 Importantly, nature for Hegel does not constitute a self-identical realm. Instead, it is a 
realm of “mediation-less indifference,” which is characterized by “side-by-sideness 
[Nebeneinander]” and “asunderness [Außeinander];” hence, it is essentially concerned with 
“space.” 97 Natural beings, in other words, appear to exist separately from and independently of 
each other in space; it is an indifferent coexistence of all natural beings in space. In this sense of 
the side-by-sideness and asunderness in space, externality is the essential determination of 
nature. In Hegel’s system, therefore, nature—understood as the realm of the objectivity of the 
Concept encompassing mechanical, chemical, and teleological objects—is fundamentally 
inorganic. As such, it is the alterity and otherness of the Idea. In Hegel’s terms, “the Idea is the 
negative of itself, or is external to itself,” so that “nature is not merely external in relation to the 
Idea” but the “externality constitutes the determination in which nature stands as nature.”98 If the 
transition from the Idea to the Philosophy of Nature can be considered in terms of the 
externalization of the Idea into nature, therefore, this can be the case insofar as externality is the 
fundamental feature of nature itself.  
Now, this inorganic, external feature of nature also circumscribes the method of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature. As natural beings are dispersed in space and nature is a realm of diversity 
without an reflective self-identity, so are the determinations of the Concept in nature isolated 
                                                   
97 ENZ, § 254. 
98 ENZ, § 247. 
 
 255  
from each other without revealing the Concept in its true form, i.e., as the organic whole that 
constitutes itself as something self-identical in self-differentiation. In Hegel’s terms, “the 
determinations of the Concept have the semblance of an indifferent subsistence and 
particularization in regard to each other.”99 The Philosophy of Nature can therefore present 
nature only as “a system of stages, one arising necessarily from the other and being the 
proximate truth of the stage from which it results.”100 Since nature is the alterity of spirit as 
mentioned earlier, strictly speaking, there is no truth in nature. Despite this, the Philosophy of 
Nature can arrange the distinct domains of nature in accordance with how proximate they are to 
the truth, to the organic form of the Concept. Thus, the Philosophy of Nature starts from the least 
organic and the most external form of natural existence and proceeds to more organic and less 
external forms. By proceeding from the mechanic, to the chemical, and to the organic nature, 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature thus moves forward to increasingly complex forms of natural 
beings. The externality of nature is thereby gradually overcome; the Concept gets closer to its 
true, organic form.  
 Seen this way, the degree of asunderness and side-by-sideness in relation to the Concept 
is the critical standard for Hegel’s classification of natural beings in his Philosophy of Nature. 
Accordingly, the Philosophy of Nature arranges our understandings of natural beings according 
to the degree to which those objects in nature fit to the organic form of the Concept. As far as I 
see, this idea plays a crucial role for Hegel’s non-dualist approach to the animal-human soul in 
the Anthropology. I below discuss in more detail the way in which Hegel applies his notion of 
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asunderness to the bodily constitution of inanimate beings, plants, and animals to establish that 
the sensitive soul, unlike the vegetative soul, has a subjectivity.  
 
2.3. An Analysis of § 389: What is the Soul? 
 
The soul is not only immaterial for itself, but the universal immateriality of nature, its 
simple ideal life. Soul is the substance, the absolute foundation [Grundlage] of all the 
particularizing and the individualizing of spirit, so that spirit has in it all the stuffs of its 
determination and the soul remains the pervading identical ideality. But in this 
determination which is still abstract, soul is only the sleep of spirit;—the the passive nous 
of Aristotle, which is all potentially.101  
 
In this first passage of the Anthropology, Hegel characterizes the soul in terms of the 
following three notions. Soul is (1) the universal immateriality of nature, or the simple ideal life 
of nature; (2) substance as the absolute foundation that contain all stuffs for spirit’s 
particularization and individualization; (3) spirit in sleep, which Aristotle considered in terms of 
the passive nous. Based on Hegel’s idea of nature as an inorganic whole I have examined above, 
I here analyze those three notions defining the soul to grasp the main concerns and issues of 
Hegel’s Anthropology. This will offer some guideline for the subsequent analysis of the 
Anthropology which I undertake in Chapter 5.  
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(1) Universal Immateriality of Nature. In the first line of the Anmerkung to §389, Hegel 
suggests that “the immateriality of the soul” is of interest only when “matter is represented as 
something true, and spirit is represented as a thing.” Later in the Anmerkung, Hegel discusses the 
problematization of the communion of the soul and the body by Descartes, Malebranche, 
Spinoza and Leibniz. We can therefore interpret the citation above as a challenge to the dualistic 
framework of modern philosophy that underlies the soul-body problem. In Hegel’s view, modern 
philosophers struggle to give an account of the communion of the soul and the body under the 
assumption that both finite substances are independent of each other. While the soul-body 
communion thus becomes an “incomprehensible mystery,” modern philosophers, Hegel 
suggests, appeal to the notion of God as the real foundation of the soul-body relationship, 
thereby making them into mere “ideal determinations in respect of each other” that “have no 
truth.” For Hegel, the “identity of the soul and the body” conceived by modern philosophers is 
either “too abstract” or “only like the copula of a judgment,” which hinders one from proceeding 
to the system of “absolute syllogism.”  
 Hegel’s dissatisfaction with the soul-body dualism and the notion of the immateriality of 
the soul is concerned with the way in which the soul is considered in terms of a non-dialectic, 
fixed notion of substance by modern philosophers. Although the soul and the body are 
considered by modern philosophers to have radically different attributes, i.e., immateriality and 
materiality, both are alike conceived as thing-like—as, for instance, Descartes considers the soul 
and the body as a thinking thing [res cogitans] and an extended thing [res extensa] respectively. 
For Hegel, what turns the soul-body communion into a crucial philosophical question is such a 
representational, non-Conceptual mode of thinking in which one sticks to an image-like, fixed 
element of thought, and which is therefore inadequate for grasping the proper negativity, activity, 
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and subjectivity of spirit. This point explains why Hegel mentions the representation of matter as 
true. Within the dualistic framework of modern philosophy, matter is considered as something 
solid that has spatial extension for its essential attribute. But this notion of matter as a solid, 
extended thing also frames one’s representation of the soul to some degree, such that the soul is 
considered as a thing, one that is separable from, independent of, and parallel to another thing, 
i.e., the body. Worth noting in this regard is Hegel’s objection to the view of matter as an 
extended, solid thing. In the same paragraph of the Anmerkung to §389, he points out that 
modern physics experiments with “imponderable matters”—matters such as heat and light, 
which have a sensory existence but do not display material properties such as weight and the 
capacity of resistance. He also observes that his contemporaries work on the notion of “vital 
matter,” which is assumed to be even without sensory existence. Those physical and vitalist 
notions serve to counter the conception of matter as a solid, extended thing, which underpins the 
soul-body problem and is also associated with the representation of the soul as a thing-like 
substance.  
 One can therefore say that the immateriality of the soul is for Hegel a false conception, 
which is made into a crucial problem due to the non-dialectic, non-speculative standpoint that 
predominates modern philosophers’ thoughts about the soul-body problem. Indeed, the existence 
of an embodied-ensouled being, I suggest, is for Hegel a sort of a matter of fact, which does not 
need to be considered a metaphysical conundrum. As we have seen earlier, one of the important 
claims Hegel makes through the dialectic of the Idea in the Logic is that the Idea is immediately 
present in a living being. That is, a living being that actively constitutes itself as an organic 
totality exhibits what the Idea, namely the Concept that has life in a dialectical sense is like. By 
implication, there exists a living organism that is alive by virtue of teleological, self-organizing 
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activities inherent to it, and not a soul-body complex. As such, the soul cannot be an immaterial 
substance opposed to another, material substance. Instead, it is always embedded in the body—as 
the principle of life or the self-organizing functionality of a living body.  
 The fact that Hegel dismisses modern philosophers’ notion of the immateriality of the 
soul as a false conception and instead focuses on the existence and life of an organism, however, 
does not imply that he would support a reductivist, materialist view of the soul. Nor does it mean 
that he reduces the problem of the soul-body relationship to the biological issue of an organism. 
What Hegel suggests in the Anmerkung to §389 is that the “identity of the soul and the body” is 
to be reconsidered from a speculative standpoint that brings about the system of the absolute 
syllogism. The speculative understanding of the soul consists in seeing the fact that “the 
immaterial is not related to the material as a particular to a particular, but as the genuine 
universal which overarches particularity is related to the particular; the material in its 
particularization has no truth, no independence in face of the immaterial.”102 That is, the soul is 
something in and through which the genuine universality, which is immaterial, comes to be by 
subjugating the particularity of the material. The soul, in other words, is something in and 
through which the dialectical movement of spirit occurs, the movement whereby spirit emerges 
as spirit by sublating its naturalness. It is therefore important to note that Hegel’s notion of the 
soul is grounded in his broader discussion of the relationship between nature and spirit:  
 
Spirit has come into being as the truth of nature. In the Idea without qualification this result 
has the meaning of the truth and of what is prior, rather than posterior, as compared with 
what precedes it. But, besides this, becoming of transition has, in the Concept, the more 
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determinate meaning of free judgment. Spirit that has come into being means, therefore, 
that nature in its own self sublates itself as what is untrue, and spirit thus presupposes itself 
as this universality that is no longer self-externalized in bodily individuality, but simple in 
its concretion and totality. In this universality it is not yet spirit, but soul.103  
 
In the Doctrine of the Concept of the Logic, Hegel establishes that the Idea is the unity of the 
Concept and objectivity. As I dealt with in Chapter 2, the Doctrine of the Concept thereby 
anticipates the progression of the Encyclopedia system from the Idea to Nature, and to Spirit. 
The truth, which can only be manifested through the dialectical movement of the Idea or spirit in 
the system, is therefore already grasped with the attainment of the Idea in the Logic. To that 
extent, it precedes all the subject matters dealt with in the Philosophy of Nature and the 
Philosophy of Spirit. However, the truth is for Hegel not something that is immediately present 
or that can be grasped at once. The truth has the syllogistic form of the Concept, namely the 
concrete universality that constitutes itself as an individuality by differentiating itself into 
particulars and reflecting into itself in the particulars. As such, it can only gradually reveal itself 
through the entire movement of spirit in the system, as the entirety of that movement. This being 
said, the truth is essentially involved in the movement of becoming. It proceeds, in other words, 
from untruth and completes itself as true by sublating its untruth. This movement of the truth’s 
becoming involves spirit’s sublation of its externality in nature insofar as nature, prominently 
characterized by externality, is the improper existence of spirit.   
 For Hegel, the soul is conceivable in the dialectical movement of the truth because it is 
that in which spirit begins to sublate its externality and thereby reveals itself as spirit. This is, in 
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turn, because an embodied being, insofar as it is ensouled, is no longer a dead matter to which 
the universality of the Concept is merely external but a living matter that has a universality that 
is a concrete and simple totality. To put it another way, the soul, conceived as the principle of 
organic life, expresses the interiority of a living organism that makes it into a simple totality. 
Hegel’s point in the passage above, however, is that this interiority of a living organism, i.e., the 
soul, is not yet spirit. This is because the soul is immediately connected to the body and does not 
yet reveal spirit in its properly dialectical form, i.e., the absolute negativity through which it 
confronts what is negative to it, the material, and reflects into itself in negating the latter. This 
point requires us to be careful about the subtle nuance in Hegel’s objection to the notion of the 
immateriality of the soul by modern philosophers. It is evident that Hegel rejects the soul-body 
dualism. This does not imply, however, that he does away with the oppositional relationship 
between the soul and the body. On the contrary, Hegel holds that the soul is “for itself 
immaterial.”104 This can be understood, first, as implying that the soul, conceived as the principle 
of life that is concerned with the interiority of organic life, is not reducible to the order of the 
material. But Hegel holds, more importantly, the view of the body as something negative to the 
soul, namely something that is to be negated by and subordinated to the soul. It is therefore to be 
noted that within the framework of Hegel’s dialectical notion of the truth, the soul-body 
opposition does not merely display the defect of the representational thinking of modern 
philosophers. If modern philosophers consider the soul-body communion in terms of a “copular 
of a judgment,” namely in a non-dialectical connection of the two finite substances by the divine, 
infinite substance as their real ground, this dualism of modern philosophy denotes, more 
fundamentally, the free judgement of the Concept, namely the original division [Ur-teil] of spirit 
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into the material and immaterial, or the natural and spiritual: the self-division of spirit in and 
through which it restores its original unity.  
 In short, the soul constitutes the starting point of spirit insofar as it is conceived as the 
principle of organic life that makes a living body into a totality that has simplicity, but it is 
nothing but a starting point. Again, spirit’s emergence necessarily involves the sublation of its 
externality in nature, which occurs through the movement of the soul whereby it gradually 
overcome its immediate subordination to the body. In this sense, the soul is for Hegel not just 
“for itself immaterial” but the “universal immateriality of nature.”105 The soul, in other words, is 
not just the principle of organic life but an existent in which spirit reveals itself as the truth of 
and the power over nature, thereby actualizing itself as the genuine universality. It is therefore 
important to note that the soul that Hegel thematizes in the Anthropology has very little to do 
with the biological functionality or teleological constitution of a living body. Instead, the soul in 
the Anthropology designates a human existence that is under the direct influence of natural 
factors, immediately embodies her inner feelings or emotions, and inscribes social norms into her 
body through habituation. By going through this pathway in the Anthropology from the natural, 
to the feeling, and finally to the actual soul, the soul gradually displays itself as a power over its 
body, which is the pre-condition for a human being to exist as a spiritual being—one who leads a 
self-conscious, intersubjective life as described in the Phenomenology of Spirit and who lives in 
the realm of objective spirit as the bearer of the freedom of spirit, in the sense established in the 
Psychology. Eventually, the soul is for Hegel defined as nature-spirit [Naturgeist],106 both in the 
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sense of itself being directly subordinated to natural factors and gradually subordinating them to 
its power.  
Returning to §389, Hegel also suggests that the soul, conceived as the “universal 
immateriality of nature,” constitutes the “simple ideal life of nature.” This determination of the 
soul as the simple life of nature, I think, gives an important clue for grasping in detail the sense 
in which spirit’s sublation of its externality in nature takes places in and through the soul. To 
spell out this, I refer to the Zusatz to § 381 where Hegel speaks of the different degrees of 
externality found in inanimate beings, plants and animals, respectively. As we have seen earlier, 
by externality of nature, Hegel means asunderness and side-by-sideness of natural beings in 
space. In the Zusatz to § 381, Hegel applies the notion of asunderness to the constitution of a 
single material body and categorizes different kinds of natural bodies depending on different 
degrees of asunderness.  
To begin, animate bodies have lesser externality and greater interiority than inanimate 
bodies. Inanimate bodies can easily break up into parts but cannot recover their original bodies 
once these break up. They have a greater degree of asunderness than animate bodies because 
these can preserve themselves as organic wholes even when they get wounded or diseased by 
virtue of their abilities to heal the wounds and diseases for themselves. In a similar vein, animate 
bodies have interiority, which inanimate bodies lack, insofar as they are alive by the constant 
process of self-organization. Hegel suggests that this process essential to animate bodies is 
comprehensible as involving “a center that overflows into the periphery, a concentration of 
differences.”107 This being said, animate bodies also have subjectivity in the sense that they 
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actively reproduce themselves as self-identical unities in self-differentiations. In this sense of 
having interiority and subjectivity, animate bodies, Hegel suggests, are “less real, more ideal, and 
of a higher necessity” than inanimate bodies.108 Whereas inanimate bodies are characterized by 
pure externality of nature in the sense of asunderness, animate bodies are ideal in the sense that 
their parts do not remain asunder but actively organize themselves to form a single body.  
But Hegel further emphasizes the difference between plants and animals. An animal body 
constitutes a sentient body due to the system of nerve and brain. It is therefore not just a self-
organizing whole.  
 
[…] the whole is so penetrated by its unity that nothing in it appears as self-subsistent, […] 
in the animal body the complete untruth of asunderness is exposed. Through this being-
together-with-itself in the determinacy, through this immediate reflectedness into itself in 
and out of its externality, the animal is subjectivity that is for itself and has sensation; 
sensation is just this omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members, which 
immediately communicate every impression to the single whole which in the animal, is 
beginning to become for itself.109 
 
As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Hegel holds that sensation is accompanied by self-feeling. This 
being assumed, an animal body has subjectivity not only in the sense that it is a self-organizing 
whole but also in the sense that it has an unconscious, immediate self-awareness in its sensory 
activities. An animal body is therefore not just a simple totality. Insofar as it senses and has a self 
in sensations, it constitutes the “being-together-with-itself,” namely a unity that is reflected into 
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itself, as Hegel puts it in the passage above. To that extent, an animal body has interiority and 
subjectivity to a greater degree than a plant body does. It is more ideal, less real, and more 
necessary than the latter. In this context, it is also to be noted that Hegel considers sensation in 
terms of a practical activity that involves a negative and active relationship of a sentient subject 
to the surrounding world. The fact that animals have sensations, in other words, means for Hegel 
that they can exercise a negative power on the objects in the world by eating them up. This 
negative, active feature of an animal’s sensitive life makes an animal body essentially distinct 
from a plant body. Whereas the growth of a plant body, Hegel suggests, passively depends on 
external elements including sunlight, water, and temperature, an animal body can actively 
annihilate external objects due to its sensitive power.110 Thus, animals have interiority and 
subjectivity to a greater degree than plants do, not only in the sense that they have an immediate 
self-awareness in their sensory activities but also in the sense that they can assimilate external 
objects to them. By implication, animals are freer from externality of nature than plants are. In 
this sense, Hegel states that overcoming externality of nature is “incomplete in plants and 
complete in animals.”111  
 By referring to Hegel’s discussion of the difference among inanimate, plant, and animal 
bodies, we can understand his notion of the soul as the “simple ideal life of nature” as implying 
that an animal body is the most ideal among all natural beings due to its ability to sense. We can 
also say that an animal actively overcomes externality of nature through its sentient body insofar 
as its body has ideality in the sense of having a self for itself, i.e., an immediate self-awareness, 
in sensations and assimilating external objects to themselves by eating them up. I therefore pay 
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attention to the fact that the sentient soul is where in Hegel’s system Nature ends and Spirit 
begins. Hegel writes: “this transition from necessity to freedom is not a simple transition but a 
gradual transition [Stufengang] of many moments, whose exposition constitutes the philosophy 
of nature. At the highest stage of this sublation of asunderness, in sensation, spirit, which is in 
itself in its being captive in nature, reaches the beginning of being-for-itself and thus of 
freedom.”112 I have earlier suggested that the soul is for Hegel defined as the “universal 
immateriality of nature” or the “nature-spirit” in the sense that it is that in which spirit reveals 
itself as a genuine universality by sublating its externality in nature. In relation to this point, the 
consideration above concerning Hegel’s other definition of the soul as the “simple ideal life of 
nature” shows that spirit’s sublation of its externality in nature takes place in and through a 
sentient body.  
 It is to be noted, however, that the Anthropology certainly thematizes the sentient soul but 
does not deal with sensations in terms of a sentient subject’s active, negative relationship with an 
external object. As I have suggested in Chapter 3, the ability to sense conceived as a power of 
desire that enables one to enter into a practical relationship with the objects in the world requires 
the oppositional relation between subject and object. It can therefore be treated in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, which thematizes the oppositional constitution of consciousness. But 
in the Anthropology, we do not have yet the distinction of consciousness between subject and 
object. At the level of the Anthropology, in other words, we have a sentient soul as the subject 
matter, and we know that it constitutes a turning point between Nature and Spirit. But we do not 
know anything about the distinction between an internal self and an external object that 
consciousness is supposed to have as a subject of desire. In this sense, the soul in Hegel’s 
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Anthropology is characterized as a pre-conscious, undifferentiated totality, which has no 
distinction between inner and outer worlds. What the Anthropology shows is how the conscious 
distinction between an inner subject and an outer object arises from the undifferentiated soulful 
totality.  
If so, how can we treat our faculty of sensation without presupposing the distinction 
between subject and object? Do we not enter into a relationship with an object primarily through 
our sensations? Regarding these questions that may arise from our ordinary understandings of 
sensation, it is to be noted that the key theme of the Anthropology is the relationship between the 
soul and the body. Hegel’s primary concern in this first part of the Philosophy of Spirit where 
spirit is still immersed in nature is to show how the soul and the body constitute an immediate 
unity and how the soul immediately exists as and through its bodiliness. What the Anthropology 
concerns in this context is the sentient body through which the soul expresses its inner feelings 
and has self-feeling and not the soul’s interactions with sensory objects. As I deal with in 
Chapter 5, however, the immediate bodily existence of the soul, namely the soul’s immediate 
exteriorization of its self through its expressive bodiliness ultimately leads to the soul’s 
pathological, one-sidedly subjective relationship with the world. Only when this pathological 
existence of the soul is overcome, one can enter into the world of the Phenomenology of Spirit in 
which consciousness as a subject of desire makes a practical relationship with sensory objects. 
The conditions under which the soul stands in a non-subjectivist, objective, and actual 
relationship with the world, in other words, are first to be elucidated before one moves forward 
to a discussion on the life of consciousness, which is based on the distinction intrinsic to 
consciousness between an inner subject and an outer object. The problem of the sentient body in 
Hegel’s Anthropology thus boils down to the issue of how the existence of a human, spiritual 
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being emerges from the transformation of bodiliness from its first, sentient mode into a second, 
encultured one.  
 
(2) Substance as absolute foundation [Grundlage]. Hegel’s definition of the soul as a 
substance can first be understood in terms of the universality of the natural soul. As I deal with in 
Chapter 5, the natural soul, which comes to the first stage of the Anthropology, is an 
undifferentiated substantial totality that has neither individuality nor subjectivity, in contrast to 
its subsequent form, the feeling soul that has a subjectivity in its self-feeling. This implies that in 
its first appearance in the Anthropology, the natural soul immediately participates in the universal 
course of nature. What the Anthropology first portrays is thus the mode of existence in which the 
human being’s life is immediately subordinated to environmental factors.   
 But Hegel’s definition of the soul-substance as the absolute foundation of spirit further 
implies that the soul is a substrate containing all determinations of consciousness and spirit-as-
such that will be developed in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and even all the determinations 
of objective spirit, which will be posited and recollected by absolute spirit. Thus, the soul is a 
substrate that underlies and undergoes all further developments of spirit in the Philosophy of 
Spirit. It is that which embraces everything about Geist. Now, one can set Hegel’s definition of 
the soul as the absolute foundation of spirit in the context of his notion of the determinate 
substrate developed through the dialectic of form and matter in the “Ground” section in the 
Doctrine of Essence. As I attempted to show in Chapter 2, what Hegel develops through that 
dialectic is the notion that thought is a matter of which the form involves the self-relating 
negativity. As such, thought is a determinate substrate; in this sense, it is the content. My claim 
was that this Hegelian notion of matter is indebted to Aristotle’s thought about the relationship 
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between form and matter but is fundamentally different from the latter’s hylomorphic notion of 
matter as an indeterminate substrate receptive of any form. Indeed, one cannot directly apply 
Hegel’s logical notion of matter as a determinate substrate to the notion of the soul as a 
determinate substrate because the former concerns pure thought and its self-determining 
movement whereas the latter concerns a natural existent with a psyche. But the idea in the logic 
that thought is a self-determining matter allows us to consider the soul as such a matter that 
determines itself, given that both are defined as a determinate substrate. Although the connection 
is loose, this likely further allows us to consider the soul’s bodiliness as a particular kind of 
matter or a natural being in which spirit’s movement of self-development takes place. As I show 
in Chapter 5, it is a realm where some spiritual elements can directly be embodied or 
materialized and this immediate mode of the materialization of the spiritual can also be 
transformed.  
 
(3) Sleep of spirit: the passive νοῦς of Aristotle. Traditionally, it has been largely assumed that 
chapters 4 and 5 of Aristotle’s De Anima, Book III, deal with the passive and active nous, 
respectively. Since Hegel defines the soul as spirit in sleep and identifies this with Aristotle’s 
passive nous, I below examine Aristotle’s notion of the nous as “all things in potentiality” 
presented in the De anima, Book III, chapter 4 and Hegel’s interpretation of it in his Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy.  
In chapter 4 of his De anima, Book III,113 Aristotle sets out his discussion of the 
intellective soul by the analogy and disanalogy with the sensitive soul. As with sensing, thinking 
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is “potentially identical in character with its object without being the object .”114 Thinking is thus 
analogous to sensing insofar as it is the capacity for receiving the form of an object while 
remaining unaffected or impassible. But thinking differs from sensing since mind thinks all 
things whereas sense perceives only perceptible things. To be more precise, a sense perceives 
sensible things only in its range; mind is unlimited in the range of its objects. From this, it 
follows, Aristotle argues, that mind “must be pure from all admixture.”115 By arguing this, 
Aristotle embraces Anaxagoras’ reasoning that if mind were mixed with something else, this 
would hinder it from ruling—that is, knowing and making things known—all things. In order 
that mind is accessible to all intelligible things without limit, it is necessary, according to 
Aristotle, that mind is unmixed with anything else and separate from all things.  
But the notion that mind is separate from all things entails the difficulty concerning how 
it comes to think. Aristotle suggests that this difficulty can be resolved by supposing that “mind 
is in a sense potentially the intelligible things but in actuality nothing until it thinks.”116 Mind 
may well be conceived as “the place of forms” as his predecessors suggest.117 But it is the place 
of all intelligible things only in potentiality and stays the store of all things in potentiality even 
when it does not actually think. This being said, mind is all things in potentiality but nothing in 
actuality.  
                                                   
anima: Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De anima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Regarding the 
citation above, I choose Polansky’s translation “mind” for “νοῦς” instead of “thought” used in the Oxford translation 
because νοῦς in the citation denotes the soul that thinks, i.e., the intellective soul whose operations differ from those 
of the nutritive and sensitive souls. For the detailed explanation of this translation, see: Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s 
De Anima, 440. 
114 Aristotle, De anima, 429a15-16. 
115 Aristotle, De anima, 429a18. 
116 Aristotle, De anima, 429b28-29. 
117 Aristotle, De anima, 429 a27-29. 
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Regarding the way in which mind as all things in potentiality comes to actually think, it is 
important to note that all things stored in mind are not possibilities in a broad sense of whatever 
is not impossible. 118 For Aristotle, mind’s potentiality of thinking is a real power or capacity 
which is developed over time. Mind develops the potentiality of thinking by forming intelligible 
things by experience and learning. In this sense, mind is all things in potentiality. To put it 
another way, mind is “what it is by virtue of becoming.”119 Further, Aristotle argues that mind as 
actual thinking is “what it is by making of all things.”120 By this, he suggests that actual thinking 
involves a difference between “matter” and “cause which is productive in the sense that it makes 
all.”121 This idea in chapter 5 of De anima, Book 3 caused a number of discussions on and 
controversies over the passive and active nous. Given the complexity of this issue, however, I 
here only attempt to grasp some general ideas of Aristotle which I find are helpful to elucidate 
Hegel’s definition of the soul as the passive nous in the Anthropology. First, insofar as mind can 
be conceived as the place of intelligible things, one may consider it a substrate where actual 
thinking arises in the way that matter is considered a substrate of changes. This notion of matter 
as a substrate of changes, however, is applicable to mind only analogously. Since Aristotle 
consider “mind’s becoming intelligible things,” the distinction between mind and intelligible 
                                                   
118 As for the distinction between possibility and potentiality, see in particular: Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De 
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powers to be actualized. Polansky gives an example: “bricks on the way to becoming a house are potentially a 
house, whereas clay would only be potentially a house when already formed into bricks.” When applied to the mind, 
a human newborn is born with the power or potentiality of sense perception. But she is born with the possibility of 
thinking and not the potentiality for thinking. This is because in order for mind to think, intelligible things must 
enter the mind from sense experiences. Intelligible things, in other words, are formed in mind over time by 
experiences and learning. This is the way in which mind is developed from its initial mere possibility of thinking all, 
into a potentiality of thinking all.   
119 Aristotle, De anima, 430a14. 
120 Aristotle, De anima, 430a14. 
121 Aristotle, De anima, 430a10-14. 
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things is somehow blurred. Consequently, we do not have to assume that mind is a substrate 
where intelligible things are thought. Instead, perhaps one can say that intelligible things are 
matters in the sense that they are objects of thinking in potentiality. Second, intelligible things in 
mind operate as unmoved movers of thinking just as sensible objects are unmoved movers of 
sensing; they are the cause of thinking. Thus, the distinction between matter and cause does not 
necessarily imply that there are two different parts of the mind or two distinct minds. Instead, it 
is concerned with two different ways in which intelligible things are at work in thinking: as 
matters of thinking which are to be actualized by thinking on the one hand, and as the moving 
cause of thinking on the other. Then, thinking is an actualization of intelligible things in 
potentiality. This activity of thinking is eventually a self-thinking, thinking itself, since its object 
is the thinking itself in potentiality.  
With respect to Aristotle’s notion of mind as potentially all and actually nothing, Hegel 
puts great emphasis on the idea that mind is intelligible things as it becomes the latter: as he puts 
it, “νοῦς is νοητος or that which becomes thought [das Gedachtwerdende].”122 This further 
implies that “that which thinks [das Denkende] and that which becomes thought [das 
Gedachtwerdende] are one and the same.”123 The activity of thinking would then consist in 
making that unity of its subject and object actual; it is “the form of forms” “just as the hand is the 
tool of tools.”124 For Hegel, this is the correct way to comprehend the unity of subject and object, 
which the modern philosophy seeks for.  
                                                   
122  VGP: 88 (my translation.) 
123  VGP: 89. 
124 VGP: 89. 
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 Now, Aristotle’s discussion about the intellective soul and Hegel’s reading it in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy make Hegel’s definition of the soul as the passive nous in 
the Anthropology both comprehensible and questionable. First, if we put emphasis on Aristotle’s 
notion of mind as potentially all, we may interpret Hegel’s soul in the Anthropology as 
something that contains all further determinations of spirit in potentiality. However, it is then 
questionable why Hegel refers to the Book 3 of De anima where the intellective soul is 
discussed. Indeed, Aristotle deals with the intellective soul as separable from matter, in the sense 
that it is unmixed with any other things in order to be able to think all, that its operations do not 
depend on bodily conditions, and that its objects, intelligible things, are not enmattered. As 
Hegel rightly emphasizes, the separability from matter in this sense is the element that makes it 
possible for mind to be identical with intelligible things. The activity of the intellective soul, 
which is a self-thinking and which Hegel conceives as a form of forms, is therefore concerned 
with the pure thinking exhibited in the Science of Logic. However, the main concern of the 
Anthropology is not the human-divine thinking but the animal-human sensation. Therefore, one 
can call into question how the notion of passivity characteristic of Aristotle’s nous as intelligible 
things can be used for characterizing the soul of Hegel’s Anthropology.  
 
But what Aristotle says about thinking, is for itself absolutely speculative and does not 
stand next to another, for instance, to sensation; […] for sensation is a mere δύναμις 
[potentiality] for thinking. νοῦς is all in itself, is totality, or what is truthful without 
qualification with respect to its being-in-itself and to thought [Gedanke]; then, it is being 
that is truly in and for itself, or thinking—this activity, which is being-for-itself and being-
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in-and-for-itself, is a thinking of thinking, […] which constitutes the nature of absolute 
spirit for itself.125  
 
Hegel suggests that the intellective and sensitive soul are not separate from each other the way 
that a thing stands next to another thing. Instead, the thinking soul should somehow include the 
sensing soul such a way that the latter is the potentiality for the former. This implies, as far as I 
see, that the formation of intelligible things as objects of thinking involves the process of 
sensation. We have seen above that mind develops itself into the potentiality for thinking all by 
forming the intelligible things in the soul. While holding that the formation of intelligible things 
in mind is carried out by learning and experience, Aristotle explains in chapter 2 of De anima, 
Book 3 how it occurs within the soul in terms of fantasia. Briefly stated, sensation is here not 
considered a momentary cognitive event with respect to what is immediately present. The 
sensation of red color, for instance, disappears when one takes away a red rose from the sight. 
But it leaves in mind a sort of image of red color, i.e., fantasma, which can be present in mind 
without the presence of a red rose and which we can bring to mind as we wish. It is distinct both 
from sensation and thinking but somehow overlaps with both. For it is involved in the process of 
sense perception on the one hand; it can be part of thinking on the other, insofar as it leads, as a 
faculty of illusory images, to opinions [endoxa].  
 Considering the way in which in Aristotle’s De anima, fantasia connects sensation and 
thinking while remaining distinct from both, the part on representation and imagination in the 
Psychology of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, I suggest, can be read as a Hegelian 
version of a theory of fantasia. Indeed, Hegel seems to concern more to a positive link between 
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representation and thinking, as he suggests that memory [Gedächtis] is a thought [Gedachte]. 
The positive link can further be considered to be a genesis of pure thinking, insofar as the 
internalization [Erinnerung] which takes place in imagination or the faculty of representation can 
be understood as a process whereby mind becomes thoughts or intelligible things. It is, in other 
words, a process whereby it is established that “νοῦς is νοητος or what becomes thought [das 
Gedachtwerdende],” namely that “that which thinks [das Denkende] and that which becomes 
thought [das Gedachtwerdende] are one and the same.”126 From this perspective, the part on 
imagination and representation in the Psychology may be viewed as offering the genesis of the 
pure, infinite thinking in the Science of Logic. 
 But Hegel’s point in the passage above from the Lectures on the History of Philosophy is 
that sensation—neither fantasia nor representation or inwardization of images—is the 
potentiality of thinking. Again, “soul is the passive νοῦς of Aristotle, which is all potentially.”127 
Therefore, I suppose an essential connection between the Anthropology and the Psychology as I 
have mentioned in Chapter 3. Soul and spirit-as-such denote different aspects of the same subject 
matter, i.e., subjective spirit, rather than different entities. If the inwardizing recollection of 
images takes place in spirit-as-such, the soul is the same spirit-as-such which is considered in its 
undifferentiated substantiality. With reference to the notion that the soul is substance and 
universal materiality of nature, I further suggest that the soul is the substance of spirit-as-such: 
that which underlies the movement of theoretical spirit in the Psychology. Further, it is also to be 
noted that while the soul is for Hegel the passive nous which is all potentially, he also holds that 
Aristotle’s notion of a thinking of thinking, namely the devine νόησις or νοεῖν exhibits “the 
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nature of the absolute spirit.”128 If the soul is the passive nous, it is therefore something 
substantial which includes all, with respect not only to spirit-as-such but more fundamentally to 
the absolute spirit.  
 According to the above considerations, perhaps one can say that the difference between 
the Anthropology and the Psychology consists in the different ways in which sensation is 
thematized. In the Psychology, sensation is considered separately from the body, whereby its 
intelligent aspect concerning representation and inwardization is thematized. In the 
Anthropology, sensation is considered in terms of immediate embodiment of inner feelings, 
which may be pathological due to the immediacy of the embodiment.  
 
Conclusion. Hegel’s Anthropology Without a Teleology of History 
 
As a final remark, I here briefly discuss how the difference in the view of nature results 
in the different idea of an anthropology by comparing Kant and Hegel. As I have attempted to 
show, nature plays a vital role in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. But what grounds his 
anthropology is not the notion of his transcendental idealism that nature is a totality of 
appearances, which are also the objects of natural sciences, but the teleology of nature that 
considers nature a whole that is teleologically organized. We thus notice that Kant’s 
anthropology is grounded in the view that nature is not just a mechanistic space in which natural 
beings are supposed to stand in causal relations to each other. More fundamentally, nature is a 
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teleological world in which the teleologically self-organizing objects, i.e., organisms exist; they 
are the ends for the sake of which inanimate beings are supposed to exist; and human beings 
populate as the master of all other natural beings while heading towards another world of moral 
perfection. This teleological world of nature thus has for its end the existence of the moral and 
cultured beings, i.e., humans. It is also a historical world in which numerous generations of the 
human species have lived and will continue to live; and the human species fully developed its 
antagonistic nature with the advent of modern civil society and is heading for the cosmopolitan 
future. In Kant’s teleology of nature, nature is thus moralized, humanized, and historicized. This 
is the world of nature that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology assumes. And the humanity that 
Kant’s pragmatic anthropology seeks in this teleologically humanized world of nature consists in 
moral perfection, which is always in the noumenal, future tense.  
Unlike Kant, Hegel does not consider nature in terms of a teleological whole or totality 
of all natural beings. What for Hegel defines nature is for externality in the sense of asunderness 
and side-by-sideness. That is, nature is a realm of indifferent coexistence of natural beings in 
which they exist asunder and side-by-side without forming a teleological whole. What is organic 
in Hegel’s system is the Concept or the Idea, and nature is itself inorganic. Nature constitutes 
part of the organic whole of the Concept and a moment of the dialectical life of the Idea. As it is 
primarily defined as externality, however, nature is the negative moment in which the Idea does 
not exist in its true form and is therefore to restore itself as interiority and subjectivity by 
sublating its untrue existence in the form of externality. As I discussed, the organic character of 
the Concept and the inorganic character of nature also have important methodological 
implications. Although nature does not reveal the Concept in its concrete totality, we can arrange 
our understandings of natural beings according to the degree of externality, namely the extent to 
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which they are far from or close to the interiority and subjectivity of spirit. Thus, Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature describes how the Idea becomes for itself by going through the stages of 
nature—mechanical, chemical, and teleological ones. This being said, Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Nature does not go for a spiritualization of nature in the Kantian, teleological sense. In his 
system of absolute idealism, nature is neither moralized, nor humanized, nor historicized. This 
does not imply that nature for Hegel has nothing to do with spirit. Evidently, nature is in his 
system of absolute idealism conceived as part of the life of spirit. It is part of the life of spirit, 
however, as the alterity or otherness of spirit. The relationship of nature with spirit, therefore, is 
entirely dialectical: nature is the other of spirit because it is the other of spirit.   
What underlies Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the Anthropology is 
the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit. Its primary concern is to show how spirit 
first appears in the form of Naturgeist and how it gradually emerges as spirit out of this 
immediate submersion in nature. Consequently, the various forms of human life treated in his 
Anthropology in relation to the systematic issue of spirit’s emergence out of nature do not take 
on the teleological, Enlightenment view of human history. The sweeping criticism that Hegel’s 
Anthropology is grounded in the teleology of history is therefore to be thoroughly reexamined.  
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CHAPTER 5. The Dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology: 
Soul, World, and Bodiliness 
 
 In the previous chapters, I have discussed Hegel’s rejection of subjectivist notions of 
consciousness based on the first-person perspective (Chapter 1); how his philosophy of 
subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia relates to the Science of Logic (Chapter 2); how the 
philosophy of subjective spirit deals with the finite human spirit in its threefold constitution 
concerning the soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such (Chapter 3); how Hegel’s Anthropology is 
related to his philosophy of nature and how it does not adopt the Enlightenment view of 
universal history (Chapter 4). Based on these previous studies, in this chapter I offer a thorough 
analysis of Hegel’s Anthropology.  
 Hegel’s Anthropology comprises three parts: “The Natural Soul” (§§ 388-412), “The 
Feeling Soul (§§ 403-10), and “The Actual Soul” (§§ 411-12). “The Natural Soul” section begins 
with the consideration of the soul’s immediate connection with natural qualities including 
meteorological, geographic, and dispositional determinations. While this first stage of the natural 
soul portrays human life as it is under the direct influence of nature, the second stage deals with 
the differences that are at once natural and spiritual, which Hegel calls natural alternations. In 
this second stage of the natural soul, Hegel thematizes the stages of life that a person goes 
through during her lifetime, the sex relationship in which a subject finds her self in another 
subject of the opposite sex, and the alternation between sleep and waking that one undergoes 
every day. The differences that an individual soul runs through in these three ways of alteration 
are all at once natural and spiritual: a person goes through different stages of life depending on 
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her age, but they involve different ways in which the person relates to the cultural world; two 
individuals of the opposite sex form a relationship based on sexual desires and emotional 
affections, but they thereby produce an ethical union, i.e., the family; and the alternation of sleep 
and waking is a change in physical state but is ultimately concerned with the soul’s 
differentiation into being and being-for-itself, substantiality and subjectivity. Through the first 
two stages of the natural soul, i.e., natural qualities and natural alterations, spirit thus appears, 
first, in its immediate submersion in nature and, second, in the form of a complex of natural and 
spiritual elements. With this development of Naturgeist in the first two stages of the natural soul, 
the Anthropology comes to thematize its subject matter: the relationship between the soul and the 
body. This is what Hegel deals with in the third stage of the natural soul, i.e., sensation.  
 We thus notice that Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the Anthropology 
is preceded by the development of Naturgeist, which leads us step by step to the point where we 
come to have an object that has both individuality and subjectivity, i.e., the sentient soul. It is 
therefore important to note that Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship at the last stage 
of the natural soul, i.e., sensation, is embedded in the pivotal problem of the Encyclopedia 
system, that is, the emergence of spirit out of nature. As Hegel holds that sensation is the end 
point of Nature and the starting point of Spirit, the sentient soul is that in which spirit sublates its 
naturalness, thereby revealing itself as spirit. Framed by this systematic issue of the 
Encyclopedia, Hegel’s Anthropology thematizes sensation in terms of the immediate bodily 
existence of the soul rather than an epistemic encounter with an external object. The sentient soul 
is thus considered an immediate existence as the body, namely as that which comes to exist by 
immediately exteriorizing its interior through its bodiliness.  
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This expressive, bodily existence of the sentient soul, however, is completely immediate 
such that it has no connection with the external world. This condition of the stage of sensation 
where it is supposed that the natural soul is not yet mediated by objective consciousness and its 
objective relationship with the world is not yet established causes the soul to fall into one-sided 
subjectivism. Falling out of joint with the world of actuality, the soul thus insists on her beliefs 
and ideas even when they are contradicted by the objective reality outside of herself. This one-
sided subjectivism of the sentient soul is what Hegel thematizes in the “Feeling Soul” section 
and considers under the rubric of derangement [Verrücktheit] or madness. Derangement, 
however, is not just insanity. For Hegel, derangement proper occurs when one is tormented by an 
awareness of the unresolved and irresolvable contradiction between her inner world and the outer 
world of actuality. The distinct character of a deranged subject is therefore not the maniacal 
reactions but the feeling of unhappiness, which is in fact an expression of a high form of 
consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness.  
 The ultimate significance of derangement bears on Hegel’s speculative notion of 
consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, reason as the unity of reason 
and unreason. Derangement presents the conflictual coexistence of those two elements in one 
conscious subject and thus reveals the speculative constitution of consciousness, although only 
negatively. This stage of the feeling soul where the inner contradiction of consciousness bursts 
out thus constitutes the negative stage in the development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology. 
Derangement, in other words, represents the negative of spirit’s own, which spirit is to overcome 
for itself to reveal itself as spirit. In relation to the self-development of Geist in the Encyclopedia 
system, we further notice that whereas Geist or the Idea went through the life, disease, and death 
of an organism at the end of the Philosophy of Nature, in the Anthropology it starts from the 
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death (the stages of life) and proceeds to the disease (derangement) and life (the actual soul) of 
an individual soul. Whereas the system of nature culminates in the death of an organism, the 
Anthropology thus describes the journey of Geist whereby it gets out of the death of nature and 
comes to gain its proper form, that is, life, with the attainment of the actual soul, or 
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In this journey of Geist toward life in the 
Anthropology, then, derangement also represents the diseased stage of Geist that it is to 
overcome to acquire life.1  
                                                   
1 By suggesting that the self-development of Geist in the Anthropology throughout the three stages of the natural 
soul, feeling soul, and actual soul can be considered in terms of the process whereby Geist gets out of death and goes 
through disease before it attains life, I draw on Hegel’s conception of disease as the state in which a certain part 
breaks loose from the organic, fluid totality of the whole. For Hegel, this notion of disease is applicable to the 
psyche as well as to the body, such that derangement or madness bears on the unconscious, soulful elements’ 
breaking free from the unity of consciousness. But derangement differs from physical disease in that it displays the 
negativity proper to Geist. Derangement is for Hegel the conflictual coexistence of consciousness and 
unconsciousness in one and the same psyche. As such, it reveals the speculative form of consciousness as the unity 
of consciousness and unconsciousness in its negative form. As I later examine in detail, therefore, the speculative 
meaning of derangement, for Hegel, rests on the fact that the most deranged is the most conscious. And this is the 
sense in which derangement represents the negativity of Geist. It is therefore important to note that what Hegel 
considers in the “Feeling Soul” section is not just this and that phenomenon or experience of mental disease, but the 
philosophical, speculative meaning of derangement in general. This being assumed, one can say that derangement 
represents the diseased stage in the self-development of Geist, more precisely, in the sense that it is that through 
which the negativity of Geist is fully exhibited.  
In this dissertation, I also suggest that the self-development of Geist in the Anthropology can be viewed as a process 
whereby Geist goes through childhood and youth before it achieves the stage of adulthood, drawing on Hegel’s 
discussion of the stages of life. This cannot mean, however, that Geist is born and grows like a person. Indeed, Geist 
is not a person. As I discussed in Chapter 2, it is that which displays its dialectical life in the Encyclopedia system 
through the movement of the Idea’s externalization into nature and internalization as spirit. It is therefore to be noted 
that the self-development of Geist in the Anthropology bears on the dialectical process whereby one moves from the 
natural soul to the feeling soul, and to the actual soul—dialectical, in the logical sense of the self-development of the 
Concept as a concrete universal, one through which it starts as undifferentiated unity and differentiates [Ur-teilen] 
before it reveals itself as reunited identity. Again, this process of Geist is not the development of a person. We 
cannot say, for example, that the natural soul is a child, the feeling soul is a youth, and the actual soul is an adult 
because we are directly affected by natural circumstances, become insane, and habituate ourselves regardless of our 
ages. What Hegel thematizes with those three forms of the soul, in other words, has little to do with how old a 
person is. My claim is that the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul can be portrayed as representing the stages 
of life of Geist and not those of a person. In making this claim, I also argue that the stages of life hinge upon the 
ways in which the soul and the world relate to each other; to that extent, they involve some general meanings 
applicable to the Anthropology as a whole. Briefly stated, the natural soul immediately participates in the universal 
course of nature, or it lives in a half-natural and half-spiritual world. Whereas there is no conflict between the soul 
and the world in this first stage of the Anthropology, the feeling soul stands in a conflictual relationship with the 
world. This second stage of the Anthropology thus introduces the conflict between the soul and the world. The third 
stage, then, shows how the soul comes to establish an objective relationship with the world by habit. Thus, the three 
forms of the soul represent three different modalities of our relationship with the world, and we proceed from 
immediate unity between the soul and the world to their separation, and their reunification step by step as we move 
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 What is to be overcome, however, has nothing to do with mental illness as a psychical 
symptom that a person undergoes; nor is the Anthropology concerned with suggesting a 
psychiatric remedy for mental illness. The problem of the feeling soul ultimately bears on the 
ontological condition of the sentient soul of immediately existing as the body without the 
mediation of objective consciousness and having not yet established its relationship with the 
world of actuality. What is to be overcome is this mode of existence. In the last stage of the 
feeling soul, “Habit,” Hegel thus re-thematizes the bodily existence of the soul, suggesting that it 
is the fundamental problem of the Anthropology. Habit, then, effectuates an overall 
transformation of bodiliness such that it can serves spiritual purposes in the realm of ethical life. 
With this transformation of bodiliness into a second nature, we thus arrive at the stage of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the realm of the intersubjective life of objective consciousness. This is 
how spirit emerges out of nature in the Anthropology.  
 Now, the main theme of Hegel’s Anthropology is the relationship between the soul and 
the body, and it treats this in relation to the key problem of the Encyclopedia concerning the 
emergence of spirit out of nature. This short summary, however, can never reveal the richness of 
the Anthropology. As I have outlined, the Anthropology is full of rich ideas with multiple layers 
of meaning, which together in their interconnections illuminate Naturgeist, its development and 
sublation. The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct Hegel’s idea of the soul-body relationship and 
show how spirit emerges out of nature without sacrificing the richness of the text. As I hopefully 
show, the dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology portrays the complicated relationships 
                                                   
from the natural soul to the feeling soul, and to the actual soul. In the Anthropology, in other words, Geist—
Naturgeist, more precisely—develops itself by going through those three different forms of the soul-world complex. 
This is the sense in which we can say that in the Anthropology, Geist goes through the stages of childhood and youth 
before it achieves the stage of adulthood. 
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between human, world, and bodiliness in their inseparable and dynamic connections. It thereby 
suggests that the prominently spiritual being in nature, i.e., the human being, exists, first of all, as 
the body, and that she is an essentially worldly being whose life and existence is inseparably 
connected with the world, and who interacts with the world through her bodiliness. How, then, 
does the human being as such a bodily-worldly existent come to live in the objective, spiritual 
world of actuality as an intersubjective subject? This is the key question I address in this chapter. 
This question further leads us to the properly dialectical meaning of Naturgeist. Indeed, the 
emergence of spirit out of nature or the spiritualization of nature performed by the dialectic of 
Naturgeist in the Anthropology cannot result in an absolute de-naturalization of spirit because 
spirit can reveal itself only through its other, i.e., nature. As I show, spirit is for Hegel essentially 
subject to self-naturalization, and Naturgeist embraces this essentially dialectical aspect of spirit. 
Herein lies the significance of the Anthropology for Hegel’s notion of Geist. 
 
1. Naturgeist and the Natural Soul: Soul, World, Bodiliness 
 
 The first stage of Hegel’s Anthropology, “the Natural Soul,” comprises three sub-stages: 
(1) Natural qualities (§§ 392-395); (2) Natural alterations (§§ 396-398); (3) Sensation (§ 399-
402). In the Anthropology the soul thus appears at first in its immediate connection with natural 
qualities or determinations including meteorological factors, geographical/racial differences, and 
natural predispositions. These sidereal, earthy, and personal elements that determine the soul in 
an immediate way present the stages in which spirit that is submerged in nature, i.e., Naturgeist, 
develops itself through universality, particularity, and individuality. At the end of this first stage, 
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we thus have the form of the natural soul that has individuality. Following this, the second stage, 
“Natural alterations,” thematizes the individuality of the soul, specifically in terms of the 
differences constituting an individual soul that are at once natural and spiritual. These differences 
are considered in terms of the three ways of the soul’s alteration: the stages of life (§ 396), the 
sex relationship (§ 397), and the transition from sleep to waking (§ 398). Thus, the natural soul is 
conceived as an individual who passes through different stages of life, finds her self in another 
subject of the opposite sex, and alternates between sleep and waking. Through the last way of the 
alteration, then, the soul is differentiated into being and being-for-itself, i.e., substantiality and 
subjectivity. This is the place where an object that has subjectivity appears for the first time in 
the Philosophy of Spirit. This incipient subjectivity has the form of a bodily subjectivity of a 
sentient soul because in the Anthropology spirit still has the form of the Naturgeist. This is what 
Hegel considers in the last stage of the natural soul, “Sensation.” Since this last stage of the 
natural soul discusses the soul-body relationship in earnest, in what follows I only consider the 
first two stages of the natural soul. The third stage, “Sensation,” will be discussed in the second 
section of this chapter.  
 The first two stages of the “Natural Soul” section, the “Natural Qualities” and the 
“Natural Alterations,” have received relatively less attention than other sections of the 
Anthropology where Hegel discusses embodiment, derangement, and habit. They contain, 
however, a set of pivotal ideas concerning Hegel’s dialectical notion of Naturgeist. While the 
“Natural Qualities” thematizes the human life forms in which one’s life is immediately affected 
by natural factors, the “Natural Alterations” concerns those forms in which one’s life has some 
spiritual elements, but these are ultimately subordinated to nature. The first two stages of the 
“Natural Soul” section thus exhibits how Geist appears, first, in its immediate submersion in 
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nature and, second, in its subordination to nature. Accordingly, we can hardly understand 
Hegel’s conception of Naturgeist and his idea of the relationship between nature and spirit 
without close examination of those first two stages of the “Natural Soul” section. Nor can we 
properly understand his discussions of embodiment, derangement, and habit if we dismiss those 
stages of the natural soul because Hegel’s Anthropology deals with the soul-body relationship 
within the framework of the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit.  
 Indeed, the unpopularity of the “Natural Soul” section is not surprising given its racist, 
ageist, sexist implications. Hegel’s presentation of different human races, together with his 
philosophy of world history that frames it, raises criticism for its commitment to racism. His 
discussion of the stages of life gives rise to the suspicion that he endorses the idea that one’s 
ways of life are decided by age, which is hard to accept due to its discriminatory effects 
concerning children, adolescents, and old people. And his consideration of the sex-relationship 
involves sexist and patriarchal ideas, suggesting that the family is based on gender roles, 
monogamist marriage, and the blood relationship. Given the severity and enormity of racist and 
sexist problems today in particular, then, the “Natural Soul” section seems to have no relevance 
today no matter what interesting philosophical ideas it presents. We therefore need to examine 
whether or not the “Natural Soul” section, where Hegel discusses spirit’s subordination to nature, 
supports naturalist reductionism, claiming that our identities and lives are determined by 
biological factors including race, age, and gender. In what follows, I show that the “Natural 
Soul” section does not involve the claim to naturalist, biological reductionism because it 
eventually means, for Hegel, that Geist is so fundamentally subordinated to nature that 
discussing its emergence out of nature is nonsensical. It is therefore important to investigate 
Hegel’s dialectical notion of Naturgeist without sacrificing all its subtlety. Leaving the context of 
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Hegel’s dialectic aside, however, it should also be noted that his statements about different 
human races and the presentation of the sex-relationship may have some racist and sexist 
implications and effects. I critically address this problem of the “Natural Soul” section in the 
Conclusion of this dissertation. Prior to this, I focus in this chapter on giving a detailed analysis 
of the “Natural Soul” section.   
 In what follows, I examine, first, the “Natural Qualities” and show how Hegel starts off 
his discussion of the soul-body relationship by challenging Schelling’s notion of the world-soul.  
With respect to the “Natural Alterations,” I show that the first alteration, the stages of life, 
presents the notion of the threefold complex consisting of soul, world, and body as the subject 
matter of the Anthropology, and that in this respect, Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body 
relationship in the Anthropology departs from Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Further, I consider the 
form of the world that we have at the stage of the natural soul. By doing this, I suggest that in 
this pre-recognitional, pre-intersubjective, cultural world, the individuality of the natural soul is 
ultimately subordinated to nature, i.e., death, and that it does not have yet the subjectivity proper 
to a spiritual being living in the ethical world, namely the intersubjective subjectivity realized by 
self-conscious subjects. But one cannot downplay the significance of the stages of life because 
one’s relationship with the world of actuality is the key element that underlies Hegel’s thought 
about human life in the Anthropology. This point will turn out to be important more explicitly as 
we proceed to the “Feeling Soul” section. The second mode of the soul’s alteration, the sex-
relationship, also provides crucial ideas concerning Hegel’s notion of Naturgeist. To spell out 
this dialectical notion of Hegel in relation to his thesis that the sex relationship finds its ethical, 
spiritual meaning in the family, I examine his presentation of Antigone in the Jena 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the discussion of the family found in the “Ethical Life” section in 
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the philosophy of objective spirit of the Encyclopedia. I show that there cannot be an absolute 
denaturalization of spirit because spirit is essentially involved in the movement of spiritualizing 
its other, i.e., nature, to reveal itself as spirit, and that this is the properly dialectical, speculative 
meaning of Naturgeist. Lastly, the transition from sleeping to waking exhibits how Hegel blurs 
the distinction between dreaming and awaking, thereby setting the stage for his discussion of 
derangement in the “Feeling Soul” section. 
 
1.1. Natural Qualities: The Gradual Emergence of Spirit out of Nature  
Hegel sets out his discussion of the soul in the Anthropology by defining the soul as 
“universal substance, which has its actual truth only as individuality, subjectivity.”2 Thus, the 
natural soul does not appear in its true form from the outset. It appears at first in its immediate 
association with universal determinations of nature. Starting with this form of the soul in which it 
participates in the universal course of nature, having neither individuality nor subjectivity, the 
first stage of the natural soul, “Natural Determinations,” further thematizes the 
particular/geographical and individual/dispositional determinations to which the soul is bound. It 
thus shows step by step how the natural soul comes to appear in its individuality.  
To be more precise, the Anthropology treats the soul as “an individual soul, but 
immediately only as a soul which just is [nur als seiende Seele], which has natural 
determinations in it.”3 It thus thematizes the human life forms that are immediately associated 
with natural factors including meteorological, geographical elements, and innate predispositions. 
                                                   
2 ENZ, § 391. 
3 Ibid. 
 
  289  
 
First, the natural soul takes part in universal planetary life in the sense that it is directly affected 
by meteorological factors such as climate, seasonal change, and periods of the day. On account 
of the immediate association with those environmental elements, it happens that one’s mood, 
decisions, and ways of behaving vary depending on them. Second, the natural soul is bound to 
race and the geographical features of the place where its race inhabits. Hegel conceptualizes the 
geographical distribution of human races on earth as the particularization of universal planetary 
life into different races. Third, the natural soul has natural predispositions such as talent, 
temperament and character. One may be born with a unique talent; one may be sanguine or 
phlegmatic or choleric or melancholic; one may be predisposed to cling to mere details or 
concerns or to greater aims. These natural predispositions are the elements that turn the natural 
soul into an individual soul.  In short, the natural soul is under the direct influence of the 
movement of the universe, embodies the geographical features of the local habitation, and has 
peculiar natural predispositions. In this first stage of its development, the natural soul stands for 
the natural existence of the human being—natural, in the sense that one is immediately and 
inseparably associated with those natural determinations in all her aspects of universality, 
particularity and individuality.  
Notable in this first stage of the natural soul where the soul gradually gains individuality 
is Hegel’s rejection of the idea of “a world-soul as a sort of subject.”4 What Hegel thereby 
challenges is Schelling’s Platonic conception of the soul as an animating principle of nature. 
Briefly stated, Schelling understands the notion of the world-soul in Plato’s Timaeus through the 
lens of Kant’s notion of the inner purposiveness of an organism presented in § 65 of the Critique 
of the Power of Judgement. Schelling writes: “we must moreover remind ourselves that Plato 
                                                   
4 Ibid. 
 
  290  
 
looked at the entire world as a ζωον, i.e., as an organized being, thus as a being whose parts are 
possible only in relation to the whole, and thus according to their form as well as connection 
reciprocally produce one another.”5 For Schelling, what Plato brings forth through the Timaeus is 
the idea that the entire world of nature constitutes an organic whole which has itself for both its 
means and ends.6 Schelling’s great concern to the view of nature as a self-organizing whole 
comes from his dynamic notion of the absolute. He holds that the absolute, conceived as the 
undivided, original unity of subject and object, completes itself as such by making itself divided 
into the two poles and constitutes itself as their unity. For Schelling, this self-development of the 
absolute takes place in nature. Thus conceived, nature is the realm in which the absolute reveals 
itself, which we can reconstruct in the form of a philosophical system that considers natural 
phenomena as the expressions of the self-organizing power of nature.  
                                                   
5 F.W.J. Schelling, Timaeus (1794), in Schellingiana, Bd. 4, ed. Hartmut Buchner (Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 
1994), 33. 
6 In the Timaeus, Plato suggests that the supreme, divine intelligence, personified as Demiurge, created the well-
ordered universe (kosmos) from an unordered aggregation of basic material elements, i.e., fire, earth, air and water 
(chaos), by setting in its center a “soul, which he extended through the whole body, with which he then covered the 
body outside:” Timaeus 34b, in Plato. Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997). Thus defined, the world-soul denotes a kind of principle of the cosmological organization 
of the universe, which is immanent and ubiquitous to it. That is, the universe has a rational order such that all motions 
in it are accountable in terms of mathematical relations, and this immanence of the supra-sensible world of the forms 
in the sensible world is made possible by the mediation of the world-soul. In the mythical language, Plato also gives 
an account of the creation of the world-soul by a Demiurge. This divine intelligence, first, made a mixture between 
divisible and indivisible being, a mixture between divisible and indivisible sameness, and the same mixture with 
difference and, second, mixed these three mixtures before he re-divided them, third, into two intersecting circles, an 
outer circle of the sameness and an inner circle of the difference, such that it keeps itself undividedly same and uniform 
outside while having divided inner circles that move at different speeds. What is to be noted is that the world-soul is 
constituted by the ontological elements shared by all things in the world including both indivisible and divisible things 
and not just pure supra-sensible forms. It also has the figure of a line, or more precisely a set of circles, which is 
assumed to ground the relations between the bodies with magnitude. One can therefore say that the world-soul is 
called a “soul” in the sense that it denotes a pure intelligence (nous) or rationality that exists or is realized in the 
sensible world. However, the intelligence or rationality that is embodied in the universe is for Plato conceived 
primarily in the Pythagorean mathematical model. That the universe has a world-soul, therefore, means that it has a 
rational, namely mathematical order. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the universe has life in the way that 
an organism has life. Although Plato hints at this, it is in an analogical sense rather than in a systematic, theoretical 
sense as Schelling conceives.  
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Hegel’s rejection of Schelling’s notion of the world soul rests on the idea that the 
absolute reveals itself as spirit rather than in nature. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the truth or the 
absolute, for Hegel, consists in the organic totality of the Concept and reveals itself through the 
dialectical life of the Idea. The prominent feature of nature, however, consists in externality, 
namely non-organic relations such as the asunderness and side-by-sideness of natural elements 
and beings in space. Thus, nature does not exhibit the Concept in its properly dialectical form. 
Whereas Schelling takes nature and spirit to be ontologically continuous and considers the self-
conscious form of human spiritual life to be a part of the self-organizing life of nature, therefore, 
spirit is for Hegel not reducible to the realm of nature.  
This does not imply, however, that Hegel endorses a dualism of nature and spirit. With 
respect to the constitution of his mature system of the Encyclopedia, he states that while the Idea 
is “immediate simple being-in-itself [Insichsein],” nature is “its being-outside-of-itself 
[Außersichsein]” and spirit is “its being-with-itself [Beisichselbestsein].” 7 More precisely, spirit 
is the Idea’s being-with-itself as “ideality, that is, the sublation of the otherness of the Idea, the 
Idea’s returning, and its having returned, into itself from its other.”8 Hegel’s Encyclopedia 
system thus presents the dialectical monism of the Idea or spirit. In his monistic system, both 
nature and spirit are parts of the dialectical self-development of the Idea, exhibiting different 
determinations of the Idea, i.e., externality and reflective interiority. These determinations 
certainly mark the essential difference between nature and spirit but do not render them 
incommensurable. For the reflective interiority of spirit consists in sublating its externality in 
nature. Spirit, in other words, reveals itself as spirit in and through nature, but this is not in the 
                                                   
7 ENZ, § 381 Z. 
8 Ibid. 
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sense that it is a part of nature but in the dialectical sense of idealizing this other of itself. 
Importantly, spirit’s sublation of its naturalness is not achieved at once. As I deal with later, 
embodiment of the soul is an idealization of nature by spirit. But this immediate idealization of 
nature through an immediate exteriorization of the soul’s interior lacks an objective link with the 
actual world, thereby leading the soul to the deranged, feeling form of life. The idealization of 
nature by spirit that occurs through the bodily exteriorization of the soul’s spiritual interior is 
therefore to be negated. This occurs through habit, which concerns the overall transformation of 
the soul’s bodiliness. When the soul thus obtains a habituated body that serves spiritual purposes 
in the actual world, nature is spiritualized such that it is sublated in and as a second nature. What 
Hegel’s Anthropology describes is such a gradual emergence of spirit out of nature. As I discuss 
later in relation to the sex relationship, however, the emergence of spirit cannot mean a complete 
denaturalization of spirit because it reveals itself only through its other, i.e., nature.  
Now, the point that spirit gradually reveals itself in increasingly spiritual forms by 
passing through various forms of a nature-spirit relationship explains why Hegel starts from 
universal, planetary determinations and proceeds to particular, geographic determinations, and to 
individual, dispositional ones. With this Conceptual order, the soul starts from its most natural 
and most abstract mode of existence and proceeds to more concrete and less natural modes of 
existence. Seen this way, the idea of spirit’s gradual emergence out of nature is at work from the 
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1.2. The Stages of Life of the Natural Soul and the Stages of Life of Geist 
 
The discussions of the soul’s immediate connection with natural determinations leads to 
the point where the soul has individuality in natural predispositions. Following this, Hegel 
proceeds to examine how one individual soul relates to its differences. At the level of the natural 
soul, the differences of an individual soul are both natural and spiritual, and they appear in the 
form of alteration, that is, the change of state that the soul undergoes:  
 
In the soul determined as an individual, the differences take the form of alterations in it, in 
the single subject persisting in the alterations, and of moments in its development. As they 
are at once [in einem] physical and spiritual differences, a concrete definition or 
description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the cultivated 
spirit.9  
 
Hegel discusses three different ways of the alteration of the soul: the stages of life (§ 396), the 
sex relationship (§ 397), and the transition from sleep to waking (§ 398). But in the passage 
above Hegel seems to be starting out his discussion of the first way of the alteration, i.e., the 
stages of life. In what follows, I consider the sense in which the stages of life involve the 
differences that are both natural and spiritual, and the way in which they frame Hegel’s 
Anthropology.  
 
                                                   
9 ENZ, §396. 
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The Threefold Complex: Soul, World, and Body10 
Briefly stated, the natural soul passes through the stages of life including childhood, 
youth, adulthood, and old age.  The stages of life are distinguished from one another depending 
on the way in which an individual relates herself to the actuality of the world she inhabits. 
Childhood is characterized by the soul’s innocent harmony with the world whereas youth is a 
period of opposition between the soul and the world or the soul’s ideal resistance to the existing 
order of the world. Adulthood is a period when one recognizes the world as completed and leads 
a practical life in that world. Finally, old age is a stepping back from the actuality of the world 
and liberation from limited interests with respect to the external world.11 If one can identify the 
stages of life as the differences that constitute an individual soul as Hegel does, this is because 
the soul can be said to remain a selfsame subject which goes through those stages and to which 
these belong. Further, those differences of the soul are both physical and spiritual because 
childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age involve one’s bodily growth and aging on the one hand, 
and the changes in her view of the world and way of relating herself to it on the other.  
 At first glance, Hegel’s thematization of the stages of life in terms of alterations of the 
soul seems quite odd. The formulation of the soul as a “single subject persisting in the 
alterations” in §396 is reminiscent of Aristotle’s notion of the substratum as what underlies all 
the changes it undergoes. Thus, it reminds us of Aristotle’s treatment of the soul in the De anima, 
in which the diverse functions of an ensouled-embodied being including growth, perception, and 
                                                   
10 As I discuss later, Hegel’s notion of bodiliness [Leiblichkeit] denotes the dynamic, ontological, expressive 
communion of the soul and the body rather than a physical, organic body (embodiment), or the dialectical 
relationship between one’s existence and the world in which one becomes part of the world by inwardizing it and 
outwardizes the world by taking part in the actuality of the world (habit). Since this technical meaning of Hegel’s 
term Leiblichkeit is not yet established, I here use the general term body instead of Hegel’s terminology bodiliness 
[Leiblichkeit]. 
11 ENZ § 396 A. 
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thinking are explained in terms of the changes undergone by that form-matter composite between 
potentiality and actuality. We notice, however, that Hegel’s notion of the soul as a subject that 
has individuality in its persisting through the stages of life has very little to do with Aristotle’s 
hylomorphic account of the soul. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Hegel highly appreciates 
Aristotle’s accounts of the soul-body relationship, estimating that they reveal Aristotle’s 
speculative insight about the inseparable unity of soul and body. And Hegel himself develops his 
non-dualistic, dynamic account of the soul-body relationship in the Anthropology, specifically by 
thematizing embodiment at the last stage of the “Natural Soul” section, and habit at the last stage 
of the “Feeling Soul” section. What Hegel’s Anthropology considers, however, is not just the 
soul-body relationship but the threefold complex consisting of soul, world, and body. As I 
discuss later in detail, embodiment, for Hegel, represents the way in which the soul immediately 
exists as the body; however, the soul that comes to exist by immediately exteriorizing its interior 
is necessarily subject to one-sided subjectivism due to the lack of an objective relationship with 
the world. Habit, then, is a process whereby the soul establishes an objective relationship with 
the world by transforming the mode of its bodily existence. Thus, the crucial assumption of 
Hegel’s Anthropology is that the human being is a worldly existence, one whose psychic life 
necessarily depends on her ways of interacting with the world, and that the mode of her worldly 
existence is mediated by the mode of her bodily existence. 
If the soul can be called a substance in the sense of the self-identical unity that underlies 
and undergoes changes, we thus observe that throughout his discussion of the stages of life, 
Hegel transforms this Aristotelian notion of sensible substance to conceptualize a particular type 
of sensible being:12 the sensible being that has a temporal individuality determined by birth and 
                                                   
12 As I discussed in Chapter 3 by examining Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aristotle does not consider 
 
  296  
 
death and undergoes changes in its physical states as it grows and gets old. This individual, 
sensible being that Hegel thematizes with his discussion of the stages of life, however, is not just 
a living organism because it goes through different ways of interacting with the cultural world as 
well as changes in its physical states. Therefore, Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship 
in the Anthropology is anthropological because what it thematizes is the human soul in particular 
and not the enmattered-ensouled being in general.  
 With respect to the point that Hegel’s Anthropology considers the human being as a 
worldly being, it is important to note that the world here at stake is a cultural world and not the 
natural environment. When discussing the stages of life, Hegel thus uses the term the genus 
[Gattung] for indicating the cultural world in which the soul is born, grows, and dies. As Hegel 
puts it, childhood consists the soul’s innocent unity with her genus; youth, in her opposition to 
her genus; adulthood, in an actual unity with her genus and the achievement of the “standpoint of 
the objective spirituality.”13 As I dealt with in Chapter 2, in the last stage of the Philosophy of 
Nature Hegel considers the genus-process to represent the relationship between individuality and 
universality that is inadequate for a spiritual existence. The genus-process is a natural course in 
which a natural species is sustained by individuals’ constant coming to be, begetting, and 
perishing. Hegel’s point was that in this course of nature, individuals are subordinate to death, 
which implies that their individuality is nothing but a vanishing moment of and for the 
universality of their species. The natural soul that undergoes the stages of life and maintains 
itself as a single subject persisting in them, however, differs from an individual member of a 
                                                   
the soul a substance; instead, the soul-body composite is a substance, a sensible and perishable substance.    
13 ENZ, § 396 Z. 
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natural species because it can truly “actualize the genus within itself.”14 Hence, the genus to 
which the natural soul relates herself is not the natural species but a cultural world that she 
inhabits as a cultural being. It is not a static universality in which all the same individuals 
perpetually appear and disappear. Instead, it is a dynamic and living universality that involves 
various relations with individuals: full acceptance, idealistic resistance, actual preservation, and 
reflective distancing, performed on behalf of individuals in relation to it.  
Now, we can pose a question as to why Hegel considers the relationship between an 
individual human being and the cultural world in terms of the four modalities: acceptance, 
resistance, actualization, and reflection, and why he considers these as related to age. Since we 
can explain the difference between nature and culture in many different ways, we need to 
expound the sense in which the cultural world differs from nature on account of those four 
modalities. We also need to examine whether or not these modalities are necessarily associated 
with age, and whether or not this is Hegel’s claim. All these issues are ultimately concerned with 
the sense in which the stages of life present the differences that are at once natural and spiritual. 
Since Hegel’s discussion is somewhat unfocused, discerning between the natural and spiritual 
dimension of the stages of life and elucidating the relationship between the two dimensions 
remain our interpretative tasks. 
 To begin, Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life is to be understood as concerning 
different modalities of one’s relationship with the world rather than a person’s life course. As 
mentioned above, the “Natural Alterations” differs from the “Natural Qualities” in that it 
concerns spirit’s subordination to nature whereas the latter thematizes spirit’s submersion in 
                                                   
14 Ibid. 
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nature. Thus, we can now point out that the soul’s immediate participation in the universal 
course of nature—e.g., the immediate determination of one’s mood by the weather, one’s life by 
race, and one’s personality by innate dispositions—cannot be called relationship, if a relationship 
is between two distinct relata, because the soul is in these cases so immediately merged with the 
natural, determining factors that it is not distinct from them. In the “Natural Alterations,” 
however, the soul no longer remains immediately associated with natural determinations. Instead 
of being merely passively affected by nature, the soul enters a relationship with the cultural 
world through its individuality. Of importance here is that the cultural world also undergoes 
changes in accordance with the ways in which individuals react to it. This is because it is the 
genus that is actualized by individuals’ activities. It is therefore to be noted that the relationship 
between humans and the world is deterministic bilaterally, in such a way that we grow up as 
adults responsible for the actuality of the world by being encultured in this world, and the world 
undergoes changes in accordance with our reactions—for instance, violent upheavals by our 
revolutionary actions, gradual reformations by our moderate approaches, and decays along with 
our falling into mannerism, indifference, and moral decadence. Since it is deterministic 
bilaterally, it is essentially dynamic and flexible. Of course, natural beings too bring about 
changes to their environmental world; some animal interactions, for instance, can cause changes 
in their ecosystem by bringing about changes in the food chain of their habitat. I am here not in a 
good position to enter into an in-depth discussion of the difference between nature and culture. It 
is here sufficient to note that the changes in the cultural world by human activities are far more 
contingent, irregular, and unpredictable than those in the natural world due to the exercise of 
human free will.  
 
  299  
 
Thus, we can say that just as an individual is born, grows, and dies, so does a cultural 
world come into being, become prosperous, decay, and collapse. In this sense of undergoing 
changes through a dynamic relationship with individuals, the cultural world has a historical 
temporality. This historical temporality that I draw from Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life, 
however, is the one that is grounded in natural temporality. It is therefore to be noted that birth, 
growth, and death are natural categories peculiar to an organism. When we say that a cultural 
world comes into being, becomes prosperous, decays, and collapses, we are thus applying the 
model of an organism’s life to the cultural world. On what ground, then, can we determine the 
four modalities of one’s relationship with the world, which Hegel presents through his discussion 
of the stages of life, as constituting a historical temporality of the world? Is it not a natural 
temporality that is metaphorically applied to historical changes? It is, indeed. And the fact that 
the four modalities constitute a historical temporality by analogy with nature is associated with 
the status of the Anthropology within the Encyclopedia system. Since the Anthropology is the 
place where the Philosophy of Nature ends and the Philosophy of Spirit begins, and the “Natural 
Soul” section considers human life and existence in terms of spirit’s submersion in or 
subordination to nature, we here do not have any conceptual or theoretical bases for thematizing 
human history. Thus, the stages of life have a spiritual dimension in that they display the 
historical nature of the human, cultural world; however, this spiritual dimension of the stages of 
life is subordinated to nature insofar as the historical temporality they display is grounded in 
natural temporality.  
The stages of life, however, also involve some distinctly human, historical aspect that is 
not grounded in nature. Regarding this, I pay special attention to the two modalities of one’s 
relationship with the world: resistance (youth) and actualization (adulthood). It is here to be 
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noted that the four stages of life and the four modalities of one’s relationship with the world 
Hegel discusses in the “Natural Alteration” have no conceptual, a priori ground. Neither one’s 
life course nor historical temporality, in other words, need be considered in the way that Hegel 
presents. Hegel’s formulation of the stages of life rather finds its ground, I suggest, in his 
experiences of and concerns with the reforms of Germany in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, and the two modalities, resistance and actualization, reflect them. These two 
modalities, then, represent the non-natural, spiritual dimension of the stages of life, first, in the 
general sense that revolution and reformation are distinctly human-historical changes and, 
second, in the particular sense that they exhibit the negativity of Geist in its historical 
manifestation that Hegel contemplated and conceptualized in relation to his experiences of the 
historical changes of his time. We can here refer to the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
published one year after Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army at Jena in 1806: “it is not 
difficult to see that ours is a birth-time, and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken 
with the world it has hitherto inhabited and has been conceived, is in the Concept that lets it sink 
into the past, and in the labor of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always 
engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet 
nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth—[and makes] a qualitative 
leap—and the child is now born, so likewise the spirit in its formation [der bildende Geist] 
matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous 
world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by symptoms here and there. […] But this new 
world has no more a complete actuality than a new-born child has.”15 In the Anthropology of the 
1830 Encyclopedia, then, we notice that the two modalities frame the Feeling Soul” section in a 
                                                   
15 GW 9, 14-5/ PhS, §§ 11-2.   
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significant manner; historical changes may cause individuals to feel alienated from the world and 
unhappy to such an extent as to become insane (derangement), or they may make them feel at 
home and enjoy settling down in the world (habit). As I discuss later, derangement constitutes a 
necessary stage in the development of Geist in the Anthropology. And the necessity of 
derangement is dialectical, first, in the sense that it represents the stage of differentiation [Ur-
teilen] in the development of Naturgeist and, second, in the sense that radical alienation 
dissolving and fluidizing all the things that were previously held is the prerequisite for the 
emergence of Geist—I consider the critical implications of Hegel’s notion of derangement in the 
Conclusion. Anticipating the “Feeling Soul” section, then, we can say that Hegel’s Anthropology 
considers humanity as essentially historical; further, the historicity of human existence in 
Hegel’s Anthropology is ultimately concerned with the particular ways of interacting with the 
world, those in which one feels alienated or feels at home with historical changes, rather than the 
analogous understanding of the cultural world as growing and decaying in a similar way to an 
organism.  
Seen this way, Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life does not involve any claim to 
ageism. Indeed, Hegel does not claim that our experience of the world is necessarily connected 
with how old we are; instead, he thematizes the stages of life to conceptualize different forms 
and modalities of our relationship with the world. Further, it can never be Hegel’s position that 
our relationship with the world is necessarily decided by age because this means, for him, that 
spirit is subordinated to nature in such a way that it can never emerge from that subordination. 
Therefore, I draw attention to the fact that the “Natural Alterations” thematizes the forms of 
human life in which we can discern, grasp, and conceptualize spiritual elements constitutive of 
human existence and life that are entangled in natural elements. Since spirit’s subordination to 
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nature is in Hegel’s Anthropology considered as something that is to be overcome for the 
emergence of truly spiritual reality, no discussion in the “Natural Alterations” support the 
position of naturalist reductionism, which claims that our identity, existence, and life are decided 
by natural, biological categories including race, age, and gender. 
We can further show that Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life, in fact, supports the 
idea that we can accept, resist, actualize, reflect on the world regardless of age, by showing how 
they frame the development of Geist in the Anthropology. Again, Hegel’s discussion of the 
stages of life centers around different modalities of our relationship with the world: acceptance, 
resistance, actualization, and reflection, and the two modalities, resistance and actualization, play 
an important role in his discussions of derangement and habit in the “Feeling Soul” section. 
Thus, the three stages of the Anthropology, i.e., the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul 
represent the three different modalities: while the natural soul represents the form of human life 
that involves no conflict with the world, the feeling soul is characterized by a serious conflict 
with it. The actual soul that is achieved by habit, then, represents the one who establishes an 
objective relationship with the world, thereby actualizing the world she lives in by her activities. 
Seen this way, what passes through the stages of life in Hegel’s Anthropology is Geist which 
passes through the three forms of the soul. To be more precise, Geist passes through childhood 
(the natural soul), youth (the feeling soul), and adulthood (the actual soul).  
Geist passes through the stages of life, however, not temporally but dialectically, in the 
sense that the three forms of the soul are concerned with philosophizing different modalities of 
one’s relationship with the world in terms of spirit’s emergence out of nature. Insofar as the 
Anthropology thus concerns the stages of life of Geist in this sense of conceptualizing different 
modalities of one’s relationship with the world, each of the three forms of the soul can represent 
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any person who is involved in the modality it represents regardless of how old this person is. 
Any person, in other words, can be the natural soul, or feeling soul, or actual soul depending on 
the way in which she relates herself to the world. Any person can accept, resist, and actualize the 
world regardless of age. It is also possible that a person actively participates in the world she 
lives in at some point of her life but comes to feel alienated at another. All these have nothing to 
do with how old we are.  
 
The Natural Soul: Individuality without Intersubjective Subjectivity 
I have considered Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life in terms of modalities of one’s 
relationship with the world. In what follows, I examine the kind of individuality that the natural 
soul has at this first stage of the “Natural Alterations.” The individuality that the natural soul is 
supposed to have by persisting through all the stages of life, I argue, is a temporal individuality, 
of which the starting and ending points are determined by its physical birth and death. To that 
extent, it has a natural aspect. But the temporality that individuates the natural soul is not just a 
natural temporality because it also involves distinct stages representing the different ways in 
which the natural soul relates herself to the cultural world she inhabits. In this sense, the stages 
of life, again, are the differences that are at once natural and spiritual. The stages of life that thus 
involve the spiritual dimension of human life, however, constitute the differences of the soul. 
They are different moments of an individual, natural soul, which belong in the latter. This 
implies that the spiritual dimension of human life, which we recognize in the stages of life, is 
still subordinated to the natural elements, that is, the physical birth and death that makes the 
natural soul into an individual soul. It is therefore to be noted that the entire course of life 
embracing childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age may well be considered in terms of 
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individuation of a soul but cannot itself be identified with the individuality of a person living in 
the intersubjective world. It is a natural course of life of which distinct moments involve some 
spiritual aspect whereas the life of an intersubjective subject consists in a negative relationship 
with other subjects through the mediation of a negative relationship with nature. Briefly stated, 
the natural soul is an individuality that does not have the subjectivity characteristic of a self-
conscious, intersubjective subject.  
Now we can more aptly determine the status of the natural soul in Hegel’s Anthropology. 
It represents the mode in which the spirituality of the human life is still subordinated to nature. 
As mentioned earlier, the natural soul can be said to be leading a spiritual life insofar as the 
stages of life she goes through involve her relationship with the cultural world she inhabits. But 
this is not yet a fully spiritual life in the proper sense because the natural soul is here considered 
as an individual without an intersubjective subjectivity. The natural soul, in other words, is one 
who lives the spiritual world in a natural mode. In the “Feeling Soul,” Hegel proceeds to 
consider self-feeling in terms of the subjectivity that the soul has in its sentient activities. As I 
discuss later in detail, however, this subjectivity of the sentient soul is eventually pathological. 
The feeling soul gets deranged in its contradictory relationship with the spiritual world in which 
she lives.16 The main concern of Hegel’s Anthropology is to show how the soul comes to 
overcome its pathological subjectivity before it reaches the stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 
 
                                                   
16 I discuss the debate on the necessity of derangement in Hegel’s Anthropology in note 93.  
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1.3. Hegel’s Non-Evolutionary Notion of the Genus [Gattung] as the Environmental World of 
the Soul 
Throughout the above consideration of Hegel’s idea of the stages of life, I have suggested 
that the natural soul represents the mode in which one’s spiritual life is subordinated to nature. 
Following this, I examine in what follows Hegel’s conceptualization of the genus as the 
correlator of the natural soul involved in the stages of life. I have suggested that the genus to 
which the natural soul relates herself is the cultural world inhabited by human beings, which 
involve diverse modes of reaction on behalf of the latter. In the Anthropology, Hegel thus 
imposes a new, spiritual meaning on the term genus, which he used in the Philosophy of Nature 
for indicating a natural species. But Hegel’s retainment of the word genus as the term indicating 
the cultural world that the natural soul inhabits by going through the stages of life implies, I 
claim, that this world for the natural soul is not a fully spiritual world. There is a natural 
remainder in the universality to which the natural soul relates herself, just as her individuality is 
determined by natural elements such as birth and death. My claim is that the cultural world is at 
the stage of the Anthropology considered as a pre-Phenomenological, environmental world to 
which the soul is subordinated. For Hegel, the cultural world is spiritual, as far as I see, when it 
appears in the form of objective spirit, which incorporates the communal, social, cultural, 
political and historical dimensions of human life. This is also the world, I argue, to which the 
self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit relates herself. As with Kant’s pragmatic 
anthropology, Hegel’s Anthropology takes on a semantic transformation of the notion of a 
natural species [Gattung] for indicating the human world. But this human world considered in 
Hegel’s Anthropology is still a natural world which affects the life of individuals and not the 
spiritual world in the proper sense, i.e., an intersubjective world that is constituted by human 
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actions and also involves a historical temporality, nor the Kantian teleological world for moral 
perfection. 
 
Buffon and Kant: The Genealogical View of a Natural Species  
To spell out the sense in which the genus of the natural soul has a natural remainder, I 
would like to briefly discuss the historical background of the eighteenth century in which a new 
conception of natural species served to give rise to a historical, diachronic, and genealogical 
view of nature. To begin with, in 1753, the French natural historian, Georges-Louis Leclerc, 
Comte de Buffon, suggested defining a species as the constant succession of similar individuals 
capable of producing fertile offspring, known as Buffon’s rule. What triggered Buffon’s new 
definition of species was his methodological dissatisfaction with the Swedish natural historian, 
Carolus Linnaeus’ taxonomy. Buffon strongly criticized Linnaeus for classifying natural beings 
on the basis of artificial and arbitrary concepts.17 He instead paid attention to the empirically 
observable process of breeding and was thus able to establish a consistent notion of species, 
which does not rely on abstract and arbitrary conceptual distinctions. As many scholars 
acknowledge, Buffon’s rule made a significant contribution to the rise of a new, historical view 
                                                   
17 In the twelve editions of his System naturae sive regna tria naturae that were published from 1735 until 1778, for 
instance, Linnaeus classified Homo sapience into Homo americanus, Homo Europaeus, Homo Asiaticus, and Homo 
Africanus, and later added Homo monstrosus and Homo ferus. Linnaeus correlated the difference in the color of skin 
found among those four geographical varieties of the human species with the medieval theory of the four humors, 
suggesting that Americans are choleric, Europeans sanguine, Asians melancholic, and Africans phlegmatic. 
Linnaeus’ classification of the four varieties of the human species is unsatisfactory due to the questionable 
connection between the color of skin and the theory of temperament. But his addition of two more varieties, i.e., 
malformed individuals (Homo monstrosus) and feral children encountered in European forests (Homo ferus), makes 
his classification of the human species even more suspicious due to the lack of consistent conceptual criteria for the 
classification. 
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of a natural species, which entailed the subsequent development of the modern, Darwinian 
theory of evolution in the nineteenth century.18 
Thus, Buffon opened a diachronic view of natural species. Conceived under his rule, 
species is not just a synchronic collection of the individuals sharing similar morphological 
characteristics, but a temporal existent that constitutes a lineage through the constant process of 
reproduction. This temporalization of natural species, which was latent in his theory of species, 
was solidified by Kant’s theory of race.19 Kant accepted Buffon’s rule as a correct understanding 
of species and made a distinction between what he calls the history of nature [Naturgeschichte] 
and the description of nature [Naturbeschreibung] depending on whether the natural division is 
grounded on “the common law of propagation” or the abstract, Scholastic notion of “classes” 
which “divides animals according to resemblances [Ähnlichkeithen].”20 The idea was that the 
study of natural species in light of Buffon’s rule of fertile progeny can truly be called the 
“history” of nature whereas Linnaeus’ taxonomical system pursues a mere descriptive 
classification of nature.21 Kant’s acceptance of Buffon’s rule was concerned with his 
                                                   
18 For instance, Doron suggests that Buffon played a leading role for the change in the style of reasoning in natural 
history: from a logical and classificatory style to a genealogical one. What Buffon’s theory of species brought about 
was the view of “genealogical continuity” among varieties of a species, which focuses on lineages and descent; cf. 
Claude-Olivier Doron, “Race and Genealogy. Buffon and the Formation of the Concept of ‘Race’,” Humana. Mente 
Journal of Philosophical Studies. vol.22 (2012), 87-93. 
19 Cf. Robert Bernasconi, “Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of 
Race,” in Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford: Blackwell), 16-17. 
20 Ak 2, 429; “Of the different races of human beings” (1777), 84. Kant’s notion of Naturgeschichte as a genetic 
history of nature is first articulated in his 1755 work, “Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels,” 
which concerns the genetic account of the solar system.  
21 Kant’s endorsement of Buffon’s approach, according to Doron, illustrates the historical association of the rise of a 
genealogical perspective of nature and the change in the view of reproduction. In his words, “natural reproduction 
constitutes the basis of this new system, and not in its Linnaean meaning (i.e., that the anatomical parts necessary to 
reproduction must be fixed and static); reproduction is here understood as a dynamic function (with historical depth), 
as a process which creates lineages, establishes the constancy of characters and sorts differences as more or less 
constant:”  Claude-Olivier Doron, “Race and Genealogy. Buffon and the Formation of the Concept of ‘Race’,” 92.  
In a similar vein, Sloan suggests that the Darwinian evolutionary view of nature has its origin in the Enlightenment 
thinkers’ historicization of biology, which gave “some privileged epistemological status to viewing organisms in 
terms of their history, rather than in terms of their atemporal relations:” Phillip R. Sloan, “Buffon, German Biology, 
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monogenetic position, claiming that all human beings belong to one and the same human species. 
Buffon’s rule offered scientific support for the monogenetic claim by providing the essential 
principle of the biological unity of mankind. However, Kant was also seriously concerned with 
giving an account of the racial differences of one and the same human species. While the notion 
of race remained ambiguous in Buffon’s theory of species, Kant elaborated on a precise 
definition of race. In his second essay on race, “Determination of the concept of a human race” 
(1785), Kant suggested defining race as the “class difference of the animals of one and the same 
line of descent [Stamm] insofar as this difference is unfailingly hereditary,”22 arguing that the 
only character of the human species that is unfailingly hereditary is skin color. To explain the 
permanent inheritance of the single racial character, i.e., skin color, Kant further supposed the 
existence of “the germs [Keime] and predispositions [Anlagen] lying in the species itself,” 
namely the original stock containing a set of pre-structured characteristics of a species on the one 
hand, and its development depending on the environment on the other.23 What Kant solidified 
                                                   
and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species,” The British Journal for the History of Science, vol.12, no. 2 
(1979), 110. By “historicism of nature,” Sloan means “a genetic explanation” of nature, drawing upon Meinecke’s 
idea of historicism as concerning “specifying forces and principles acting in time, in opposition to universally acting 
general laws:” Phillip R. Sloan, “Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species,” 
note 2. He thereby claims that historicism appeared in the realm of the Enlightenment natural history and not only in 
the studies of human history.  
22 Ak 8, 100/ DC, 154. For Kant’s terminological distinction between class (Klasse), species (Gattung), kinds 
(Arten), stem (Stamme), and race (Rassen), see: Andrea Gambarotto, Vital Forces, Teleology and Organization: 
Philosophy of Nature and the Rise of Biology in Germany (Cham: Springer, 2018), 66. Gambarroto argues that 
Kant’s conception of race is mostly derivative of Buffon. According to him, Kant endorses Buffon’s rule as the 
correct definition of species and shares with the latter the idea that “the natural division actually concern stems 
(Stämme), which divide animals according to relationships (Verwandtshaften) and generation (Erzeugen),” and not 
“any abstract division relying on classes (Klasse), which divides animals according to resemblance (Änlichkeiten):” 
Andrea Gambarotto, Vital Forces, Teleology and Organization: Philosophy of Nature and the Rise of Biology in 
Germany, 67.   
23 Ak 8, 97/ DC, 151. For instance, Africans’ skin is black because they “live in regions in which the air is so 
phlogistized through thick forests and swamp-covered region” and their skin therefore needs to “remove much 
phlogiston from the blood” (Ak 8, 103/ DC, 156); Americans’ skin is red because they live in the “aerial acid” 
environment which “would give the iron particles in the blood the red rust color” (Ak 8, 104/ DC, 157). Inheritance 
of skin color thus testifies to the human species’ prominent adaptability to the environment, the ability that makes it 
populate everywhere on earth. But it testifies, more fundamentally, to the purposiveness of nature. In his third and 
final essay on race, “On the use of teleological principles in philosophy” (1788), Kant claims that the differences of 
human races cannot be the work of chance; they are “purposively supplied in the original phylum” “in order to 
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was the genealogical view of species with his definition of race in terms of transmission of 
certain characteristics over generations. By considering the color of skin as the definitive 
character of the human race and suggesting that the existence of different races and their 
inheritance are predetermined, however, Kant theorizes, philosophizes, and perpetuates racism. 
What Kant established, therefore, was not only the neutral, biological idea that a species 
is a temporal existent that is maintained through a constant process of successive reproduction. 
As we have seen above, Kant held that the development of a species involving its differentiation 
into racial varieties is pre-determined.24 That is, there is nothing accidental in the existence of a 
species and its differentiation into racial varieties because this is teleologically pre-determined. 
In Kant’s theory of race, the temporality of species therefore has very little to do with the notion 
                                                   
ground and subsequently develop the fitness to fewer but more essential ends” (Ak 8, 166/ UT, 202). That is to say, 
differentiation of the human species into the four racial varieties is predestined in its original stock. In the same 
paragraph cited above, Kant further claims that neither do existing races become extinguished, nor is any new race 
formed. For him, race is preformed and irreversible. 
24 In this context, it is to be noted that Kant also embraces epigenesis as a correct account of the generation of an 
organism, but Kant’s epigenesis involves some preformationist components. Although Kant does not explicitly 
mention Buffon’s molecule intérieure, he acknowledges that Blumenbach offers a plausible account of generation 
with his notion of formative drive [Bildungstrieb], one that neither postulates a supernatural, divine cause, nor 
appeals to a mere mechanistic notion of matter and motion. Kant writes: “even if one did not recognize the great 
advantage that the defender of epigenesis has over the other side in the matter of experimental grounds for the proof 
of his theory, reason would still already be favorably disposed to this explanation because it considers nature, at least 
as far as propagation is concerned, as itself producing rather than  merely developing those things that can initially 
be represented as possible only in accordance with the causality of ends, and thus, with the least possible appeal to 
the supernatural, leaves everything that follows from the first beginning to nature. No one has done more for the 
proof of this theory of epigenesis as well as the establishment of the proper principles of its application, partly by 
limiting an excessively presumptuous use of it, than Privy Counsilor Blumenbach. He begins all physical 
explanation of these formations with organized matter. For he rightly declares it to be contrary to reason that raw 
matter would originally have formed itself in accordance with mechanical laws, that life should have arisen from the 
nature of this lifeless, and that matter should have been able to assemble itself into the form of a self-preserving 
purposiveness by itself” (Ak 5, 424/ KU, 292). What is to be noted is that the generation of an organism, for Kant, 
cannot merely be concerned with the formation of an organic matter insofar as reproduction is also considered a 
process of inheriting hereditary characters. But his argument about the development of germs and predispositions 
resulting in racial varieties involves a preformation line of thought that it is pre-determined by nature. Alix Cohen 
portrays Kant’s theory of race in terms of epigenesis limited by preformationist component and explains the 
connection of epigenetic and preformationist components as follows: “without preformationist component that 
allows for natural predispositions to be developed and then transmitted, permanent racial lineages cannot be secured; 
yet without an epigenetic component that allows some seeds rather than others to be actualized depending on the 
environment, racial differences cannot be accounted for:” Alix Cohen, Kant and the Human Sciences. Biology, 
Anthropology and History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 25.   
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of time as objectively measurable, nor with his transcendental view that time as a form of 
sensibility serving our subjective cognition. It is instead a teleological temporality, which is 
allegedly governed by the purposiveness of nature. In Chapter 4, I discussed the ways in which 
Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is grounded in his teleology of nature and his teleology of nature 
introduces a teleological understanding of human history. What we see in his theory of race is 
the same line of thoughts whereby a natural species comes to take on a teleological, racist 
historicity on the basis of the purposiveness of nature. The fundamental problem of Kant’s 
theory of race, then, consists in the fact that he erroneously makes a constitutive use of a 
teleology of nature by defining race as predetermined existence and heredity of the color of skin, 
in contradiction with his claim in the third Critique that a teleology must be limited to a 
regulative use of reason. Seen this way, Kant is not just a racist who enjoyed a pejorative gossip 
about non-European races but a racist theorist who gave an epistemological status and theoretical 
justification to racist understandings of humanity.   
 
Hegel’s Anti-evolutionary Conception of Species 
Hegel’s discussion of species has often been dealt with in terms of its compatibility with 
the modern, Darwinian evolutionary theory. J.N. Findlay argues that “had the Darwinian and 
later data been available, he would certainly have acknowledged the historical trend in Nature 
that he admits in the realm of Spirit; if any philosopher is a philosopher of evolution, that 
philosopher is Hegel.”25 Errol E. Harris suggests that  Hegel’s dialectic conceived as a process in 
which “the superseded moment is preserved, transformed at a higher level of integrity enabled 
                                                   
25 J.N. Findlay, Hegel. A re-examination (Aldershot: Routledge, 1993), 272. 
 
  311  
 
Hegel to develop a consistent theory both of nature and of mind, which requires, while it 
properly explains, an evolutionary process in nature.”26 As these authors observe, Hegel’s notion 
of the dialectical development provides some conceptual inspiration for the theory of evolution. 
Their arguments for Hegel’s pro-evolutionism, however, are hardly tenable. Hegel predates 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. He was familiar with Lamarck’s pre-Darwinian theory of 
evolution but strongly rejects Lamarck’s evolutionary theory as a non-Conceptual 
comprehension of nature.27  Hegel writes: “one must reject such nebulous and basically sensuous 
conceptions as for example the so-called emergence of plants and animals out of water, and of 
the more highly developed animal organizations out of the lower, etc.”28 Indeed, Hegel’s explicit 
objection to Lamarck’s evolutionary theory would not be a big problem if one is concerned with 
demonstrating the conceptual suitability of Hegel’s dialectic for the contemporary conception of 
evolution, disregarding Hegel’s position to this or that evolutionary theory. But the problem in 
both Findlay’s and Harris’ arguments, as far as I see, consists in their failure to recognize the 
essential difference between nature and spirit in Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel holds that the 
dialectical life of the Concept cannot be exhibited in nature. Consequently, Hegel’s notion of the 
dialectical development, even if it can be considered as illuminating the conceptual scheme of 
the Darwinian notion of evolution as those pro-evolutionist readers assume, is within Hegel’s 
philosophy not applicable to a natural species.  
                                                   
26 Errol E. Harris, “How Final is Hegel’s Rejection of Evolutionism?” in Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature, ed. 
Stephan Houlgate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 189. 
27 As Houlgate points out, the Conceptual comprehension is for Hegel concerned with comprehending “the logical 
rather than temporal relations between phenomena in nature:” Stephan Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel. 
Freedom, Truth and History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 173. 
28 ENZ, § 249 A. 
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In opposition to pro-evolutionary readings of Hegel, I argue that Hegel’s conception of 
species is framed by his anti-evolutionary understanding of nature—his rejection of 
temporalization or historicization of natural species, more broadly speaking.  
 
In its in-itself-existing universality, the genus particularizes itself, first of all, in varieties 
[Arten] in general. At the basis of the various forms and orders of animals lies the 
universal type of the animal determined by the Concept. Nature exhibits this type partly in 
the various stages of its development from the simplest organization to the most perfect, in 
which nature is the instrument of spirit, and partly in the various circumstances and 
conditions of the elemental nature. Developed into individuality, the class of the animal 
distinguishes itself from others in and through itself and is for itself through the negation of 
others. In this hostile relation to others, in which they are reduced to inorganic nature, 
violent death constitutes the natural fate of individuals.29 
 
In § 368, Hegel considers the particularization of the genus [Gattung] into varieties [Arten]. 
What Hegel here considers is a rational, conceptual classification of natural beings, which he 
sees is carried out by the French zoologist and paleontologist, Geoges-Fédéric Cuvier’s 
comparative anatomy. In the Anmerkung to § 368, Hegel suggests that Cuvier’s distinctions 
between monocotyledon and dicotyledon and between vertebrate and invertebrate illustrate a 
scientific comprehension of empirical observations in accordance with the Concept. Hegel’s 
point in the passage above is that morphological features of animals exhibit the determinations of 
the Concept, such that one can systematically arrange them by the extent of their organization. 
The “development” here at stake, therefore, has very little to do with a temporal, evolutionary 
                                                   
29 ENZ, § 368. 
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development which underlines Kant’s genealogical consideration of a species’ differentiation 
into its varieties over time; instead, it concerns the logical determinations of the Concept, which 
one can associate with certain morphological features of natural beings. Animals’ morphological 
features are also associated with different circumstances and conditions of the environmental 
world. When one systematically considers the division of nature in view of those morphological 
features which display both the Concept-determinations and the particular environmental factors, 
it turns out, for Hegel, that the highest one in the system of nature is the class of animals that 
have individuality, which bears selfness in and through the negative relation to an other, and is 
subject to death in that practical relation to an other.  
 A completely systematic classification of nature, however, is not possible because nature 
exhibits the infinite variety of animal features, all of which cannot be, and not need to be 
considered in conformity to the Concept-determinations. In Hegel’s terms, “the forms of nature 
cannot be brought into an absolute system” and this is because the animal life is “bound to the 
infinitely numerous particularizations of inorganic and vegetable nature,” which it is “not able to 
overcome.”30 The particular circumstances and conditions of the environmental world to which 
the animal life is subordinated are therefore the fundamental elements that hinder us from 
conceiving the animal world as a complete, rational system of organization. They mark the 
contingency of nature and further, the externality of the Idea. Correspondingly, the infinite 
variety of nature, for Hegel, marks “the immediacy of the Idea of life,” that is, “the Concept as 
such failing to exist in life, submitting its existence therefore to the manifold conditions and 
                                                   
30 ENZ, § 368 Z. 
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circumstances of the external nature, and being able to appear in the most stunted forms:” “the 
fruitfulness of the earth” which “allows to break forth everywhere, and in all kinds of ways.”31 
 As was clearly shown above, the focus in Hegel’s discussion of the genus in terms of the 
classification of natural beings is based on the natural character of the environmental 
circumstances and conditions to which the animal beings are connected—natural, in the sense of 
representing the externality of the Idea. Accordingly, animal life in general can be called a 
natural life, for Hegel, in the sense that it is essentially connected to environmental factors. To be 
more precise, animal life is characterized by its “sympathetic participation in the universal course 
of nature,” which makes it plausible to assume a “connection between the life of the animal, and 
the moon, as well as terrestrial and sidereal life.”32 This immediate participation of the animal 
life in the environmental world is demonstrated, Hegel suggests, by animals’ premonitions 
including birds’ prediction of earthquakes, spiders and frogs’ presentiment of the coming 
weather, and man’s awareness of a future climatic change.33 It is here not hard to see that the 
natural soul in the Anthropology lives an animal life insofar as, for example, the weather, 
climate, and season affect its mood.  
 However, neither every kind of animal nor every kind of animal life is subordinated to 
the environmental world to the same degree. For Hegel, not all animals share the same 
environmental world because “each animal has as its own only a restricted range of inorganic 
nature, which is its own domain, and which it must seek out by instinct from its complex 
                                                   
31 ENZ, § 368 A. 
32 ENZ, § 361 A. 
33 Cf. Ibid. 
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environment.”34 Each animal, in other words, has a specific, particular range of other plants and 
animals that serve to its preservation of life and has a instinctual cognition of what other plants 
and animals it is to eat to maintain its life. In Hegel’s terms, the animal can be stimulated “only 
by means of its inorganic nature” because the animal “does not recognize the other in general” 
but “its own other.”35 The sight of a deer, Hegel suggests, cannot give rise to a lion’s desire for it 
if there is not such an instinctual, immanent determinations of the lion’s inorganic nature. Thus, 
the kind of animal life that plays a key role in Hegel’s thought about animals’ connection with 
the environmental world, as far as I see, is the nutritive life or eating. This point bears a further, 
important implication with respect to the ways in which animals interact with their 
environmental world. Hegel considers Cuvier’s attention to teeth and claws to offer a valuable 
insight into animals’ instinctual connection with the environmental world because those 
“weapons” are “that through which an animal posits and preserves itself as a being-for-itself over 
against another animal, that is, differentiates itself from itself.”36 This being said, animals with 
such weapons are not passive to their environmental world because they can exercise a negative 
power on its inorganic nature to the extent that it brings violent death to other animals. This class 
of animals that can bring death to others and risk its life in bringing death to others, I suggest, is 
one that is in § 368 said to occupy the highest position in the system of nature: the class of 
animals that have individuality and subjectivity in and through a negative relation to others. They 
are highest natural beings because they are the least subordinated to their environmental world 
and can even go for a negative relation to the latter.   
                                                   
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 ENZ, § 368 A. 
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 The considerations above about Hegel’s discussion of the environmental world show that 
his notion of the genus [Gattung] means more than a natural species. Hegel certainly holds the 
idea of the genus as a natural species. He embraces Buffon’s rule in his discussion of the genus-
process by taking the sex-relationship and propagation as key factors of that process, which he 
considers as a way in which an individual relates to its universal. It is to be noted, however, that 
Hegel’s notion of the genus as a natural species does not take up Kant’s and Buffon’s 
genealogical ideas. Regarding this point, I pay attention to the fact that in considering the genus-
process, Hegel does not address questions about the generation of an organism or about the 
origin of diverse varieties of one and the same natural species. He dismisses the debates between 
epigenesis and preformation as unworthy of philosophical discussion and criticizes the debates 
between monogenesis and polygenesis as being motivated by the desire to show one’s race’s 
superiority over others.37 For him, the sole fact that the human being is rational is sufficient for 
ensuring the equality of right for all human beings.38 In a similar vein, he takes the racial 
difference of humankind to be a matter of geography, which connects the diversity of human 
races with different geographical features of the Old world (divided into Africa, Asia, and 
Europe) and the New world (America).39  
                                                   
37 ENZ, § 393 Z.  
38 Ibid. 
39 One of my claims is that Hegel’s Anthropology is not grounded in the teleological view of history presented in his 
philosophy of world history, nor does it systematically introduce the racist, Eurocentric view of history. This is 
because the Anthropology considers the racial differences as merely natural, non-spiritual determinations of human 
beings. Despite this, it is hard to deny that Hegel’s “spiritual” standpoint has some racist implications. In the Zusatz 
to § 393, Hegel states that “in a spiritual respect,” “negroes are to be regarded as the nation of a child” dominated by 
uncultured naivety; with Asian races, “spirit begins to awake, separate itself from nature” but “does not grasp itself 
as yet in its absolute freedom;” with the Caucasian race, spirit “first attains to the absolute unity with itself.” This 
“spiritual” consideration of the racial differences is based on his view that universal human history can be 
considered in terms of the achievement of the modern, political freedom. In the Conclusion, I critically consider the 
potential, racist implications of Hegel’s Anthropology. For studies of Hegel’s racism, see in particular: Susan Buck-
Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Robert Bernasconi, 
“Hegel at the Court of Ashanti,” in Hegel After Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett, (Routledge, 1998), 41-63; Darrel 
Mollendorf, “Racism and Rationality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,” History of Political Thought, 
 
  317  
 
Gattung as the Environmental World  
 In contrast with Kant’s and Buffon’s genealogical notion of a natural species, Hegel 
holds a broader conception of the genus, I suggest, as signifying the universal of an individual 
that appears in three forms: (1) the natural species it belongs to; (2) the environmental world to 
which it is immediately connected, but with which it can enter into a negative relation; (3) the 
organic constitution of its living, healthy body.40 My claim is that what has a special significance 
for Hegel’s Anthropology is the second meaning of the genus, i.e., the environmental world. As 
                                                   
vol.13, no.2 (1992): 243-255. 
40 I articulate these three meanings of the genus from Hegel’s discussion of three ways of death in the Zusatz to 
§367. In §367, Hegel states that the genus is “the universal,” namely “the concrete substance of the subject” that is 
“in implicit [ansichseiend] and simple unity with the singularity of a subject.” But the universal for Hegel involves 
the “original division [Urteil]” or the self-diremption through which it “becomes the unity that exists for itself” and 
“posits itself in existence as a subjective universality.” The genus-process is such a process of the universal’s self-
diremption, which involves the “negation of the merely internal universality of the genus” and the “negation of the 
merely immediate singularity in which a living being still belongs to nature.” As far as I see, these two negations are 
not separate from one another; instead, the first negation must occur through the second because a natural living 
being is the one that actively relates itself to its universal. All the issues of the genus-process, therefore, converge in 
the death of an individual living being because this is the mode of the negation of immediate singularity that we 
have in the realm of nature. Yet, the genus-process has for its foundation “neither a subjective universal nor a 
subject;” hence, its moments “fall apart” such that there are “multiple particular processes,” which boil down to “the 
ways of a living being’s death.” In the Zusatz to §367, Hegel thus discusses three ways of death: (1) the “death of 
other individuals of the same species [Geschlecht],” which we observe in the preservation of a natural species; (2) 
the “violent death,” which we see in two individuals’ mutual relationship with each other as the inorganic nature of 
one another, and which is thus concerned with the particularization of the genus into varieties;  (3) the “natural death 
of an individual” whereby the individual stands in a “relationship with itself as the genus,” that is, “the terminating 
state in which the genus as such maintains itself through the individual’s passing over into existence as a universal.” 
For an analysis of Hegel’s dialectical notion of life and death, see in particular: Jay Lampert, “Speed, Impact, and 
Fluidity at the Barrier between Life and Death,” Angelaki, 10:3 (2005): 145-56. Paying attention to several places in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature where he mentions life and death, Lampert shows that they are not subject to a 
dualistic, rigid distinction. From the case of death by impact and Hegel’s idea that impact of bodies constitutes 
displacement of one space-time configuration by another configuration, first, Lampert draws out the point that life is 
transition between motion and impact whereas death is the loss of this transition. This being said, life consists in 
space-time flexibility whereas death is its dissolution. Hegel’s idea of an animal organism, second, for Lampert, 
involves three forms of life and death: in the bone, excretion, and the sex. Through an analysis of these three forms 
of life and death concerning an animal’s self-movement, Lampert shows that life consists in superfluidity, surplus, 
and overflow whereas death is over-fluidity, over-surplus, and the flow of overflow. Specifically, he makes an 
interesting remark on excretion. He suggests that excretion of the bile is for Hegel a high animal’s ability to “make 
use of useless things to take death itself and reshape it:” Jay Lampert, “Speed, Impact, and Fluidity at the Barrier 
between Life and Death,” 149. As such, a high animal can immediately embody its feeling of anger with the 
excretion of the bile. This discussion complements Hegel’s idea of embodiment in the Anthropology from the 
perspective of the Philosophy of Nature. The last case Lampert discusses is Hegel’s idea of heath and disease. As he 
shows, health and disease are for Hegel concerned with the proportional relationship between organic and inorganic 
elements, that is, fluidity and rigidity. 
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mentioned above, Hegel considers the environmental world, first, as the universal, terrestrial and 
sidereal course of nature in which the animal life immediately and sympathetically participates 
and, second, as the particular, inorganic nature with which an animal enters into a negative 
relation. In relation to this notion of the environmental world in the Philosophy of Nature, we 
notice that the natural soul is in the Anthropology treated, first of all, as participating in the 
universal course of life, being immediately subordinated to meteorological, geographic/racial, 
and dispositional determinations. The natural soul, I suggest, is also exposed to the violent death 
that characterizes the mutual relationship between animals in the environmental world. Although 
Hegel does not make this point explicit in the Anthropology, his conception of the violent death 
in the Philosophy of Nature of the 1830 Encyclopedia reminds us of his idea in the 1807 
Phenomenology of Spirit of the life-death-struggle as the requisite for the rise of self-
consciousness. Hegel’s idea in this early work is that self-consciousness first appears as a subject 
of desire, that is, a natural, sentient being, and it should get itself liberated from this natural 
existence by risking its life and thereby proving that it is completely detached from the 
attachment to life. In relation to this, the notion of the environmental world as involving the 
violent death in the Philosophy of Nature in the 1830 Encyclopedia makes it plausible to assume 
that the world in which self-consciousness enters into the life-death-struggle is a natural world in 
which animals are forced to risk their lives for survival. Seen this way, one can say that the early 
Phenomenology of Spirit thematizes the sublation of this natural world into a spiritual world of 
intersubjectivity. The Anthropology of the 1830 Encyclopedia, as far as I see, retains this theme 
of the transition from nature to spirit but addresses it through a systematic examination of a 
sentient being’s bodiliness and its sublation by habit.  
 
  319  
 
 However, the environmental world inhabited by the natural soul cannot be the same as 
the environmental world of animals discussed in the Philosophy of Nature. As mentioned earlier, 
the natural soul that has individuality in its persisting through the stages of life is no longer 
subordinated to the universal course of nature; it lives in a cultural world by reacting in different 
ways depending on the stage of life it is passing through. The natural aspect of this cultural world 
is therefore to be explained in other terms than the violent death characteristic of the animal 
environmental world. The cultural world in which the soul is still subordinated to death, as far as 
I see, can best be understood in terms of the co-growth of the soul and the world. Regarding this 
point, I pay attention to Hegel’s notion that the external world “has its thread in him in such a 
way that what he actually is for himself, consists in threads, so that he too would die away 
internally together with the disappearance of these externalities.”41 In other words, the soul is 
essentially opened to the external world and lets the latter flow through into it; it thus comes to 
reflect within it the rational constitution of the actual world. By implication, the soul grows in the 
world and together with the world. She grows in the world since it is to be educated and 
encultured so as to lead her life in actuality as an adult; she grows together with the world in the 
sense that the actuality of the world is not something fixed but is something changeable by the 
activities of the individual souls. We may say that the world grows, for Hegel, as much as the 
individuals grow. Conversely, the external world that flows through into the soul and becomes 
part of it is essential for the soul to have actuality. This close connection between individuals and 
the world also applies to death, such that the collapse of the existing world results in the internal 
death of an individual. It happens, Hegel suggests, when one’s beloved friends die or when one 
suffers from homesickness. The internal death of an individual upon her losing the connection 
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with the world is also observed, according to Hegel, in the stoic Roman senator, Cato’s killing 
himself with the downfall of the Roman republic. As Hegel gives many examples of such a 
connection between individuals and the world, the idea of the co-constitution, co-growth, and co-
death of individuals and the world, I argue, serves as an implicit, underlying assumption of 
Hegel’s Anthropology.  
 As I discuss later, Hegel’s concern about this anthropological world that co-exists and co-
grows with individuals is that the soul gets involved in derangement if it loses such a close 
connection with the world. The soul’s immediate existence as bodiliness marks the spiritual 
illness, that is, the diseased state in which spirit is involved in its development throughout the 
Anthropology. Accordingly, spirit comes to reveal itself in the form of life when the soul’s 
immediate bodiliness is transformed into second nature by habit. Seen this way, if the natural 
aspect of the cultural world inhabited by the natural soul consists in the fact that the soul’s 
individuality is determined by natural birth and death; the natural aspect which is to be sublated 
is eventually concerned with the soul’s bodiliness. Then, we can perhaps say that for Hegel, habit 
is a process whereby one’s natural, first body dies and gains a spiritual, second life.  
 
1.4. The Sex-relationship and the Family: Duplication of Naturgeist 
The second way of the alteration of the natural soul is the sex-relationship. According to 
Hegel’s short account in §397, the sex-relationship is the “moment of real opposition of the 
individual to itself” whereby “it seeks and finds itself in another individual.” It involves the 
“natural difference” between woman and man: the difference between the one who remains a 
harmonious self-unity without having the moment of opposition and does not advance to 
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“universal purposes” because her life is based on the “sentiment [Empfindung] of ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit],” and the other who proceeds to the “opposition of universal, objective interests to 
the existence at hand, the existence of his own and that of the external world, and “actualizes 
those universal, objective interests in this existence” by “producing their unity.” Finally, the 
“spiritual and ethical significance” of the sex-relationship is found in the “family.”  
While the stages of life are concerned with the life of an individual soul, the sex-
relationship is a relationship between two individuals. We thus notice that the sex-relationship, 
considered in terms of seeking and finding oneself in an other, prefigures the intersubjective 
relationship of recognition—that in which “self-consciousness exists for another self-
consciousness,” as stated in the Phenomenology of Spirit.42 What underlies Hegel’s recognitional 
presentation of the sex-relationship is the concept of love that he developed in his Frankfurt 
years. In the 1798 manuscript “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” Hegel elaborated on the 
idea that in love the self finds itself in the other as the other finds itself in that subject. While in 
this manuscript Hegel articulates the significance and structure of the experience of love in order 
to present the religion of love as an alternative to Kantian morality, in his fragment on “Love,” 
written eight months before “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” we find a more explicit 
reference to the mundane experience of love. Specifically, the logic of love is found in Juliet’s 
statement in Romeo and Juliet that “the more I give to thee, the more I have.”43 For the young 
Hegel at Frankfurt, love was thus a category that expressed a union of subject and object, which 
one can broadly understand in terms of the dialectical union in difference, although Hegel had 
                                                   
42 GW 9, 108-9/ PhS, § 177. 
43 Hegel, “Love,” in Early Theological Writings. G.W.F.Hegel. trans. T.M.Knox and Richard Kroner (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 307. 
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not yet developed the idea and method of the dialectic.44 Thus, the sex-relationship as the second 
way of the alteration of the natural soul in the Anthropology retains the recognitional, dialectical 
meaning of love, as opposed to denoting a sexual relation, which we understand according to its 
natural aspects such as sexual desire or reproduction.  
Despite this spiritual connotation, however, the sex-relationship in the Anthropology is 
natural; it still marks the naturalness of Naturgeist and not its sublation as and into Geist. To 
spell out the signification of the sex-relationship for the development of Naturgeist in the 
Anthropology, we therefore need to clarify the spiritual and natural aspect of it and the 
relationship between these two aspects. Regarding this, we observe that Hegel describes the 
natural difference between the two sexes involved in the sex-relationship in terms of the 
difference in the ways in which each side relates to her/his ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. The 
difference between the two sexes thus involves a certain spiritual dimension, of which the full 
spiritual significance is, Hegel suggests, found in the family. This short account of the sex-
relationship in the Anthropology, as far as I see, retains the contrast between man and woman in 
the “Spirit” chapter of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. In what follows, I examine, first, how 
the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit describes the first appearance of Geist, the Greek ethical life, 
in terms of the opposition between woman and man through an interpretation of Sophocles’ 
Antigone; second, how the “Ethical Life” section in the philosophy of objective spirit deals with 
the sex relationship and the family in terms of spirit’s re-naturalization of itself as Naturgeist; 
and third, what these mean for the Naturgeist in the Anthropology.  
 
                                                   
44 For the detail, see Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 112-123. 
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Antigone and the Family: the Limited Sublation of Nature in and through Nature in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit 
In the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit, Geist appears for the first time in the ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit] of the ancient Greeks. For Hegel, the characteristic of the Greek ethical life is the 
un-reflected, immediate unity of private and communal life. For instance, Antigone did not 
experience any inner conflict in risking her life to bury her brother, Polynices’ body, following 
the unwritten, customary law; the Greek heroes accepted their fate without any resistance or 
hesitation. Yet, this Greek ethical life also involves the opposition between the two laws 
concerning one’s communal life: the unwritten, customary law, and the written, public law. This 
opposition is revealed by the confrontation between Antigone and Creon, the new ruler of 
Thebes, that is, Antigone’s burial of her brother’s body in defiance of Creon’s command that 
Polynices’ body be left to rot on the battlefield as punishment for his treason.  
The confrontation between Antigone and Creon thus reveals, for Hegel, the opposition 
within the Greek ethical life itself. This internal opposition of the Greek ethical life embraces the 
mutually related, binary oppositions: between the divine and the human law, the family and the 
city, night and light, unconsciousness and consciousness, passivity and activity, substantiality 
and subjectivity/actuality, and so forth. But all these oppositions are eventually represented by 
one and the same opposition, that between woman and man. Thus, Antigone and Creon represent 
womanhood [Weiblichkeit] and manhood [Männlichkeit], which represent, in turn, the different 
principles for the two different forms of community, i.e., the family and the city, respectively. 
Whereas womanhood bears the passivity of following the given, divine law, manhood is the 
activity of enforcing the human law. Whereas woman is immersed in the substantiality of the 
ethical life, sticking to the life of the family, man is engaged in the subjectivity and actuality of 
the ethical life that is realized in the city. Thus, the difference between the two sexes, for Hegel, 
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is a natural difference, of which the “naturalness acquires at the same time the significance of 
their ethical [sittlich] determination.”45  
In his early work the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers the first appearance of 
Geist in terms of a community [Gemeinwesen] that ties up plural individual agents. At least in its 
first appearance as the ethical life of the ancient Greek, spirit thus has the connotation of the 
spirit of the people [Volkgeist].46 It is therefore to be noted that the Phenomenology of Spirit 
thematizes the appearance or emergence of Geist in a very different way than the mature system 
of the Encyclopedia, in which the Philosophy of Spirit is preceded by the Logic and the 
Philosophy of Nature; and the family, together with civil society and the state, is considered in 
light of the modern Sittlichkeit. Despite this, we notice that the Phenomenology of Spirit also 
presents, although not systematically, the idea of the overcoming of nature in and through nature 
for the development of Geist. This is found in Hegel’s account of the sex-relationship within the 
family.  
To begin, the family is for Hegel basically a “natural ethical community” grounded in 
natural factors: the blood relationship, sexual desire, and emotional affections.47 It is thus distinct 
from the city because the family members’ service and work are made for the sake of meeting 
their private needs and not the universal purposes realized by the city. Now, Hegel analyzes the 
family according to three relationships: husband and wife, parents and children, and sisters and 
brothers.48 The relationship between husband and wife involves “mutual recognition;” however, 
                                                   
45 GW 9, 248/ PhS, § 459.  
46 Cf. GW 9, 242/ PhS, § 447. 
47 GW 9, 242-3/ PhS, §§ 450-51. 
48 See GW 9, 246-7/ PhS, § 456. This passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit is the source of all citations made in 
this paragraph with respect to Hegel’s accounts of the relationships between husband and wife and between parents 
and children.  
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this mutual recognition is a “natural and not an ethical one.” The recognition between husband 
and wife is natural because it is based on sexual desires, feelings, and affections; it is not ethical 
because the union of those two parties seeking and finding themselves in their other has no 
“actual existence” in itself. Instead, the union of husband and wife has its actual existence in its 
other, i.e., the child, which is their “objective reality.” Thus, the relationship between husband 
and wife “disappears [in their other],” in such a way that “this alteration of successive 
generations has its enduring basis in the people [Volk].” In the relationship between husband and 
wife, which is “mixed with a natural relation and with feeling [Empfindung],” “the return-to-
itself to the relationship does not take place within the relationship itself.” By the same token, the 
second relationship constitutive of the family, the relationship between parents and children, is 
characterized by mutual otherness. Both sides have emotional affections towards each other, 
specifically reverence. But the parents’ reverence of their children is grounded in their 
witnessing that their children become an “alien reality,” an “independent existence which they 
are unable to take back again;” the child’s reverence towards their parents comes from the fact 
that “[the child] has her becoming or being-in-itself in an other who disappears, and attains her 
being-for-itself and self-consciousness of her own only by the separation from the origin.” 
The third relationship constitutive of the family, between sister and brother, is different 
from those first two relationships, which are confined to a “transition and disparity of the 
sides.”49 Sister and brother are tied to one another through the blood relationship. However, they 
are “free individuals with regard to each other” because they have “not given to, or received 
from, one another [their] being-for-itself;” further, they “do not desire one another.”50 In this 
                                                   
49 See GW 9, 247-8/ PhS, § 457.  
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relationship between two free individuals free from desire, “the feminine, in the form of the 
sister, has the highest intuition of the ethical essence.”51 What Hegel here has in mind is the story 
of Antigone and her burial of her brother Polynices’ body. For Hegel, burying a dead family 
member’s body has a special meaning for the family as an ethical community.52 Through burial, 
the family keeps its dead member tied up to itself beyond natural death and thereby expands its 
blood relationship beyond the limit of nature. Through burial, in other words, the dead members 
are turned into universal beings who are preserved as family members even after their deaths. 
The buried dead members, then, are no longer natural beings confined to natural conditions and 
limits because they are dead; however, they are preserved as part of the natural ethical 
community grounded in the blood relationship. One would therefore have to say, more precisely, 
that the blood relationship, as the ground of the family, is completed by the elements that 
contradict its naturalness: the deaths of individuals, that is, the perishing of its living members, 
and the transformation of them into non-natural, universal beings. The family, then, is a natural 
community that keeps itself as such by overcoming nature in and through its own naturalness. It 
is also an ethical community in which individual members are not separate from one another but 
instead tied up to each other by the mediation of the dead members who are turned into universal 
beings. It is in this sense that the family can rightly be called a natural ethical community.  
Of importance, however, is not such a general meaning of burial. In Hegel’s presentation, 
burial is an ethical action that Antigone was able to do because she was standing in the sex-
relationship that is free from sexual desire. Since she is in that particular sex-relation with her 
brother free from natural desires and individual interests, she conducts herself as a universal 
                                                   
51 Ibid. 
52 See GW 9, 244-5/ PhS, § 452. 
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being rather than as an individual member who sticks to another with some particular feelings or 
affections. Further, her burial is an action, one that animates her family. Thus, Antigone is not 
just one of the members of her family; she is the guardian, namely the one who turns her family 
into an ethical union beyond the natural limit by her action, binding her family members to each 
other by effectuating the mediation by the dead. Thus, the sex-relationship between sister and 
brother, Antigone and Polynices, is contrasted with another sex-relationship in the family: that 
between husband and wife. As mentioned above, this sex-relationship involving sexual desire 
does not produce an ethical union because its product, its objective reality, is an other that 
remains outside of it, i.e., the child.  
Now, one can rightly call into question the legitimacy of the special meaning and status 
that Hegel gives to the relationship between sister and brother. If burial offers the key element 
that makes the family an ethical union, should the member who performs the burial actually 
matter? If Hegel’s message is that the full meaning of that ethical action bears on the fact that the 
actor acts as a universal being free from natural desire and individual interests, why can we not 
expect that that ethical action takes place in the same-sex relationship between brother and 
brother, and sister and sister? Further, if the ethical action occurs in the other-sex relationship 
between sister and brother as Hegel suggests, can we not think of the opposite case to Antigone’s 
burial as also an ethical action, namely the brother’s burial of his sister’s body? All of these 
questions boil down to the key supposition underlying Hegel’s presentation of Antigone: the 
difference between the sexes is a natural difference, and as such, is the natural element that 
underlies the first appearance of Geist in the form of the Greek ethical life.   
Thus, we must remember that Antigone stands in another sex-relationship that is outside 
of the family: the binary opposition between woman and man, represented by her confrontation 
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with Creon. Of importance is that Antigone, who displays “the highest intuition of the ethical 
essence” through her ethical action, is “the feminine” appearing “in the form of the sister.” 53 
That is, Antigone, as the guardian of the family who makes her family into an ethical union, is 
the woman who resists the ruler’s command, to be precise. And this woman, for Hegel, is an 
“internal enemy” of the city, because the city can sustain itself only by keeping itself from being 
dissolved into multiple families.54 Hegel’s point here has nothing to do with an extreme anti-
family socialist position. What he analyzes through the story of Antigone is, again, the internal 
opposition of the Greek ethical life between the two principles of the two different forms of 
ethical community: the family and the city. This internal opposition is “the conflict of the ethical 
order and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and the contingency stemming from 
nature.”55 It is also the conflict between two powers: the power of the “manifest spirit [der 
offenbare Geist]” of the upper world, and that of the household deities, the Penates, governing 
the underworld.56  In the case of the Greek ethical life, however, the former has the source of its 
union in the latter, that is, in the “mute unconscious substance of all, in the waters of 
forgetfulness.”57 The internal opposition of the Greek ethical life is therefore not resolved within 
it, which leads to its collapse. This is how Hegel describes the development of Geist at its 
beginning stage in terms of the historical transition from the Greek antiquity to the Roman world 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
                                                   
53 Ibid. 
54 GW 9, 258-9/ PhS, § 475. 
55 GW 9, 256/ PhS, § 452. 
56 GW 9, 257-8/ PhS, §§ 474-5. 
57 Ibid.  
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From the above considerations of Hegel’s presentation of the Greek ethical life in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, we can then draw out the following points with respect to the 
relationship between nature and spirit. In the Greek ethical life, there is a moment when nature is 
overcome in and through itself: Antigone’s burial of her brother’s body, which serves the 
establishment of the family as an ethical union beyond the natural limit, death. This sublation of 
nature, however, is limited because it stands in an oppositional relationship with another, more 
truthful, ethical union, i.e., the city. Further, this limited sublation of nature strengthens the 
principle of the family, thereby intensifying the internal conflict of the Greek ethical life so as to 
lead this spiritual union to its dissolution. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, therefore, the family, 
its guardian Antigone, and therefore womanhood, remain representative of nature, which leads to 
the dissolution of the first appearance of Geist in stark opposition to it.  
 
The Family in the Philosophy of Objective Spirit: the Sublation of Naturgeist in and through 
Naturgeist  
Hegel’s presentation of Antigone in the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit has generated 
criticisms for being sexist.58 The idea that the difference of the sexes is a natural difference likely  
supports gender essentialism, suggesting that femininity and masculinity are fixed, innate 
qualities. The idea that womanhood concerns the life of the family and manhood is about the life 
of the city tends to promote a patriarchal understanding of gender roles. This sexist connotation 
of Hegel’s Antigone, however, turns out to be far more perplexing than it seems when we 
consider the significance of nature in relation to the manifestation of spirit, which underlies his 
                                                   
58 See in particular: Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, ed., Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel (Philadelphia: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).  
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discussion of the difference of the sexes. If my previous discussion is correct, womanhood 
eventually represents nature, and it does so as the power of opposition. Of importance is that 
womanhood does not just oppose manhood but represents the opposition itself. It represents, in 
other words, the element of difference that stubbornly resists incorporation into the system of 
identity.59 Thus, it eventually concerns the opposition between nature and spirit that is internal to 
spirit: the moment of difference or self-differentiation in and through which alone spirit can 
manifest itself. This ontological framework of his discussion of the sexual difference, I think, has 
some important critical powers in relation to sexism. I will discuss this in the Conclusion.  Of 
more importance with respect to our study of Hegel’s Anthropology is that in his mature system 
of the Encyclopedia, nature is the locus of the negativity of spirit as a realm of difference which 
does not exhibit the Conceptual, organic totality. Seen this way, what womanhood presented in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit is fundamentally concerned with is the dialectic negativity of nature 
that plays a key role in the Encyclopedia system.  
Hegel’s discussion of the sex relationship is thus essentially situated in the dialectical 
relationship between nature and spirit. And this is even more the case in his mature system of the 
Encyclopedia. At this point, we need to clarify how the two texts, the Phenomenology of Spirit 
and the Encyclopedia, consider the sex relationship differently. As we have seen above, the 
discussion of the sex relationship in the Phenomenology of Spirit boils down to the notion of the 
family as a natural ethical union. To recapitulate, the sex relationship constitutes a union of love, 
specifically through the relationship between husband and wife, where each side seeks and finds 
his or her self in the other side. The sex relationship thus has a recognitional structure, but it only 
                                                   
59 It should also be noted that limiting the resistance to incorporation of the system of identity to a particular gender 
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realizes a natural mode of recognition, which is based on sexual desires and emotional affections. 
As such, the sex relationship does not create a rational bond among the members, failing to 
produce a spiritual, ethical community that realizes universal purposes of the people. The family 
is also involved in another sex relation: the opposition between man and woman. Considered in 
terms of the womanly guardianship, the family is a union of kinship, which is preserved beyond 
the natural limit, death, through the mediation by the dead. In this framework where the principle 
of the family opposes the principle of the city, however, the oppositional difference of the sexes 
eventually leads to the decline of the Greek ethical life. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the 
family thus represents the natural remainder in the appearance of Geist that remains not sublated 
by and as Geist. That is, the family is a spiritual union; however, as a bond of love or as a bond 
of kinship, it is also a natural union of which the ethical, spiritual dimension is subordinated to 
nature.  
At first glance, the brief discussion of the sex relationship in § 397 of the 1830 
Encyclopedia seems to reiterate the idea presented in the early Phenomenology of Spirit that the 
sex relationship is about the family as a natural ethical union. To recapitulate, the sex 
relationship, now conceived as the second way of the alteration of the natural soul, constitutes 
(1) a bond of love, (2) involves a natural difference that also represents the different ways in 
which one relates herself or himself to their ethical life, and (3) finds its ethical, spiritual 
significance in the family. We notice, however, that the family is here considered in terms of 
spirituality, rather than naturalness, of the sex relationship. It is, in other words, not a natural 
ethical union that fails to reconcile with another ethical union that concerns the public life of the 
city, but a spiritual ethical union in which the half-natural and half-spiritual relationship, i.e., the 
sex relationship conceived either as a bond of love or in terms of the difference of the sexes, has 
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its ultimate spiritual meaning. In line with this, we also notice that in the Encyclopedia system, 
the family is not the subject matter of the Anthropology but is treated in the third part of the 
philosophy of objective spirit, “Ethical Life.” Thus, we can say, to be precise, that what really 
concerns the sex relationship as a way of the alteration of the natural soul is its first two 
conceptual factors, i.e., a bond of love and the difference of the sexes. We are here reminded that 
the alteration of the natural soul is concerned with the differences that are at once physical and 
spiritual. The “Ethical Life” chapter in the philosophy of spirit, then, presents the family as that 
in which the naturalness of the sex relationship is ultimately resolved. In the mature system of 
the Encyclopedia, the family no longer represents a natural remainder of spirit, which can even 
lead to the latter’s dissolution, but presents the sublation of Naturgeist. As I examine in what 
follows, however, this sublation of Naturgeist in the family assumes re-naturalization of spirit as 
Naturgeist in the form of the family. Thus, the significance of the sex relationship in the 
Anthropology centers around the dialectic of Naturgeist in the Encyclopedia system.   
To begin, the sex-relationship reappears in the last stage of the philosophy of objective 
spirit, i.e., ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. In the mature system of the Encyclopedia, ethical life is the 
“completion of objective spirit” in which the one-sidedness of both subjective, and objective 
spirit is sublated.60 With this completion of objective spirit, we come to the reconciliation 
between the objective, normative world and one’s inward individuality.61 Thus, an ethical 
[sittlich] subject relates herself to the ethical substance she is living in with an ethical sentiment 
[sittliche Gesinnung], specifically trust.62 As such a sentimental unity of an ethical subject and 
                                                   
60 ENZ, § 513. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See ENZ, § 515. 
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her ethical substance, ethical life has the form of custom [Sitte],” and in custom, the “subjective 
freedom” or the “self-conscious freedom” “became nature.”63 To be precise, custom is a nature 
that has become nature and not a nature that is given: a second nature, which in the Philosophy of 
Right is considered to be “posited in the place of the first, merely natural will” and to be the 
“spirit that is living and presents as a world, of which [spirit] the substance exists now for the 
first time as spirit.”64 This being said, at the stage of ethical life, Geist appears as “immediate or 
natural spirit [Naturgeist],” and this Naturgeist that reappears at the stage of ethical life is the 
“family.”65 And the family is, first of all, the elevation of the sex relationship to something 
spiritual:  
 
The ethical spirit, when in its immediacy, contains the natural moment that the individual 
has its substantial existence in its natural universality, the genus,—the sex relationship, but 
elevated to a spiritual determination;—the unity of love and the sentiment of trust;—spirit, 
as family, is sensitive [empfindend] spirit.66 
 
In the family, in other words, the sex-relationship is, first, a natural, animal process, that 
is, the sex relationship as a moment of the genus-process considered at the end of the Philosophy 
of Nature.67 But it means more than sexual copulation [Begattung], second, because in the 
                                                   
63 ENZ, § 513. 
64 PR, § 151. 
65 ENZ, § 517. 
66 ENZ, § 518.  
67 One might here point out that Hegel’s understanding of sexual desires as merely natural is somehow limited, 
considering the fact that they also involve complicated operations of unconsciousness as Freud showed. This issue 
would require an extensive study of Hegel’s understanding of the sex-relationship in relation to his theory of 
sensation, imagination, and desire. As this goes beyond the scope of my dissertation, I reserve it for my future 
studies.  
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family, it constitutes a bond of love and involves the ethical sentiment [Besinnung]. This 
elevation of the meaning of the sex relationship in the family, however, elevates the Naturgeist 
reappearing at the level of objective spirit only to “sensitive spirit.” A rationally ethical bond, 
which is to replace the bond based on love and sentiment, then, is produced by marriage:  
  
The difference of the natural sexes also appears at the same time as a difference of 
intellectual and ethical determination. These personalities combine, in accordance with 
their exclusive individuality, to form one person; subjective intimacy determines them to 
substantial unity, makes this union into an ethical relationship—marriage. The substantial 
intimacy makes marriage into an undivided bond of persons—monogamous marriage; the 
physical union is a consequence of the ethically formed bond.68  
 
The ethical meaning of the difference of the sexes here consists in the fact that the two sexes 
conduct themselves as persons, namely as those who have the abstract right to property and enter 
into the contract relationship with other persons.69 This notion of person as an economic and 
legal subject being assumed, what the two persons of different sexes produce through marriage is 
one person: one entity for household economy. This ethical entity produced by monogamist 
marriage, then, is itself a living unity that operates for the purpose of earning a living. This is the 
third, economical dimension of the family considered in the Encyclopedia system, and it is 
through the family in this third sense that the difference of the sexes as a natural difference 
reveals its full, ethical and spiritual meaning. With this being revealed, then, a physical union 
between the two sexes based on desire does not have any essential meaning for the family. When 
                                                   
68 ENZ, § 519.  
69 For the details see ENZ, §§ 488-492; PR, §§ 41-71. 
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the family is considered in its spiritual ethical bond, the physical union is not the cause, but only 
a consequence of marriage; it is not necessary, but only accidental; not essential, but merely 
peripheral. To be more precise, if the physical bond has any sense in the family, this is so only 
through marriage; marriage is the end of the physical bond and not vice versa. In a similar vein, 
if the sex relationship can constitute a union of love in the family, this second sense of the family 
is made possible by marriage; Hegel writes, marriage is the converting of the “union of natural 
sexes,” the union that “is only internal or in-itself and for that reason is only external in its 
existence,” into “self-conscious love.”70 When the family is considered as a bond for house 
economy produced by monogamist marriage, therefore, the Naturgeist that reappears in the 
philosophy of objective spirit in the form of the family, is no longer subordinated to nature. Its 
naturalness is now exhausted.   
 It thus appears that the family occupies a pivotal status in Hegel’s system. As discussed 
several times throughout this dissertation, Hegel’s Encyclopedia system centers on the dialectical 
relationship between nature and spirit. The fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s Geist, again, 
consists in the determination that it can only reveal itself in and through its other: it is a being in 
otherness, which can reflect into itself only in this being in otherness. The dialectical becoming 
of Geist thus occurs through nature because nature is its principal, prominent other. Geist reveals 
itself by alienating itself into nature and reflecting into itself in and from nature. This being 
assumed, Naturgeist has an essentially dialectical meaning: it is the form of Geist in which Geist 
is in its other and therefore, through which it is to return to itself. According to Hegel’s 
                                                   
70 PR, § 161. 
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exposition of ethical life in the philosophy of objective spirit, Naturgeist in this dialectical sense 
is the family. 
 
Naturgeist in the Anthropology without the World as a Second Nature   
Returning to the sex relationship in the Anthropology, we first need to clarify how the 
two forms of Naturgeist, one in the Anthropology and the other in the philosophy of objective 
spirit, differ from one another. We notice that in the Anthropology, Naturgeist appears in its 
immediacy. It appears in the form of the natural soul, of which existence and life are associated 
with natural elements in an inseparable, unconscious, and irreflective manner. The Anthropology, 
then, shows how this Naturgeist gets out of its immediate submergence in nature by thematizing 
the soul-body relationship—by considering how the soul immediately exists as bodiliness, and 
how this immediate and natural bodiliness is transformed into a spiritual bodiliness through 
habit. The Anthropology thus concerns the immediate presence of Naturgeist and its 
spiritualization with the sublation of its naturalness. In relation to this, then, Naturgeist in the 
philosophy of objective spirit is a re-naturalization of spirit—spirit that appeared as immediate 
Naturgeist, sublated its naturalness, and thus spiritualized itself in the Anthropology. What 
underlines this re-naturalization of spirit in the form of the family, again, is the dialectical feature 
of spirit that necessarily involves self-externalization, self-alienation into its other, and self-
naturalization to regain and reveal itself in its being otherness. While in the Anthropology 
Naturgeist appears in its immediacy, then, this immediacy is resolved by spirit’s re-self-
naturalization as Naturgeist. What the family concerns is such a dialectical movement of spirit 
that lets itself reappear in its immediate submergence in nature to resolve this immediacy itself.  
 
  337  
 
While Naturgeist is a central figure of spirit that is involved in its dialectical movement, 
its double appearance has a further implication concerning the relationship between a subject and 
the world she lives in. Regarding this, we notice that the two different forms of Naturgeist come 
together around the notion of habit. As I deal with later, the Anthropology presents habit as a 
process of the overall transformation of one’s bodiliness. Since the Anthropology is part of the 
movement of subjective spirit, habit is here concerned with the way in which a subject’s will is 
exercised—the mode of a subject’s existence in which she can exercise a universal or public will, 
more precisely. In contrast to this, the philosophy of objective spirit presents habit as a second 
nature and considers this in terms of custom. We thus notice that in ethical life, where spirit finds 
itself in the realm of objectivity, habit is concerned with a certain form of the world: the world 
consisted of customary norms and rules. This world is called a nature in the sense that those 
norms and rules are given to individuals rather than established by the latter’s self-conscious 
activities; it is a second nature, namely a nature that has become nature, because those customs 
can exist only when they are practiced by individuals, and they are thus subject to changes in 
accordance with the social, cultural, historical changes of the community. Thus, the immediate 
presence of Naturgeist and its sublation in the Anthropology are essentially concerned with an 
individual subject’s natural mode of existence and its transformation into a spiritual one. In 
contrast to this, the re-naturalization of spirit as Naturgeist in the philosophy of objective spirit 
bears on the world that exists as a second nature and changes through the activities of the 
individuals. The philosophy of objective spirit, then, is to show how this Naturgeist as a second 
nature, namely the world of customs that an individual appropriates as her own though habit, and 
to which she is bounded through sentiment, is elevated to a truly self-conscious, spiritual union. 
In short, the double appearance of Naturgeist ultimately concerns the spiritualization of an 
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individual who lives in the ethical world on the one hand, and the spiritualization of this ethical 
world on the other. And the spiritual mode of an individual’s existence is so closely intertwined 
with the spiritual mode of the world that the sublation of nature cannot be performed one-sidedly 
but is necessarily duplicated.  
Returning to the sex-relationship in the Anthropology, it is now important to note that at 
this stage of the natural soul, we do not have yet the notion of the world as a second nature. The 
natural soul is still far away from habituation; the ethical world of customary norms and rules 
appears at the stage of ethical life in the philosophy of objective spirit. The only world we have 
at the stage of the natural soul is the cultural world in which the soul goes through the stages of 
life: the genus of an individual, which I suggested refers to an environmental world of the human 
beings. This cultural genus is different from the animal genus that is considered at the end of the 
Philosophy of Nature. To recapitulate, the genus-process is a process whereby animal organisms 
preserve their species by entering into the sex-relation and giving birth to newborns. In this 
natural course, however, individual members are nothing but the perishing moments in and for 
the universal; in this sense, they remain external to the latter. In contrast to this, the stages of life 
offer a different model of the relationship between individuals and their universal. With the 
semantic modification in the term genus into an environmental, cultural world, the stages of life 
illustrate a spiritual, genus-process in which individuals are born, grow, and die in their close 
connection with that cultural world. Conversely, this cultural world co-exists and co-grows with 
the individuals and hence, the latter is no longer external to their genus. Yet, this 
Anthropological world, as mentioned above, is not yet the universal, rational world that contains 
a set of ethical norms, rules, and values which binds individuals through the latter; nor is it yet a 
world that exists through the individuals’ ethical activities. Lacking the dialectical interplay 
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between individuals and ethical life through habit, then, the Anthropological world finds the 
ground of its existence only in the individuals’ pre-self-conscious, feeling lives. As I deal with 
later, this is the form of the world that Hegel considers in the “Feeling Soul” section, namely a 
monad that is immediately individualized in and as the feeling soul, lacking the mediation of 
objective consciousness.  
 
1.5. From Sleep to Waking: The Soul’s Differentiation into Substantiality and Subjectivity  
 The third way of the natural soul’s alteration are the two states that the individual soul 
alternates between every day and every night, i.e., sleep and waking. The discussion of sleep and 
waking plays a key role in the transition in the Anthropology from the natural soul to the feeling 
soul. Whereas the natural soul is in its first mode of alternation, i.e., the stages of life, treated as 
having individuality without subjectivity, the alteration between sleep and waking exhibits the 
way in which an individual soul has subjectivity at the level of sensation, which is next treated in 
terms of the feeling life of a sentient soul. In Hegel’s terms, the alternation between sleep and 
waking marks the differentiation of the soul’s individuality into a mere being and a being-for-
itself, namely into substantiality and subjectivity:  
 
Differentiating of the individuality as being-for-itself [für-sich seinder] from the 
individuality as merely being [nur seiender] is immediate judgment [Urteil], and this 
judgement is the awakening of the soul, which, as the determinacy of nature and state in 
the soul’s self-enclosed natural-life, confronts another state, sleep.—Waking is 
differentiated from sleep not only for us or externally; it is itself the judgment of the 
individual soul, […]. All the self-conscious and rational activity of the spirit’s 
differentiation, a differentiation that is for itself, falls into the waking state [of the soul].—
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Sleep is an invigoration of this activity, not as a merely negative rest from it, but as a 
return from the world of determinacies, from dispersion and solidification in singularities 
into the universal essence of subjectivity, which is the substance of those determinacies 
and the absolute power over them.71 
 
As Hegel suggests in the Zusatz to this passage, when we awake from sleep, we gradually 
come to perceive ourselves and the external world distinctly as we open our eyes and sense 
the object in the surroundings. The soul in the state of waking is therefore not just a substance 
filled with contents and determinations but something subjective that can perceive itself and 
the objects in the surrounding world. It is, in other words, not just what is but what is for 
itself. In this sense, the transition from sleep to waking is the differentiation [Ur-teilen] of the 
soul into itself as a mere being and itself as a being-for-itself.  
 It is to be noted, however, that the two distinct moments of the soul that Hegel 
observes in the alteration between sleep and waking, i.e., being and being-for-itself, do not 
exclude each other. To illustrate the inclusive relationship between those two moments, Hegel 
draws on the distinction between organic and animal life made by the French anatomist and 
pathologist, Bichat. In Bichat’s distinction, organic life is concerned with the reproductive 
system concerning digestion, blood-circulation, perspiration, and breathing; animal life 
comprises the system of sensibility and irritability, which makes an organism responsive to 
stimuli from the external world. As Hegel underlines, Bichat characterizes organic life in 
terms of a complete cutting off from the external world and animal life, in terms of its being 
directed toward the external world. Further, organic life does not cease to function unless the 
                                                   
71 ENZ § 398. 
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organism dies, whereas the animal life may not function when the organism is alseep.72 
Hegel’s point in referring to Bichat would be that the soul in sleep remains the foundation of 
all conscious and spiritual activities even when there are no conscious or spiritual activities. 
That is, the soul is a substance that embraces all fundamental thought-determinations; these 
determinations are necessarily interconnected to each other by virtue of the absolute 
negativity of thought, as dealt with in the Logic.73 In Hegel’s terms, “man always thinks, even 
in sleep; in all forms of spirit, in feeling, in intuition, as well as representation, thinking 
remains the foundation” which is “unaffected by the alteration of sleep and waking.”74 
Passing to the state of sleep is therefore returning to this fundamental state of thought where 
its absolute power is at work, away from the world of ordinary consciousness in which the 
fundamental power of thought is solidified in singular representations. Since the absolute 
negativity of thought is for Hegel at the basis of all conscious and spiritual activities, 
returning to the state of sleep is “invigoration” of the spiritual activity in the waking state.  
 But the soul embraces not only thought-determinations dealt with in the Logic, but 
also the spiritual contents in a comprehensive sense: the ethical, the moral, the artistic, and the 
religious, which characterizes the notion of spirit in the Phenomenology of Spirit as I 
discussed in Chapter 2 in reference to the Anmerkung on § 25 of the Encyclopedia Logic, and 
                                                   
72 ENZ § 398 Z. For Bichat’s distinction between organic and animal life, see his Recherches physiologiques sur la 
vie et la mort (Paris, 1800 ; 4th ed. 1822; reprinted in 1973 by Éditions Gérard: Verviers, Belgium), 7-8. 
73 Regarding this point, Inwood’s commentary on this statement in the Zusatz to § 398 is insightful: “Hegel does not 
mean that we think all the time […]. He means rather that any human mental activity, whether in sleep or in waking, 
involves thought. In sensing a mountain, for example, thought or categories enable me to see it as a unitary object, 
as mountain, and to assign the perception to myself, to be aware that I can see the mountain. The doctrine stems 
from Kant, but it is also present in Plato’s Theaetetus, where Socrates argues that perception of a unitary object by a 
unitary self involves such concept as being, identity, and difference:” Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. W.Wallace 
and A.V.Miller with Revisions and Commentary by M. J. Inwood (New Work: Oxford University Press, 2007), 350.  
74 ENZ § 398 Z. 
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the universals recollected from particular intuitions, treated in the Psychology. The different 
kinds of the contents dealt with in the Logic, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the 
Psychology, cannot be separated from each other in actual operations of our mind. As I 
discussed in Chapter 3, the case should rather be that one’s mind is filled with the spiritual 
contents that are formed by the processes of enculturation and recollection; the logical 
interconnections among thought-determinations are always at work when the spiritual 
contents are actualized in our mind. In this sense, the soul is a substance that is all in 
potentiality as Hegel defines, that is, a substance containing all the logical, phenomenological, 
and psychological contents in potentiality. 
 However, the fact that the soul is a substance containing all the logical, 
phenomenological, and psychological contents, does not make it necessary that its cognitive 
operations are all the time objective and true. As I discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel considers the 
soul as a substance in the sense of being all in potentiality. By implication, the soul may well 
fail to actualize the substantial contents in an objective manner. It may have a deranged 
subjectivity. This is, I think, what makes the soul’s division into sleep and waking into a 
crucial problem in Hegel’s Anthropology. Hegel mentions two different ways in which the 
substantial totality of the soul underlies our mental activities: in sleep and dreaming on the 
one hand, and in waking on the other. In dreaming, we often produce false representations, 
but Hegel highlights that this is not because the soul loses some fundamental thought-
determinations. While the soul remains the substantial totality containing all thought-
determinations, it may take a merely subjective attitude toward its representations without the 
presence of external objects corresponding to them. This is what happens in dreaming and the 
way in which false representations are produced. As I discuss in what follows, the distinct 
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feature of the feeling soul consists in its production of deranged representations of herself and 
the world. This being said, the differentiation the soul into itself as being and into itself as 
being-for-itself, which Hegel conceptualizes through his discussion of the soul’s alternation 
between sleep and waking, does not entail the achievement of the soul’s true being-for-itself. 
At the last stage of the natural soul, one comes to have for the first time an individual soul that 
has subjectivity. But this incipient form of the soul’s subjectivity, which is at work in our 
sentient activities, is involved in the one-sided subjectivism of the sentient soul. Thus, the 
second sub-division of the Anthropology on “the Feeling Soul” thematizes the conditions 
under which the soul gets involved in the deranged state and how it comes to overcome the 
one-sided subjectivity.  
 In Hegel’s discussion of the natural soul, sleep and waking therefore mean more than 
the physical states in which sense organs are active or inactive. Instead, the distinction 
between these two states of the soul is for Hegel concerned with the existential conditions 
under which one produces a one-sidedly subjective, deranged representation of herself and the 
world or an objective, true one. Even if one is physically awake, in other words, she may well 
be said to be dreaming if she gets involved in her subjective representations that do not match 
the actual constitution of the things outside her. She may well also be said to be sleeping in 
the sense of being shut off from the world, insofar as she is stuck in her inner, subjective 
world, turning away from the actual constitution of the objective world. What one comes to 
have at the last stage of the natural soul is therefore a soul in the dreaming state.75 One can 
                                                   
75 Jeffery Reid offers an insightful analysis of Hegel’s modification in the title of the section concerning the soul’s 
feeling life (§§ 403-408) from “The Dreaming Soul [die träumende Seele]” in the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia 
to “The Feeling Soul [die fühlende Seele]” in the 1830 edition: Jeffrey Reid, “How the Dreaming Soul Became the 
Feeling Soul, between the 1827 and 1830 Editions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Empirical Psychology 
and the Late Enlightenment,” in Essays on Hegel’s Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2013), 37-54. As Reid points out, the contents of the texts and Hegel’s main points remain largely 
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therefore say that Hegel’s Anthropology is a doctrine of the dreaming soul, showing how this 
deranged subject becomes a waking soul, i.e., an actual soul, which indicates consciousness, 
and eventually, self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Consequently, the soul in 
the state of waking refers to the “concrete I or understanding [Verstand].”76 This being 
assumed, the Anthropology deals with the way in which the soul in the state of dreaming 





                                                   
unchanged in those two editions of the Encyclopedia. Yet, the fact that the feeling soul in the third edition was 
considered as a dreaming soul in the second edition, Reid suggests, reveals one of the significant concerns 
underlying Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit: Hegel’s rejection of Schleiermacher’s conception of religion as 
being based on the religious fervor [Schwärmerei].  
Reid shows that the dreaming/feeling soul section has its original source in Hegel’s 1794 manuscript on psychology, 
titled by Hoffmeister as “Materien zu einer Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes.” In this early manuscript, Hegel 
considers the mind in terms of the production of representations—specifically, under the heading “the sign of Kant’s 
transcendental esthetic, through his interpreters Johannes Schultze and Karl Reinhold”—and address the issue of 
how the mind comes to produce irrational representations unconsciously. Hegel’s suggestion was that this happens 
when consciousness is weakened to such an extent that it is overpowered by the soul’s arbitrary representations. 
While drawing a special attention to the section in Hegel’s 1794 manuscript entitled, “Use on Certain Conditions 
Where Phantasie Takes Part: Dreams, Somnambulism, Madness, Premonitions, and Visions,” Reid highlights that 
this section begins with a subsection entitled “Sleep” and ends with a final section on religious fervor 
[Schwärmerei]. Relying on Hoffmeister’s supposition that the content of Hegel’s 1794 manuscript is derived from 
the Tübingen professor J.F.Flatt, Reid argues that “much of the inspiration for Philosophy of Subjective Spirit §§ 
403 to 408, on the dreaming/feeling soul, actually comes from J.F.Flatt:”cf. Jeffrey Reid, “How the Dreaming Soul 
Became the Feeling Soul, between the 1827 and 1830 Editions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Empirical 
Psychology and the Late Enlightenment,” 43.  
But he emphasizes that the one who inspires Hegel with respect to the dreaming/feeling soul is not the Flatt Hegel 
critically recognizes as a dogmatic theologian at Tübingen but the earlier Flatt as a proponent of Leibniz/Wollfian 
late Enlightenment reason against the claim of the phantasy, whose position includes an objection to the religious 
fervor [Schwärmerei]. Seen this way, the underlying concern of Hegel’s discussion of the dreaming/feeling soul, for 
Reid, consists in his struggle against the Gefühlsreligion of Schleiermacher. 
76 ENZ, § 398 A. 
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2. The Sentient Soul and Symbolic Bodiliness 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel considers sensation as the highest point in the 
system of nature and hence, the middle point between Nature and Spirit. The concrete sense in 
which spirit emerges as spirit out of its submersion in nature is therefore to be elucidated 
through an examination of how Hegel considers sensation. As I discuss later by examining 
“The Feeling Soul” section, the life form based on sensation is for Hegel fundamentally 
subject to derangement [Verrücktheit] and the rise of the spiritual form of life requires the 
overcoming of this spiritual illness through habit. Yet, the fact that the sentient soul is subject 
to spiritual illness implies that sensation is not just a natural or physical process but instead 
involves a certain spiritual aspect. Sensation is certainly a bodily process, which cannot occur 
without the operation of sense organs and sensory nerves. But if it were a mere mechanic 
process involving no spiritual aspect at all, it would not be possible for it to be involved in any 
spiritual phenomena, either pathological or healthy ones. In what follows, I spell out the sense 
in which the sentient soul is in Hegel’s Anthropology considered to be spiritual, paying 
special attention to his notion of the sentient body. As I show, the sentient body is for Hegel a 
sphere for the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings, and it is made into an instrument for 
this externalization of the soul’s interior by virtue of the inwardizing recollection treated in 
the Psychology. But I argue that this symbolic, spiritual aspect of the sentient body is 




  346  
 
2.1. Sensation: Internal Process of the Soul Mediated by Bodiliness 
 
In the being-for-itself of the waking soul, being is contained as an ideal moment; the 
waking soul thus finds the content-determinacies of its sleeping nature—which are in itself 
in the sleeping nature as in their substance—within itself and indeed, for itself. This 
particular, as a determinacy, is distinct from the self-identity of being-for-itself and at the 
same time simply contained in its simplicity: sensation.77  
 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel holds that sensation marks the end point of the system 
of Nature and the starting point of Spirit. If sensation constitutes the starting point of Spirit, 
this is because it involves a form of subjectivity, i.e., self-feeling. Now, the passage above 
where Hegel defines sensation in terms of the simple unity of being and being-for-itself is 
worth noting because it illustrates how the incipient form of subjectivity that the sentient soul 
displays differs from the subjectivity of the self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. In the passage above, Hegel repeats the point that he made in §398: the soul is a being 
in the sense of containing all content-determinations, and a being-for-itself in the sense of 
having a self-reflective aspect, i.e., self-feeling. Hegel’s point is that these two aspects 
constituting the sentient soul are immediately and inseparably associated with each other. 
Sensation and self-feeling, in other words, are not distinct from each other; instead, one and 
the same operation of the sentient soul is called sensation when its aspect of passivity is 
                                                   
77 ENZ, § 399. 
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emphasized, and self-feeling, when the emphasis is given to the aspect of selfness 
[Selbstischkeit].78  
Hegel’s emphasis on the immediate, inseparable, and indistinguishable association 
between a particular sensation and self-feeling is closely related to the fact that the soul is in 
the Anthropology treated as an undifferentiated substance filled with content-determinations. 
As I discussed previously, the Anthropology considers how the oppositional relationship 
between subject and object arises from the undifferentiated substantiality of the soul without 
presupposing this conscious opposition belonging to the realm of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. It is therefore important to note that the sentient soul is in Hegel’s Anthropology treated 
as an inner without an outer, having no distinction between a sentient subject and a sensed 
object: sensation is considered as an internal process within the sentient soul rather than as an 
interaction between the soul and an external object. Importantly, the fact that the sentient soul, 
unlike consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, does not have a relationship with an 
object entails that it also lacks an intersubjective relationship with another subject. Since the 
sentient soul is assumed to have no distinction between subject and subject, the self-feeling 
involved in a particular sensation does not involve a relation to an other either. The 
subjectivity that the sentient soul has in its self-feeling, in other words, is not mediated by an 
other to itself, whereas self-consciousness is in the Phenomenology of Spirit considered to 
have intersubjective subjectivity, which necessarily requires a relation to and mediation by an 
                                                   
78 Cf. ENZ, § 402 A: “In ordinary linguistic usage, sensation [Empfindung] and feeling [Fühlen] are not sharply 
distinguished. Still we do not speak of the sensation [Empfindung] of right, self-sensation [Selbstempfindung], etc. 
but of the feeling [Gefuhl] of right, self-feeling [Selbstgefühl]. Sensation is connected with sensitivity 
[Empfindsamkeit]; it seems plausible therefore that sensation emphasizes more the aspect of passivity, of finding 
[des Findens], i.e. the immediacy of the determinacy in feeling [Fühlen], whereas feeling [Gefühl] looks more to the 
selfishness [Selbstischkeit] involved in it.” 
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other. In this sense, sensation and self-feeling, the being and being-for-itself of the sentient 
soul, are immediately associated with each other. 
The fact that the sentient soul has no distinction between subject and object such that its 
self-feeling is immediately attached to a particular sensation further implies that the self-
feeling involved in our sensory activities is far from being a conscious awareness. As self-
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit displays, a conscious awareness of oneself for 
Hegel involves a reflection into oneself in and through a relation to an other to oneself. The 
self-feeling is therefore a special phenomenon which certainly displays the aspect of 
subjectivity, reflectivity, and selfness but displays this without any relation to an other. We 
can then rightly pose the question of what the self-feeling is, if it is not a self-conscious 
awareness of oneself. I argue that the self-feeling considered in Hegel’s Anthropology is an 
unconscious, bodily subjectivity of the soul. As Hegel underlines, being-for-itself, which is a 
fundamental determination of consciousness or spirit, is determined in sensation as “natural 
bodiliness [die natürliche Leiblichkeit].”79 The soul therefore differs from self-consciousness 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit in that it has a bodily subjectivity, that is, the subjectivity 
mediated by natural bodiliness. In what follows, I discuss in more detail what this bodily 
subjectivity of the sentient soul is like.  
 
2.2. The Bodily Subjectivity of the Sentient Soul 
Since Hegel assumes that natural bodiliness is essential for the subjectivity of the 
sentient soul, I first examine his notion of the sentient body. In § 401, Hegel suggests that 
                                                   
79 ENZ, § 401. 
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natural bodiliness can be analyzed into two spheres: (1) the “bodiliness (e.g., of the eye or of 
any particular physical part whatever)” which “becomes sensation by being made internal, 
recollected in the soul’s being-for-itself;” (2) “the sphere of the determinacies originating in 
spirit and belonging to it, which, in order to be sensed, in order to be as if found, become 
embodied.”80 These two spheres are concerned with two different kinds of sensation, which 
have two different directions: the first sphere for outer sensation, and the second sphere for 
inner sensation. As Hegel discusses in the Anmerkung to § 401, the first sphere of the natural 
bodiliness for outer sensation is comprised of the five senses: the senses of physical ideality 
(sight and hearing), diffusive reality (smell and taste), and solid reality (touch). Besides this 
system of outer sense organs, there must be a system of particular organs that embody the 
inner contents of the soul. This system of inner sense organs, Hegel states, possibly includes 
all organs as well as viscera and deserves a separate scientific investigation by psychic 
physiology.  
Now, it appears that Hegel holds a non-conventional conception of outer and inner 
sensation. Outer sensation considered in his Anthropology has very little to do with an 
immediate, passive process of receiving sensory data from the external world because it 
involves, as Hegel suggests in the passage above, the recollective inwardization of what is 
intuited, which is dealt with in the Psychology. Outer sensation thus presupposes the process 
whereby what is sensed or intuited is given a symbolic or even spiritual meaning by being 
turned into a universal representation. Likewise, inner sensation is far from being a conscious 
awareness of one’s inner state because it is what is to be embodied rather than what is to be 
brought to consciousness. The soul’s inner feelings involve the determinations concerning 
                                                   
80 ENZ, § 401. 
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spiritual life, but Hegel’s point is that these spiritual determinations, insofar as we are 
concerned with inner sensation, must be embodied because they cannot otherwise be sensed.  
Noticeable regarding this non-conventional notion of inner and outer sensation by 
Hegel is his comparison between the Anthropology and the Psychology in terms of the issue 
of bodiliness. He somehow blurs the distinction between these two parts of the philosophy of 
subjective spirit by suggesting that both parts thematizes the same subject matter, i.e., outer 
and inner sensation, in different respects. The Anthropology, he states, does not consider outer 
sensation in terms of pleasure and displeasure because the feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure, which arouse urges and desires, belong to practical spirit. It only examines “the 
unconscious relatedness of outer sensation to the spiritual interior,” namely “mood.”81 
Further, the Anthropology deals with inner sensation insofar as it is embodied, whereas the 
disembodied, purely internal aspect of inner sensation is the subject matter of the 
Psychology.82 The Anthropology thus deals with sensation in terms of the arousal of a mood 
by outer sensation and the embodiment of the soul’s inner sensation, of which both are 
unconscious and immediate.83 This illustrates how Hegel introduces a non-dualistic view of 
                                                   
81 ENZ, § 401 Z. 
82 ENZ, § 401 Z. 
83 For a study of Hegel’s notion of mood, see: John Russon, “Emotional Subject: Mood and Articulation in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Mind,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol.49, n. 1, issue 193 (2009): 41-52.  By analyzing 
Hegel’s notion of mood in the Anthropology, Russon suggests that mood is a species of sensibility [Empfindung]. 
He shows that Hegel considers sensation not merely as a cognitive process but as a way in which we live in the 
world with bodiliness. For Russon, Hegel thus sides with Heidegger in holding that mood precedes ego-based 
consciousness. Further, he focuses on Hegel’s idea presented in the Zusatz to § 401 that the highest form of the 
expression of the soul’s inner sensation is gesture, and that gesture is completed in language. With a close analysis 
of this idea of Hegel, Russon argues that emotion is not merely subjective; instead, “emotion is the subjective non-
differentiation of subject and object which seeks an adequate externalization,” which “accomplishes itself in its 
expression of itself as an intersubjective reality;” cf. John Russon, “Emotional Subject: Mood and Articulation in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind,” 52. This is, for Russon, how emotion and spirit are necessarily linked in Hegel’s 
philosophy. Russon also provides a comprehensive analysis of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in terms of the 
relationship between the self and the body: John Russon, The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Toronto, Buffalo, London: Toronto University Press, 1997). In his view, the science of experience in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit can be reconstructed in terms of the “science of the embodiment of consciousness:” cf. 
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the unity of the soul and the body. The Anthropology treats both inner and outer sensation as 
bodily-emotional processes internal to the sentient subject and not as a cognitive, objective-
relational process.  
As sensation is in the Anthropology considered in terms of a physical-emotional 
process internal to the sentient subject, the sentient body is an instrument for this 
externalization of the soul’s interior. As mentioned earlier, Hegel holds that the sentient body 
comprises the system of outer sense organs and that of inner sense organs; the former serves 
to the sense of outer materials, embracing from the most real and solid to the most ideal and 
fluid ones and the latter serves to the expression of one’s inner feelings. Yet, we would have 
to say that the system of outer sense organs is incorporated to the system of inner sense organs 
because all organs, including viscera, according to Hegel, serve the embodiment of the soul’s 
inner sensations. This being said, the sentient body is an expressive body that embodies the 
soul’s inner feelings.  
Of importance is that the physical-emotional process in which an outer sensation 
arouses a mood in the soul or serves to the expression of her inner feelings is made possible 
by the symbolic meaning associated with that outer sensation in an immediate, unconscious, 
and unreflective manner. Hegel suggests that the sensation of the color of black, for instance, 
arouses a gloomy mood in the soul, and that this arousal of a mood by an outer sensation is 
                                                   
John Russon, The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 3. Specifically, he articulates the three 
forms of the body: phusis, hexis, and logos—namely, the natural body engaged in the process of life and desire, the 
encultured body engaged in the process of master-slave dialectic and the social, cultural institutions, and the 
scientific body, which is absolute knowing. While Russon’s analysis is illuminating in elucidating the role of the 
body in Hegel’s thought, he does not seem to be doing full justice to the fact that the body is for Hegel eventually 
the locus of the negativity of spirit. In what follows, I focus more on showing that the emotional body is that which 
is to be sublated by spirit and that spirit emerges as spirit through this negation of what is the negative to itself, i.e., 
the immediate, emotional bodiliness. 
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possible due to the association of the soul’s inner determination with an outer sensation, 
which is in turn made possible by a meaning stored in the soul. The soul, in other words, 
contains the meaning of black including death, fear, and ominousness; this meaning is 
actualized upon seeing the color of black, which arouses a gloomy mood in the soul. Further, 
the meaning of black immediately intervenes the soul’s sensation of the color of black—
“immediately, namely without conscious understanding needing to intervene,”84 and “by this 
[inner] meaning, the outer sensation becomes symbolic.”85 Further, the symbolic meaning 
stored in the soul also makes it possible for the soul to express her inner feelings by using an 
outer sensation. For instance, one wears in black, Hegel states, to express the grief when 
attending a funeral.86  
                                                   
84 ENZ, § 401 Z.  
85 ENZ § 401 Z. Hegel’s example of the color of black can provoke criticism for its potential, racist implication, 
although giving the context of his discussion of embodiment, his example does not necessarily involve a racist 
claim. Given the severity and enormity of the problem of racism today, however, it should be noted that associating 
the color of black with negative meanings carries the risk of racist commitment, and that the color of black may well 
be associated with positive symbolic meanings such as comforting and beautiful.  
86 In the Zusatz to § 401, Hegel make a distinction between two different kinds of inner sensation; emotions such as 
anger, revenge, envy, shame, and so forth, which he considers to be individual, and the feelings of universals such as 
right, the ethical, the religious, the beautiful, and truth. Hegel discusses physiological expressions of emotions, such 
as an abdominal illness as the embodiment of grief and the embodiment of courage and anger in the heart and breast. 
He also discusses laughing and weeping as the reactions to comedy and tragedy respectively, suggesting that those 
bodily externalizations of the inner feelings such as gaiety and destruction are eliminations or expulsions of the 
latter. However, he does not offer an explanation of the embodiment of the feelings of the universals. This point 
makes us refer back to Hegel’s mention in the Zusatz to § 401 that the Anthropology deals with inner sensation 
insofar as it is embodied whereas the disembodied, purely internal aspect of inner sensation is the subject matter of 
the Psychology. As far as I see, Hegel’s idea is that a person’s emotion can be embodied and this physical expression 
of one’s emotion can be thematized in the Anthropology, but the feeling of what he calls universals, that is, spiritual 
determinations concerning morality, the ethical life, art, religion, and philosophy are not necessarily embodied. 
Further, the feeling of these spiritual determinations, insofar as they can be immediately felt, may be treated in the 
Psychology, which thematizes the disembodied, internal aspect of the soul in relation to the universalization of what 
is intuited. As we notice in his Psychology, however, this last part of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit does not 
address the immediate feeling of universals or those spiritual determinations. In short, Hegel considers the 
embodiment of a person’s individual emotion to be an important issue of the Anthropology; however, he does not 
deal with the immediate feeling of universals or spiritual determinations although he suggests that these are the 
subject matters of the Psychology. The fact that Hegel’s Psychology does not really thematize the feelings of 
universals seems to bear on his objection to Romantic subjectivism, specifically Schleiermacher’s conception of 
intuition and feeling as the fundamental faculty of religion. Throughout his philosophical career, Hegel consistently 
held that the absolute cannot truly be grasped by immediate feelings but only by thought, the speculative thought 
involving the power of absolute negativity. This is, I think, what is implicit in Hegel’s distinction of inner sensation 
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Therefore, both the arousal of a mood by outer sensation and the embodiment of inner 
sensation treated in the Anthropology presuppose, I claim, the process of the inwardizing 
recollection considered in the Psychology. This is what is implied by Hegel’s assertion that 
the bodiliness of outer sensation involves inwardizing recollection. As I discussed in Chapter 
3, the process of recollection entails the production of symbols and signs whereby what is 
intuited is liberated from its particularity and is given the form of a universal representation. I 
also showed that Hegel views symbols and signs as having rational meanings in the sense that 
they are somehow determined by custom. Prior to this spiritual process, there cannot be the 
physical expression of one’s emotions, nor the arousal of a mood by a sensation.  
The above considerations of Hegel’s conception of inner and outer sensation illustrate 
that the natural bodiliness of the sentient soul is not a mere physical body. It is not just an 
apparatus consisting of sensory organs and sensory nerves that process outside information 
but a material sphere that can perform a symbolic function, one that immediately stimulates a 
symbolic meaning stored in the soul to rise and immediately externalizes it. The sentient soul 
has an expressive, symbolic body in this sense; this is also the spiritual aspect of the sentient 
body.  
This being said, we can now spell out the sense in which the sentient soul has 
subjectivity in and through its natural bodiliness. As Hegel suggests in the Anmerkung on § 
402 that “the waking soul finds the content-determinacies of its sleeping nature within itself,” 
                                                   
into individual emotions and the feelings of universals.  
To the extent that immediate feelings thus do not play any constitutive role for Hegel’s philosophy, they do not 
necessarily have to be thematized in the Psychology. Regarding Hegel’s rejection of Schleiermacher’s conception of 
religion and its implication for his Anthropology, see in particular: Jeffrey Reid, “How the Dreaming Soul Became 
the Feeling Soul, between the 1827 and 1830 Editions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Empirical 
Psychology and the Late Enlightenment,” in Essays on Hegel’s Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2013), 37-54. 
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the subjectivity of the sentient soul consists in self-reflectivity, namely in the activity of 
recognizing itself in and through what constitutes itself. Generally speaking, subjectivity in 
this sense of a self-recognitional reflectivity, for Hegel, requires a differentiation of the 
subject from herself as an object of her self-recognition and a recognitional reunification of 
this objectified self, which became an other to herself, with herself. But at the level of 
sensation, this self-reflective process, as mentioned above, does not occur in a conscious way 
due to the lack of a conscious, oppositional relation between subject and object. Regarding 
this point, my previous claim that the sentient soul is in Hegel’s Anthropology treated as an 
inner without an outer is now to be more aptly understood as follows. The fact that the soul is 
treated as an internal process within the soul without a conscious relation to the external world 
does not imply that it is a pure interior without an exterior, nor that it involves no relation to 
an other at all. When a mood is aroused by an outer sensation and the soul’s inner feelings are 
embodied, the sentient body operates as the exterior of the soul, one that immediately 
stimulates or expresses the interior of the soul. Accordingly, in those physical-emotional 
processes the soul does not remain a pure interior or a purely undifferentiated substance 
because it takes on a new, external form of existence, a bodily expression. They thus involve 
the soul’s self-differentiation into itself as an interior and into itself as an other to itself, i.e., 
the sentient body that externalizes itself. 
Therefore, the sentient soul essentially has a relation to an other to itself, i.e., the 
sentient body. Further, the body that embodies the soul is not just any sentient body but the 
body of the soul because it becomes “a sign” of the soul, “a sign visible to others.”87 More 
precisely, the bodiliness of the sentient body as mine consists in this: “that its materiality is 
                                                   
87 ENZ, § 401 Z. 
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unable to be for itself, can offer no resistance to me, but is subordinate to me, is pervaded 
through and through by my soul for which it is an ideality.”88 This being said, the sentient 
soul has subjectivity in the sense of having its body as its own and not in the sense of having a 
conscious self-awareness of herself and others. 
It is to be noted, therefore, that the sentient soul has the subjectivity in this sense only 
in an immediate way. The soul does not make its body into its sign in an active, negative, and 
conscious way. The arousal of a mood and the embodiment of its inner feelings occur in an 
unconscious and immediate way. As I argued that these physical-emotional processes are 
made possible by inwardizing recollection conceived as a process whereby the sentient body 
is turned into a sphere for symbolic meanings, we can perhaps say that recollection is the 
process whereby we appropriate our bodies as that which expresses our interiors, gives an 
external existence to our souls, and thereby shows who we are at this moment. In this sense, it 
is also a process that turns our natural body into a spiritual bodiliness. Once this process has 
been made, however, the embodiment of the soul’s interior occurs unconsciously or naturally 
without the intervention of consciousness.89 The sentient soul does not appropriate its body as 
                                                   
88 Ibid. 
89 Regarding this, the feeling of anger can be a good example because it makes it possible for us to think of 
various cases in which the feeling, the body, and consciousness operate in their interactions, including a 
voluntary or conscious control of the rise of  the feeling and its embodiment. When I have a feeling of anger, this 
feeling is not necessarily embodied. It may just arise inside me and remain an internal feeling. It is also possible 
for me to be mindful of the rise of anger in me, watch it with my internal eyes, and let it go. In this case, my 
feeling of anger remains internal to my soul without gaining an external, bodily existence. When I am mindful of 
its rise, my soul is also differentiated into itself as the feeling of anger and another self of mine which is my 
internal eyes watching its rise. This differentiation of my soul into two selves, however, does not involve an 
externalization of my soul’s interior. But the same feeling may also be immediately and unconsciously embodied 
through my heartbeat or facial expression. In this case, whether or not I am conscious of the rise of the feeling of 
anger in me and its embodiment is not an issue. What is here at stake is the fact that the embodiment occurs 
regardless of my will or thinking. Certainly, I can control this bodily process and even the rise of the feeling of 
anger before it arises in me through some practices with my mind. But I cannot control it at every time it arises 
in me and even if this is possible for someone, it is not what Hegel considers in the Anthropology. What is at 
stake in the “Sensation” section is the case in which my feeling of anger is embodied through my heart beating 
or facial expression regardless of my will and thinking and prior to my consciousness of its happening. In this 
case, embodiment is immediate and unconscious. Further, my heartbeat and facial expression are not the feeling 
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its own but instead is just given the latter; to be more precise, the sentient soul immediately 
exists as the body. Although the sentient body is subordinated to the soul as its sign which 
offers no resistance to it, we would have to say, therefore, that the soul is likewise 
subordinated to its exteriorization through the embodiment of its inner feelings. In short, the 
natural bodiliness of the sentient soul is a special, spiritual kind of body whose materiality is 
capable of symbolizing the spiritual interior of the soul; however, the embodiment in this 
sense of externalizing the soul’s interior is still a natural process that occurs to the soul in an 
immediate and unconscious way.  
 
3. Derangement of the Feeling Soul and the Negativity of Naturgeist 
 
In the previous section, I discussed how Hegel’s Anthropology treats the sentient soul 
in terms of the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings without pursuing a dualistic approach 
to the soul-body relationship, nor presupposing the conscious, oppositional relationship 
between a sensed object and a sensing subject. As I discussed, Hegel thus considers 
embodiment in terms of the soul’s immediate, bodily existence through the symbolic, 
                                                   
of anger itself but its externalization. The part of my soul’s interior thereby gains an external existence, i.e., the 
motion of my heart and the change in my facial muscle. My soul is thereby differentiated into itself as the feeling 
of anger and into the motion of the heart and facial muscle. As mentioned earlier, in relation to embodiment, 
Hegel holds that all organs, including viscera, can serve to embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings. As far as I 
see, this notion of all bodily organs as the means of embodiment of inner feelings supposes that embodiment 
incorporates all kinds of unconscious bodily gestures that reflect one’s psychic states: e.g., eye movements when 
I tell a lie and have the feeling of anxiety, shaking of my legs when I feel bored or nervous, and so forth. In this 
sense of the sentient body for inner feelings as incorporating all organs, my heart and facial muscle are part of 
my sentient body. My soul is thus differentiated into itself as its internal feeling and the sentient body that 
embodies it. I would here like to say that this sentient body embodying my feelings is an other to myself not 
simply in the sense that it is an externalized form of my interior or that I recognize the feeling of anger as my 
feeling and its embodiment as an expression of this feeling and hence, as secondary to the feeling itself, but more 
fundamentally in the sense that this embodiment occurs regardless of my will and consciousness. 
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expressive bodiliness. Embodiment in this sense of the immediate bodily existence of the 
soul, however, constitutes a key problem of the Anthropology. First of all, embodiment occurs 
to the soul regardless of her will. This implies that the soul has no power over her substantial 
being and its externalization. Seen this way, embodiment is a natural process to which the 
soul is subordinated. More importantly, the soul’s bodily existence through embodiment is 
completely immediate such that it has no connection with the world. In order for the soul to 
come to exist by exteriorizing its interior, in other words, the soul needs not to actively 
interact with the world. And the soul’s immediate bodily existence without a relationship with 
the world is for Hegel problematic because it forms the ontological condition under which the 
soul falls into one-sided subjectivism. Lacking the relationship with the world, the soul thus 
remains a self-enclosed, one-sided subjectivity, which dictates “what I sense I am” and “what 
I am I sense.”90 Hegel calls this soul that believes what it senses and feels to be true even in 
contradiction to the actual constitution of the external world “subjective consciousness” in 
comparison to “objective consciousness.”91 Subjective consciousness in this sense is what 
Hegel thematizes in “The Feeling Soul” section.  
The “Feeling Soul” section comprises three parts: (1) The Feeling Soul in Its 
Immediacy (§§ 405-406); (2) Self-Feeling (§§ 407-408); (3) Habit (§§ 409-410). In the first 
stage of the feeling soul, “The Feeling Soul in Its Immediacy,” Hegel thematizes what he calls 
the magical relationship and animal magnetism. At first glance, Hegel’s thematization of 
these pseudo-scientific themes seems philosophically insignificant. Hegel’s thematization of 
various irrational phenomena related to those topics, however, essentially bears on his 
                                                   
90 ENZ § 402 Z. 
91 Ibid. 
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speculative notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, 
reason as the unity of reason and unreason. What Hegel conceptualizes through a reflection on 
those irrational phenomena, then, is the contradictory coexistence of the two elements in one 
and the same conscious subject. This is the structure of the feeling soul, or the feeling form of 
consciousness, which Hegel considers in the second stage of the feeling soul, “Self-Feeling,” 
under the rubric of derangement. In Hegel’s terms, the “Self-Feeling” concerns the form of 
the soul in which it “finds itself in the contradiction between its totality systematized in its 
consciousness, and the particular determinacy that is not fluid in that totality, not integrated 
and subordinated [to that totality],” and this is “derangement [Verrücktheit].”92 As I show, the 
feeling soul is therefore a form of consciousness, which reveals the speculative constitution of 
consciousness (i.e., the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness) in its negative form (i.e., 
the contradiction between the two). As such, derangement is the stage in the Anthropology 
where the negativity of Naturgeist bursts out.  
Of importance here is that derangement is fundamentally grounded in the ontological 
condition of the sentient soul, namely the fact that the soul immediately exists as the body 
without an objective relationship with the world. What Hegel further shows in the first two 
stages of the feeling soul is that under that ontological condition of the sentient soul, the soul is 
caged in the monadic world that is only perceived from her individual perspective, and that the 
soul thus lives a dreaming life even while being awake. Since this problem of the feeling soul is 
ultimately grounded in the condition of the sentient soul of immediately existing through 
bodiliness and having not yet established an objective relationship with the world, in the third 
stage, “Habit,” Hegel re-thematizes the bodily existence of the soul. In this last stage of the 
                                                   
92 ENZ § 408. 
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feeling soul, Hegel thus shows how the soul comes to establish an objective relationship with the 
world of actuality by transforming its bodiliness. In what follows, I investigate the first two 
stages of the feeling soul, aimed at spelling out Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness and 
its role in the Anthropology. The last stage, “Habit,” will be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter. 
 
3.1.  The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy: Being Awake while Dreaming or Dreaming while 
Being Awake 
  Embodiment presents the immediate unity of the soul’s being and being-for-itself with 
respect to bodiliness. In the first stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, titled “The Feeling Soul 
in its Immediacy,” Hegel thematizes the same, immediate unity of the soul’s being and self 
anew by switching the focus to the soul’s psychical life. He thus examines a wide range of 
psychic phenomena that present the immediate unity of the soul’s being and self. These 
phenomena fall into two categories: (1) the magical relationship [das magische Verhältnis] 
(§405); (2) animal magnetism (§406). The magical relationship is the immediate 
subordination of a selfless and passive subject to the power of another subject, which Hegel 
calls the genius or the guardian spirit. This magical relationship is observed in the life of a 
fetus in the womb and the influence of circumstantial factors on one’s destiny. Whereas the 
fetus who is under the direct influence of her mother’s physical and psychological states and 
an individual whose life is directly affected by circumstantial factors are, in fact, selfless 
objects rather than conscious subjects, animal magnetism is the fixation of the magical 
relationship as a form or state of sober consciousness. This is observed in clairvoyance and 
mesmerism or hypnosis. Interestingly, Hegel starts off his discussions of those two forms of 
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the feeling soul in its immediacy with an examination of a kind of dreaming: (1) natural 
dreaming (premonition and postmonition),93 which is relevant to the magical relationship; (2) 
somnambulism, which is related to animal magnetism.  
It seems that those phenomena Hegel considers in terms of the immediate unity of the 
feeling soul’s being and self are philosophically insignificant or hard to accept from the 
viewpoint of modern science and rationality. Obviously, the idea that a mother’s physical and 
psychological states affect the formation of her fetus’ personality, and that external 
circumstances determine the direction of one’s life runs counter to the essential feature of the 
modern conception of human subjectivity: autonomy in the sense of self-determination and 
self-reliance, in particular. Further, premonition, postmonition, mesmerism, and clairvoyance 
are all pseudo-scientific in the eyes of today.94 The fact that Hegel discusses those irrational 
                                                   
93 I translate “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen” into premonition and postmonition respectively, suggesting that they 
denote the forms of paranormal dreaming in which one has a vision of what will happen in the future or a vision of 
what has happened in the past without knowing it happened. I discuss the reason for this translation below in note 
97.  
94 Indeed, dreaming, somnambulism, clairvoyance, and mesmerism are all concerned with the development of early 
German psychiatry at the turn of the nineteenth century. In 1808, Johann Christian Reil, who was a professor of 
medicine at the University of Halle and recognized as a leader of German medicine, coined the term Psychiatrie. In 
his 1803 work Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Geisteszerrüttungen, Reil 
discussed somnambulism, suggesting that madness [Wahnsinn] is analogous to the state in which one’s mind dreams 
without her body being asleep. 
Animal magnetism, or mesmerism, stood at the center of the controversy between the somatist and the psychist 
school; for the detail, see Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness (Albany: State University of New 
York, 1995), 29-35. Clairvoyance was conceived as the highest stage of animal magnetism which is adduced by a 
Mesmerist for the treatment of a mental patient.  
With respect to Hegel’s interest in and knowledge of those psychiatric themes of the time, it is noteworthy that he 
had some personal experiences with mental illness and its treatment; he saw his friend at Tübingen, Hölderlin, going 
mad, and his sister Christianne got treatment for hysteria over a decade (1822-32) from Schelling’s brother Karl, 
who was himself a practicing Romantic physician and published articles on animal magnetism. Karl’s treatments for 
Christianne likely included “magnetic or mesmeric therapy;” Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic 
Tradition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 217. Hegel’s acquaintance with mesmerism dates 
back to his years in Jena where he worked together with Schelling. In his letter to Hegel dated to March 22 of 1807, 
Schelling stated that mesmerism was “continuing to progress and prove indeed correct” and recommended Hegel 
reading his brother Karl’s article on animal magnetism; see Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic 
Tradition, 216-7.  
Hegel regularly discussed mental derangement [Verrücktheit] in his lectures from 1816 to 1830, but he only left 
short and condensed lecture notes on this topic: § 408 and Anmerkung to § 408 in the 1830 Encyclopedia. In 1845, 
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and pseudo-scientific experiences at length, however, does not imply that he acknowledges 
their scientific value or status. More importantly, Hegel maintains his critical stance against 
Romanticism, which places great value on unconsciousness and imagination as the source of 
true knowledge.95 It is therefore to be noted that Hegel’s discussion of the magical 
                                                   
his student Boumann edited a thirty-page long text on the basis of Hegel’s lecture manuscripts and the notes that he 
and other students took from Hegel’s lectures. It is in this Zusatz text where we find Hegel’s discussion of dreaming, 
somnambulism, clairvoyance, animal magnetism, and mesmerism. Examining this editorial history, Danial Bond-
Berthold points out that Hegel’s discussion of the psychiatric themes of the time has not received sufficient attention 
from Hegel scholars as well as his contemporaries. As he quotes, W.T. Stace, for instance, suggests that Hegel’s 
discussion of derangement “appears to be parenthetical, and to have no connection with the course of the dialectic:” 
W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Dover, 1995), 336.  
However, one can hardly dismiss Hegel’s lengthy discussion of dreaming, somnambulism, clairvoyance, animal 
magnetism, and mesmerism in the Zusatz to § 408 as merely parenthetical or insignificant, considering the formation 
of psychiatry at the turn of the nineteenth century, his interest in the change of the era and the breadth of his reading, 
as well as his personal experiences with mental illness and its treatment. By this I do not mean, again, that Hegel 
believes those pseudo-scientific phenomena and theories to be true. Regarding the suspicion that Hegel is a pseudo-
scientist, nor do I mean that one can argue that he is not because the pseudo-scientific themes Hegel discusses in the 
“Feeling Soul” section are those that played an important role in the formation of psychiatry in his time. Indeed, the 
question as to whether or not the Hegel in the “Feeling Soul” section is a pseudo-scientist, as far as I see, is off the 
track. The best way to characterize of Hegel’s treatment of those themes in the Anthropology would be to say that 
Hegel thematizes them and make use of the psychiatric discussions of his time to theorize his notion of 
consciousness. As I discuss later, in other words, what Hegel theorizes in the “Feeling Soul” section is his dialectical 
notion of consciousness as uniting unconsciousness with itself rather than as opposed to the latter, and not those 
pseudo-scientific themes in themselves. Of importance in this regard is the fact that the “Feeling Soul” section 
constitutes a negative stage in the Anthropology. As I discuss in the next note, Hegel’s thematization of those themes 
implies his critical stance on Romanticism. Further, I think that the historical context of his time in which psychiatry 
began to form has an important significance for elucidating his theory of the soul-body relationship in the 
Anthropology. By this, I do not mean that one can show that Hegel’s theory of the soul-body relationship is right in 
all its aspects by drawing on the historical context. Nor do I mean that historical researches justify all ideas of Hegel. 
In my view, however, historical researches are necessary prerequisites for further critical researches as well as 
accurate understandings of Hegel.  
With respect to the significance of Hegel’s discussion of derangement, Berthold-Bond thus challenges Stace, 
highlighting Hegel’s claim that derangement is a necessary and essential stage in the development of the soul: 
Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), 1-3. More 
importantly, he points out that in Hegel’s treatment of derangement, “insanity and rationality are not in fact 
conceived as the opposites, but in important respects as kindred phenomena, […] each illuminating their ‘other’ in 
significant ways;” Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness, 3. This being said, Hegel’s notion of 
derangement and the discussion of the related, psychiatric themes have an essentially speculative, dialectical 
meaning, illustrating how reason involves its other, insanity, within itself, and how it becomes reason for itself by 
sublating this negative to itself. This is the direction I take in this chapter to interpret the “Feeling Soul” section in 
Hegel’s Anthropology. 
95 The late eighteenth-century is regarded as a turning point in the history of the concept of madness where 
psychiatry began to form as an independent medical discipline treating the health and disease of the psyche. While 
this Enlightenment movement occurred across the European countries including England, France, and Germany, 
German psychiatry at its inception is characterized by its association with the movement of Romanticism. Otto M. 
Marx gives a good picture of the mutual influence between Romantic philosophy and the rising, new discipline, 
psychiatry in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries: Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part 
I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” in History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, ed. Edwin 
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relationship and animal magnetism leads to an essentially internal criticism of those who find 
the access to the truth in some irrational and unconscious experiences. 
Further, Hegel’s treatment of the magical relationship and animal magnetism in his 
Encyclopedia system is more importantly concerned with his speculative notion of reason.96 
                                                   
R.Wallace IV and John Gach (New York: Springer, 2008), 313-334. First, he points out that the Romantic 
enthusiasm with mesmerism was related to the social and political situation of the eighteenth-century Germany. 
Germany fell behind England and France in social and political reformation, maintaining the traditional, feudal and 
religious system. The Romantic yearn for an idealized past, search for unity and freedom, objection to the empiricist, 
cold reason, emphasis on subjective, intuitive experiences, and favor in metaphor and analogy, according to Marx, 
were part of a substitute revolution, compensating for its impotence to bring changes to the real world. Seen this 
way, what evoked Romanticists’ enthusiastic interest in mesmerism, Marx suggests, was not just Mesmer’s theory 
that a magnetic fluid penetrates the entire universe including the human mind, but more importantly, his view of 
utopian society, which went beyond the framework of the Enlightenment’s cold notion of reason. Thus, the 
Mesmerists’ interest in somnambulism and trance states “corresponded with the romantics’ concern with the dark 
side of life, the inner self, and the longing, dreams, and hidden forces that operates beyond the limits of the waking 
mind:” Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” 
316. Second, Schelling’s philosophy of nature contributed to the reformation of medicine by bringing forward the 
organicist view of nature and humanity. His influence on the formation of early German psychiatry is first seen in 
the works by Johann Christoph Reil. By discussing mental illness in his 1803 work Rhapsodien über die Anwendung 
der psychischen Kurmethode auf Gesteszerrüttungen, Reil proposed a holistic approach to the human mind whereby 
one also considers the irrational depth of the psyche, namely an “empirical psychology for and by physicians, 
different from the psychology of the philosophers, who seemed satisfied to establish a system of mental functions in 
the normal state:” Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological 
Orientations,” 319. Further, Schelling developed the idea that madness [Wahnsinn] pre-exists as a basic part of 
human understanding, and understanding is nothing but regulated madness; this view of Schelling was accepted by 
Alexander Haindorf—the Jewish physician who wrote an award winning thesis “Schrift über die Pathologie und 
Therapie der Gemüts- und Geisteskrankenheiten” in 1810 and taught psychiatry at a university for the first time (at 
University of Heidelberg, 1811)—and was further developed by Johann Christian August Heinroth; for the details, 
see Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” 322-
325.  
With respect to Hegel’s place in the early nineteenth-century situation where psychiatry began to form under the 
influence of Romantic philosophy, Danial Berthold-Bond suggests that Hegel’s criticism of Romanticism for its 
empty formalism applies to Romantic medicine as well. He points out that Hegel criticizes Romantic medicine for 
its “construction of a priori metaphysical systems which are then simply imposed on the diagnostic and 
classificatory tasks of medicine:” Danial Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness (Albany: State University of 
New York Press,1995), 17-8. Yet Hegel dismisses empirical medicine too, Berthold-Bond highlights, which 
considers mental phenomena only as a posteriori facts. According to Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s position can ultimately 
be described as a middle way between Romantic and empirical medicine, where the main concern is a “conceptual, 
theoretical, philosophical discernment of the underlying, inner meaning of disease;” Hegel’s speculative theory of 
mental illness thus essentially involves an “ontology of the psyche which rests upon the ‘notional thinking’,” which 
Freud also pursued in his own way a century later: Danial Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness, 19. 
96 In this chapter, I focus only on Hegel’s speculative notion of reason as the unity of reason and unreason and its 
significance for his treatment of the Naturgeist in the Anthropology. But it seems that one can find a crucial clue for 
elucidating Hegel’s notion of “anthropology”—in what sense he gives the title “anthropology” to the first part of his 
philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia where he treats the soul-body relationship—by setting his 
thematization of those psychiatric themes of the time in the context of the rise of psychiatry in the early nineteenth-
century. As I discussed in Chapter 4 in reference to Fernando Vidal’s work, anthropology and psychology were not 
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Dismissing those impenetrable phenomena as nonsensical without any examination, for 
Hegel, presupposes a specific notion of reason: the notion of a rigid opposition between 
                                                   
established as independent disciplines in Hegel’s time; the terms anthropology and psychology were often used in an 
interchangeable way around the notion of the human soul as separable from but united with the body: cf. Fernando 
Vidal, The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, trans. Saskia Brown (Chicago/London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2011). Working on the history of Enlightenment psychology, therefore, for Vidal, 
amounts to investigating the formation of the idea of anthropology in the eighteenth century. By shedding light on 
the complicated history of Enlightenment psychology, Vidal thus challenges Foucault’s famous claim that man did 
not exist before the nineteenth century. Foucault’s claim, presented in his 1966 work, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences, was that man was not taken as the object of a science before the overall 
redistribution of the episteme occurred in the nineteenth century: before the classic, general theory of representation 
was abandoned, and biology, economics, and philology were formed as new, specific disciplines treating human life, 
labor, and language. Foucault further remarks that in this modern event, “the necessity of interrogating man’s being 
as the foundation of all positivities was imposing itself in its place;” Michael Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 345. Foucault’s idea is that the modern and 
contemporary human sciences revolve around the double notion of man as an a posteriori self-authorizer concerning 
her investigations as well as the a priori foundation of all knowledge: in his terms, man, first, as “that upon the bases 
of which all knowledge can be constituted as immediate and non-problematized evidence” and, second, as “that 
which justifies the calling into question of all knowledge of man” (ibid.). Whereas in this remark Foucault seems to 
be placing emphasis on the conception of man as an a posteriori self-authorizer in and for human sciences—and 
hence, the interconnection between power and knowledge, or the formation of modern disciplinary power—Vidal 
claims that “the ‘man’ of the ‘archaeology of the human sciences’ has nothing to do with its Enlightenment 
homonym, and that its meaning is decipherable only from within a Foucauldian framework;” Fernando Vidal, The 
Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, 100. He further suggests that in the eighteenth-
century Enlightenment, there was “the idea of one science that would bring together and integrate all the disciplines 
concerning the human being,” namely the idea that “man as a composite totality of soul and body must be taken as 
an autonomous object of study,” and that this ideal of a science of man “played a key role in the advent of the 
human sciences;” Fernando Vidal, The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, 101-109.  
Vidal considers the formation of that Enlightenment ideal of one science of man in light of the history of psychology 
and thus does not thematize psychiatry. His suggestion gives an important insight, however, into the significance of 
psychiatry for the German conception of anthropology in the late eighteenth- and the early nineteenth-centuries. We 
can refer, for instance, to Reil’s student at the University of Halle, Christian Friedrich Nasse’s suggestion. In 1822, 
Nasse suggested determining the new discipline, psychiatry, as “psycho-somatology” or “psycho-physiology,” 
which should be “a branch of anthropology” treating “the entirety of human nature [das Ganze der 
Menschennatur];” his program of this new, sub-discipline of anthropology thus challenges the old division 
according to which “the soul belongs to philosophers and the body, to physicians” and the separation between 
“psychology and physiology:” Marion Schmaus, Psychosomatik: Literarische, philosophische, und medizinische 
Geschichten zur Entstehung eines Diskurses (1778-1936) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2009), 169. It is 
therefore to be noted that psychiatry brought some important changes in the classic, philosophical framework of the 
soul-body relationship. In place of the old parallelism of the soul and the body, it introduced the idea of “an 
individually varying community of the soul and the body that is interactive, developmental-historical, and 
changeable depending on gender, external factors, etc.,” and the spacial topology of “the soul as inner and the body 
as outer:” Marion Schmaus, Psychosomatik: Literarische, philosophische, und medizinische Geschichten zur 
Entstehung eines Diskurses (1778-1936), 170.  
Thus, to shed full light on the “anthropological” meaning of Hegel’s Anthropology, it seems that we need to explore 
the ambiguous semantic field of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries in which anthropology, 
psychology, and psychiatry were not differentiated. This comprehensive historical study will give a good picture of 
the conception or image of man at the turn of the nineteenth century, thereby offering a chance to reconsider 
Foucault’s thesis.  
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reason and unreason. He thus argues that the existence of animal magnetism or hypnosis does 
not need to be verified insofar as we observe it. Verification is called for in order to “deny 
what they have seen with their own eyes” as “mere deception and imposture” while being 
“fixed in their a priori understanding.”97 Hegel’s point here is not that we should accept all 
mysterious phenomena as true without verifying them. Needless to say, this claim is not only 
nonsensical but also extremely dangerous because a malignant person, for instance, can 
delude people and establish a pseudo-religion for the purpose of making money and gaining 
power by claiming that he met a divine being and this divine being gave him supernatural, 
healing powers. Instead, his point is about the theoretical attitude of the people who already 
decided to deny animal magnetism or hypnosis. That is, they require verifications not because 
they want to examine whether or not hypnosis really exists or what it is, but because they 
want to deny it. No matter what verifications they are provided, they will deny it because they 
already decided to deny it.  
Instead of taking this antithetical standpoint of consciousness, Hegel thus embraces 
the irrational and paranormal experiences that attract a good deal of attention from his 
contemporaries and treats them as lived experiences, ones that are reported by people and 
deserve a speculative account with respect to the self-development of Geist in the 
Anthropology. This speculative account is first found in the way in which Hegel considers 
dreaming. As I suggest in what follows, natural dreaming is concerned with the state in which 
one is awake while dreaming; somnambulism, with the state in which one is dreaming while 
being awake. Both kinds of dreaming thus display an immediate connection between 
consciousness and unconsciousness; both the magical relationship and animal magnetism 
                                                   
97 ENZ, § 406 A. 
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challenge the idea of a rigid distinction between reason and unreason. Thus, Hegel’s intention 
in thematizing those experiences which seem to have no philosophical significances is not to 
give a scientific account or a phenomenological analysis concerning how or why it occurs. By 
seeing in them an immediate connection between consciousness and unconsciousness, he 
instead elaborates on the notion of the feeling form [Gefühlsform] of consciousness, one in 
which consciousness is tied to unconsciousness without being able to play the role of the 
mediator of that bond. This is, for Hegel, the disease of Geist, namely the diseased, negative 
stage that Geist, as Naturgeist, passes through in the Anthropology.  
 
3.2. The Magical Relationship: Being Awake While Dreaming 
Hegel starts his discussion of the magical relationship by considering what he calls 
natural dreaming. He already discussed dreaming in §398, framing the development of Geist 
in the Anthropology in terms of the soul’s awakening from sleep. His suggestion was that 
dreaming need not be identified with sleep insofar as it is thought of in terms of the 
production of unrealistic, subjective representations that do not match the actual constitution 
of the objective world. One produces these unrealistic and subjective representations even 
when awake. That is, one can be said to be dreaming even when she is awake. This form of 
consciousness in which it is subordinated to unconsciousness is the fundamental form of the 
feeling soul, which Hegel conceptualizes through a consideration of animal magnetism. Prior 
to developing this idea, Hegel considers the reverse form of that immediate bond between 
consciousness and unconsciousness: being awake while dreaming, which appears in natural 
dreaming.  
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The Zusatz to §405 suggests that the soul attains a “profound, powerful feeling of its 
whole individual nature, of the entire encompass of its past, present and future.” That is, the 
soul can have an immediate feeling or awareness of what has happened and what will happen; 
it can have an unconscious but objective knowledge of the world that matches reality even 
without the mediation of consciousness. Although Hegel calls this form of dreaming in which 
the soul attains a certain objective cognition of the past and the future “natural dreaming,” it 
thus refers to supernatural phenomena such as premonition and postmonition.98 But Hegel 
calls these “natural,” I think, to compare them with mesmerism, one in which a conscious 
subject’s withdrawal to her unconscious, substantial totality is artificially induced by another 
conscious subject, i.e., the magnetizer.  
What is more important than those paranormal phenomena themselves is Hegel’s 
evolving conceptualization of the connection between dreaming and being awake—
consciousness and unconsciousness, reason and unreason. The paranormal forms of dreaming 
lead us, as I suggested, to the idea of being awake while dreaming, that is, an objective 
cognition of the world that occurs in dreaming. Insofar as such unconscious knowledge of the 
world is given as people’s experiences and Hegel’s speculative perspective does not allow us 
to dismiss it only for the reason that it is incomprehensible from the antithetical standpoint of 
consciousness, one would have to concede that unconsciousness sometimes allows us, in a 
                                                   
98 “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen.” I presume that Hegel read some materials reporting the paranormal experiences of 
having a vision of the past or the future in dreaming, but I could not find any materials that support this presumption. 
In spite of this, I translate “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen” into premonition and postmonition with reference to 
Hegel’s formulation that natural dreaming is concerned with the soul’s awareness of the entire encompassment of its 
“past, present, and future.” In translating “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen” into premonition and postmonition, I also 
paid attention to his idea that natural dreaming presents the soul’s unity with its objectivity: in natural dreaming, 
“which in recent times have received universal attention,” “the soul still lies in immediate, undifferentiated unity 
with its objectivity” (ENZ, §402 Z). By premonition [Ahnen], I therefore understand a dreaming in which one sees 
what will happen in the future. By postmonition [Durchträumen], I mean a dreaming in which one has a vision of 
what happened in the past without knowing it happened. 
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certain way, to access the objective world and produce a correct representation of it. Giving 
an account of how it occurs, however, is not Hegel’s concern. Those paranormal exper iences 
suggest that unconsciousness is sometimes immediately bounded with consciousness rather 
than constitutes a purely irrational part of the mind inaccessible to consciousness. What Hegel 
sees in them and conceptualizes is such a relationship between consciousness and 
unconsciousness that challenges the idea of the rigid distinction between consciousness and 
unconsciousness. However, this unmediated, immediate fusion of dreaming and being awake 
is for Hegel essentially pathological. This is the critical position concerning the feeling form 
of consciousness, which he presents more clearly by considering somnambulism and animal 
magnetism, and further thematizes in terms of mental disorders in the second stage of the 
“Feeling Soul” section, titled “Self-Feeling.”  
This critical position of Hegel is already found in his treatment of the magical 
relationship. The magical relationship represents the immediate unity of the soul’s being and 
self. Hegel mentions the case in which a mother’s psychological disturbance is said to 
negatively affect the formation of her fetus’ body and mind. In this case, the fetus is a selfless 
substantiality, which has its actual self in an other, i.e., her mother. Hegel calls such an actual 
self who exercises a power on the life and constitution of another being the genius or the 
guardian spirit. Further, it is a “magical power [die magische Gewalt]” that the guardian spirit 
exercises on its other: the power to dominate an other’s mind and body without any mediation 
by something else.99 The soul’s immediate subordination to its guardian spirit is also found in 
                                                   
99 In the Zusatz to § 405, Hegel suggests that the magical infection [die magische Infektion] also occurs, for instance, 
when a child is immediately affected by the adults she sees around; when an adult with superior spirit attracts 
another with weaker spirit—e.g., when “Kent felt himself drawn to Lear because the king seemed to him to have 
something in countenance which he would fain call master.” Even habit can be considered in terms of the magical 
infection; “making one’s bodiliness subservient, unresisting executant of her will” is the exercise of the soul’s 
“magical power” upon its “bodiliness.”  
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the case in which one’s destiny is said to be determined by external circumstances. In this 
case, circumstantial factors that are said to determine the direction of one’s life are the 
geniuses or guardian spirits, which exercise a magical power on that individual. Neither a 
fetus in the womb nor an individual who are greatly affected by circumstances, however, can 
be said to be a conscious subject. They are rather objects, the passive beings on which the 
magical power of an actual self is exercised.  
As I discuss later, Hegel holds that the soul, or the human psyche in general, is 
ontologically connected with the world such that it is an individualized world of actuality. But 
when this individualization of the world in and as a soul occurs in a unilateral way, from the 
world to the soul, without the latter’s active participation, the life of the soul is like being 
awake while dreaming. That is, such an individual who just accepts a set of values and norms 
of the existing world can be said to be conscious in the limited sense that she can lead her life 
in accordance with those objective factors of the world. This conscious life, however, is not 
conscious in a self-conscious manner; it is said to be in the state of dreaming in the sense that 
it is subordinated to the magical power of the world.  
 
3.3 Animal Magnetism: Dreaming While Being Awake 
Animal magnetism is the fixation of the “feeling life [Gefühlsleben]” characteristic of 
the magical relationship as “a form, a state, of the self-conscious, enculturated, sober human 
being.”100 As with the magical relationship, Hegel sets out his discussion of animal 
magnetism with a consideration of a kind of dreaming: somnambulism. When discussing 
                                                   
100 ENZ, §405. 
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natural dreaming in the Zusatz to §405, Hegel briefly suggested that the soul’s unconscious, 
substantial totality is its “whole individual nature.” That is, the soul’s unconsciousness 
involves a whole of the factors that constitute its individuality; further, this whole individual 
nature of the soul also involves the factors concerning her relationships with the objective 
world, which bring about paranormal cognitions of the world when they are felt in dreaming. 
In the Anmerkung on §406, Hegel further develops the idea of the soul’s individuality as an 
individualization of the world of actuality in and as a soul. He states that “the concrete being 
of an individual” involves “the entirety of his fundamental interests, the essential and the 
particular empirical relationships in which he stands to other men and to the world at large.” 
This is also “the actuality of that individual:” an actuality “immanent to” her, which “was just 
called her genius.” In other words, unconsciousness contains the world of actuality in the 
individualized form as a soul; the unconscious, inner world of the soul is an individuation of 
the external world of actuality. Somnambulism occurs when this “sphere of the individually 
determined world, of particular interests and restricted relationships” enters into 
consciousness. It is such an immediate displacement of consciousness which is capable of 
relating to the world of actuality in a universal, objective manner by the soul’s unconscious, 
inner world—namely, by the world of actuality that is individualized in and as a soul, which 
the latter represents and feels only from her individual perspective.  
Somnambulism thus represents the immediate bond of consciousness and 
unconsciousness in the reverse direction to natural dreaming. The unconscious but objective 
cognition in natural dreaming is consciousness’ seizing the place of unconsciousness; 
somnambulism is unconsciousness’ taking over the seat of consciousness. While natural 
dreaming is being awake while dreaming, somnambulism is dreaming while being awake. 
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Both thus challenge the rigid distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. It is to 
be noted, however, that somnambulism is a form or a state of sober consciousness. By 
proceeding from natural dreaming to somnambulism, from the magical relationship to animal 
magnetism, Hegel thus elaborates on his critical conception of a particular form of 
consciousness in which it is immediately bound to unconsciousness without being able to play 
the role of the mediator of that bond, rather than just juxtaposing two different forms of the 
their immediate bond. It is “the feeling form [die Gefühlsform]” of consciousness, i.e., the 
feeling soul, which is, in fact, the “surrender of its (the soul’s) existence as the spirituality in 
being-with-itself [die bei sich selbst seiende Geistigkeit].”101  
The feeling soul  is therefore contrasted with sober consciousness, namely “the man of 
sound sense and understanding.”102 This subject who is consciously awake “relates to her 
inner world in a self-conscious way;” that is, “she knows herself in the form of the 
interconnection between herself and the determinations of that actuality as an external world 
distinct from herself, and she is similarly aware of this world as a network of rational 
[verständige] connections.”103 Sober consciousness’ awareness of herself, in other words, 
involves an awareness of the rational interconnection between her inner world and the 
actuality of the world outside of her. For example, a person living in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution, as a sober consciousness, would be able to be aware of her reactionary 
mindset; she would also be able to know that her mind consisting of the factors from the pre-
revolutionary world is no longer in accordance with the times; hence, she would be able to 
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recognize the revolutionized, new world as a rational one, thereby cultivating a new mindset 
that fits with this new, rational world.  
That the feeling soul is the surrender of its existence as Geist, therefore, implies that 
consciousness, when having a feeling form, comes out of joint with the actuality of the world 
and gets stuck in her merely subjective representation of the world. It is therefore important to 
note that Hegel’s critical conceptualization of the feeling soul bears on his idea of 
consciousness as a worldly being, a being that is encultured in the world of actuality as part of 
it and makes this world actual by conscious and self-conscious activities. If consciousness’ 
awareness of the world is rational and objective whereas the feeling soul’s is subjectivist and 
even perverted, this is for Hegel an essentially ontological issue concerning one’s existence in 
the world rather than a merely epistemological issue with respect to a correct or incorrect 
representation of the world. Hegel thus states that the world has its “thread” in the soul in 
such a way that “what it actually is for itself, consists of these threads.”104 Due to this 
connection between the soul and the world, an individual dies internally, Hegel suggests, 
when her world is destroyed; for instance, the Stoic, Cato, killed himself after the collapse of 
the Roman Empire. Or, one becomes psychologically ill with the loss of her close connection 
with the world: for instance, one suffers from depression with the death of her beloved people, 
and homesickness when living in a foreign land. These cases, however, do not differ much 
from the magical relationship insofar as the suicide and the sufferers of psychological 
sicknesses remain passive in relation to their worlds of actuality. The issue at stake is 
therefore the fact that in such a feeling-life, consciousness remains a “monadic individual” 
                                                   
104 Ibid. 
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that reflects and perceives the world only from its individual perspective, a passive substance 
that has subjectivity in another man or the world.105  
Now, Hegel elaborates on the psychical structure of the feeling soul by examining 
animal magnetism. Animal magnetism is the withdrawal of consciousness and its 
submergence in the soul’s substantial totality. As with natural dreaming, this submergence in 
unconsciousness entails a variety of supernatural cognitions such as clairvoyant visions that 
go beyond the conditions of space and time. Unlike natural dreaming, however, these are 
experienced by those with sober consciousness when they are awake. Further, a person’s 
submergence in her unconsciousness can also be induced by another person intentionally. 
This occurs in mesmerism in which the magnetizer exercises the power on the magnetized to 
have the latter sink into her unconscious, inner world. Hegel calls mesmerism animal 
magnetism proper.  
Animal magnetism proper, i.e., mesmerism or hypnosis, is similar to a fetus in the 
womb in that the magnetized stays passive in relation to the magnetizer; to that extent, both 
pertain to the magical relationship. However, there is a big difference between the two. 
Whereas the subjectivity of a mother is inseparably united with the substantiality of her fetus, 
the subjectivity of the magnetizer is separated from the substantiality of the magnetized. 
Whereas the mother has “the formal subjectivity of life,” the magnetizer has “the real 
subjectivity of the feeling soul.”106 To put it simply, mesmerism is a relationship between two 
independent, conscious subjects. It thus displays a rupture between consciousness and 
                                                   
105 ENZ, § 405. 
106 ENZ, § 406 Z.  
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unconsciousness, between the one who actively induces the other to fall into the state of 
somnambulism and the other who is passively led to this state.  
Of importance is that Hegel further conceptualizes this rupture between consciousness 
and unconsciousness observed in mesmerism in terms of the constitution of one person’s 
mind. What mesmerism introduces is the idea of a “rupture between my soulful being and my 
waking being.”107 That is, “everyone includes these two aspects in herself,” such that the 
rupture can occur “in even the healthiest people.”108 Thus, Hegel does not seem so much 
concerned with clairvoyant experiences and mesmerism themselves as with the general 
feature of the human psyche, which those phenomena lead one to consider. The phenomena of 
clairvoyance and mesmerism, in other words, leads us to the idea that the human mind is a 
coexistence of consciousness and unconsciousness, and that they coexist in such a way that 
unconsciousness can break loose from consciousness so far as to take over the seat in one’s 
mind. By implication, it is possible that a person with sober consciousness or even with the 
healthiest mind is caught by the power of unconsciousness and is drawn to some irrational 
ideas and behaviors.  
Such a rupture between consciousness and unconsciousness in an individual person’s 
mind, however, is a disease [Krankheit] according to Hegel.109 For Hegel, disease  is defined 
as the “fixation of an organ or system” in opposition to the organic totality of the body.110 One 
gets diseased, in other words, when a part of the body breaks loose from the organic system of 
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the body, loses fluidity in relation to the organic whole, and is fixated as such. This model of 
disease applies, Hegel suggests, to the psyche as well, such that the “soul-life” gets “disease” 
when “the merely soulful [Seelenhaft] side of the (psychic) organism” becomes “independent 
of spiritual consciousness.”111 The psyche gets diseased, in other words, when 
unconsciousness breaks loose from the organic totality of consciousness; or, when 
consciousness loses its power to hold unconsciousness under its power, thereby surrendering 
the “objective relationship to the actual world.”112 It is in this sense that “the feeling-life 
[Gefühlsleben], when it becomes a form, a state, of the self-conscious, educated, sober human 
being, is a disease.”113  
 
3.4. Derangement: The Negativity of Naturgeist 
Throughout his discussion of the magical relationship and animal magnetism in the 
first stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, Hegel elaborates on the notion of the feeling soul, 
that is, a feeling form of consciousness in which it is subordinated to unconsciousness without 
having the power to have the latter under control. As we may expect from this 
conceptualization, the feeling soul represents a conscious subject who is subject to mental 
illnesses. This mentally deranged consciousness is in the state of dreaming while being awake 
with her disconnection with the sober, objective consciousness.  In Hegel’s terms, the feeling 
soul “can perceive visible things without the aid of the eyes and without the mediation of 
                                                   
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 ENZ, § 406. 
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light” whereas objective consciousness “is able to see only with the eyes.”114 For Hegel, 
derangement [Verrückheit] is therefore a matter of one-sided subjectivism. Further, this 
diseased state of consciousness eventually represents a spiritual disease, I suggest, in the 
sense that one loses her close and solid connection with the spiritual world she inhabits, 
falling off from this world-organism. Thus, it is important to note that derangement is for 
Hegel not simply concerned with this and that symptom and behavior that we categorize as 
mental illness. For him, “derangement is not an abstract loss of reason, but is […] only a 
contradiction within the reason that is still present.” The significance of this Hegelian idea of 
derangement is what I consider in what follows.  
Starting his discussion of the second stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, titled “Self-
Feeling” in §408, Hegel states that the self-feeling is concerned with the form of a soul in which 
it “finds itself in the contradiction between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the 
particular determinacy that is not fluid in that totality, not integrated and subordinated [to that 
totality]” and defines this state of the soul as “derangement [Verrücktheit].” In the Zusatz to § 
408, he  considers a wide range of the phenomena concerning derangement [Verrückheit], 
drawing the following three divisions:115 
                                                   
114 ENZ, § 406 A. 
115 The English translator of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit of 1827-8, Robert R. Willams, suggests 
that the best English translation of Hegel’s term Verrücktheit would be “dementia” (LPS 149, note 260). According 
to Williams, the German “Verrücktheit” contains as its root meaning “displacement,” and this illustrates Hegel’s 
fundamental idea that Verrücktheit involves the division of a self into “two centers, the conscious and the 
unconscious” and occurs when “the unconscious is not subject to direct rational control.” The English “dementia” is 
suitable for conveying this meaning, Williams suggests, because it contains the “concept of mind (mens)” and 
implies at the same time “its disunion, derangement, and impairment.” Williams’ suggestion is relevant at large, but 
I use A. V. Miller’s translation “derangement” due to the specific medical idea of a decline in memory and language 
associated with “dementia.” “Insanity” or “madness” might be good alternatives, specifically when one sets Hegel’s 
consideration of Verrücktheit in the context of the history of the concept of madness. But I do not use these terms, 
first, because my primary concern in this section is to consider the significance of the feeling soul for the 
development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology rather than the significance of Hegel’s understanding of madness or 
insanity within the history of the concept of madness. Second, insanity or madness in a narrow sense is Hegel’s 
 
  376  
 
 
a) Imbecility [Blödsinn], absent-mindedness [Zerstreutheit], and rambling [Faselei]. (1) 
Imbecility is the “entirely indeterminate submergence in oneself.” It may be congenital but 
may also be the consequence of frenzy; it may be permanent or temporary. (2) Absent-
mindedness is a “non-awareness of the immediate present:” a “submergence into a suspension 
of sober, objective consciousness, into an unaware non-presence of spirit at things at which it 
should be present.” Absent-mindedness may be the beginning of madness but often occurs 
when one conducts profound meditations. (3) Rambling is the “inability to fix attention on 
anything determinate,” which is the opposite of absent-mindedness. Its cause is “the weakness 
of the power of rational [verständiges] consciousness to hold together the entirety of its 
representations.” Ramblers often suffer from delirium; hence, rambling is not merely non-
awareness of what is immediately present but an “unconscious reversal of it.” 
                                                   
discussion one of the three classes of Verrücktheit, i.e., Tollheit or Wahnsinn, and does not represent Verrücktheit as 
a whole.  
Dora B. Weiner also points out the difficulty in the translation of the German terms Geistesverwirrung and 
Geisteszerrüttung that were used for denoting insanity by the early German psychiatrists: Dora B.Weiner, “The 
Madman in the Light of Reason. Enlightenment Psychiatry. Part II: Alienists, Treatises, and the Psychologic 
Approach in the Era of Pinel,” in History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, eds. Edwin R.Wallace IV and John 
Gach (New York: Springer, 2008), 284. Geistesverwirrung was the German translation of Philippe Pinel’s French 
term aliénation mentale, which he used for describing a mental patient as the one who “feels foreign to the ‘normal’ 
world, a stranger (alienus) in the land of sanity,” and who can therefore be turned back to the world of sanity by a 
due moral treatment. While the German Geistesverwirrung well conveys “the image of a patient who has lost his 
way,” Verwirrung conveys, Weiner points out, “an image of tangled and snagged threads that an expert might 
disengage;” and Zerstürrung, “a strong physical commotion that shakes and deranges the mind.” Those two German 
terms thus imply a therapist’s “practical task” of “reconstructing the disturbed arrangements” and “making order,” 
which is “congenial to the Anglo-Saxon empirical approach” and is thus adequately translated as “derangement.” 
Weiner points out, however, that the real problem rests on the “unique plasticity of the German language” that 
connects “the tangible notions of Verwirrung and Zerstürrung” with “the spiritual and vague terms Geist and Seele.” 
This mixture of psyche and soma, Weiner suggests, is unique in German Idealism and especially German 
Romanticism but remains impenetrable to scientific analysis.  
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b) Folly proper [die eigentliche Narrheit]. While imbecility, absent-mindedness, and rambling 
are various modifications of the subject’s indeterminate submergence in herself, folly proper 
arises when a “determinate content” becomes a “fixed representation” of “the natural spirit 
that is closed within itself [Insichverschlossensein des natüralischen Geist].” Not every fool is 
crazy because folly proper means one’s holding fast to an “individual, merely subjective 
representation” and regarding it as “something objective.” Folly is still “consciousness” 
because it displays, unlike imbecility, the power and ability to hold on to something 
determinate; the fool is “crazy in relation to one point” but is at the same time a “good, 
coherent consciousness.” In most cases, it arises when “one shuts herself up in her 
subjectivity out of dissatisfaction with actuality.” It thus includes “weariness with life,” 
namely an “indeterminate, groundless disgust with actuality,” and “melancholy,” which is the 
mind’s unhappiness and inability to rise to the vitality of thought and action. In contrast with 
these indeterminate forms of folly which involve “killing off all vitality [Lebendigkeit],” folly 
proper has the “individualized content” of the fool—e.g., the fool’s idea that she is “God, or 
Christ, or a king,” or “a barleycorn, or a dog, or to have a carriage in their body”—and this 
displays “lively interests” and even “passions” of the fool. But the fool has no consciousness 
of the contradiction between her fixed ideas and the objectivity of the world; she is not 
tormented by her folly. 
c) Mania or insanity [Tollheit/Wahnsinn]. Unlike folly proper, the insane “has a vivid feeling 
of the contradiction between her merely subjective representation and objectivity” but “insists 
on making her subjective representation an actuality or annihilating what is actual.” Insanity 
arises from some particular causes rather than mere illusions, including “a stroke of great 
misfortune,” “a derangement [Verrückung] of a person’s individual world,” and “the violent 
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upheaval and coming out-of-joint of the universal state of the world.”116 The last case stands 
out in the French Revolution when many people went insane with their rejection of the 
present and insistence on the past. In contrast to folly proper, insanity entails an unhappy 
feeling, which is easily accompanied by a “hypochondriacal mood” and further, by a 
“suspicious, false, jealous, mischievous, and malicious disposition” and a “fury over her [the 
insane] hindrance by the surrounding actuality” from which she suffers a “limitation of her 
will.” Thus, the insane becomes frenzied, throwing off the “ethical laws rooted in the truly 
universal will.” 
 
In short, derangement for Hegel has three forms: a) indeterminate submergence in oneself 
with the weakness of the power of consciousness; b) determinate submergence in oneself and 
adherence to her subjective representations without an awareness of the contradiction between 
her subjective representations and the outer, objective world; c) adherence to one’s subjective 
representations even with an awareness of the contradiction between herself and the world.  
In discussing those forms of derangement, Hegel often refers to the French physician, 
Philippe Pinel, known as one of the founders of modern psychiatry. Let us briefly examine the 
historical background. Historians of Enlightenment science agree that psychiatry began to form 
as an independent medical discipline toward the end of the eighteenth century.117 Besides the 
                                                   
116 Hegel’s speculative notion of derangement as concerning the form of consciousness of a rational person who is 
tortured by the feeling of unhappiness due to her conflictual relationship with the world hinges upon how to interpret 
this third category of derangement, i.e., mania. In what follows, I suggest that the Hegelian, speculative notion of 
derangement is grounded in his acceptance and correction of Pinel’s theory of mania.   
117 Roy Porter, Madness. A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Dora B.Weiner, “The Madman in 
the Light of Reason. Enlightenment Psychiatry. Part I: Custody, Therapy, Theory and the Need for Reform,” in 
History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, ed. Edwin R.Wallace IV and John Gach (New York: Springer, 2008), 
255-277. 
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increase in asylums and the development of medical studies in universities, Roy Porter counts as 
an important contributing factor to the formation of modern psychiatry the influence of Locke’s 
philosophy, specifically his idea that madness is the result of the mis-association of ideas and is 
therefore curable through a psychological approach. This Enlightenment situation entailed the 
rise of the new field of neurology, which assigns mental illness to the disturbance of the nerves 
and brain. In his Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae of 1769, the Scottish physician, William 
Cullen, brought up for the first time the concept of neuroses as illnesses caused by the 
disturbance of the nervous system and included vesaniae (“disorders of judgement without any 
pyrexia or coma”) to the sub-categories of neuroses. Pinel promptly introduced Cullen’s ideas of 
neuroses and vesaniae to France and developed his humanitarian and moral approach to insanity. 
Influenced by Cullen’s neurology, in the Nosographie philosophique ou méthode de l’analyse 
appliqué à la médicine of 1798, Pinel classified mental illness into four main categories: 
melancholia, mania, dementia, and idiotism, while dividing mania into two kinds: mania with, 
and without delirium. In his Traité médico-philosophique sur l’aliénation mentale; ou la manie 
of 1801, he also put forward a sympathetic notion of a mental patient as the one who “feels 
foreign to the ‘normal’ world, a stranger (alienus) in the land of sanity” and who can therefore be 
turned back to the world of sanity by a due moral treatment.118 The importance of Pinel in the 
early history of psychiatry rests on his humanitarian and moral approach. While patients were 
often treated with chains, whips, straightjackets and some other violent methods in pre-
Revolutionary asylums, Pinel suggested that insanity, since it is mental illness, can be treated 
through a mental and moral approach. Yet his humanitarian and moral approach does not seem to 
                                                   
118 Dora B.Weiner, “The Madman in the Light of Reason. Enlightenment Psychiatry. Part II: Alienists, Treatises, and 
the Psychologic Approach in the Era of Pinel,” in History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, eds. Edwin 
R.Wallace IV and John Gach (New York: Springer, 2008), 284. 
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be a mere ideology. Its theoretical ground is found, I think, in his new category “mania without 
delirium [manie sans délire or folie raisonnable].” This category implies the idea of “partial 
insanity”: that one would become mad in one respect alone, and that one’s personality can be 
warped while her understanding remains sound.119 By implication, every normal person can be 
insane in a certain respect while being rational in her thoughts and behaviors at large; hence, an 
abnormal person is the same, rational human being as a normal person.  
Hegel’s appraisal of Pinel is found in his Lectures of the Philosophy of Spirit of 1827-8: 
 
Many means are employed that are not capable of restraining the illness as such, but rather 
only restrain the mad frenzies: straightjackets and swing. However, the main aspect of the 
therapy is psychic healing. […] In modern times people have began to take spirit into 
consideration and to make people healthy [gesund] by spirit. This presupposes that the 
deranged are still human beings and are rational. […]  This presupposition is the same as 
the idea that every illness still has health, and it becomes the focal point of the treatment. It 
presupposes that the demented person still knows what right and wrong are, and that he 
possesses complete soundness and accountability outside of the specific sphere of his folly 
itself.120  
 
What Hegel here appreciates is the tendency of the emerging modern psychiatry to consider 
insanity as a psychical disease, of which both the cause and treatment are assumed to rest on the 
psyche and further, Pinel’s idea of mania without delirium, which suggests that a person with 
sound consciousness may be deranged in a certain respect. Pinel’s category of mania without 
                                                   
119 Cf., Roy Porter, Madness. A Brief History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 132.  
120 VPG, 119-120/LPS, 149 
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delirium also suggests, conversely, that an insane person is still a rational subject capable of 
thinking and acting in accordance with rational rules. As Hegel puts it in the passage above, there 
is no (mental) illness that is absolutely separate from health; there is no absolute insanity that 
completely lacks reason.  
Returning to Hegel’s classification of mental illness in the Anthropology, it appears that 
Hegel incorporates many cases and ideas found in Pinel’s works, but his classification is very 
different from Pinel’s.121 It is noticeable, among others, that Hegel does not consider the absence 
of reason to be the source of mental disorders whereas Pinel takes impairment of intellectual 
faculties as the cause of certain disorders: imbecility and mania with delirium. Hegel concedes 
that imbecility is a natural mental disease; it is characterized by the absence of rational faculty 
and is therefore incurable. But he categorizes imbecility more broadly, together with absent-
mindedness and rambling, as one of the disorders that present the subject’s indeterminate 
submergence in her unconsciousness, which illustrates the weakness of the power of 
consciousness. Hegel’s point with this first group of derangement is therefore the fact that one’s 
submergence in her unconsciousness is associated with the powerlessness, rather than the 
                                                   
121 In his 1794 work, Nosographie philosophique ou méthode de l’analyse appliquée à la médicine, Pinel classified 
mental illness as follows. (1) Melancholia is the gloomy state in which the patient is often fixated on one idea. It 
appears in the form of the exalted sense of self-importance as well as in the form of despair and depression. (2) 
Mania without delirium displays perverted ideas and shows the tendency to act violently; however, the patient 
maintains the ability to reason and think coherently, and her symptoms do not arise from impairment of her 
intellectual faculties. (3) Mania with delirium involves impairment of some cognitive faculties, accompanying fury, 
indulgence, and frenzy. (4) Dementia is the inability to think coherently; e.g., a rambler who keeps speaking in an 
incomprehensible manner and a patient who lost her memory and remains in the past. (5) Idiotism is the absence of 
intellectual faculties and affections.  
When compared to this classification of Pinel, the first group in Hegel’s categorization of derangement (imbecility, 
absent-mindedness, and rambling) seems to incorporate a part of (4) dementia (the case of ramblers) and (5) 
idiotism. Hegel’s second group (foolishness and folly proper) includes Pinel’s notion of (1) melancholia and a part 
of (4) dementia (rejection of the present and insistence on the past); however, Hegel does not consider memory 
damage as the main cause of dementia but focuses on the contradictory relationship between subjectivity of one’s 
representation and objectivity of actuality. The third group (mania or insanity) seems to incorporate those two 
factors and further, some symptoms of (3) mania with delirium such as fury and frenzy; however, these symptoms 
for Hegel have little to do with impairment of intellectual faculties. 
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absence, of consciousness. An absent-minded person and a rambler can therefore be freed from 
their symptoms, Hegel suggests, when their mind regains the power of consciousness. More 
importantly, Hegel does not hold that maniacal reactions such as fury, indulgence, and frenzy 
prove the complete absence of consciousness or reason whereas Pinel takes those reactions as 
arising from impairment of intellectual faculties and hence, as providing the point of division 
between mania with, and without delirium. For Hegel, those reactions rather come from the 
maniac’s self-consciousness, the awareness of the contradiction between her subjective 
representation and the reality of the world, and the feeling of unhappiness, which arises from this 
self-consciousness concerning the unfilled gap between herself and the world.  
Thus, it seems that Hegel generalizes Pinel’s notion of mania without delirium so far as 
to conceptualize all mental disorders in terms of a conflictual relationship between consciousness 
and unconsciousness. That is, there is no mental illness, for Hegel, in which consciousness or 
reason is absolutely removed. Consciousness is either weak, or conflicts with unconsciousness; it 
is too weak to keep the subject from wondering around her thoughts appearing out of the blue, or 
it is in discord with a particular, deranged representation that takes the subject’s mind off. 
Derangement in general is for Hegel such a conflictual coexistence of consciousness and 
unconsciousness. Or, it is a contradictory coexistence of objective consciousness and the 
subjective soul—“an internally consistent consciousness, which orders and maintains itself in 
accordance with its individual position and its connection with the likewise internally ordered 
external world” and “a particular determinacy” which is not subordinated to it.122  
                                                   
122 ENZ, § 408. 
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Yet, Hegel’s notion of derangement as a conflictual coexistence of consciousness and 
unconsciousness is more importantly concerned with the constitution of consciousness itself. It is 
here important to recall that the feeling soul is a form of consciousness: the deranged feeling soul 
is a deranged consciousness. That is to say, the contradiction between consciousness and 
unconsciousness is internal to consciousness. In Hegel’s term, “derangement is not an abstract 
loss of reason, but is […] only a contradiction within the reason that is still present, just as 
physical disease is not an abstract, i.e., complete loss of health (that would be death), but a 
contradiction.”123 We here see Hegel’s speculative notion of reason as the unity of reason and 
unreason rather than the opposite to the latter. Further, this unity is dialectical in the sense that it 
has the contradiction between the two as its essential moment in such a way that it becomes 
consciousness for itself by resolving the contradiction that is internal and negative to itself. Seen 
this way, derangement is the negative moment of consciousness itself, in and through the 
negation or sublation of which consciousness constitutes itself as a self with a being-for-itself. 
By implication, one can largely say that our mind is healthy and sound when it is capable of 
incorporating the subjective beliefs arising from within itself to the consistent system of 
objective consciousness; it is deranged when it loses this capacity of consciousness, yielding 
itself to the power of unconsciousness.  
Thus, derangement for Hegel displays the speculative feature of consciousness.  As we 
have seen above, Hegel holds that properly maniacal reactions are the expressions of the 
subject’s awareness of the contradiction between herself and the world. This being said, a maniac 
has a higher cognition than a fool, the one who has no awareness of the discrepancy between her 
belief and the reality of the world and hence, no feeling of unhappiness. In contrast with a fool, a 
                                                   
123 ENZ, § 408 A. 
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maniac is self-conscious; she becomes insane, more precisely, because she is self-conscious. 
What we here see is the Hegelian, speculative paradox: the most deranged is the most conscious 
and the most rational. This paradox is not to be interpreted literally as implying that no one is 
rational unless she is insane. The notion of derangement as a “necessarily emerging from or stage 
in the development of the soul” is not to be understood, Hegel states, “as if we were asserting 
that every mind, every soul, must go through this stage of extreme disruption.”124 Instead, 
Hegel’s focus is on the “determination of the concept of derangement,” that is, the philosophical, 
inner meaning of derangement. Thus conceived, derangement for Hegel exhibits consciousness 
in its properly dialectical, spiritual form, namely in the form of self-relating negativity whereby it 
enters the dialectical movement of becoming itself in and through what is negative to itself. To 
the extent that derangement thus displays the negativity proper to Geist, one would have to say 
that consciousness is a spiritual being distinct from all other natural beings by virtue of its 
capacity of derangement. That is to say, the fact that one can become insane, namely that one can 
come out of joint of the world, insist on her subjectivity, and suffer from the feeling of 
unhappiness from this unfilled gap, would be the factor that makes the human being distinct from 
all other worldly beings.  
Consequently, the feeling soul is the first spiritual being that appears in Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia system in the strict sense of Geist. As I discussed earlier, Hegel’s Anthropology 
concerns the spirit that is submersed in nature, i.e., Naturgeist, that finds itself in its otherness 
and is not with itself. This anthropological spirit is thus fundamentally self-alienated in its 
negative without having yet turned back to itself in that negative of its own. In relation to this 
overall framework of the Anthropology, derangement represents the phenomenon in which the 
                                                   
124 ENZ § 408 Z. 
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natural, unmediated, unconscious element of the soul stands out for the first time as the 
negativity of this Naturgeist. In the previous stages of the Anthropology, Hegel considered the 
immediate association of the soul with natural elements in terms of the influences of 
meteorological, geographical/racial, and dispositional factors on the formation of the soul, and 
the bodily exteriorization of the soul’s interior. However, those natural elements were not 
explicitly considered as something negative to the soul. In contrast with them, the soulful 
element that coexists with objective consciousness in the deranged feeling soul constitutes its 
negative and is in conflict with it. More importantly, derangement reveals consciousness in its 
properly spiritual, negative form as I discussed above.  
 
3.5. Bodiliness as Spirit’s Own Negative  
According to the above considerations of Hegel’s notion of derangement, the 
development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology requires that the contradiction of the deranged 
soul be dissolved. That is, there must be a process whereby the soulful element which gets out 
of the control of objective consciousness is somehow reintegrated into the system of the latter. 
More precisely, it is to be shown how objective consciousness comes to have a power over the 
merely subjective, soulful element. For Hegel, this requires that the universality that is for 
itself get detached from the particularity of sensation:  
 
Self-feeling, immersed in the particularity of feelings (of simple sensations, and also 
desires, urges, passions, and their gratifications), is not differentiated from them. But the 
self is implicitly a simple relation of ideality to itself, formal universality, and this is the 
truth of the particular; in this life of feeling the self is to be posited as this universality; 
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thus, it is the universality that differentiates itself from particularity, the universality that is 
for itself. […] Particularity is […] only the particular being or immediacy of the soul in 
contrast to its equally formal, abstract being-for-itself. This particular being of the soul is 
the moment of its bodiliness; here it breaks with this bodiliness, differentiates itself from it 
as its simple being and becomes the ideal, subjective substantiality of this 
bodiliness,[…].125  
 
As I discussed in the previous section, a sentient being exhibits a form of subjectivity for the first 
time in Hegel’s system of nature, and Hegel considers this incipient form of subjectivity 
exhibited by a sentient being in terms of the self-feeling of the feeling soul, namely the soul’s 
self-conception that is immediately attached to a particular sensation or feeling. But the 
immediate self-feeling is one-sidedly subjective due to the lack of the mediation by objective 
consciousness. It is not a reflective self-awareness or the abstract I. For Hegel, this conscious 
form of subjectivity pertains to objective consciousness, i.e., the phenomenological self-
consciousness that actively interacts with another self-consciousness in the intersubjective, actual 
world. And the self of objective consciousness is a universal that unites what it perceives, 
desires, represents, or thinks without being itself subordinated to the latter. As Hegel puts it in 
the passage above, it is a universality that is for itself, which is not immersed in the particularity 
of what it unites but keeps itself distinguished from the latter. In contrast with this, the self of the 
feeling soul is immersed in the particularity of what it senses and feels. It is such a non-reflective 
self that immediately takes the particular that it senses and feels to be true and objective. The 
feeling soul thus represents a deranged consciousness, a conscious subject who comes out of 
joint from the world of actuality and holds on to a deranged self-conception. Consequently, the 
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one-sided subjectivity of the feeling soul is essentially pathological. That is, the immediate self-
feeling is disease: psychical disease in the sense of mental illness, and spiritual disease in the 
sense of the negativity of Naturgeist appearing in the contradictory constitution of the feeling 
soul.  
What Hegel suggests in the passage above where he sets out his discussion of habit is 
that the self of the feeling soul is to be posited as the self of objective consciousness. As the 
universality that is for itself is the truth of particularity, the phenomenological objective 
consciousness is the truth of the anthropological feeling soul. The Anthropology is therefore 
to show how the self of objective consciousness emerges out of the self of the feeling soul: 
how the universality of self-consciousness comes to be by getting itself liberated from the 
immediate attachment to the particularity to which it relates itself and by gaining a power over 
that particularity.  
 As I discuss later in this chapter, Hegel considers the liberation of the feeling soul 
from its immediate attachment to the particularity of sensation in terms of habit by elaborating 
on the notion of habit as an overall transformation of bodiliness. Yet the transition from the 
second to the third stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, from the self-feeling to habit, likely 
seems problematic. Since Hegel deals with various mental disorders under the rubric of the 
self-feeling, one may raise the question, for instance, as to whether he means that those 
mental disorders can be treated by habit. If this is the case, one can easily refute it by giving a 
counterexample: e.g., a case of getting mad by some detrimental habits such as alcohol abuse. 
What Hegel conceptualizes in the second stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, however, is the 
speculative notion of consciousness according to which unconsciousness constitutes an 
essential, negative moment of consciousness. As I discussed above, Hegel thus views 
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maniacal reactions to be the expressions of the subject’s self-consciousness. What he 
eventually considers in terms of derangement is a form of unhappy consciousness who comes 
out of joint from the world of actuality and is tormented by this dislocation from the world. 
Hence, derangement for Hegel has an essentially existential sense. It concerns one’s existence 
in the world and therefore, has very little to do with this or that mental disorder which is 
assumed to be curable by this or that treatment. Accordingly, if habit is for Hegel the way in 
which consciousness becomes the mediator of itself and its own negative, unconsciousness, 
and thereby comes to have power over the latter, this is to be understood in terms of an 
existential relationship between consciousness and the world. The role of habit, in other 
words, consists in establishing a harmonious relationship between a conscious subject and the 
world in which the subject is not alienated from the world, keeps pace with the latter, and 
does not suffer from the feeling of unconsciousness. It is through habit in this existential sense 
that the negativity of Naturgeist is overcome.  
What is to be noted with respect to this existential framework of the transition from the 
self-feeling to habit, is Hegel’s suggestion in the passage above that the particularity of the 
self-feeling, which is to be sublated for the emergence of objective consciousness, is 
fundamentally concerned with the particularity of bodiliness rather than this or that particular 
determinate content of sensation. In transitioning from the second to the third stage of the 
“Feeling Soul” section, from self-feeling to habit, Hegel thus turns back to the issue of 
bodiliness. This suggests that the negative element of Naturgeist, namely the natural element 
that constitutes the otherness of Geist in its alienation from the latter is no other than 
bodiliness. This further implies that bodiliness—the particularity of the soul’s bodily 
existence that is not subordinated to objective consciousness, more precisely—is the 
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fundamental problem of Hegel’s Anthropology. If the Anthropology is to show how spirit 
emerges as spirit out of its submersion in nature, in other words, this is to be shown through 
an account of how the particularity of bodiliness becomes subordinated to the universality of 
the phenomenological objective consciousness. In the Anmerkung on § 409, Hegel states more 
precisely:  
 
The abstract being-for-itself of the soul in its bodiliness is not yet I, not the existence of the 
universal that is for the universal. It is bodiliness reduced to its pure ideality, which thus 
suits the soul as such. That is, just as space and time as abstract asunderness, as, therefore, 
empty space and empty time, are only subjective forms, pure intuitions; so the pure being 
mentioned above, which is being-for-itself when the particularity of bodiliness, i.e. the 
immediate bodiliness as such is sublated within itself, is the entirely pure, unconscious 
intuition, but the foundation of consciousness. It proceeds to consciousness when it has 
sublated within itself the bodiliness—of which it is the subjective substance, and which 
still constitutes a barrier for it—and is thus posited as a subject for itself.  
 
We thus notice that the last transition within the “Feeling Soul” section from self-feeling to 
habit is made on the basis of an equation of bodilinss and unconsciousness. To make sense of 
the transition from the self-feeling to habit, the sense in which bodiliness represents 
unconsciousness in Hegel’s Anthropology is therefore to be clarified. As we have seen 
previously, in considering embodiment, Hegel developed the idea that bodiliness is the sign of 
the soul: bodiliness is that through which the soul expresses its interior, and thereby its 
interior obtains an external existence. Importantly, this inner and outer dynamic between the 
soul and the body exhibits their monistic relationship. Bodiliness, in other words, is an 
immediate exteriorization of the soul’s substantial totality and not a distinct substance 
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separated from the soul. In the strict sense, it thus denotes the dynamic, monistic relationship 
between the soul and the body as such rather than a physical body with flesh, blood, and 
bones. Further, the immediate exteriorization of the soulful, substantial totality is made 
possible by the fact that this substantial totality involves a network of inwardized, symbolic 
meanings. What unites the soul and the body through their inner and outer dynamic is 
therefore, to be precise, an expressive bodiliness. Accordingly, the soul’s bodily existence is 
likewise to be understood as an expressive existence. In the framework of embodiment, in 
other words, the mode of existence of the soul consists in its speaking through bodiliness; it 
comes to exist by making it visible through its bodiliness what it is, what it contains within 
itself. On account of this expressive dimension of the soul’ existence, bodiliness is at the same 
time the self of the soul—which is, however, distinct from a conscious self or a self-reflective 
I because it is an immediate, bodily exteriorization of the soul’s interior.  
 In short, bodiliness is not a physical, organic body, but the “pure ideality” of the soul, 
namely a “pure being” that serves as a sphere for the exteriorization of the soul’s interior, 
substantial totality. Further, it is at the same time the soul’s self, i.e., the soul’s “being-for-
itself,” which is “abstract,” however, in the sense that the immediate, bodily exteriorization of 
the soul is not mediated by objective consciousness and the actuality of the world with which 
objective consciousness is connected. In this sense of exteriorization of the soul’s symbolic 
self without the mediation of consciousness, bodiliness represents unconsciousness: “the 
entirely pure, unconscious intuition” as Hegel puts it in the Anmerkung to § 409.126 
                                                   
126 As mentioned earlier, embodiment of my feeling of anger by my cardiac impulse or facial expressions 
immediately occurs without intervention of my consciousness or will. Of course, it is possible for me to control 
my facial expressions or to deliberately grimace with intention to let others know about my feeling. But this is 
not always possible; I cannot control my facial expressions when I am mad completely, nor can I control my 
cardiac impulse. When I come to grimace unconsciously or my face becomes red regardless of my will, this 
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The equation of bodiliness and unconsciousness is tied up with what we have 
previously considered in terms of Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness. In discussing 
consciousness in the form of feeling-life, i.e., derangement, Hegel develops the idea that 
unconsciousness is an essential, negative part of consciousness. Now, we have to add that 
unconsciousness, thus conceived as an essential part of consciousness, is not purely irrational. 
Instead, it is rational in a certain way insofar as it denotes the soul’s substantial totality 
containing all things, namely all symbolic meanings, representations, and thought-
determinations, in potentiality, and insofar as this soulful, substantial totality constitutes a 
somehow consistent system in their interconnections rather than a hodgepodge of all possible, 
imaginary ideas. The distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, therefore, for 
Hegel, hinges upon whether that totality of the mind is mediated by objective consciousness 
or not; whether it is actually connected to the world it lives in. If unconsciousness is irrational, 
this is so, for Hegel, in the sense that it lacks objectivity, which is rooted in the connection 
with the world. By the same token, consciousness is rational because it has objectivity in the 
actual connection with the world it lives in.  
 Thus, it is to be noted that the discussion of derangement brings an important 
development to the notion of bodiliness within the “Feeling Soul” section. As with 
embodiment, bodiliness still denotes the soul’s un-mediated existence. Yet, derangement 
reveals, as we have seen above, the dialectic, contradictory constitution of consciousness that 
involves unconsciousness as its essential, negative moment. In relation to this contradictory 
                                                   
sentient body immediately expresses who I am now in my unconsciousness. It represents my unconsciousness 
because I am not aware of the rise of the feeling of anger and its embodiment. In a similar vein, shaking my legs 
while attending a boring discussion represents who I am in my unconsciousness when I am not aware of losing 
my attention to the discussion. 
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conjunction between consciousness and unconsciousness, bodiliness marks a precarious 
existence in which the subject is in the grip of the feeling of unconsciousness in discord with 
the world. At the stage between the self-feeling and habit, bodiliness thus represents the 
negativity of Geist in both senses of the contradictory constitution of consciousness and of the 
conscious subject’s discord with the world. It is in this sense that bodiliness is the “foundation 
of consciousness.” The contradiction internal to consciousness, because it is internal to it, is to 
be resolved in and by consciousness. With the resolution of this contradiction, consciousness 
can establish a spiritual, lively relationship to the world, which is achieved, for Hegel, by 
habit. We can here see why habit is in Hegel’s Anthropology considered in terms of an overall 
transformation of bodiliness. The overall transformation of bodiliness is no other than an 
overall modification in the mode of existence of a conscious subject. As I consider later, habit 
in its ultimate sense of overall transformation of bodiliness does not simply mean hardening 
one’s body, nor making it into a particular body specialized for a certain profession (e.g., a 
body of a pianist or a swimmer). More fundamentally, it means turning my body into 
something in which my wills and purposes are inscribed. Thus, habit brings another mode of 
existence in which the subject becomes part of the world of actuality, effectuating the 
subject’s spiritual connection with the world. It is thus that through which Geist emerges with 
the institution of a mediated relationship between the soul and the world. Further, we can now 
explain more clearly the sense in which bodiliness is the key problem of Hegel’s 
Anthropology, namely in what sense it represents the naturalness of Naturgeist. This 
naturalness in its proper sense bears on a conscious subject’s immediate existence in the 
world, in which Geist is not yet present as a mediator of the two. 
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4. Habit as Second Nature: Transformative Bodiliness 
 
Through the above examination of Hegel’s discussions of animal magnetism and 
derangement, I have suggested that bodiliness is the element that marks the negative of 
Naturgeist in and through which sprit is to turn back into itself. It is the natural element that, 
when separated from objective consciousness, causes the soul to get deranged—deranged, not 
in the narrow sense of the soul becoming mad, but in the more general sense of it standing in 
a conflictual relationship with the actuality of the world. In relation to bodiliness as such a 
negative element of spirit, habit is a process whereby the soul overcomes its bodiliness. As I 
discuss below, the soul forms, transforms, and masters its bodiliness through habit, thereby 
positing itself as a subject for itself. While the feeling soul’s self-feeling is characterized by 
its immediate connection with the particularity of its bodiliness, habit is the soul’s detachment 
from that immediate connection. By virtue of this detachment, the soul becomes an actual 
soul and hence, consciousness. Habit is therefore the process whereby spirit emerges as spirit 
out of its submersion in nature. In what follows, I examine this notion of habit in Hegel’s 
Anthropology, focusing on how and in what sense the soul sublates its bodiliness through 
habit.  
 
4.1. Habit as Second Nature: the Overall Transformation of the Bodiliness 
The feeling soul is immersed in a particular sensation and her self-feeling is likewise 
immediately attached to this sensation. As we have seen above, Hegel views such an 
immediate attachment to a particular sensation, and further, to bodiliness, as the source of 
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derangement. In contrast with this, the soul engaged in the process of habituation is 
characterized by its detachment from particular sensations. This point is illustrated by the first 
two forms of habit considered in the Anmerkung on § 410: (1) hardening against external 
sensations; (2) becoming indifferent to desires and urges. First, the soul can habituate herself 
to be unaffected by sensations (e.g., the sensations of frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, 
pleasant taste). By habituating herself this way, the soul develops a strength to become 
indifferent to particular sensations and to handle distress in general. Instead of being 
immersed in a particular sensation and directly identifying it with herself, the soul comes to 
distance herself from sensations. Second, the soul can also habituate herself to become 
disinterested in satisfying her desires and urges. Hegel suggests that this mode of habituation 
is, in fact, the liberation of the soul from her subordination to the body and re-subordination to 
the rational will. Thus, one can more generally characterize the habituated soul in terms of the 
detachment from the feeling-life form, that is, from the way of life based on the particularity 
of sensation, including appetitive life stimulated by desires and urges, which are in turn 
aroused by sensations. By virtue of this detachment, the soul becomes a universality-for-itself, 
one that is not subordinated to sensations, desires, or urges, but instead has these under its 
control.  
The habituated soul can therefore be said to be the master of sensations and what is 
aroused by sensations, i.e., desires and urges, and Hegel explains habit in this sense of 
hardening of the soul in terms of a mechanistic process. In his terms, habit concerns “the 
mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.”127 Thus, we can 
perhaps say that a habituated action occurs in a mechanistic way without the intervention of a 
                                                   
127 ENZ § 410 A. 
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conscious awareness. Just as a natural phenomenon takes place in a cause and effect 
relationship, so does a habituated action causally occur as a response to given circumstances.  
Hegel’s accounts of habit in terms of hardening of the soul and mechanistic process, 
however, raise some important objections. First of all, the two cases of habit, i.e., hardening 
of the soul against sensations and becoming indifferent to desires and urges, seem to suggest 
that the habituated soul is nothing but the master of sensations and what is aroused by 
sensations, i.e., desires and urges. If Hegel’s theory of habit only involves such a didactic 
account, which disparages the roles and significances of sensation, desire, and urge, then, it is 
hard to accept not only because of its unjustifiable devaluation of sensation, but more 
fundamentally because of its lack of a plausible account of the complicated interplay between 
sensation and habit. Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of habit as cultivating a dispositional state 
of the soul by practices, we can therefore rightly point out that the dispositional state of the 
soul formed by habit is essentially changeable, flexible, and fluid. Since actions and practices 
are essential to habit, habituation is so situational that a virtuous, courageous soul, for 
instance, can become less courageous when she compromises on an unreasonable, social 
demand; she becomes a coward when her compromising practices are repeated. That is, the 
distinct character of habit consists in changeability, flexibility, and fluidity of the soul that can 
never be removed in the process of habitual hardening. To be more precise, the soul cannot 
harden itself without fluidizing itself if habit requires repeated practices which essentially 
involve trials and errors. The dynamic interplay between hardening and fluidizing 
characteristic of habit is further concerned with a sensible, animal being’s adaptability to the 
environment. If a didactic, moralist disparagement of sensation, desire, and urge is not 
acceptable, one of the fundamental reasons is that they perform indispensable functions for 
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the animal’s survival in nature. Importantly, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
accompanying sensations, which cause desires and urges and which are also caused by the 
latter, have a cognitive function that enables the animal to look for more favorable 
environmental conditions. Insofar as the environmental adaptation is a habituation, and this 
adaptive habituation hinges upon the cognitive function of sensation, it is untenable to say that 
habit only means a hardening of the soul against sensations. By the same token, it is too 
simplistic to say that habit is a mechanistic, natural process without intervention of 
consciousness or will.  
A close examination of Hegel’s account of habit, however, reveals that it rather 
centers around the radical fluidity of habit that dissolves the body as a first, mechanistic 
nature to form a second nature, and that it is thus concerned with inscription of wills and 
purposes to a body rather than with merely mechanistic, involuntary responses to the given 
environment. Therefore, we need to pay attention to his notion of habit as an overall 
transformation of bodiliness from its immediate, natural form to a mediated, encultured one. It 
is, in other words, not just a cultivation of this and that virtue, nor is it a development of this 
and that adaptive function. Instead, it is concerned with the production of a new mode of the 
soul’s existence in which she is no longer immediately connected to nature but exists as 
second nature:  
  
Habit, like memory, is a hard point in organization of spirit; habit is the mechanism of self-
feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural qualities and alterations 
of age, of sleeping and waking, are immediately natural; habit is the determinacy of feeling 
(as well as of intelligence, will, etc., insofar as they belong to self-feeling) made into 
something that is natural, mechanical. Habit has rightly been called second nature; nature, 
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because it is an immediate being of the soul, as second nature, because it is an immediacy 
posited by the soul, incorporating and moulding [Ein- und Durchbildung] the bodiliness 
that pertains to the determinations of feeling as such and to the determinacies of 
representation and of the will insofar as they are embodied.128  
 
By conceptualizing habit in terms of a second nature, Hegel does not do away with its 
mechanistic aspect. As he suggests in the passage above, habit is called nature in the sense 
that it is produced by repeated practices, and that a habitual action occurs without necessarily 
involving the intervention of consciousness. It is, however, a second nature that is produced 
by the soul. And habit in the sense of second nature is in the formation or in-formation [ein-
bilden] of one’s bodiliness. Further, this in-formation is not a local or partial modification but 
an overall transformation [durch-bilden] of bodiliness—more precisely, the bodiliness that is 
considered as a sphere for the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings. As bodiliness is 
considered in the Anthropology to be that through which the soul externalizes her interior and 
hence the immediate mode of the soul’s existence, habit as an overall transformation of 
bodiliness is thus eventually concerned with an overall transformation in the mode of the 
soul’s bodily existence.  
 The way in which habit produces an in-formation and overall transformation of 
bodiliness is illustrated by the third form of habit discussed in the Anmerkung on § 410: 
skillfulness or acquiring a skill [Geschicklichkeit]. It is here to be noted that skillfulness has a 
peculiar meaning in Hegel’s theory of habit. As Hegel puts it, skillfulness differs from the 
previous two forms of habit because in it “the abstract being of the soul is supposed not only 
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to be held on to for itself, but to be imposed as a subjective purpose within bodiliness.”129 In 
other words, whereas the detachment from sensations, feelings, desires, and urges makes the 
soul into the abstract universality-for-itself which brings those particulars under its control, 
acquiring a skill makes the soul go further than becoming this abstract universality-for-itself. 
This is because when becoming skillful in a certain area by continuous practices, the soul 
inscribes a determinate purpose and will into her bodiliness. For instance, when one practices 
playing the piano, every moment of the practice may be considered an inscription of the 
player’s purpose and will into her body—to play a song well, for instance. Further, a piano 
player has a different bodiliness from a swimmer’s because a swimmer inscribes a different 
purpose from the piano-player’s one into her body. Thus, habit is more aptly defined as a 
process of transforming one’s bodiliness into the realm of “a particular potentiality or power 
[Möglichkeit] for a determinate purpose.”130 One can say that the body of a piano player has 
been developed so as to have a particular potentiality to play the piano and the body of a 
swimmer, a particular potentiality to swim.  
Therefore, the practice of playing the piano or swimming differs from the motion of 
the hands of a watch, although both kinds of movement can be considered a mechanistic 
repetition. For habit is ultimately concerned with making one’s bodiliness into an 
“instrument” that serves the realization of her purposes without any resistance to her will. 
This habitual instrument of the soul differs from the bodiliness considered as an instrument 
for the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings, which Hegel previously called “a sign of the 
soul.” Whereas the bodiliness is somehow given to the soul as the instrument for its 
                                                   
129 ENZ § 410 A. 
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embodiment such that the soul is subordinated to the operation of this instrument, habit is to 
be more aptly defined as the “instrumentalization” of one’s bodiliness. By virtue of such an 
active appropriation of one’s body into her instrument, it becomes possible that “as soon as 
the representation (e.g., a sequence of musical notes) is in me, the physical body too, 
unresistingly and fluently, has expressed it correctly.”131  
Since the soul makes its bodiliness into the realm of a particular potentiality for a 
determinate purpose, the habituated soul is no longer an indeterminate substantial totality 
containing all possible things in potentiality. To be more precise, the habituated bodiliness 
serves to the selective actualization of some particular determinations contained in the soul. 
Nor is the habituated bodiliness a passive sphere for the immediate embodiment of the soul’s 
inner feelings because it involves the soul’s active instrumentalization. However, Hegel’s 
notion of habit is not simply concerned with acquiring a particular skill or forming a 
bodiliness suitable for a particular profession. As I argue in what follows, it is to be 
considered more fundamentally in terms of the formation of human bodiliness, one that is 
developed as a particular potentiality for a spiritual purpose—spiritual, in the sense that it is 
concerned with the ethical life [Sittlichkeit] in the realm of objective spirit.  
 
4.2. Habit as the Genesis of Consciousness 
 
In itself matter has no truth without the soul; the soul, as being-for-itself, cuts itself off 
from its immediate being, and places this being over against itself as bodiliness, which can 
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offer no resistance to soul’s in-formation [Einbilden] into it. The soul, which has set its 
being in opposition to itself, sublated it and determined it as its own, has lost the meaning 
of soul, of the immediacy of spirit. The actual soul in the habit of sensation and of its 
concrete self-feeling is in itself the ideality of its determinacies, an ideality that is for itself; 
in its externality it is recollected into itself, and is an infinite relationship to itself. This 
being-for-itself of free universality is the soul’s higher awakening to the I, to abstract 
universality insofar as it is for abstract universality, which is thus thinking and subject for 
itself, and in fact determinate subject of its judgement in which the I excludes from itself 
the natural totality of its determinations as an object, as a world external to it, and relates 
itself to that world so that in it is immediately reflected into itself: consciousness.132 
 
In this last passage of the Anthropology, Hegel recapitulates the meaning of the habitual 
instrumentalization of bodiliness in terms of the rise of the conscious distinction between 
inner and outer. Specifically, Hegel considers this rise of the conscious distinction as coming 
from the separation of the soul from its bodiliness. To spell out the sense in which the 
conscious distinction between inner and outer arises from habit, I first focus on how habit 
entails the separation of the soul from its bodiliness. According to our previous discussion of 
Hegel’s conception of skillfulness, the soul is differentiated from bodiliness in the way that a 
will and purpose are differentiated from the instrument that realizes them. Seen this way, the 
separation of the soul from its bodiliness is not to be understood in terms of an oppositional 
parallelism between the two because the soul is that which puts the body into practice. As 
Hegel puts it, the body has no resistance to the soul’s habitual practices; the soul has the 
power over her body in this sense. This does not necessarily mean that the soul has complete 
control of the body, nor does it mean that the soul controls the body consciously and willfully. 
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It instead implies that habituation has a mechanistic aspect that once the body has tuned into a 
second nature, namely a body in which the wills and purposes are inscribed, the habituated 
action occurs without necessarily involving the intervention of conscious awareness. Of 
importance in the passage above is the fact that the separation of the soul from its bodiliness is 
to be considered more fundamentally as the rise of a self that is neither immediately attached 
to the bodiliness nor subordinated to the latter. In Hegel’s terms, through habit, the soul cuts 
herself from her body, opposes herself to it, and stands as the universality-for-itself over 
against it. The sense in which the habituated soul has such a self that is detached from the 
body is illustrated by a sharp contrast with the feeling soul. Whereas bodiliness is the 
“abstract being-for-itself” and “pure ideality” of the feeling soul133 such that it immediately 
represents the self of the feeling soul, the habituated, actual soul is itself the “ideality of its 
determinacies” that is “for itself,” as Hegel puts it in the passage above. In other words, the 
actual soul no longer immediately exists as a bodiliness but is recollected into herself in and 
through this external existence of herself. It is no longer a natural subject who expresses 
herself through her body but the I that is the universality-for-itself, that is, a subject who can 
think. The actual, habituated soul, therefore, is no longer “a soul or the immediacy of spirit”—
or, better, Naturgeist—because it has become a subject who achieves a self-reflective 
relationship to herself through the detachment from her bodiliness.  
 If habit entails the rise of consciousness, however, this is in the stricter sense that the 
separation of the soul from its bodiliness also involves the soul’s exclusion of the natural 
totality of her determinations as an object or a world external to herself. Hegel’s claim is that 
consciousness has its origin in the actual, habituated soul because the separation of the soul 
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from its bodiliness simultaneously involves the differentiation between the internal soul and 
the outer world as the object of the soul. But this claim of Hegel involves some perplexing 
ideas. We can first consider the differentiation between inner and outer in terms of an 
awareness of one’s body as something external to oneself and the simultaneous awareness of 
oneself as something internal in relation to one’s body. There is no big problem, as far as I 
see, in arguing that such a twofold self-awareness is preceded by the process of habituation. 
Whereas the embodiment of inner feelings does not necessarily involve our conscious 
awareness as Hegel emphasizes, habit may well entail an awareness of oneself and one’s body 
insofar as it involves a number of practices with the body. Otherwise, one may also argue, I 
suggest, that one does not have an awareness of one’s body as something external to herself 
by birth; instead, this awareness is developed over time in the first years of life by repeated 
practices with sensations. Yet, it is hard to accept that habit effectuates an “exclusion” of the 
totality of the soul such that this totality becomes an external object, at least insofar as this is 
taken to be anything more than a metaphor. This is perplexing because it might sound as if an 
external object is in fact a projection of what is contained within the soul.  
 This problem requires a closer examination of how habit is concerned with the rise of 
the conscious distinction between one’s interior and the external world as an object. Further, 
one should show how this conscious distinction is not a merely subjective one that would 
make consciousness fall back into the stage of the feeling soul, but an objective one which 
ensures that it is in agreement with the actuality of the world. This is so because the actual, 
habituated soul is supposed to differ from the feeling soul in that it has overcome the problem 
inherent to the feeling soul: derangement. The actual, habituated soul, in other words, is no 
longer a subjective consciousness trapped in her own world but an objective consciousness 
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that takes part in the world-organism. It is here to be noted that taking part in the world-
organism does not rule out the soul’s conflictual relationship with the world. More 
importantly, we need to say that the actual, habituated soul may well become a deranged, 
feeling soul. Ultimately, this issue is concerned with the essentially ambivalent aspect of 
Hegel’s theory of habit. As we have seen above, habit is for Hegel not just hardening of the 
soul but a hardening that comes to be in and through radical fluidization. Thus, Hegel further 
suggests that complete hardening and complete habituation lead to the death of Geist. Prior to 
examining this idea of Hegel, I consider in what follows in what ways habit ensure that 
consciousness lives the world as an adult responsible for the actuality of the world as I 
formulated in the first section of this chapter.  
 
4.3. Habit and Spirit: The Mechanism of the Soul  
Indeed, the fact that bodiliness is my instrument for exercising my will and actualizing 
my purpose does not make it necessary that I exist harmoniously with the actual world 
without making a delusive or distorted representation of the world. To use Hegel’s example, 
one may well remain a reactionary figure denying the actuality of the new order implemented 
by a revolution regardless of the profession in which she is skilled. In order that Hegel’s 
notion of habit works without the problem of the subjectivism inherent to the feeling soul, one 
should therefore presume that habit means more than acquiring this or that particular skill; the 
habitual instrumentalization of one’s bodiliness is not an inscription of any kind of subjective 
will and purpose whatsoever to one’s bodiliness.  
 
  404  
 
To spell out the sense in which habit entails the objective distinction between one’s 
interior world and the external world, I refer to Hegel’s notion of second nature put forward in 
the Philosophy of Right.134 Hegel writes that the Philosophy of Right considers the system of 
right as a “realm of actualized freedom,” which is “the world of spirit brought forth out of 
itself as second nature.”135 In other words, it considers the legal, economic, political, and 
cultural institutions in terms of a system in which the freedom of a will is actualized, 
assuming that freedom is the fundamental determination of spirit. Hegel writes: “the basis of 
right is the spiritual and its precise position and starting point is the will which is free.”136 For 
Hegel, this realm of the free will is a world brought up by spirit out of spirit itself as second 
nature. And the world of the free will as second nature bears on habituating oneself to the 
ethical [das Sittlich] or customs: 
                                                   
134 For an insightful analysis of Hegel’s notion of second nature in the Philosophy of Right in terms of its connection 
with the Encyclopedia system, see in particular: Adriaan Peperzak, “‘Second Nature’: Place and Significance of the 
Objective Spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” The Owl of Minerva, 27/1 (1995): 51-66.  Specifically, he suggests that 
the nation-state and world history can be viewed as two moments of Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit which 
manifests “its natural, non-mediated, and ‘somatic’ side:” “‘Second Nature’: Place and Significance of the Objective 
Spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” 57. As he shows, the states are for Hegel big animals which appear and perish in 
world history. Hence, world history, namely the history of the second nature of the world can be considered in terms 
of a genus-process, which parallels the genus-process, so to speak, of first nature, presented at the end of the 
philosophy of nature. Accordingly, if spirit emerges out of the death of life, this can also be considered, Peperzak 
suggests, in terms of the destructive feature of the states and the people’s spirit [Volkgeist]. Perperzak points out that 
in Hegel’s system, spirit is to be naturalized or materialized into nature and a world of second nature, but both nature 
and history are not adequate for the genuine actuality of spirit. This is so because spirit is eventually infinite and 
eternal. The ultimate sublation of nature, therefore, occurs by “theoria” which Hegel says consists in “stripping off 
the limitedness of the peoples’ spirits and its own worldliness,” undertaken by “the thinking spirit of world history” 
(ENZ § 552). As Peperzak highlights, “contrary to all post-Hegelian attempts to present him as the philosopher par 
excellence of history, praxis, or politics,” “Hegel does not consider the dimensions of history or politics to be 
spiritual or ‘ideal’ enough for humanity to accomplish its full meaning:” “‘Second Nature’: Place and Significance 
of the Objective Spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” 63. In a similar vein, Simon Lumsden offers a discussion about the 
role of habit for world history: Simon Lumsden, “Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History,” International Journal f Philosophical Studies, vol.24, no.1 (2016): 74-94. Specifically, he draws attention 
to Hegel’s notion in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History that over-refinement [Überbildung] and 
complete habituation are the sources of the fall of civilization since they make spirit lifeless and dead. Lumsden thus 
challenges Robert Brandom’s interpretation of the master-slave dialectic in terms of norm formation, by pointing out 
that this view contradicts the destructive feature of habit in relation to historical dimensions of human life. 
135 PhR § 4. 
136 PhR § 4 
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In the simple identity with the actuality of an individual, the ethical [das Sittlich] appears 
as the universal mode of action, i.e., as custom,—the habit of this [custom], as second 
nature, which is posited in the place of the first, mere natural will, and which is the 
penetrating soul, the meaning and actuality of the existence [Dasein] of the soul, namely 
the spirit living and present as a world, whose substance now stands as spirit for the first 
time.137  
 
If habit serves the soul’s transformation of herself into second nature, this is therefore also 
concerned with the notion that habit involves one’s taking up the existing ethical order. Of 
importance with respect to this notion of second nature as habitual acceptance of the existing 
ethical order is the distinction between the moral and the ethical standpoint. Hegel states that 
morality and right are not yet “customs, namely spirit.”138 The standpoint of morality is based 
on the moral subject’s value judgment concerning good and bad, but this inner judgment of 
the subject is for Hegel not free from the risk of an arbitrary, or only subjective judgment. 
From the ethical standpoint, however, “the will is a will of spirit and has a substantial content 
which is in conformity with itself.”139 That is, in the ethical life, my will is not just my 
subjective or private will but the will of spirit, namely an objective will that represents the 
ethical [sittlich] view of the community in which I am living. In this sense, my will contains 
the contents which come from a set of values and norms of my community. But my will does 
not coincide with the will of spirit by birth; it is encultured [gebildet] by education so as to 
                                                   
137 PhR § 151. 
138 PhR § 151. Z 
139 Ibid. 
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become the will of spirit. As Hegel puts it, “education is the art of making human beings 
ethical.”140 
 Thus, habit is an educational process by which the existing system of normative values 
of the community to which one belongs is transplanted into one’s soul and body. Hence, habit 
also entails the formation of one’s will insofar as the direction of the will is decided by the 
value system that is to be acquired by education. As Hegel puts it, habituation is a 
replacement of the first, merely natural will with the spirit of the ethical life.  
 Habit, thus conceived as an educational acquisition of the existing ethical order, is a 
heteronomous process. Educational enculturation is brought about not by the will of the child 
who is educated but by the will of the community which educates the members. Habit is 
therefore a mechanism of the soul not simply in the sense that a habituated action is a 
conditioned reaction to some environmental factors. More precisely, it is a mechanistic 
process in the sense that it is the heteronomous implantation of a value system to one’s soul 
and body and that this is carried out by the way of learning by doing. This being said, 
bodiliness as the key issue of habituation represents the mechanistic mode of the educational 
enculturation of one’s soul and body, namely the fact that one learns by doing without 
necessarily thinking self-consciously. In this sense, habit is the process of a mechanistic 
development of oneself into an instrument for a spiritual purpose, namely the will of the 
ethical life, rather than of acquiring this or that skill.  
Returning to the issue of the distinction between inner and outer, the notion of habit as 
educational enculturation put forward in the Philosophy of Right explains in what sense one 
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can say that habit entails the exclusion of the substantial totality of the soul into an external 
object, and how this is not just a subjective projection of one’s representation which is 
possibly deranged. As we have seen above, habit is an inscription of the general behaviors and 
judgments of the people with which an individual person lives together in a community. In 
this sense, it is an inscription of the ethical world into the individual’s soul and body. Indeed, 
the inscription would assure to a larger degree that her perception of the world is in agreement 
with the actuality of the cultural/social world. Once the world is thus inscribed into the 
individual, one can say that the external world she perceives is exclusion of the totality of the 
soul into something external to it without having to worry that this might be the projection of 
an individual’s subjective representation.  
 Hegel’s point about habit is that the heteronomous formation of one’s will is the 
foundation of our moral life. Of course, this does not mean that morality is all about accepting 
customs and following the existing rules of our community, which is hardly acceptable. 
Instead, Hegel’s point is that no one can be free without first settling down herself in the 
world or the ethical life of her community, and that her moral actions and behaviors are 
concerned with the interactions with customs and the existing rules of her community. Thus, 
the autonomy of moral self-consciousness would end up falling into empty formalism unless 
consciousness is provided with the contents of the ethical life. Since no one can be free 
without first settling down herself in the world, in this sense, we can say that the freedom of 
spirit consists in the mechanism of the soul. The heteronomous formation of one’s will as the 
necessary condition for the freedom of spirit, however, does not imply that one is assumed to 
uncritically accept any normative values, nor that one becomes a mechanical part of the state 
or an instrument that carries out the will of the state. As I discussed in this beginning of this 
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chapter, if the soul can “truly actualize the genus [Gattung],” this is in the sense that the world 
inhabited by the soul is not the natural universality in relation to which individuals just come 
to be and perish but the dialectical universality of which the spiritual life necessarily requires 
individuals’ activities. To put it another way, the actual world does not find its existence 
elsewhere than in consciousness; consciousness is not just an internal world separable from 
the world, but its interiority itself constitutes the external world. Seen this way, the 
heteronomous formation of one’s will through habit can be considered in terms of the 
dialectical limit between outer and inner that goes through in and out, building itself through 
inwardizing the world and outwardizing itself as the world.  
  To sum up, habit is for Hegel concerned with molding or in-forming our soul and 
body so that we can live the ethical life rather than acquiring this or that skill or this or that 
normative rule. It is a process of transforming a natural, sensitive, animal soul into a human, 
social existent. Thus, the habituated bodiliness is an artifact which is produced by the 
mechanistic practices of the soul and which is produced such a way that it can serve a human, 
spiritual purpose. For Hegel, this transformative production of one’s existence as second 
nature is the pre-condition of the existence of spirit. As he puts it, “habit embraces all kinds 
and stages of spirit’s activity.” Even the upright posture is a habit made by one’s will; seeing 
is also a habit which “immediately unites in a simple act the many determinations of 
sensation, consciousness, intuition, understanding, and so forth;” thinking also requires habit 
so that “I can exist for myself as thinking;” in spirit-as-such, habit is “recollection and 
memory.”141 
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Conclusion. Philosophy and Old Age 
 
What is the soul in Hegel’s Anthropology? The soul is a substantial totality which is filled 
with contents. It is undifferentiated substance in the sense that it is an inner without an outer, 
having no distinction between interior and exterior. As such a non-conscious being, it constitutes 
a part of the universal course of nature, being subordinated to the influences of the 
meteorological, geographical/racial, and dispositional factors. Further, it is an interior that can 
immediately externalize itself through the embodiment of its feelings. Due to such an immediate 
relationship with its body as its other and the lack of the mediation by objective consciousness, 
however, it can always make unrealistic, subjectivist misrepresentations of the world. In this 
sense, it finds itself in the state of dreaming. It is not yet objective consciousness but is on the 
way of being awakened to this spiritual subject living in the intersubjective world. It is awakened 
to objective consciousness through an overall, habitual transformation of bodiliness and a 
heteronomous formation of her will as an ethical one. It is a bodily existence, which immediately 
externalizes itself through bodiliness but overcomes this natural existence by producing itself as 
second nature.  
Throughout this chapter, I considered Hegel’s treatment of the soul in the Anthropology 
in terms of the development of Naturgeist, focusing on the question of how spirit emerges as 
spirit out of its immersion in nature. As I showed, this key problem of the Anthropology centers 
around bodiliness. Bodiliness is for Hegel the soul’s immediate, external existence insofar as it 
serves the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings. But it is, as such, the negative of spirit, one 
that is sublated by the transformative process of habit which gives rise to the conscious 
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distinction between one’s internal world and the external world as its object. Bodiliness, 
conceived as such a locus of spirit’s negativity, is the foundation of spirit.  
But the crucial notion that underlies Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in 
the Anthropology, I claim, is that one’s existence is inseparably connected to the actual world 
and is to be considered in terms of the ways in which she relates herself to that world she lives 
in. As a natural being, one is born, grows, gets ill, and dies. But she also undergoes spiritual 
illness and also actualizes spiritual life because she is born to the spiritual world that has the 
existing order and the ethical life. As I discussed, spiritual illness consists in the soul’s being 
disconnected from the actuality of the world and insistence on her subjectivist representations; 
the spiritual life, in its being the objective consciousness that takes in part of the actuality of the 
world. And the soul becomes objective consciousness through habit. As I suggested, habit is 
therefore to be understood in terms of the soul-world relationship: a dialectical process in which 
the soul inwardizes the world into her interior and outwardizes her interior as the actual world, 
rather than a unidirectional, passive imbuement of the existing order into one’s mind.   
With respect to Hegel’s notion of habit as such a dialectical relationship between the soul 
and the world, I finally consider its implications for old age. As I discussed, Hegel’s discussion 
of the stages of life does not need to be understood as implying that one’s way of interacting with 
the world is decided by how old she is. Thus, what I would here like to consider is the last 
modality of one’s relationship with the world: reflection and contemplation on the world. I 
suggested that the soul in the Anthropology represents a child who is being educated or a juvenile 
who resists accepting the existing world order; the habituated, actual soul represents an adult 
who takes part in the actuality of the intersubjective world. Seen this way, Hegel’s Anthropology 
considers humanity in terms of an immature soul’s growing up into an adult consciousness, 
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which is to be understood more aptly as the transformation of one’s existence into second nature 
by habit. Habit is therefore what makes it possible for the human beings to lead spiritual life in 
an actual relationship with the world. It is also what makes spirit overcome the diseased state it is 
involved in as Naturgeist in the Philosophy of Spirit. However, habit seems to contradict the 
living nature of spirit. Whereas spirit is for Hegel essentially life in the sense that it is something 
active having the power of negativity, habit seems to make the soul proximate to a machine or a 
natural being rather than a spiritual being because it serves the heteronomous formation of one’s 
existence. With respect to this problem, I suggested, again, that it is concerned with the 
dialectical inwardization of the world into the soul and outwardization of the soul into the world. 
In spite of this, we are left with the question as to what old age would then mean in 
relation to the dialectic of Geist—the fourth modality of our relationship with the world that I did 
not discuss when dealing with Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life, i.e., reflection. 
Regarding this, Hegel writes that recollection, namely the mechanism of spirit-as-such treated in 
the Psychology means in old age the “wisdom, the lifeless, complete coincidence of subjective 
activity with its world” and thus leads the soul to “death.”142 The complete mechanism of the 
soul, in other words, leads to the death of spirit because it no longer involves the activity and 
negativity of spirit. By implication, the habituated, actual soul, insofar as she leads a healthy, 
spiritual life, cannot be a complete adult who has left her childhood and youth behind but an 
incomplete adult who involves this immature, negative stage of life and confronts it to lead the 
healthy, spiritual life. In contrast with this, old age represents complete adulthood in which one 
has lost such a dialectical conflict between youth and adulthood. In old age, we thus do not live 
in the present, nor do we have a hope for the future, but live in the past; what we do in old age is 
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“living in recollection of the past and of the substantial.”143 Again, this does not involve the 
claim to ageism as I discussed earlier, but it rather leads us to the question as to what it means to 
be doing philosophy. As far as I see, Hegel’s above characterization of old age goes together 
with the idea put forward in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that “the owl of Minerva 
spreads its wings at dusk.”144 What Hegel suggests by this is that philosophy comes after world 
history since it is a contemplation on the actuality of the world. Seen this way, the philosophical 
recollection of the past actuality of the world, which is the work of old age, represents the death 
of spirit: the work of spirit that has left with its death. 
  
                                                   
143 ENZ § 396 Z. 
144 PR, “Preface.” 
 





On the Recent Naturalist Readings of Hegel’s Anthropology 
 
In this Conclusion, I consider the recent naturalist readings of Hegel and show why they do 
not fit with Hegel’s thought about the relationship between nature and spirit in the Anthropology. 
I also show that Hegel’s position cannot be determined as naturalism even when we refer to 
eighteenth-century context. On the basis of the studies pursued in this dissertation, I instead 
suggest that the crucial issue in studying Hegel’s Anthropology is to clarify the Hegelian, pre-
Phenomenological sense of the life-world.  
In recent Hegel scholarship, there has been a remarkable attempt at determining Hegel’s 
philosophical position in terms of naturalism and this has evoked interests in Hegel’s treatment 
of the soul-body relationship and the notion of habit in the Anthropology. Naturalist readings of 
Hegel have potential for making sense of Hegel’s thought in the contemporary context, but they 
have an essential problem concerning the definition of naturalism. The author of the article on 
“naturalism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, David Papineau, observes that there is 
no agreed-upon definition of naturalism,1 making the term uninformative. The recent debates on 
Hegel’s naturalism, as far as I see, are no exception. As I discuss below in more detail, some 
naturalist readers of Hegel do not clearly state what they mean by naturalism; others do, but use 
                                                   
1 David Papineau, “Naturalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/naturalism/>. 
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different criteria from one another, such that an author’s naturalism is often criticized by others 
for being anti-naturalist.   
The rise of naturalism as an important philosophical position is associated with the formation 
and development of analytic philosophy in post-war American academia. The prominent analytic 
figure with regard to the rise of naturalism is Quine, who proposed a “naturalized epistemology” 
under the influence of logical positivism.2 Blurring the distinction between analytic meaning and 
synthetic knowledge, he takes on the empiricist view that knowledge of nature consists in 
sensory experience. In his terms, “all inculcation of meanings of a word must rest ultimately on 
sensory evidence.”3 Accordingly, for him, the best way to obtain knowledge about the world is 
through natural sciences, and natural sciences offer the standard of knowledge by which 
philosophers are to be constrained. This scientific naturalism of Quine involves the 
methodological claim that scientific methods and techniques are applicable and should be 
applied to any serious attempt at gaining significant information about the world. It further 
involves the ontological doctrine that all that exist are the things that are studied and known by 
natural sciences.4  
                                                   
2 Willard van Oman Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” in: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969), 69-90. 
3 Ibid. 75. 
4 Jaegwon Kim points out that Quine’s rejection of normative epistemology in favor of the scientific psychology of 
cognition is hardly acceptable to most contemporary analytic philosophers although his “Naturalized Epistemology” 
is one of the main sources through which most analytic philosophers first encounter naturalism: Jaegwon Kim, “The 
American Origin of Philosophical Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 28 (2003): 83-98. Kim 
suggests that Quine’s naturalism has its origin in the earlier debates among American authors such as John Dewey, 
Sydney Hook, Ernst Nagel, George Boas, and John Herman Randall in a volume of essays published in 1944 under 
the title Naturalism and the Human Spirit. He underlines that naturalism was understood by those authors as well as 
by Quine primarily as a methodological doctrine but was more than a methodological doctrine. Another half of the 
history of naturalism around the mid-twentieth century in America, Kim suggests, is concerned with an elaboration 
of naturalist metaphysics. Stated briefly, Roy Wood Sellars and Ernst Nagel shared a metaphysical doctrine that “the 
spacetime world is the whole world; the entities, properties, events, and facts in spacetime are all the entities, 
properties, etc. of the world,” which excludes “a variety of entities that have been claimed to exist, such as deities 
(conceived as transcendent), Kantian noumena, the Hegelian Absolute, and abstract universals:” Jaegwon Kim, “The 
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The development of naturalism is situated within the broader framework of the tradition of 
American pragmatism, which began to form during the last decades of the nineteenth century by 
the philosophers such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. There was no 
commonly shared conception of what pragmatism is even among those founders of pragmatism 
as well as their successors.5 But the early classic pragmatism is largely characterized by a 
concern with action and effects, and the belief that the truth of a conceptual idea consists in the 
effects brought up by its actualization. Further, they considered language and communication as 
essentially social practices. This idea is further developed by the neo-pragmatist Robert 
Brandom, whose main concern is the institution of linguistic conceptual norms by social-
practical activities. Roughly speaking, naturalism and pragmatism have an affinity in their 
grounding belief that meaningful objects of any philosophical discussions are observable effects 
in space and time because there is no supernatural entity, and that the understanding of those 
effects does not requires a priori concept.  This explains why Quine calls the classic pragmatist 
Dewey a naturalist who holds that, according to Quine, “knowledge, mind, and meaning are part 
of the same world that they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in the same empirical 
spirit that animates natural science; there is no place for a priori philosophy.”6  
                                                   
American Origin of Philosophical Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 28 (2003), 90.  
The explicit formulation of the ontological stance of naturalism is given by Sellars: “Naturalism […] is a 
cosmological position; its opposite is supernaturalism in the larger meaning of that term. I mean that naturalism 
takes nature in a definite way as identical with reality, as self-sufficient and as the whole of reality. And by nature is 
meant the space-time-causal system which is studied by science and in which our lives are passed. […]  
Supernaturalism essentially affirms that nature is only a part of reality. This supernaturalism may be of the myth-
believing, popular type bounded up with traditional religion or it may be quite opposed to the miraculous:” Roy 
Wood Sellars, “Why Naturalism and Not Materialism?,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 36, no.3 (1927), 217. 
5 For instance, Lovejoy discerned thirteen meanings of pragmatism. See: Arthur O. Lovejoy, “The Thirteen 
Pragmatisms,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, vol.5, no.1 (1908): 5-12. 
6 Willard Van Oman Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” in: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969), 26. 
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Given the historical context of the formation and development of naturalism and pragmatism 
in contemporary American philosophy, the appeal to Hegel on the part of naturalist philosophers 
is both understandable and surprising. First of all, the formation of classic pragmatism was 
deeply influenced by the philosophy of Kant and Hegel.7 Specifically, Dewey is known for being 
influenced by St. Louis Hegelians who conceived of Hegel’s philosophy as practical philosophy 
upholding political liberalism.8 The pragmatic concern with practical action and its social effects 
is in accord with Hegel’s dialectical notion of actuality according to which rationality is what is 
actualized in the world rather than a cognitive activity of an individual mind. Recent debates on 
Hegel’s naturalism thus show evidence of the liveliness of the tradition of American pragmatism 
in which the pragmatist themes concerning action, social practice, and normativity recur within 
the analytic tradition. It also evidences the liveliness of interaction between continental and 
analytic philosophy. While American pragmatism was formed under the strong influence of 
German philosophy, it is also noticeable that German thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and 
Axel Honneth adopted and developed pragmatic themes. 
The pragmatist background against which Hegel has been actively revisited illustrates the 
potential relevance of Hegel’s philosophy for today. However, the pragmatist-naturalist tradition 
has some important elements that do not fit with Hegel’s own context. As mentioned above, one 
of the most central characteristics of this contemporary American tradition is the rejection of a 
                                                   
7 As for the detailed history of the adoption of Kant and Hegel by American intellectuals in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, see in particular: Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 
2010). 
8 As with Bernstein, James A. Good  underlines that the adaption of Hegel by nineteenth-century American 
intellectuals was closely associated with the political situation around the Civil War: James A. Good, “A ‘World-
Historical Idea’: The St. Louis Hegelians and the Civil War,” Journal of American Studies, vol.34, no.3 (2000): 447-
464. The need for social reform and the liberalist concern with antislavery brought Hegel’s philosophy and German 
Idealism together for these thinkers. Good argues that the perception of Hegel as an upholder of Prussian 
authoritarianism was formed during World War I. By contrast, during the time between the Civil War and World War 
I, Hegel was viewed as an upholder of advanced political liberalism.    
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priori, metaphysical thinking. But Hegel’s absolute idealism pursues a philosophical system 
dealing with two parts of reality, nature and spirit, on the basis of the logic, which is, for him, an 
essentially metaphysical discipline. This implies, as I discussed in Chapter 2, that Hegel’s 
thoughts about nature and spirit are grounded in his logical theses of the objectivity of thought 
determinations and the subjectivity of the Concept, which are concerned with a priori 
demonstrations of the identity of being and thought. Further, the claims of scientific 
naturalism—that all realities are exhausted by nature and that any account of realities must be 
constrained by natural sciences—contradict Hegel’s notion of spirit because spirit, for Hegel, is a 
higher reality than nature which is irreducible to the latter. Nor does Hegel credit natural sciences 
as the standard for valid knowledge. 
In fact, what has evoked the naturalist readings of Hegel is an attempt within analytic 
philosophy to elaborate on an alternative version of naturalism to the scientific one. Scientific 
naturalism has been criticized for their conception of mind as part of nature with the narrow 
definition of nature as “a causally closed spatio-temporal structure governed by efficient causal 
laws,” and their “reductive attitude towards normativity, especially in the ethical and aesthetical 
domains.”9 As a response to these criticisms, there has been a movement to work on the other, 
“philosophically more liberal, naturalism,” which aims at offering a “new nonreductive form of 
naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided by natural sciences.” 10 
John McDowell represents this new, liberal naturalism. Inspired by Aristotle, he developed the 
view that “reason, values, and meanings are conceived as sui generis but natural items on the 
                                                   
9 Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question (Cambridge, London: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 9.   
10 Ibid. 1. 
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basis of the actual character and role of thinking, knowing, and evaluating in our lives.” 11 
McDowell’s liberal naturalism has exerted a considerable influence on the naturalist readings of 
Hegel. Instead of going into the details of his naturalism, however, I here refer to Italo Testa’s 
discussion of Hegel’s Anthropology because it exemplifies, I think, McDowell’s influence on the 
naturalist readers of Hegel. Testa draws attention to Hegel’s non-dualistic treatment of the 
relationship of the soul and the body in the Anthropology. For him, these terms do not refer to 
things of a different kind but to “the same subject, namely the living individual,”12 and this 
identity of the soul and the body leads us to the notion of “Hegel’s naturalism:” the idea that 
“spirit is for Hegel nothing other than a determinate constellation of relations of Nature itself as 
the one single unity.”13 While he thus seems to be suggesting that spirit is an aspect of the one 
single unity, i.e., nature, he refines his position by stating that Hegel’s naturalism is not a “first-
natural naturalism” which legitimatizes a physical description alone but a “broad or liberal 
naturalism” that embraces “the various levels of organization of living beings, including those 
phenomena of their social organization that we can consider as spiritual second nature.” 14 
However, McDowell’s strategy of “re-enchanting nature” to consider the forms of human life 
as belonging to it sparked a controversy over whether this non-reductive, soft version of 
naturalism can be considered naturalism in the strict sense of the term.15 More importantly, the 
naturalist readings of Hegel inspired by McDowell’s liberal naturalism seems hard to avoid the 
                                                   
11 Ibid. 10-11. 
12 Italo Testa, “Hegel’s Naturalism or Soul and Body in the Encyclopedia,” in Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State University of New York, 2013), 23.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 25.  
15  See in particular: Addrian Haddock, “McDowell, Transcendental Philosophy, and Naturalism,” Philosophical 
Topics, vol.37, no.1 (2009): 63-75. 
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criticism that their strategy is the opposite of Hegel’s. For Hegel integrates nature and spirit by 
affirming the superiority of the latter over the former, not by extending disenchanted first nature 
to reenchanted second nature.16 Further, Alison Stone suggests a cluster-based approach to 
Hegel’s naturalism while defining naturalism by the belief in the compatibility of philosophy 
with empirical science and the disbelief in supernatural entities.17 Her suggestion is that Hegel’s 
position can best be described as broad naturalism, which is more naturalist than Schelling and 
less naturalist than Kant. But Gardner argues that Hegel is anti-naturalist by putting the 
contemporary, non-metaphysical trend in Hegel scholarship in perspective through an 
examination of the context of German Idealism.18 Another important naturalist reader of Hegel is 
Terry Pinkard who understands Hegel’s notion of spirit—“Geistigkeit” which he translate as 
“mindedness”—as denoting “self-interpreting animals.”19 But Renault characterizes Pinkard, 
together with other neo-pragmatists such as Rorty and Brandom, as idealist readers of Hegel 
sharing anti-naturalist insights.20  
Thus, it seems that “broader, philosophically more liberal, naturalism” generally shares with 
scientific naturalism the tendency to consider all realities to be part of nature, no matter how 
broad or inclusive notion of nature they suggest. But this naturalist tenet turns out to run counter 
to Hegel’s position in the Encyclopedia when one considers his rejection of the Romantic 
Naturphilosophie. The formation of the Naturphilosophie is associated with the development of 
                                                   
16  Alexis Papazoglou, “Hegel and Naturalism,” Hegel Bulletin, vol. 33, issue 2 (2012), 81-83. 
17  Alison Stone, “Hegel, Naturalism and the Philosophy of Nature,” Hegel Bulletin, vol. 34, issue 1 (2013): 59-78. 
18 Sebastian Gardner, “The Limit of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism,” in German Idealism: 
contemporary perspectives, edited by Espen Hammer (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), 19-49. 
19 Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Naturalism. Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 5-6. 
20  Emmanuel Renault, “The Naturalist Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism,” Critical Horizons, vol. 3, issue 2 (2012): 244-
274. 
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some particular domains of natural sciences including medicine, physiology, natural history, and 
biology in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. We can perhaps characterize this new 
intellectual movement as eighteenth-century naturalism along the line of Zammito’s suggestion:  
 
I term “naturalists” the protagonists in this study [philosophers and physiologists from Stahl 
to Schelling]. They operated in a conceptual field with two distinct poles of orientation. 
“natural philosophy” explained the physical world in terms of general principles. “Natural 
history,” by contrast, described all the plants, animals, and minerals encountered in the 
material environment. By the mid-eighteenth century, natural history came to a crossroads in 
its self-definition and articulation via-à-vis natural philosophy that coincides with some 
fundamental crises within natural philosophy itself concerning the possibility and 
importance of a “nonmathematical physique,” setting the stage for a shift in the “semantic 
field” of natural inquiry, a paradigm shift that has been conceptualized by historians of 
science as “vital materialism.” My thesis is that, over the eighteenth century, naturalists 
undertook to reformulate some domains of natural history (living things) into a distinct 
branch of natural philosophy (ultimately, the science of biology).21 
 
In line with Zamitto, one can determine eighteenth-century naturalism by referring to those 
scientists and philosophers who were engaged in empirical studies of various phenomena of 
living organisms and philosophical speculations about general features or principles of life. This 
allows us to draw out two key important characters of eighteenth-century naturalism: (1) 
concerns with organisms (theme); (2) positive and hermeneutic interplay between empirical 
                                                   
21 John H. Zammito, The Gestation of German Biology. Philosophy and Physiology from Stahl to Schelling 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 1-2. 
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knowledge and speculation (method).22 Eighteenth-century naturalism entails the rise of the 
Romantic Naturphilosophie, which presents the vitalist view of nature as a self-organizing, self-
vitalizing totality. This new movement can also be considered as a challenge to the modern, 
mathematical-physical conception of natural science.23  
                                                   
22 It is to be noted that the borderline between science and philosophy for eighteenth-century figures was not as 
sharp as it is today. Instead, the eighteenth century displays dynamic interactions between science and philosophy—
between empirical knowledge based on scientific observation and experiment, and philosophical speculation. This 
positive, hermeneutic relationship between science and philosophy in the eighteenth century is well illustrated in 
Gambarotto’s recent study: Andrea Gambarroto, Vital Forces, Teleology and Organization. Philosophy of Nature 
and the Rise of Biology in Germany (Cham: Springer, 2018). As Gambarotto shows, Blumenbach’s notion of 
formative force [Bildungstrieb] was a postulated principle of self-organization in organic matter. Kielmeyer 
developed Blumenbach’s scheme of five vital forces into a teleological principle that makes living organisms 
distinct from non-living bodies and applied this to the realm of the animal kingdom. Kant’s attempts at a definition 
of race can be seen as an example of a philosophical engagement with natural science. A more radical case of the 
engagement of this sort is found in Schelling who integrated Kielmeyer’s framework of vital forces into his 
considerations of animal classification. Further, Manfred Frank shows that Schelling develops the conceptual 
structure of a living organism into an underlying principle of his philosophy. In his terms, an organism in its broad 
sense “served Schelling’s entire system as model:” Manfred Frank, “Schellings speculative Umdeutung des 
Kantischen Organismus-Konzept,” in Hegel’s Jenaer Naturphilosophie, ed. Klaus Vierweg (München: Fink,1988), 
201-218. Olaf Breidbach shows that Hegel was exposed to the life sciences of the time during his early Jena years 
and elaborated on his notion of the Concept as an organic totality based on his understandings of the biological 
debates of the time: “Das Organische in Hegels Jenaer Naturphilosophie,” in Hegel’s Jenaer Naturphilosophie, ed. 
Klaus Vierweg (München: Fink,1988), 309-318.  
To sum up, natural scientists (Buffon, Blumenbach, Kielmeyer) were not reluctant to speculate about the general 
principles in pursuit of their studies of nature, which played a key role in the development of biology in the 
eighteenth century. Philosophers suggested some conceptual criterion for defining scientific terms such as race 
(Kant) or absorbed scientific discoveries concerning an organism into their philosophical system (Schelling and 
Hegel). Such dynamic interactions between natural science and philosophy can be characterized as hermeneutic, in 
the sense that the newly observed and experimented phenomena of living organisms stimulated speculative 
interpretations, and that the teleologically interpreted phenomena of an organism were integrated into philosophical 
systems as their underlying principles.  
23 Peter Hans Reill suggests that Enlightenment vitalism and Naturphilosophie is to be understood as a breach in the 
history of Enlightenment science and philosophy: cf., Peter Hans Reill, “The Legacy of the ‘Scientific Revolution’: 
Science and the Enlightenment,” in The Cambridge History of Science Volume 4. Eighteenth Century Science, ed. 
Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23-43.  As he suggests, eighteenth-century science has 
been characterized as an era in which the scientific paradigm achieved by the scientific revolution in the previous 
century was accepted and made into normal science, and thereby the stepping-stone to another scientific revolution 
in the next century was laid down. While this view assumes continuity in the development of Enlightenment science 
over the centuries, Reill points out that the negative evaluation of Enlightenment reason, most famously by 
Horkheimer and Adorno, likewise sees the Enlightenment as a consistent and unificatory process. In both cases, 
their conception of the uniformity of the Enlightenment draws on “the triumph in and by the Enlightenment of a 
mathematically based science:” ibid. 24. However, Reill shows that the development of Enlightenment vitalism and 
Naturphilosophie challenges prevalent views of eighteenth-century science as a “tiresome trough to be negotiated 
between the peaks of the seventeenth century and those of the nineteenth century:” ibid. 23. Consequently, they 
overlook the Enlightenment vitalism and Naturphilosophie that emerged out of skepticism and criticism of 
mathematical-mechanical conceptions of nature. The organic-teleological notion of nature envisioned by 
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Eighteenth-century naturalism in the sense I just described seems to allow us to situate 
Hegel in that movement insofar as his notion of the Concept embraces the organic feature of a 
living being, i.e., self-organizing totality.24 However, it does not seem that we can call Hegel a 
naturalist on that basis. As I discussed throughout this dissertation, the organic dimension of the 
Concept for Hegel consists in the dialectical life of the Idea, which is exhibited through the self-
development of spirit in his philosophical system. Within the dialectical life of the Idea, nature 
constitutes an inorganic whole rather than a self-vitalizing totality. Further, his discussion of the 
soul-body relationship in the Anthropology somehow involves the view of a human being as an 
organism to the extent that it focuses on the inseparable connection between the two, and hence, 
our immediate bodily existence. However, the biological feature of a living being, i.e., self-
organization, is not essential to the soul-body complex treated in Hegel’s Anthropology. As I 
attempted to show, it is rather concerned with the sentient bodiliness through which the soul 
makes an ambivalent relation to spiritual life—ambivalent, in the sense that it immediately 
embodies the spiritual interior but, as such, constitutes the negative, diseased stage in the 
development of spirit in the Anthropology.  
Therefore, it is important to note that Hegel’s Anthropology problematizes the immediate 
existence of the spiritual in the material; further, it suggests that this should be sublated through 
habit, which brings forth the mediation by objective consciousness or the intersubjective world. 
This leads us to the essentially dynamic character of Hegel’s notion of spirit. That is, spirit is 
what constitutes itself as spirit by emerging out of its immersion in nature. By implication, spirit 
                                                   
Enlightenment vitalism and Naturphilosophie is therefore to be understood, Reill claims, as a breach in the history 
of Enlightenment science and philosophy.  
24 See: Olaf Breidbach, “Das Organische in Hegels Jenaer Naturphilosophie,” in Hegel’s Jenaer Naturphilosophie, 
ed. Klaus Vierweg (München: Fink,1988), 309-318. 
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does not remain part of nature, regardless of how nature is understood—either as a closed space 
of causality or a self-organizing whole. Therefore, Hegel’s thought about the relationship 
between nature and spirit in the Anthropology cannot be defined in terms of naturalism, either in 
the contemporary sense or in the eighteenth-century context.  
Beyond the framework of naturalism, this dissertation finally leads us to a crucial 
question concerning Hegel’s dynamic notion of spirit, which is not addressed by naturalist 
readers: how can we determine the anthropological world treated in Hegel’s Anthropology? As I 
attempted to show, Hegel’s treatment of derangement and habit in the Anthropology centers 
around the idea that an individual exists in the world and the world exists in and through 
individuals. This relationship between individuals and the world is ontological rather than 
epistemological because it is concerned with the bodily existence of the human being and one’s 
relation to the world through the bodily existence. Further, this relationship is entirely dynamic 
and dialectical in the sense that the spiritual world emerges through a spiritualization of an 
individual’s mode of existence, and individuals become spiritual in the spiritual world. This 
dynamic and dialectical relationship, however, makes it hard to firmly determine what this 
anthropological world is like. We may say in a negative way that it is not a mathematical-
physical world of causality, nor a world of organisms, nor a normative world of practical spirit. 
But the Anthropology does not give many clues for a positive characterization of the world in 
which the soul is living.  
Determining the life-world in which the soul is living, however, is important specifically 
when we want to situate the Anthropology section in Hegel’s Encyclopedia within the tradition 
of philosophical anthropology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We are thus referred 
back to Odo Marquard’s thesis that philosophical anthropology began with the twofold turn to 
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the life-world from the old metaphysics and the mathematical-physical conception of nature, and 
it gained its disciplinary independence when it was liberated from Kantian teleology of history. 
Marquard also takes Hegel’s Anthropology to be based on a teleology of history in a similar way 
to Kant. As I attempted to show, however, Hegel’s Anthropology does not systematically 
institute a teleological view of human history; the anthropological world does not yet involve a 
historical temporality, which is introduced after the philosophy of objective spirit. We cannot 
therefore consider his Anthropology in alignment with Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. Thus, 
what the Hegelian, pre-Phenomenological life-world is, remains unsettled. It is a question that is 
to be further examined to offer a full account of Hegel’s thought about the relationship between 
nature and spirit in the Anthropology.  
 
 
The Critical Powers of Hegel’s Dialectic of Naturgeist 
 
When dealing with the stages of life, I suggested that Hegel’s Anthropology concerns the 
threefold complex of the soul, the world, and the body, claiming that in this respect, Hegel’s 
discussion of the soul-body relationship in the Anthropology departs from Aristotelian 
hylomorphism. My claim was that what turns Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in 
the Anthropology into an anthropological discussion rather than an epistemological or 
psychological one is the idea that the human being is a worldly being. Now, it is to be noted that 
Hegel’s conception of the world in the Anthropology does not rest on cosmological reflections on 
the position and significance of the earth as the human habitat within the universe, which 
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normally characterizes thought about the world in the European culture up until the seventeenth 
century.25 Rather, Hegel’s conception of the world reflects the complicated, European world-
experience of the time. The most important part of this experience was the expansion of political 
liberalism and the underlying universal humanism throughout Europe in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution, which entailed radical changes in their social and political systems as well as 
outbreaks of inter-European wars. In relation to Germany of the time and Hegel’s conception and 
experience of the world, we can point out that throughout the nineteenth century, Germany was 
in the middle of omnidirectional modernization through the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, which 
were triggered by the defeat of Prussians by Napoleon I at Jena in 1806, abolished guild 
monopolies in 1812, and lasted until 1820. Uncomfortable, however, is the fact that the European 
experience of the formation of the new, modern world involved another world-experience of the 
colonialist exploration and invasion of the non-European world, together with the development 
of the commercial capitals. Thus, the awareness of the global world of the nineteenth-century 
Europe does not simply concern innocent curiosity and increasing knowledge of the world 
outside of Europe, but far more significantly the violent colonization of the non-European world, 
which runs against the ideal of the equality of all people. As it is well known, Hegel was well 
aware of the slave trades and the Haiti Revolution, although Germany did not establish or more 
precisely was not capable of doing so, overseas colonies up until 1884.  
 The world-experience of nineteenth-century Europe is thus essentially ambivalent. It 
involves modernization and rationalization of the domestic world on the one hand, and 
imperialist colonialism at the level of the global world on the other. While the social and political 
                                                   
25 See: Artur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University 
Press, first edition in 1936/ twenty-second printing in 2001), 183-207. 
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reformations at the domestic level were based on the ideals of universal humanism and political 
liberalism affirming the equality of all people, the colonialist invasions of the lands outside 
Europe were anti-humanist practices upholding the anti-cosmopolitan, racist ideology. Hegel’s 
Anthropology reflects these ambivalent world-experiences of nineteenth-century Europe in a 
significant manner. In the “Feeling Soul” section, he uses the example of the ones who fail to 
accept the change of time: the Stoic, Cato, who committed suicide with the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, and the ones who resisted accepting the new regime and became insane during 
the French Revolution. His thematization of the soul’s derangement, feeling of unhappiness, and 
alienation from the world of actuality in the “Feeling Soul” section thus reflects his experiences 
of and concerns about the social and political upheavals of his time that greatly affected 
individuals’ mental lives. In line with this, his emphasis on the objective relationship with the 
world and the theory of habit, which is an important part of his philosophy of objective spirit, is 
closely associated with his experiences of and concerns with the reformation of Germany into a 
new, modernized state. Yet, his Anthropology also displays Eurocentric, racist ideology. For 
instance, in discussing the different human races in the “Natural Soul” section, he states that 
Africans are to be regarded as “a nation of children,” while Asians “rise above this childish 
naivete” characteristic of Africans, but “it is in the Caucasian race that spirit first attains to 
absolute unity with itself.”26  
Seen this way, the world that Hegel’s Anthropology inhabits cannot be a purely abstract 
concept that is theoretically neutral and politically innocent. It rather represents the global world 
that is organized by colonialism and structured by racism, as well as the domestic world that 
strives to achieve the ideal of political liberalism in the form of a modern state. Regarding the 
                                                   
26 § 393 Z. 
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problem of Eurocentrism in Hegel’s Anthropology, however, I attempted to show that the 
Anthropology in Hegel’s Encyclopedia, unlike Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, is not based on a 
teleological understanding of human history. Although Hegel applies the framework of his 
philosophy of world history to his presentation of the differences in human races, the philosophy 
of world history does not play any systematic role for his treatment of the soul-body relationship 
in the Anthropology. If we confine ourselves to the Anthropology, we can rightly say that 
Eurocentrism is neither essential nor necessary, but only contingent to it.27 Also, we saw that 
Hegel dismisses polygenesis for the reason that it is motivated by the malignant desire to 
establish the superiority of a particular human race over other races, arguing that men are all 
equal in their intellectual abilities and political rights. More significantly, I showed that Hegel’s 
Anthropology considers human existence and life in terms of the dialectical relationship between 
nature and spirit, namely the emergence of spirit out of nature. We therefore need to pay 
attention to the fact that his discussion of different human races occurs in the “Natural Soul” 
section, and that this section presents the stage where Geist is submerged in nature. Within the 
framework of the dialectical development of Geist in the Anthropology, this stage, where all of 
the spiritual dimensions of human existence and life are subordinated to nature, is the one from 
which Geist is to emerge, namely the one that is to be negated, overcome, and sublated. Seen this 
way, the “Natural Soul” section instead has critical implications, suggesting that the 
determination of human beings by natural and biological factors—conceived either as racist and 
sexist realities/practices or as such discriminatory perspectives/ideas—is to be overcome for the 
emergence of a truly spiritual, or rational form of the world.  
                                                   
27 Mollendorf makes this point clear: “his philosophy of spirit is not necessarily racist, only contingently so, that is 
that his racism does not follow from any of his fundamental claims about spirit:” Darrel Mollendorf, “Racism and 
Rationality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,” History of Political Thought, vol.XIII, no.2 (1992), 243.  
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When we take the “Natural Soul” section away from the dialectical framework of the 
development of Geist and look at Hegel’s statements, however, it is undeniable that many of 
them are indeed racist. No matter how successfully we can defend Hegel by drawing on his 
dialectical and speculative method, it is therefore not to be ignored that Hegel himself kept silent 
about the European colonialist practices of his time. Further, his philosophy of world history, 
which frames his presentation of different human races in the “Natural Soul” section, perpetuates 
Eurocentric ideology. On the one hand, Hegel seems less racist than Kant when he claims that 
Africans have the “capacity for education.”28 However, he also claims that Africans have no 
“inner impulse towards culture.”29 Thus, that Africans have the capacity for education ultimately 
means, for him, that they can at best follow the European model of modernization, namely “a 
state [founded] on Christian principles,” as we see in the case of “Haiti.”30 Although his 
philosophy of world history does not play any important methodological role in his 
Anthropology, and the “Natural Soul” section presents the stage that is to be overcome through 
the dialect of Geist in the Anthropology, we still must acknowledge that his statements about 
Africans are undoubtedly Eurocentric. The fundamental problem of such statements is the 
perpetuation of colonialist practices through the justification of missionary colonization of other 
lands. Thus, we should admit that Hegel’s Anthropology, although it does not institute a 
teleology of history systematically or methodologically, retains the theoretical tension in Kant’s 
philosophy between the ideal of cosmopolitan, universal humanism on the one hand, and the 
Eurocentric, colonialist and racist ideology on the other.  
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Further, we need to point out that Hegel’s notion of the natural soul carries the risk of 
legitimizing the discriminatory, reductionist view that one’s identity is decided by natural factors 
such as age, race, and sex, by giving an epistemological and conceptual status to those biological 
categories. However, it must be admitted that these biological categories have no such 
determinate status. Thus, if we disregard all the dialectical meanings of Hegel’s presentation of 
the stages of life and take it literally, we can rightly object that one can resist, preserve, and 
philosophize the world regardless of age. Next, his statement that Africans are naïve and have no 
inner motivation for civilization is a racist stereotype. Further, the idea that the role of women is 
confined to taking care of the family justifies misogynic practices and the patriarchal structure of 
the society. In a similar vein, his model of the family as based on monogamist marriage, the 
blood relationship, and gender roles is sexist and patriarchal. Obviously, the family need not to 
be based on a heterosexual relationship between man and woman. A homosexual couple can 
form a family; an adult and an adoptee, too. We therefore have to say that not just monogamist 
marriage, but the marriage institution itself and the blood relationship are no prerequisite for the 
family.  
Thus, the world presented in the “Natural Soul” section seems discriminatory at large, 
structured by colonialist-racist and patriarchal-sexist perspectives. The prominent way to defend 
Hegel, again, is to highlight the status of the “Natural Soul” section in relation to the dialectical 
development of Geist in the Anthropology. As discussed above, this strategy is relevant to 
Hegel’s context; however, it is a weak argument to assert that the “Natural Soul” section has no 
sexist and racist effects. It therefore seems that we are left with few positive options for studying 
this section that comes to the first place of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit. If it constitutes a merely 
negative stage that is to be overcome, and if we understand this negativity as simply implying 
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that those phenomena that represent spirit’s subordination to nature are to be denied, we only 
come to the abstract, unsubstantial conclusion, at best, that racism and sexism are bad and Hegel 
does not necessarily oppose this. In this case, it does not really matter if we throw away the 
“Natural Soul” section insofar as we have today a number of studies that address those problems 
directly, profoundly, and critically.  
Independent of the racist and sexist nature of the statements and ideas in the “Natural 
Soul,” how we can defend or criticize Hegel, and what strategies and arguments we can use and 
make, therefore, do not seem so essential to my inquiry here. The question that seems far more 
important to me is whether or not Hegel’s conception of the dialectic of Naturgeist can offer us a 
critical perspective that is relevant to our realities and problems today, and how effective and 
powerful this critical perspective, if any, can be. Now, what is at stake in pursuing such a critical, 
interpretative study is Hegel’s notion of the dialectical sublation. Since we cannot here discuss 
all of its complicated meanings, I would instead like to confine myself to the dialectic of 
Naturgeist in the Anthropology. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, the dialectic of 
Naturgeist does not imply that spirit’s overcoming of its naturalness is an absolute 
denaturalization. Instead, it consists in an essentially dynamic movement in which it naturalizes 
and re-naturalizes itself to overcome its naturalness in and through this being-in-other of itself. It 
ultimately reflects Hegel’s ontological insight that identity is dynamically constituted in and 
through alterity, which is essential to any of his dialectical presentations. With respect to the 
conception of the world in his Anthropology and the problematic tension between its 
discriminatory and humanist dimension, we can first refer to Kant’s thesis that the perfection of 
humanity is a transcendental ideal that cannot be realized in the empirical, phenomenal world. As 
I have discussed, for Kant, the gap between the transcendental ideal of the perfection of 
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humanity and the empirical world of human history is concerned with the egoistic, antagonistic 
proclivities of human beings conceived as empirical beings. Whereas it thus bears on human 
nature for Kant, Hegel’s thesis of the necessity of spirit’s self-naturalization concerns the 
essentially dynamic feature of Geist: that it is in the movement of self-actualization, self-
becoming, and self-completion. Since the movement is essential to it, the completion of the 
movement means the end of Geist. If we consider this dynamic feature of Hegel’s Geist in 
relation to human history, we can therefore say that Kantian transcendental ideal of the 
perfection of humanity, for Hegel, cannot be achieved because this ultimately means the end of 
history. To speak more radically, our history will see other anti-humanist phenomena that run 
against our ideals reappearing even when, hypothetically speaking, we are proud of the progress 
we have made in rationalizing and humanizing our societies. Our history will encounter other 
problems even if we succeed in establishing a non-racist and non-sexist world.  
This line of interpreting Hegel’s dialectic of Naturgeist likely seems to give a pessimistic 
worldview, suggesting that we will never be able to make our world better. At this point, I would 
first like to point out that the interpretation above is one that I draw from Hegel’s dialectic as a 
person who lives in and experience today’s world and sees this contemporary world with far 
more critical eyes than Hegel’s, and that Hegel himself held, generally speaking, a rather 
optimistic view of the world, as many Enlightenment figures did. For an accurate evaluation of 
Hegel’s dialectic and a productive engagement with it, we need more historical works 
concerning Hegel’s ideas about the changes and reformations of his society that he observed and 
experienced, thereby keeping our distance from his philosophy. Since this goes far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, I here only make a general suggestion. In the way that I read Hegel, the 
worldview we can draw from his dialectic of Naturgeist is realistic rather than pessimistic. And 
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the worldview concerning the failure in realizing the ideal world that both Kant and Hegel can 
offer to us is realistic not in the general sense that the human world has evil phenomena at all 
times, but in the particular sense that the tension between universal humanism and discriminatory 
ideologies structures our modernized, political world at both domestic and global levels. It is 
realistic insofar as the problematic tension characteristic of their philosophies appears in more 
radicalized, deepened, and complicated forms in our contemporary world. And the realistic view 
and diagnosis of the actual world, I believe, is the prerequisite for any critical work.  
Now, I suggest that Hegel’s dialectic of Naturgeist has a critical power in the idea that 
the emergence of Geist out of nature requires the stage of an alienation from the world, namely 
derangement. Certainly, this does not literally mean that we all should become insane to achieve 
a truly spiritual world. As I discussed, Hegel’s treatment of derangement is part of his 
speculative notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, which 
blurs a firm distinction between insanity and normality; it also involves an indirect criticism of 
Romanticism’s privilege of the power of irrational faculties, which I believe tends toward a 
conservative political ideology by appealing to the nostalgic longing for the past and by 
romantically idealizing nature. Most importantly, the necessity of derangement is speculative in 
the sense that it concerns the dialectical development of Geist in the Anthropology. To be more 
precise, by the necessity of derangement, Hegel means that a philosophical understanding of the 
significance of pathological mental phenomena, which people undergo in the time of radical 
upheavals, is required for theorizing the way in which one comes to establish an objective 
relationship with the world. Of course, one can object that treating insanity is not necessary for 
thinking about our relationships with the world, and one can definitely pick up other issues that 
she thinks important. In fact, insofar as we are concerned with philosophizing our relationships 
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with the world, one can never say that a certain issue is absolutely necessary, nor can anybody 
offer a theoretical proof of the necessity of a certain issue because thinking about the world is 
ultimately rooted in one’s experiences. Thus, if it is necessary to thematize derangement for 
thinking about our lives in the world, this necessity ultimately comes from Hegel’s experiences 
of and concerns with the world he lived in, as I suggested above.  
Instead of recapitulating Hegel’s conception of derangement, I would here like to 
contemplate the possible or potential implication that we can draw from his idea of the necessity 
of the feeling soul’s derangement, namely the subject’s alienation from the world for the 
development of Geist in the Anthropology. The fundamentally critical power of the idea of the 
necessity of one’s alienation from the world consists in the fact that it gives us a chance to keep 
our distance from any values, ideas, views, perspectives, and ideologies that we have built up 
through all our life experiences since birth. If Hegel’s dialectical consideration of derangement 
suggests that the most deranged is the most self-conscious, as I discussed when interpreting the 
“Feeling Soul” section, then, we can further radicalize the critical power of Hegel’s notion of 
alienation by saying that we need to keep our distance even from our ideals about the world, 
specifically the modern ideals of universal humanism and political liberalism. These ideals are to 
be called into question at every time we pursue them because any claim to universality carries 
the risk of making the discriminatory effects it involves unseen. We know that Western 
philosophies have generally represented, in fact, a particular group of humans, i.e., white males, 
even when they make a claim about the universality of humanity. A prominent analysis of this 
problem is offered by Charles Mills, who showed that the radical doubt of the Cartesian Cogito 
is not applicable to the blacks who experience the world as a real, violent threat to their 
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existence.31 In Hegel’s context, the necessity of calling into question even our ideals about the 
world follows his logic that Geist is essentially active, such that it comes to an end if it is not in a 
movement. By implication, any ideal turns into a dead, authoritarian dogma when it is just taken 
for granted.  
The crucial issue in developing a critical perspective is therefore to ensure and exercise 
absolute intellectual freedom. Regarding this, the most critical element of Kant’s philosophy is 
found, I think, in his idea of the public use of reason put forward in the 1784 essay, “An Answer 
to the Question: What Is Enlightenment.” In contrast to the private use of reason whereby one 
obeys civic and professional duties, the public use of reason concerns the scholar’s absolute 
freedom of speech. In the era of the Enlightenment, Kant thus “[hears] from all sides the cry: Do 
not argue! The officer says: Do not argue but drill! The tax officer: Do not argue but pay! The 
clergyman: Do not argue but believe.”32 But the Enlightenment cannot be achieved, Kant argues, 
if a citizen is not allowed to express her critical opinions about decrees, or if a clergyman is not 
allowed to communicate to the public his thought about what is erroneous in the creed of the 
church he serves. This intellectual freedom that allows one to freely argue with the established 
authority, for Kant, must be enjoyed by all people regardless of their profession. Thus, the 
scholar is for Kant not a profession but instead refers to the one who makes a public use of 
reason. Anyone performs as a scholar when she critically argues with the established authority; 
conversely, no one is a scholar if she is bound to the private use of reason. This idea of Kant 
gives a good reason why a critical perspective cannot come from establishing a school or a 
tradition, and why a critical scholar must be able to be free from all schools and traditions. 
                                                   
31 Charles W. Mills, “Non-Cartesian Sums: Philosophy and the African-American Experience,” in Blackness Visible: 
Essays on Philosophy and Race (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2018), 1-20.  
32 Ak 8: 37/ WE, 18. 
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Assuming this, I think that the most critical perspective can be achieved by historicizing, 
relativizing, and localizing any claim to the universality of humanity, including Kant’s and 
Hegel’s. And Hegel’s dialectic strongly supports this approach. 
The conceptually critical power of Hegel’s notion of alienation is also found in his theory 
of habit. Habit is a heteronomous, mechanistic process whereby we turn ourselves into a member 
of our community by learning basic rules that our community establishes and absorbing 
fundamental values that our community pursues. It is a process whereby every individual comes 
to embody in their own ways the world she lives in. Obviously, we do not learn the rules and 
absorb the values in a completely heteronomous way. Reflecting on and thinking about those 
rules and values that our community imposes on us is also an important part of the process of 
habituation. However, nor do we learn the rules and absorb the values in a completely conscious, 
autonomous way. If we understand this as a prescriptive statement, it leads us to a conservative 
view that we should thereby preserve the established orders. If we consider it as concerning a 
matter of fact, however, it leads us to a critical view that we should therefore call into question 
all the values we pursue. For an accurate evaluation of Hegel’s stance on this issue, I think we 
need an investigation of his idea of ethical feelings [Gesinnung] and their relationship with a 
modern state. It is here sufficient to point out that Hegel had a keen insight about the risk of 
modern political idealism, specifically concerning its tendency to uphold possessive, capitalist 
individualism. This also goes hand in hand, I think, with his criticism of the one-sided 
subjectivism of modern philosophy. Leaving this evaluative issue of Hegel’s theory of habit in 
relation to his critical position on the modern culture for further studies, I would like to refer to 
his thesis that a complete habituation leads Geist to death. As with his notion of alienation, 
therefore, habit is also a notion that has flexibility, fluidity, and dynamics for its essence. We 
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make ourselves into the members of our society who embody, sustain, and preserve it by 
habituating ourselves. If we completely habituate ourselves, however, this ultimately leads our 
world to collapse.  
In a similar vein, Hegel’s idea that femininity represents, ontologically, the element of 
alterity that stubbornly resists incorporation into the system of identity, I believe, has a strong 
critical power. That idea is unlikely helpful in promoting women’s status in our societies. It does 
not help women, for instance, with competing with men for jobs, good salaries, social 
recognitions, and so forth, because what is important in this case is how a woman can escape 
from her status of alterity and settle down in the mainstream society as much as men can. I do 
not think that this issue is not important. It is a real problem that significantly affects the lived 
experience of women and the people of LGBTQ in general, insofar as our society is structured 
by sexism. When we are concerned with critical perspectives, however, I believe that we cannot 
develop them if we fail to liberate ourselves from all the ideologies that sustain, preserve, and 
perpetuate the orders of the mainstream society. In this regard, my view is that women and other 
minority peoples have more chances to develop critical perspectives because they have more 
chances to experience, recognize, and struggle with the real problems of the mainstream society. 
Of course, this is not necessarily the case, because there may well be a sexist woman and a man 
with a great feminist perspective. These counterexamples, however, do not necessarily negate the 
potential, critical power of the minority peoples who remain, in Hegel’s terms, the ontological 
status of alterity insofar as experiences of alienation can lead us to recognize problems, cause us 
to think, and look at the problems in a different prospective.  
In the way that I read Hegel, he is a philosopher who was aware of the significance, 
difficulty, and laboriousness of a philosophical engagement with the actual world more than any 
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other philosopher, although his philosophical practices were not necessarily critical in the way 
that we today expect. Witnessing the upheavals of his time, feeling these as “a birth-time and a 
period of transition to a new era,” and conceiving this as spirit’s coming out of its egg,33 Hegel 
states in his Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807: “the easiest thing of all is to pass judgements on 
what has a solid substantial content; it is more difficult to grasp it, and most of all difficult is to 
unite them and produce the [dialectical] exposition [Darstellung] of it.”34  
 
  
                                                   
33 GW 9, 14-15/ PhS § 11. 
34 GW 9, 10-11/ PhS § 3. 
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